urbanoid Posted February 26, 2025 Posted February 26, 2025 1 hour ago, alejandro_ said: There are variants with the Belarusian truck MAZ-6317 and the Czech Tatra 815-7 (6×6) and 158 (8×8). The bottleneck is not in the platform but the gun barrel. Ukraine did not produce this type of barrels and production in Europe is limited. For all we know it can be HSW, Slovaks or, most likely... Germany - in May Rheinmetall secured 'three digit' order for... an undisclosed customer. Not only that, at some point the Ukrainians were saying that the platform is the bottleneck, not gun barrels.
alejandro_ Posted February 26, 2025 Posted February 26, 2025 Good article on lessons on the invasion of Ukraine. When analyzing the type of operation the Kremlin expected I have come across Czechoslovakia 68 often; in this article the author uses Poland 1939. In his opinion the Russian Armed Forces were not ready for a full invasion of Ukraine. Infantry - the queen of the fields: lessons of its on from Colonel Khodarenka https://vpk.name/en/979616_infantry-the-queen-of-the-fields-lessons-of-its-own-from-colonel-khodarenka.html Colonel Khodarenok named the main lessons of his three years The special military operation, which has been going on for three years, has become the first high-intensity armed conflict of the 21st century. It changed many ideas about the armed struggle and marked the beginning of the era of unmanned systems. What the Russian army learned from its military and why the assaults of Bakhmut and Chasov Yar changed the view of wars around the world - in the material of the military observer Gazeta.Ru" by Mikhail Khodarenka. During the conflict in Ukraine, opponents with approximately equal combat and operational capabilities, equipped with weapons and military equipment with comparable characteristics, clashed in an armed confrontation. After the first battles and battles, all the previous ideas about the conflicts of the future and theoretical research, such as the wars of the sixth generation, turned out to be very, very far from reality. The ideas of contactless wars, which back in 2014 seemed to theorists to be the only possible option for waging war, against the background of the assault on Bakhmut, Ugledar and Chasova Yar turned out to be so illusory that it is even inconvenient to recall them now. In short, in the course of their military training, both theorists and practitioners of military construction saw something that did not fit into their ideas of armed struggle. The theoretical foundations of its The term "special military operation" was not born in 2022, but at least 20 years earlier. Let us recall that there is a so-called system of strategic actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the forms of use of troops (forces). There is also a section on "special actions", the definition of which should be given in full.: Special actions A set of coordinated and interrelated actions of troops (forces), law enforcement and other ministries and departments, united by a single plan and plan, carried out in a certain region, both in their own country and on the territory of a foreign state, in order to solve non-traditional tasks for the Armed Forces that cannot and inexpediently be solved by declaring war and using means of armed struggle. Let's pay attention to the following phrases: "on the territory of a foreign state," "in order to solve tasks that are not traditional for the Armed Forces," and "it is impossible and impractical to solve them by declaring war and using means of armed struggle." In full accordance with these postulates, a special military operation was planned, the definition of which is "a set of interrelated and coordinated goals, objectives, place and time of special operations of troops (forces) united by a single plan and plan in peacetime and wartime to achieve certain political, strategic and operational objectives." We emphasize in particular - "special actions of troops," not combat at all. In other words, no intense life-and-death armed confrontation was initially envisaged when planning a special military operation. A kind of liberation campaign was planned along the lines of September 17, 1939 (the date of the beginning of the Red Army's military operation in Poland, as a result of which Polish territories were annexed to the Belarusian and Ukrainian USSR. - "Newspaper.Ru"). On December 20, 2021, I wrote why there would be no large-scale Russian-Ukrainian war. In those days, I argued that from the point of view of military art, a hypothetical "invasion" of Ukraine using only conventional weapons by the Russian Armed Forces could take the form of a strategic offensive operation in the theater of military operations. Given the combat and numerical strength of the armed forces of Ukraine, I believed then, the degree of their combat readiness and combat training, for such an operation it is necessary to involve at least several operational and strategic formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (i.e. fronts), the Black Sea Fleet, separate combined arms (tank) armies, army corps, divisions, at least one army Air defense and Air Force units, airborne forces, branches of the armed forces and special forces, reserves of the Supreme High Command. I thought in December 2021 that the troops and forces of the Russian Armed Forces deployed in the western regions of Russia were decidedly not ready for such an operation. I made such a conclusion only on the basis of data on the lack of deployment of operational and partly strategic logistics, forces and technical support. Air supremacy During previous local wars and armed conflicts over the past more than 30 years, the Russian Air Force (now the Aerospace Forces) has never encountered an enemy that would match the combat and operational capabilities of Russian aviation. Bomb-assault and missile-aircraft strikes against various kinds of irregular formations in such conflicts were carried out mainly from safe heights, and losses of aircraft