War in Ukraine, technical and military aspects only

[RETAC21]

On 3/16/2025 at 9:51 PM, Roman Alymov said:

More of "war of robots": since pro-Ukr use of FPV drones to hunt pro-Rus "wing" recon drones became the problem, automated rear-view camera was installed by Zala. Artificial intelligence is detecting incoming FPV and starting automatic evasion manuver.

  Hardware https://t.me/serhii_flash/5180

System in action 

https://t.me/serhii_flash/5183

https://t.me/serhii_flash/5188

I wonder how long will it take for drones to be equipped with automated rear gunners....

The obvious solution is a larger drone equipped with small AA missiles

[Roman Alymov]

9 minutes ago, RETAC21 said:

The obvious solution is a larger drone equipped with small AA missiles

Small missiles are not so easy to develop, so both sides are now playing with range of solutions with shorguns or shotgun-type weapons on board

https://www.youtube.com/shorts/48A7-l7UZBI

 

[RETAC21]

25 minutes ago, Roman Alymov said:

Small missiles are not so easy to develop, so both sides are now playing with range of solutions with shorguns or shotgun-type weapons on board

https://www.youtube.com/shorts/48A7-l7UZBI

 

Problem with gun weapons is short range and lack of accuracy, a smaller R-60 should do fine

[X-Files]

President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on March 17 in his evening address that a Ukrainian long-range drone has successfully completed testing, demonstrating its ability to fly 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles).

Ukrainian long-range drone successfully completes 3,000-kilometer test, Zelensky says

 

 

[alejandro_]

Interview with colonel Markus Reisner

A well-known military expert and historian, Colonel of the Austrian General Staff, Head of the Research and Development Department of the Military Academy in Austria, Markus Reisner, in an interview with Strana, spoke about possible scenarios in the war, threats to Ukraine on the battlefield, Russia's offensive potential, Europe's ability to replace the United States in military terms, the results of the Kursk operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the likelihood of a ceasefire.

- The Russian-Ukrainian war has been going on for four years. Can we say that a turning point has already occurred?

- I would say that we can agree that Ukraine has already written itself into history. This is really important. I will give you a similar example: Finland in the Finnish-Soviet War and in the Second World War in general. Of course, in the end they lost some of their territory, but they showed the will to fight. Many books have been written about this. I would say that the same thing happened to Ukraine. So, whatever the outcome of this war in the future, we can both agree that Ukraine has already secured its place in history.

The last three years can be compared to a boxing match. On one side is a Russian fighter, on the other is a Ukrainian one, supported by Europe. In big boxing there was a very famous Russian boxer - Nikolai Valuev. He is a huge guy who won his fights not due to tactical skill, but due to his weight. He lost only two fights, because at the beginning (of the fight - Ed. ) his opponents acted very cleverly and accurately.

Ukraine did the same. Valuev got, so to speak, two "blue eyes": he was "blinded" at the beginning. But the question is what will happen in the next "rounds".

At the beginning of the (big) war - Ed. , the West - especially the US - were ready to help Ukraine, but only up to a certain limit.

What do I mean? You may remember what happened in October 2022, when the Americans were afraid that the Russians might use tactical nuclear weapons. There were very tense negotiations between the Americans and the Russians during that period, but in the end it didn't happen.

But, as we know, the Russians managed to withdraw their troops from the Kherson bridgehead. Many say that this was not connected, however, these forces were then transferred to other parts of the front. At the same time, the Russian offensive on Bakhmut began.

At that moment, after the successes near Kharkov and Kherson, the Ukrainians were already planning a third offensive on Zaporozhye, which never took place because all the troops were transferred to Bakhmut.

Russia has gained time. In seven months, it has dug in in the Zaporizhia region - especially between Tokmak and the area north of Mariupol. The rest of the story is well known: in 2023, the expected summer offensive of Ukraine began, but it did not bring operational success. It was not possible to cut the supply lines to the Kherson region and Crimea, including by attacking the Kerch Bridge.

This was one of the key moments after which the Ukrainians decided to go on the defensive in 2024.

2024, in my opinion, was the culmination of whether the Ukrainians would be able to contain Russia and form strategic reserves, or they would no longer be able to do so. And the following happened: in 2024, the Russians finally seized the initiative, since they spent much more resources. And, of course, it is important that Russia does not fight alone. When the Russian "boxer" returns to his corner of the ring, the Chinese, Indians, North Koreans, Iranians, etc. give him something. For example, China supplies Russia with certain electronic components for weapons. The Indians buy raw materials from it. Iran - drones and assistance in building two factories for their production. The North Koreans deliver artillery ammunition - and this is 3 million shells last year and the same the year before.