were minimal. The enemy, equipped with large-caliber machine guns and, at best, portable anti-aircraft missile systems, could not provide effective counteraction to the Air Force/VKS. The only conflict during which the Russian aviation encountered the beginnings of an organized air defense system was the war with Georgia in 2008. During the special operation, the Russian Aerospace Forces encountered a qualitatively different enemy. This applies to both the small Ukrainian Air Force and the air defense forces: today, almost all types of anti-aircraft missile systems/systems of the collective West, as well as many samples of radar weapons from NATO countries, are involved in the conflict. Moreover, based on the results of air and anti-aircraft battles, the necessary changes are promptly made to the design of air defense systems, as well as to the techniques and methods of warfare. During any armed conflict, the most important task of the Air Force/VKS is to seize and maintain air supremacy. So far, this task has not been fully solved by domestic aviation. Russian fighters and bombers in the airspace of Ukraine are widely used mainly as "aerial artillery" and as carriers of cruise missiles when launching attacks from long ranges. Partially, the Aerospace forces are solving the problem of undermining the military-economic potential of Ukraine, in particular, destroying important military-industrial, petrochemical, fuel and energy and other economic facilities. Operational-tactical and army aviation provide air support to the troops, especially with bombs from the UMPC, quite effectively during their military operations. The enemy has not yet found any effective "antidote" to these weapons. In general, it is necessary to more than quickly improve the organizational and staff structure, equip the Russian aerospace Forces with the equipment and weapons necessary to perform all these tasks, and bring Russian combat aircraft to a new level. Artillery remains the "god of war" Russian artillery in the special operation in Ukraine is experiencing its rebirth, and although some Russian weapons are inferior in some characteristics to Western guns, they surpass them in reliability, performance and maintainability. In 1993, NATO adopted the Joint Ballistic Memorandum of Understanding (JBMoU). He defined a new standard for 155-mm howitzers and set the maximum range of high-explosive fragmentation shells at 30 km, and active-rocket projectiles at 40 km. The document also introduced requirements for the barrel length of 52-caliber NATO howitzers and for the volume of the charging chamber - 23 liters. Russia in the 1990s was decidedly not up to artillery, and no measures were taken to improve the tactical and technical characteristics of domestic guns and howitzers in those years. Currently, one of the main guns of the Russian artillery is the 152-mm self-propelled howitzer 2S3 "Acacia". Its production started in 1968. The length of the howitzer barrel is 28 calibers, the volume of the charging chamber is 12.8 liters. The firing range is 17.3 km. The divisional self-propelled howitzer 2S19 "Msta" has a barrel length of 47 calibers, a charging chamber volume of 16 liters, and a firing range of 24.7 km. Two critical indicators - the length of the barrel in calibers and the volume of the charging chamber - determine the firing range and give indisputable advantages to NATO guns equipped with artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this regard. In addition to the volume of the charging chamber, the higher quality of Western powders and the high processability of barrel processing should also be taken into account. This determines, in addition to the range, the high accuracy of shooting. Some characteristics of foreign guns put domestic artillery at a significant disadvantage, especially in terms of counter-battery warfare. If we add to this a high degree of automation in the field of topography (determining the location of a point on the ground. - "Newspaper.Ru") and the preparation of the initial data for firing, and add here the high characteristics of the Western-made counter-battery radar, the picture turns out to be quite bleak. The Russian artillery is rescued by a relatively small number of NATO guns equipped with the Armed Forces of Ukraine - according to some sources, no more than 150 barrels. Most of the Ukrainian artillery is armed with Soviet-made cannons and howitzers, which to a certain extent equalizes the chances. The German PzH 2000 howitzers, the British AS-90, the French CAESAR and the Polish AHS Krab could compete with the 2S35 Coalition-SV interspecific artillery system, which has a range of 70 km and a rate of fire of 12-16 rounds per minute. However, the "Coalition" did not reach the front, and there are great doubts whether this weapon will appear in the troops at all. Thus, the vast majority of Russian artillery was developed back in the 1960s and 1980s, or even earlier, and it would not be a big exaggeration to say that Leonid Brezhnev's cannons, howitzers and mortars dominate the battlefields. Tank battles in the past The armed conflict in Ukraine has seriously raised the following question: does the tank remain the main striking force of the ground forces in modern warfare? And there doesn't seem to be a definite answer for today. At first, the Ukrainian Armed Forces simply prayed for British Challenger 2 tanks, American M1A2 Abrams, German Leopard of various modifications, including the latest Leopard 2A6 - except that they did not kiss their exhaust pipes. The main battle tanks of Western countries actually have good combat characteristics. But in modern armed conflicts, the time of dashing tank attacks and large-scale battles of many hundreds and thousands of armored combat vehicles seems to have passed. The main enemy of tanks on the battlefield is no longer even an anti-tank missile system, whose influence has significantly decreased, but an unmanned aerial vehicle. Even today, formidable combat vehicles are