The Ukrainians are trapped in a war of attrition, and they can only win with the help of the West. This is a very important nuance. Western assistance is the center of gravity for the Ukrainians. Why? Because Ukraine cannot restore its forces to wage war on its own. This is often forgotten. We often focus on the tactical level, when events take place more or less on the front line. Sometimes - a little on the operational level, when we discuss, for example, Donbas in connection with the Kursk operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. But we often forget about the strategic level, where it is decided how long you can wage war.

Russia is already conducting a third air campaign against Ukraine's critical infrastructure. The country's energy minister said last year that about 80% of the critical (energy - Ed. ) infrastructure was either destroyed or badly damaged. This means that if Ukraine does not have functioning tank factories or something like that, as was the case in Kharkov, or huge factories, then the West must provide the resources to wage war.

So if the center of gravity is Western aid, and if Ukraine needs it, then the West needs to understand that if it wants Ukraine to even survive or even win the war, this aid has to come on a regular basis and in a certain amount, and it's not happening yet. Why? Because in the Ukrainian corner of the ring are the Europeans with a lot of good ideas, but without the means and the real will to produce what is needed, because of course it costs a lot of money, and the Americans say: "Well, we're not so interested in boxing anymore, let's start a wrestling competition, for example, with China." And that's actually the problem. That's why the situation is so desperate. You saw what happened in the Oval Office . And you saw Zelensky immediately realize: "Oh, my God, we have to go back to the Americans, because there are certain resources that only they can provide us, and not the Europeans." This is, for example, intelligence, which has been a major topic since the beginning of the war, but if access to data is blocked, this will complicate the whole situation even more.

- Then what should be Kyiv’s realistic political and military goals in the current conditions?

- It's always about strategy. In the case of Ukraine, it was from the very beginning the liberation of the entire territory of the country. But if you now understand that the offensive path is impossible because you no longer have the means, then you need to reconsider your strategic goal. If the West does not provide what is needed and if Ukraine itself cannot provide it - and I am not talking only about tanks, drones or artillery shells, but also about soldiers - the goals will have to be revised. The Ukrainians must at least try to convince Russia that it is better to organize some kind of ceasefire . Otherwise, Russian troops will simply continue the offensive, and then they will have to retreat to the Dnieper or something like that. Now everything will depend on what pressure the Americans can put on both sides when it comes to negotiations...

- We will return to this a little later. You mentioned drones. According to statements by the Ukrainian leadership, drones are now the main focus. Is it possible to compensate for the lack of soldiers and equipment on the battlefield with their help?

- The shortage of soldiers is Ukraine's biggest problem now. A regular battalion consists of about 500 soldiers, while in the Ukrainian Armed Forces the actual number of battalions fluctuates between 75 and 30% of the regular strength. A typical Ukrainian brigade must cover up to 30 km of the front line with four exhausted battalions. There is always space between strongholds through which Russian troops can penetrate in small units. But drones can "fill" these gaps and effectively fight the Russians in what we call in military affairs the "near zone", that is, at a distance of up to 20-30 kilometers. This is why Russian units are still suffering heavy losses, and why we call it a "transparent battlefield".

But there is also the operational level, where it is decided where the next operation will be carried out, for example, with the participation of various army units. And if you have no idea what is, figuratively speaking, on the other side of the hill, if the Russians are already forming some huge maneuver force, then there may be problems. The value of the data provided by American intelligence is in this. But the importance of drones is also great here. With their help, you can monitor a large part of the occupied territory.

Drones are even more important at the strategic level. Every two or three days, the Ukrainians try to strike targets on Russian territory with drones. There is an effect, but is it cumulative? It's like in a boxing match: if you want to knock out your opponent, it's better to hit like a machine gun. After a long series of blows, he will simply fall. But if you hit once and wait, hit again and then pause, the opponent will recover - especially if it is a person like Valuev.

The problem the Ukrainians face is that they are hitting targets in Russia, but the cumulative effect is not yet so great that the Russians really feel it.

At the same time, the Russians are increasingly depleting Ukraine's air defense with daily drone launches and missile attacks every two to three weeks. The importance of drones is undeniable.

- If we imagine that the US will stop or significantly reduce military aid, will Ukraine be able to hold the front and how long will the Ukrainian Armed Forces last?

- Many people say: "If the Russians continue to advance at the current pace, it will take 100 years before they reach Lviv." But this is due to a misunderstanding of the situation. This is a war of attrition. If one side suddenly runs out of resources, the situation on the battlefield can change very quickly. There is that cumulative effect. In one second the enemy enters your position, in a second he is already behind you, and then, lo and behold, he is already in Lviv. In my opinion, we are still not entirely honest in the West. Someone needs to say: "Europeans, listen. We agreed that we would help the Ukrainians. But the 16th package of sanctions did not produce the effect we hoped for. And all these tanks and many other things that we supplied did not stop the Russians. Let's try this option now. We will take money from the funds to combat climate change and social security and start producing shells for the Ukrainians and ourselves." True, I am not sure that the peoples of Europe will react to this with cries of "Hurray!"

A lot of money is needed. The defense industry is all private companies that want to earn a lot. At the same time, in Russia, an artillery shell costs about 800-1200 euros. In Europe, its price is from 8 thousand to 10 thousand euros. Companies say: "We can supply, but it will be very expensive." There is a way out. In 1915, a crisis with ammunition arose in Britain. The government realized that private enterprises could not produce the required number of shells for the Western Front. Then the companies were nationalized and increased production.

- It doesn’t seem that current Western governments are ready for such radical steps…

- So, we need to look for money. Because on the other side of the "ring" there is a conveyor belt. In North Korea, they produce shells in three shifts, which will then end up in Ukraine. But there is nothing new in this. History is full of such examples. It does not repeat itself exactly, but always develops according to templates. We are again seeing war fatigue in European countries. People say that it is time to find some kind of solution. They say that the Russians can be understood... But no one asks what this will mean for Ukraine? What if the Russians want to establish a demilitarized zone east of the Dnieper? Or will events unfold in such a way that Russia will get a "land bridge" in Transnistria and that Odessa will one day be Russian? In this case, Ukraine will be a landlocked country, with limited access to resources, possibly with a government in Lvov, which the Russians will influence using hybrid methods to achieve a composition that is favorable to them. In about ten years, they will get what they wanted. These are things that need to be discussed, and I speak very frankly.

- Let's now talk about the Ukrainian Armed Forces operation in Kursk Oblast , which, judging by everything, is coming to an end. How do you assess it, in whose favor did it play?

- You remember that there is a war of attrition. A very long front line - about 1,100 kilometers. The Russians are attacking in different areas to prevent the Ukrainians from forming strategic reserves for new attacks. Last year, Russia planned an operational breakthrough in Donbas. To support it, they wanted to launch an operation in the direction of Kharkov, but not to capture it, but to create such great pressure on the Ukrainians that they would be forced to withdraw their strategic or operational reserves from Donbas to Kharkov. This would weaken the section of the front in Donbas and lead to a breakthrough.

Russia failed to achieve any serious success in the Kharkov area. Ukraine's counter-move was the Kursk operation with similar goals - to force the Russian command to transfer troops from Donbass, which would reduce the pressure on this section of the front. And if they had managed to capture the nuclear power plant in the region, everyone would have said: "Oh, God, stop immediately, because we don't want another Chernobyl." And this would have given Kiev a chance to say: "Yes, you can return it, but we want, for example, to get Energodar (that is, the Zaporizhzhya NPP - Ed. ) in return." Did the plan work? Partially, since the Russians used the forces prepared for the Kharkov direction for defense. However, only a few units were sent from Donbass to Kursk. And, of course, this was a big blow in psychological terms, because for the first time since the end of World War II, the enemy entered Russian territory proper.

I guess if the operation had gone according to plan or even exceeded expectations, everyone would have said, "This will go down in history." But it didn't. What other options did the Ukrainian command have? We have to consider what was behind the planning of this operation and why it was undertaken as an act of desperation? Yes, of course, there is a big debate going on now: wouldn't it have been better to send them there, because, as you know, in the end there was a breakthrough near Ocheretino, which started the offensive on Pokrovsk. But, as I said, stories will be written about this. I just want to put it in context a little bit.

- Okay, now about Russia. Does it have the potential for new offensive operations this year? In what areas might it conduct a spring or summer offensive?

- Politically, the Russians will try to "cultivate" Trump even more. They will say: "You are a great statesman. Yes, you are absolutely right: peace is necessary. But we need to discuss this and this, and in two weeks this." I think the Russians are quite happy with how the situation is developing politically. No one expected Trump to act this way. He wants to deal with China, so let there be a stalemate peace agreement, and then the Europeans will somehow solve this problem.

In terms of war, Russia will increase pressure on the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As we have already said, one of the most serious problems of the Ukrainian army is the lack of soldiers, given that the front line is constantly stretching. The Russians, as my Ukrainian colleagues say, behave like water: they penetrate through any unprotected place. At some point, they may end up behind you. And all that remains is to either run away or try to retreat in an organized manner.

I wouldn't say that Russia will launch a major offensive. But perhaps one of the goals of the Russian army could be to cross the administrative border of the Dnipropetrovsk region to show the world that they are there. After all, most people don't study the situation in detail. The headlines will flash "Dnipro", and everyone will say: "Oh my God, they have already reached the regional center (that is, Dnipro - Ed. ), which means they are already on the Dnipro!"