used only in the form of mobile firing points firing from closed firing positions. The revision of the previous role in combat concerns not only tanks: by and large, the entire concept of infantry fighting vehicles needs to be clarified based on the rich experience gained during its military operations. Apparently, lightly armored vehicles have also exhausted themselves as the main infantry fighting vehicle. Infantry was, is, and will be the queen of the fields. In previous theoretical concepts of the wars of the 21st century, there was practically no discussion about the role of infantry in the armed conflicts of the future. Meanwhile, as the experience of the SVO has shown, the infantry was and remains the queen of the fields. For example, the Ukrainian army practically does not lack weapons, military equipment and ammunition, but the lack of infantry practically deprives the Armed Forces of Ukraine of any chance of success in combat operations. Of course, the infantry of the 21st century must be equipped with the latest weapons and military equipment, motorized, computerized, with the most modern means of protection and equipment. Let us recall the historical toast of Joseph Stalin, pronounced on May 5, 1941 at a banquet in the Kremlin in honor of graduates of military academies - and still has not lost its relevance.: "In all wars, the main branch of the armed forces that ensured victory was the infantry. Artillery, aviation, and armored forces protected the infantry and ensured the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the infantry. Fortresses, towns and settlements of the enemy were considered occupied only when infantry set foot there. It has always been so, and it will be so in the future war. I propose the first toast to the infantry. For the queen of the fields, the infantry!" The era of drones No one expected such a scale of use of unmanned aerial vehicles on the battlefields of the SVR. It is no exaggeration to say that unmanned vehicles have overturned all previous ideas about the nature of armed struggle in the wars of the 21st century. Today, the cutting edge of the sound of UAV engines running, figuratively speaking, resembles a buzzing beehive. Barrage munitions, or kamikaze drones, have become widespread in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Their ability to attack stationary and mobile targets from various angles, often located at serious distances, and to do so often unexpectedly for the enemy and with high efficiency, made them one of the "discoveries" of their military. Today, unmanned aerial vehicles dominate the battlefield. Personnel, weapons and military equipment are under almost continuous fire from the barrage of ammunition. Sometimes there are two or three attacking drones for every single soldier, so fighters avoid open spaces and actions in even small groups. In the current situation, a new branch of the armed forces is being created in Russia - the Troops of unmanned systems. The formation of the new structure is scheduled to be completed in the third quarter of 2025. The need for reform The need for major organizational and staff measures to strengthen the capabilities of the air defense and the army is not only overdue, but already, one might say, overripe. In the near future, it seems highly advisable to separate the Air Force and air Defense armies as part of the Aerospace Forces, that is, to recreate the air armies and revive on a new basis not separate air defense armies, but aerospace defense armies. It should be added that now the armies of the Air Force and air defense are headed, as a rule, by aviators, and not by specialists in the field of air defense organization. In addition, pilot commanders, and for very objective reasons, are very far from many specific issues in the field of combat automation, radar reconnaissance, and anti-aircraft missile defense. On their own, the aviators are focused on solving the tasks inherent in purely air armies, that is, bombing and launching air strikes against the enemy. For example, the issues of anti-aircraft missile cover for oil refineries and bridge crossings over the Volga River are far from the first place for pilots. And the urgency of covering a wide variety of facilities within the European part of the country will only increase. The Litmus Test A high-intensity armed conflict is the best litmus test for verifying the correctness of decisions made in the military sphere in peacetime. Unsuitable structures are discarded, and personnel who do not correspond to their positions are replaced by officers and generals who have proven themselves in battle. The results of many organizational and staff activities carried out in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in previous times need to be reviewed, and urgently. What seemed to be quite good in peacetime turned out to be of little use - and sometimes simply incompetent - in a special military operation. The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board. Biography of the author: Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel. He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986). Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983). Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988). Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992). Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000). Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia (1998). Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
JWB Posted February 26, 2025 Posted February 26, 2025 https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1894694196365111669 Russian pilot "Fighterbomber" says that the effectiveness of Russian guide bombs fell off a cliff recently due to widespread EW interference on both sides, and that Ukrainian countermeasures have now rendered satellite-guided corrections useless. He says bombs often miss their targets now but the problem was swept under the rug as it often happens in Russia to continue positive reports.