- How likely is a ceasefire in Ukraine, which is now much talked about? What could be the general parameters of a peaceful settlement? And when can it be expected?

- Imagine the following situation. You and I have to fight each other, using, for example, knives. Blood flows, bones break. And suddenly someone - let's call them the police - intervenes. They separate us and say: "Either you stop immediately, or you will be punished." In this fight between Russia and Ukraine, the only contender for the role of "policeman" is Trump. He says: "I want this to stop: enough bloodshed." And if you do not stop, I will do this and that. Let's imagine that Washington still managed to force the Russians to stop. But then Trump can "turn away", who guarantees that the war will not start again. Of course, the American president can say that he has a "young assistant", that is, the Europeans. And will the Russians take them seriously? And what will happen if they try to stand next to the Ukrainians? But Russia can attack them too, if the Americans do not stand up for them. At the moment, the Russians are saying: "We are not ready to accept the Europeans as an equal party. If European troops are on Ukrainian territory, we will consider them enemies."

Russians want to be spoken to as equals. And this is what Putin has already won. He got Trump to talk to him, thereby raising his status. The American president said that Putin is a world leader who can use force to achieve peace. This is a completely different rhetoric than under Obama, who said that Russia is a regional power. This was true in practice, but politically it sounded harsh. And it hurt Moscow a lot. But this is also important to consider when we think about Russian thinking…

So, going back to the ceasefire, it all depends on Trump, on whether he can get the Russians to agree to certain conditions. And Russia will say: yes, it was a good pass, but the ball is back in your court because there is still a lot to discuss. We do not want Ukraine in NATO, and the demilitarized zone should extend further east because we do not want Moscow to be attacked by drones and Storm Shadow missiles… And as Putin said the other day: who can guarantee that there will be no violations? Who will monitor this? What neutral force? Let's bring in the Chinese, whom we trust more than the British or the French… There is something that I call "the elephant in the room." These are nuclear weapons, anti-satellite weapons and other means that Russia has. The Ukrainians faced the problem from the very beginning that the Americans were ready to provide a lot, but not everything that was really needed to win the war. Because there was always this "elephant in the room." The question remains: How will Trump get Moscow to do what it needs to do to bring peace? He once talked about tougher sanctions. We've been hearing about that for years. Will it work as Trump hopes? Because if it doesn't, Russia will just keep going. Why should it stop?

- Lately, the EU has often said that Putin could attack Europe after the end of the war in Ukraine. Do you think this is a real possibility?

- On the one hand, we hear that Russia is already on the verge of collapse, that its soldiers are drunk, running away, etc. On the other hand, that it is going to attack Europe in three or ten years. Propaganda is trying to convince society both of the degradation of the potential enemy and that it can attack Europe, which means it needs to replenish the arsenals from which many weapons were sent to Ukraine. The second requires the consent of Western societies, so now they are trying to wake people up with alarming articles. For example, last year the Financial Times published an article that said that NATO can only control 5% of the airspace of member states. So, is a Russian attack on Europe possible? I would say: who knows.

As a historian, I can tell you that the biggest problem with historians is that they give the impression that everything was clear from the beginning. But it is never clear. No one knew that after the First World War there would be a Second World War that would be even worse. It is unlikely that the young men who returned from the battlefield wanted to end up in another one as adults. Or maybe what we see now in Ukraine is what we saw in Spain in 1937. Or maybe it is Munich in 1938. 

Will Russian tanks roll into Central Europe after Ukraine? I would say no. Why would Russia do that? Because if it did, what would happen is that the Europeans would immediately unite. They would say, "Well, of course it's true: the Russians are the aggressors." Rather, they would continue the hybrid war in an attempt to weaken Western societies by weakening their will to fight. By proving that Russia is not so bad, it is the European leaders who are forcing us to fight against it. And the Russians do not want to fight the Europeans.

The exception is the Baltic States. Because if Russia attacked them, and suddenly Article 5 of NATO did not work, since the Europeans would say that they do not want to die for the Baltic States, and the Americans would say that this is Europe's business, then the Alliance would simply fall apart. That is why the situation is so dangerous. Although in Ukraine everything could continue for a long time. And having reached the Dnieper, Russia will prepare to throw itself at Transnistria.

I think if the Europeans don't give the Ukrainians some perspective, it could lead to the next government in Ukraine being pro-Russian. For many years now, the Europeans have been saying to different small countries in the Balkans: "Okay, you have to do this, this, this, and this, and then maybe you will become a member of the European Union." And as you can see, some countries in the Balkans are already saying: "What is going on?"

- You mentioned plans to rearm Europe . This has been one of the main topics in recent weeks. There is also talk about the need to minimize Europe's dependence on US defense guarantees, up to the creation of a European defense union instead of NATO. How realistic are all these plans?