Roman Alymov Posted February 26, 2025 Posted February 26, 2025 1 hour ago, JWB said: https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1894694196365111669 Russian pilot "Fighterbomber" says that the effectiveness of Russian guide bombs fell off a cliff recently due to widespread EW interference on both sides, and that Ukrainian countermeasures have now rendered satellite-guided corrections useless. He says bombs often miss their targets now but the problem was swept under the rug as it often happens in Russia to continue positive reports. Thank you for bringing up this story i forgot about. First, let's address the original text https://t.me/fighter_bomber/20027 "A forgotten category in the channel. "What's in Laos aviation?" Well, perhaps nothing new, they fly, shoot, bomb, launch, win. The average flight time per month for the crew today is slightly more than per year <before war>. But there is a caveat. The entire section today will be devoted to this nuance. The age of divine UMPK was short-lived. Actually, I wrote a long time ago that we need to prepare for the fact that the Ukrainian will find a counteraction to the UMPK and we need to work proactively. Many years before his story. The UMPKdefinitely played a huge role, and literally saved the VKS from huge losses, but nothing lasts forever under the moon, and people are creatures who really want to live and do everything possible for their survival. Non-ignirant people of all stripes and ranks have long sounded the alarm, but according to the ancient traditions of Laos, no one gives a f+k about these worries. Bombs are flying regularly, planned targets are being "hit", everything is in place, the columns on the slides are becoming more and more beautiful, in the reports the numbers of sorties and destroyed targets are increasing to such an extent that the speakers begin to read them with a sigh and let out a stingy tear. But there is a caveat. They don't hit <the targets>. All satellite correction systems have officially left the chat. Both our EW men and, of course, the enemy ones learned how to use portable and mobile EW stations, which were used to plug the entire contact line on both sides and made the correction of all ammunition systems (not only UMPK) based on satellite navigation useless. Just like radio-controlled drones are slowly leaving the scene. Yes, for area targets such as factories, cities, a single UMPK will certainly hit. But there are no such goals on the contact line Yes, it would be possible to change tactics and spend not one UMPK bomb on one target, but for example 8. Or 16. And then, taking into account the addition of errors, you see, the target would be destroyed by some kind of bomb from this pile. In the old days, it was called salvo bombing and was the main bombing mode of all bombers. But as you understand, you will have to report that only one of the 16 targets was killed. Probably. And who needs it? Well, you get it. The situation with electronic warfare in the enemy's rear is not much better, but there are areas where the ammunition can be adjusted along the flight route, and secondly, at altitudes less than 50 meters, there is a <GPS> signal in places. Therefore, with long-range ammunition based on satellite correction, things are better, but not much. Because EW is mandatory for all "fat" targets. And here the accuracy depends on the "drift" of the ammunition without correction per kilometer. What needs to be done? Well, you definitely need to stop flying for the sake of flying and dropping for the sake of dropping. Move on to work on fewer goals, but more UMPKs. Accept it as an axiom that a single UMPK today can only hit a target by accident, or on a training ground. To consolidate this in the reports of the commanders. Processing and developing ammunition with an illuminated laser seeker from a UAV. Finish TV guidance systems and data transmission systems. And of course, complete the INS. One way or another, the future belongs to autonomous inertial navigation systems anyway. The report is finished! Oh, and I'll stress it again. It's all in Laos. We're all f+d up. The enemy has no EW. If a rocket dies or misses its target, it's only the pilots' fault. Every rocket bomb hits its target. Ask any boss from the general and above. They won't let you lie". So, what is the meaning of this text you are so cheerfully brought here? The meaning is, first and foremost, that all this nice stocks of GPS-guided amunition West was so effectively using (and stockpiling) are now just rubbish. HIMARS, Excalibur, JDAM etc. And, taking into account both pro-Russian and peo-Ukrainian EW systems now are just DIY compinations of Made-in-China components, it is question of time China will be totally immune to existing generation of Western GPS-guided ammunition. Money spent on this ammunition were effectively thrown away, and Ukraine became ideal testground for finding the ways to finding proper countermeasures. Also, as it is usual for person related to OPSEC, Fighterbomber is telling the truth but very measured truth. He is not telling you that UMPKs once started with 4-channel sat recievers Kometa-M (see https://en.topwar.ru/222148-umpk-hitryj-plan-ili-udachnaja-improvizacija.html ) Then they got 6-element, 8-element ones and, surprise, the same day Fighterbomber blew the whistle, prominent pro-Ukr EW specialist have posted the plea to his subscribers to sent him new, 12-element satnav reciever UNPKs are now comming with https://t.me/serhii_flash/5016 So, as we see, UMPKs are rapidly developing. True, the price of this development is increase of the size of GPS antenna set - now obviously too big to be fitted into artillery shells etc. So the era of GPS-guided artillery is, probably, gone (at least intill some new technological developments), and the same is true for most of GPS-guided missiles, bombs etc. West became so used to.
Roman Alymov Posted February 26, 2025 Posted February 26, 2025 P.S. And fresh illustration on UMPK accuracy: old alchohol plant in Gusevo, Kursk region https://t.me/dva_majors/65421
Stuart Galbraith Posted February 26, 2025 Posted February 26, 2025 Fighterbomber reports Russian glide bomb accuracy has fallen off a cliff due to jamming. https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1894694196365111669?t=HDWCSwPJpbIX4khhWN8Jbw&s=19
Roman Alymov Posted February 26, 2025 Posted February 26, 2025 2 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said: Fighterbomber reports Russian glide bomb accuracy has fallen off a cliff due to jamming. https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1894694196365111669?t=HDWCSwPJpbIX4khhWN8Jbw&s=19 The rush you demonstrate to report this great news here, without even taking few seconds to scroll few lines up, is quite telling of how short of good news you are recently.
Stuart Galbraith Posted February 26, 2025 Posted February 26, 2025 I did scroll up and missed it. I feel extraordinarily unmoved by your censure. Slow day was it?
Roman Alymov Posted February 26, 2025 Posted February 26, 2025 (edited) 7 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said: I did scroll up and missed it. I feel extraordinarily unmoved by your censure. Slow day was it? Censure? Have i said you can't post something? What i have done is pointing out your rush to post it is indicative. Feel free to continue, please. Edited February 26, 2025 by Roman Alymov
Yama Posted February 26, 2025 Posted February 26, 2025 7 hours ago, JWB said: Russian pilot "Fighterbomber" says that the effectiveness of Russian guide bombs fell off a cliff recently due to widespread EW interference on both sides, and that Ukrainian countermeasures have now rendered satellite-guided corrections useless. He says bombs often miss their targets now but the problem was swept under the rug as it often happens in Russia to continue positive reports. I suppose this was to be expected, as same had happened with many Western GPS guided munitions. Many thought that in static warfare, satellite guided munitions would prove to be particularly effective, and for a while this seemed to be true, but static frontlines also encourage deployment of very powerful jamming platforms.
Colin Posted February 27, 2025 Posted February 27, 2025 2 hours ago, Yama said: I suppose this was to be expected, as same had happened with many Western GPS guided munitions. Many thought that in static warfare, satellite guided munitions would prove to be particularly effective, and for a while this seemed to be true, but static frontlines also encourage deployment of very powerful jamming platforms. and Excalibur 155mm munitions.