- More and more people are saying that we need to produce more weapons, develop our own capacities to free ourselves from America, etc. But, as I said, it costs a lot of money. Why am I coming back to this again? Because we all live more or less well in Central Europe. Sometimes we have two cars, we go on holiday once a year. Now a person like me comes along and tells people: "Look, we all agreed that climate change is a problem. But there is another problem that is even worse. There may be a war in the future, perhaps with Russia, which we must avoid. We need to invest in defence. We will take the "climate" and "social" money and start producing what is needed for Ukraine and for us. And you may have to hand in your second car, and there will be no holiday this year." How many people would agree with that?

- I think most people will disagree. 

- True. They will do it when "the house is on fire". Then they will call for help "the firemen". And we already feel "smoke", although we do not really see "flames" yet.

- By the way, you mentioned the possible role of the US in a potential conflict over the Baltics or Central Europe. Do you think it is a realistic scenario that the US will leave NATO? And what will this mean for Europe?

- We are entering an era when it is difficult to make forecasts. It is like predicting the future by looking into a crystal ball. And the most incredible thing is happening. At the recent Munich Security Conference, the Americans blamed the Europeans for everything. And if someone had mentioned this before, they would have been called crazy. Everyone believed that the transatlantic partnership, as the basis of European security, could not change even under Trump. And then, first, US Defense Secretary Hegseth said that the war in Ukraine must be stopped, and those who are against it are responsible for its victims. Then: Ukraine's membership in NATO is not a topic for discussion. And the time has come for the Europeans to enter the arena. However, they should not act in Ukraine, and if something happens, it will not be covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Then Vance showed up and said, "Our enemy is not Russia or China. You are the enemy of your people." After that, he met with Weidel (leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany party Alice Weidel - Ed. ), not with Scholz. Then there was Zelensky's meeting with Trump and Vance in the Oval Office, which no one expected to happen either.

Trump is like a candy box. If it says candy on it, it's probably going to be there. In Bob Woodward's book Fury, about Trump's first term, there's a moment when the Army Chief of Staff tells his officers, "At all times of the day and night, one of you must be with the President to prevent things from happening that, in time, you can't control." That same man is now the President of the United States. Is it possible that the Americans will leave NATO? I'd say all options are on the table. We don't know exactly what's going to happen. 

Now is the moment when we can start developing scenarios. The positive one is if the Europeans wake up and say: "Okay, we will take care of our defense, we will have a relationship with the Americans, maybe more independent, but we will take care of our own security, to ensure deterrence when it comes to, for example, Russia and China. And this deterrence can be projected into the regions, as it is happening with Ukraine, so that the Ukrainians or whoever is left, are not attacked by Russia again."

Negative scenario: nothing happens, no deterrence. Putin continues. Europeans quarrel among themselves. America will simply talk to whoever they need at the moment. This situation makes us all much weaker than before.

https://strana.today/news/481848-chto-proiskhodit-na-vojne-v-ukraine-i-kohda-ona-zakonchitsja-intervju-s-markusom-rajsnerom.html

[sunday]

2 hours ago, alejandro_ said:

Interview with colonel Markus Reisner

A well-known military expert and historian, Colonel of the Austrian General Staff, Head of the Research and Development Department of the Military Academy in Austria, Markus Reisner, in an interview with Strana, spoke about possible scenarios in the war, threats to Ukraine on the battlefield, Russia's offensive potential, Europe's ability to replace the United States in military terms, the results of the Kursk operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the likelihood of a ceasefire.

(...)

https://strana.today/news/481848-chto-proiskhodit-na-vojne-v-ukraine-i-kohda-ona-zakonchitsja-intervju-s-markusom-rajsnerom.html

The Colonel raises some good points:

What is a more pressing concern, climate change and the need to diversify the ethnic makeup of Europe, or the Russian military power?

Could economies weakened by measures aimed to fight climate change, and reduce population, react to a military menace in their borders?

[alejandro_]

Interesting article on the use of Shaheeds by Russia and countermeasures applied by Ukraine

Yuri Kasyanov
Officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Radio engineer, aerial reconnaissance specialist

There are two key technological problems that Ukraine and the Ukrainian defense industry have not yet resolved and that affect the course of the war and Ukraine's position in future peace negotiations.

These two problems are "shaheeds" and ways to effectively combat them.

It has been two and a half years since Iranian long-range kamikaze drones appeared in Ukrainian skies, but Ukraine has still not been able to achieve parity with the enemy in this type of weaponry; and during this time, no effective ways have been found to combat the "shaheeds."

I have written many times about why Ukrainian long-range drone attacks cannot match Russian ones in either quality or quantity. There are many reasons for this, the first and most important of which is the lack of quality management in both the development and production of long-range strike drones and the use of Ukrainian “shaheeds.”

The topic of long-range unmanned strikes — deep strikes — is being addressed by almost all security forces and two dozen enterprises. The erosion of resources is producing a “zoo” of low-quality and high-cost drones that are unable to overcome the dense air defense and electronic warfare systems of the Moscow region (in particular), while the capabilities of two dozen semi-garage artisanal production facilities physically cannot meet the needs of the Ukrainian defense forces in hundreds of such devices per day.

Russia, according to Ukrainian intelligence, plans to increase the rate of use of "Shaheds" in Ukraine in the near future from 200 to 500 devices per day. In order to increase the effectiveness of domestic deep strike and regularly strike military facilities in Moscow ( which is also very important as a political argument), it is necessary to consolidate the efforts of developers and manufacturers, reduce the "zoo" of drones to one or two models, the quality and capabilities of which should be at least equal to the capabilities of Russian "Shaheds". That is, effective state management of this industry and the unification of all deep strike military units under a single Command of long-range unmanned bombing are urgently needed.

This idea is not new, it is logical. Such consolidated holdings of developers and manufacturers of weapons exist in all developed countries, and our enemy does too. And single bomber commands have been known for a long time, as soon as bombers (piloted) appeared. It is only here that the topic of deep strike is dealt with in every power structure, because it is, first of all, good PR. Good, but ineffective, — we see this from the result.

We also all see the low effectiveness in countering enemy strike drones. In two and a half years, we have advanced from a haughty mocking denial of the very threat posed by Iranian drones to the massive use of battle chariots armed with heavy machine guns and small-caliber anti-aircraft guns. And that, in fact, is all - neither anti-aircraft missiles comparable in cost to the Shaheds nor interceptor drones have been created.

And here, according to the cost/effectiveness criterion, we lose three times to our adversary, who, having created mass production of Iranian "shaheeds", was able to increase the number of daily launches to such an extent that no anti-aircraft missiles in the world would be enough to repel even a weekly attack.

In addition, mass production has allowed the enemy to reduce the cost of the Shahed to such a level that even the cheapest anti-aircraft missile or the cheapest anti-aircraft interceptor drone will be clearly more expensive than the Shahed itself (with the exception of cheap FPV copters, but they are ineffective against the Shahed).

The third factor is the cost of maintaining the ground infrastructure to counter the "Shaheeds." Today, it is thousands of crews with small arms; tomorrow, even if anti-aircraft missiles or interceptor drones comparable in cost to the "Shaheeds" appear, hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of additional crews equipped with new weapons will be needed.

The problem is that today's "shaheed" hunter crews—mobile fire groups with small arms or groups armed with man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS) or FPV interceptor drones—can only operate effectively within line of sight of the target. That is, these groups must constantly move after the targets, and there must be many of them.

This approach is extremely costly and inefficient. The problem could be solved by creating a long-range, reusable aircraft-type interceptor drone, fast enough to pursue the "shaheed", but with a longer flight time in target search mode, equipped with powerful optics, good navigation and communications equipment, target sensors, and non-lethal weapons.

The rejection of the disposability inherent in anti-aircraft missiles and kamikaze drones of the copter type will make such an air defense system a fairly inexpensive solution, even if the unmanned interceptor aircraft is equipped with the maximum set of expensive equipment.

"Non-lethal weapons" can be of various types. I will not list the options here, so as not to give the enemy the cards in his hands. But the very fact of not using explosives on board a drone in the event of an accident (fall) will make such a device relatively safe for the crew and those on the ground.

To reliably protect a large city like Kyiv from Shahed raids, ten mobile groups armed with reusable interceptor drones with a flight radius of up to 30 km will be enough. That is, the entire air defense system of the capital against Shahed can include only 140 people (a company), 30 vehicles and 30 interceptor aircraft (including spares). And that is a completely different story.

Separately, it is worth mentioning jamming and spoofing satellite coordinates (EW). Currently, this method of combating "shaheeds" is clearly preferred, because it is easier (although not cheap) to stuff the country's territory with powerful jammers and have an on-off switch in Kyiv.

However, the result of total jamming is unsatisfactory, because the "shaheeds" fly to Kyiv without any problems without using satellite navigation, and only in the area of the target do they begin to circle in search of reliable signals in order to adjust the route to the target. Of course, a certain part of the drones, due to suppression and spoofing, do not reach their targets and even fly to Belarus (for example), but still a significant percentage of kamikaze drones fall as debris.

At the same time, dense suppression of satellite navigation signals or spoofing throughout Ukraine (out of fear) harms our military navigation systems, our use of high-precision munitions (the same "Haymars") and drones - reconnaissance, strike, and interceptors.

It is obvious that both achieving parity with the enemy in the use of long-range kamikaze drones and combating the enemy's "shaheeds" is primarily a state management task, not a technical one. Technical solutions exist, they are known, but no one needs them.

https://zn.ua/ukr/war/jak-zakhistiti-kijiv-vid-shakhediv.html

[Roman Alymov]

1 hour ago, alejandro_ said:

Interesting article on the use of Shaheeds by Russia and countermeasures applied by Ukraine

Yuri Kasyanov
Officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Radio engineer, aerial reconnaissance specialist

That is strange since the guy is well-known journalist (or propagandist) - i have no idea if he really have engeneer background (probably not).

1 hour ago, alejandro_ said:

This approach is extremely costly and inefficient. The problem could be solved by creating a long-range, reusable aircraft-type interceptor drone, fast enough to pursue the "shaheed", but with a longer flight time in target search mode, equipped with powerful optics, good navigation and communications equipment, target sensors, and non-lethal weapons.

The rejection of the disposability inherent in anti-aircraft missiles and kamikaze drones of the copter type will make such an air defense system a fairly inexpensive solution, even if the unmanned interceptor aircraft is equipped with the maximum set of expensive equipment.

"Non-lethal weapons" can be of various types. I will not list the options here, so as not to give the enemy the cards in his hands. But the very fact of not using explosives on board a drone in the event of an accident (fall) will make such a device relatively safe for the crew and those on the ground.

To reliably protect a large city like Kyiv from Shahed raids, ten mobile groups armed with reusable interceptor drones with a flight radius of up to 30 km will be enough. That is, the entire air defense system of the capital against Shahed can include only 140 people (a company), 30 vehicles and 30 interceptor aircraft (including spares). And that is a completely different story.

Lack of aircraft engeneer knowlege is obvious here. He is proposing de-facto WWII fighterplane without pilot (but with some magic "non-lethal weapons" and "equipped with powerful optics, good navigation and communications equipment, target sensors" - de-facto analoge of instruments set only obtained by fighterplanes by 1980th if not later) and believe it would be cheap and will require "only 140 people (a company)" to defend massive place like Kiev (population without suburbs ~3mln or two times Estonia).

    This article is only interested because of problems of UkrAD  uknowleged, despite of official claims that all drones are shot down etc.

[RETAC21]

1 hour ago, Roman Alymov said:

That is strange since the guy is well-known journalist (or propagandist) - i have no idea if he really have engeneer background (probably not).

Lack of aircraft engeneer knowlege is obvious here. He is proposing de-facto WWII fighterplane without pilot (but with some magic "non-lethal weapons" and "equipped with powerful optics, good navigation and communications equipment, target sensors" - de-facto analoge of instruments set only obtained by fighterplanes by 1980th if not later) and believe it would be cheap and will require "only 140 people (a company)" to defend massive place like Kiev (population without suburbs ~3mln or two times Estonia).

    This article is only interested because of problems of UkrAD  uknowleged, despite of official claims that all drones are shot down etc.

It's the V-weapons campaign against London all over. An AA barrier will work just as well against Shaheeds but will need lots of people and guns to ring the targets, which shouldn't be particularly costly.

[glenn239]

4 hours ago, Roman Alymov said:

   This article is only interested because of problems of UkrAD  uknowleged, despite of official claims that all drones are shot down etc.

The main take away is the increase from 200 Shaheds a day to 500, or 15,000 a month.  I assume that the latter total will be increased again when possible, and that if a ceasefire occurs the Russians will not draw down Shahed production, but will rather continue to increase it even while stockpiling masses of the things.

[KV7]

What looks like an Australian M113 MRV (with turret from Scorpion) destroyed by what looks to me like some large calibre HEAT round, producing quite a lot of fragment damage.
 

 

Edited March 19 by KV7

[bojan]

I think it is not Scorpion turret, but 1-men .50 turret, M113AS4 IIRC:

Probably hit by 125mm HEAT.

[KV7]

1 hour ago, bojan said:

I think it is not Scorpion turret, but 1-men .50 turret, M113AS4 IIRC:

Probably hit by 125mm HEAT.

Yes and 125mm seems right as it has a thicker casing and produces more fragment damage than typical ATGM.

Edited March 19 by KV7

[alejandro_]

On 3/18/2025 at 6:23 PM, Roman Alymov said:

Lack of aircraft engeneer knowlege is obvious here. He is proposing de-facto WWII fighterplane without pilot (but with some magic "non-lethal weapons" and "equipped with powerful optics, good navigation and communications equipment, target sensors" - de-facto analoge of instruments set only obtained by fighterplanes by 1980th if not later) and believe it would be cheap and will require "only 140 people (a company)" to defend massive place like Kiev (population without suburbs ~3mln or two times Estonia).

Ukraine has used propeller trainer aircraft like Yak-52 to shot down Shaheeds. I don't think it is such a bad idea to develop it into a UAV that could loiter for hours.

[KV7]

8 hours ago, bojan said:

I think it is not Scorpion turret, but 1-men .50 turret, M113AS4 IIRC:

Probably hit by 125mm HEAT.

Or maybe this:

[alejandro_]

Interesting feedback of T-62M operations, by Viktor Murakhovskiy. If you consider terrain and age of the vehicles the data are not too bad. T-90s produced a few years ago had an engine life of 1,000 hours or 14,000 km (whatever was reached first). Of course it is a general value. GTD-1250 has a life of ~1,000 hours IIRC.

T-62M

Analysis of the operation of T-54, T-55, T-62 tanks (various modifications, which are increasingly in service) in difficult road conditions, under maximum engine loads revealed a number of malfunctions, among which the most common were the breakdown of the gas joint (head gasket - my translation) of the V-55 engine, premature failure of the high-pressure fuel pump, and injectors. With more than 300 engine hours, increased oil and fuel consumption was observed on a number of V-55 engines.

According to the flow of power plant failures, the malfunctions were distributed as follows: breakdown of the gas joint - 30% of failures, fuel equipment malfunctions - 30%; premature wear of the cylinder-piston group - 20%, other malfunctions occurring in the systems that ensure engine operation - 20%.

In fact, in difficult road conditions, at maximum operating loads of the power plant, the average service life is: cylinder-piston group - 300-350 engine hours, fuel equipment - 370-400 engine hours, engine water pump - 500-520 engine hours, rubber products - before major repairs.

It should be noted that the capabilities of modern power plants with V-92S2 (V-92SF) engines are 10-15% higher compared to earlier models.

https://t.me/Viktor_Murakhovskiy/754

Edited March 19 by alejandro_

[urbanoid]

Engels air force base hit by Ukrainian drones, a bit of a kaboom

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1902576525880217967

 

 

[RETAC21]

And it got hit just when there were bombers there, isn't it a wonderful coincidence? how could the Ukrainians know that, I wonder? maybe Trump is sending a message to Vlad?

[Stuart Galbraith]

He isnt that far sighted. And at this point, I think he is so invested in Putin being his buddy, he would be unable to make a decision like this.

Far more likely that the intelligence guys, given the ok to give intel to Ukraine, did their damndest to find something juicy to make up with the logjam. And clearly came up 'Trumps.' After all, if you are the CIA or NSA, you are hardly going to want to be on board with Trumps gravy train. Doing spectaculars like this is the easiest way to tip it over.

[Stuart Galbraith]

10 hours ago, KV7 said:

Or maybe this:

Possibly.

Its certainly not a Scorpion, none of the bolt or weld patterns line up. More to the point, I dont know anyone whom is still using the 76mm round, so sourcing that is likely an impossiblity now.

 

[RETAC21]

38 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

He isnt that far sighted. And at this point, I think he is so invested in Putin being his buddy, he would be unable to make a decision like this.

Far more likely that the intelligence guys, given the ok to give intel to Ukraine, did their damndest to find something juicy to make up with the logjam. And clearly came up 'Trumps.' After all, if you are the CIA or NSA, you are hardly going to want to be on board with Trumps gravy train. Doing spectaculars like this is the easiest way to tip it over.

In this case, like Roman says, let's wait and see. Sometimes, what Trump says doesn't align to what he does, and sometimes, he's silent while doing things. Don't think it's that simple.

[Stuart Galbraith]

I think its as simple as him talking a good game even when its going badly, and any success is usually due to underlings whose efforts he takes credit for. In the case of Atlantic city, his ex wife.

Yes, Ill be absolutely delighted to be proven wrong. I was after all completely wrong about Reagan.

[urbanoid]

1 hour ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

He isnt that far sighted. And at this point, I think he is so invested in Putin being his buddy, he would be unable to make a decision like this.

Far more likely that the intelligence guys, given the ok to give intel to Ukraine, did their damndest to find something juicy to make up with the logjam. And clearly came up 'Trumps.' After all, if you are the CIA or NSA, you are hardly going to want to be on board with Trumps gravy train. Doing spectaculars like this is the easiest way to tip it over.

Don't be dramatic, you can't know that.

[sunday]

1 hour ago, urbanoid said:

Don't be dramatic, you can't know that.

That has not stop him before, you know.

[mkenny]

4 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

And it got hit just when there were bombers there, isn't it a wonderful coincidence? how could the Ukrainians know that, I wonder? maybe Trump is sending a message to Vlad?

Is Is Vlad sending a message to Trump with the conflagration in the Ukrainian city of Kropyvnytskyi?

 

Something big went 'boom' and Russian sources say it was munitions  being moved east.