Colin Posted February 27, 2025 Posted February 27, 2025 On 2/18/2025 at 5:11 AM, Roman Alymov said: Corrected few translation flaws "It's a different war." The drone revolution is radically changing the face of warfare and the military Ruslan Pukhov: During the SVO, the predicted triumph of unmanned aircraft took place Ruslan Pukhov (Director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, member of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation) The obvious successes of the Russian armed forces during SVO in 2024, at the same time, did not lead to overcoming the predominantly positional nature of military operations that had developed since the end of 2022, which looks quite natural and, apparently, reflects the established trends in military affairs for a fairly long term <to come>. The battlefield has become "transparent" This positionality did not arise as a result of insufficient numbers or "density" of troops (forces) of the parties, as some still sometimes believe. On the contrary, the high dispersion and low density of troops (forces) and their battle formations were the result of dramatically increased capabilities for reconnaissance, detection, target designation and high-precision destruction. These capabilities predetermined a significant increase in the vulnerability of not only troop groups and concentrations, starting from the level of lower tactical units to operational and operational-tactical formations, but also of individual military equipment, combat vehicles, and even personnel on the battlefield. First of all, this is due to the almost total "transparency" of the battlefield, caused by the huge number of constantly deployed reconnaissance and surveillance assets, primarily small unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as a qualitative leap in the volume and speed of intelligence information transmitted and received using these assets. The latter leap is provided by means of universal globally accessible network communications, starting with the same Starlink. As a result, in the zone of such "transparency" (now primarily near the line of combat contact, which is growing more and more) any covert transfer, deployment, concentration and use of forces become, in essence, systemically impossible. Any concentration of units and subdivisions will become an immediate target for destruction, and the more significant the concentration, the more "noticeable" it will be, attracting all sorts of strike weapons at virtually any distance from the line of combat contact. This naturally forces the use of troops in small groups, subdivisions and individual vehicles, dispersing them as much as possible. Moreover, modern and especially future means of communication and control provide such an opportunity. The impossibility of concentrating and concentrating forces and means overturns all the foundations of military affairs, forcing war to be waged by small units and groups, as well as individual crews and fighters. An important aspect of the current situation is that the "transparency" of the battlefield and the resolution of the issue of target designation in real time lead to the abolition of the need for line-of-sight fire in favor of safer fire from closed firing positions. For centuries, line-of-sight fire was the basis for destruction in combat, and the foundations of tactics were built around ensuring the effectiveness of such fire. Now there is no need to see the enemy (target) directly in front of you, it can be seen theoretically from any distance and destroyed with the same high accuracy. The survivability of remote dispersed platforms for destruction from closed positions and their crews is much higher than any weapon for conducting line-of-sight fire. This revolutionizes the entire system of fire and fire destruction of troops, and in the combat operations in Ukraine, such a revolutionary means of destruction are small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) - both loitering munitions and devices with the release of munitions and, finally, FPV drones. Tank and Artillery Crisis Accordingly, the tank crisis that has been so much talked about and clearly revealed in this war is caused not so much by the vulnerability of the tank as such to weapons, but by the loss of the tank's significance as a means of fire in direct line of sight. All fire missions performed by a tank in combat can now be assigned to much cheaper, more effective and covert means of high-precision destruction from closed positions - from FPV drones to guided artillery shells and tactical over-the-horizon missile systems such as ALAS or Spike-NLOS. Experience from combat operations in Ukraine shows that tanks are now, as a rule, destroyed on the battlefield even before they reach the line of application of their weapons, which essentially makes the tank's place in the troop's weapons system meaningless. If a tank is still capable of direct fire somewhere, it is only because the number of FPV drones and similar weapons is still insufficient everywhere. Similarly, cavalry died as a significant means on the battlefield with the advent of shrapnel and machine guns. Instead of a tank in the combat conditions of the Ukrainian war, modern infantry fighting vehicles, the purpose of which is to transport, evacuate and support personnel, show the greatest usefulness of all classes and types of armored vehicles for the main type of combat operations. When hit, such IFVs demonstrate high survivability, and their complete incapacitation or destruction usually require multiple hits. On the battlefield, IFVs of this class now play a central role, replacing tanks in this role, which do not have transport capabilities, but have a useless large-caliber gun, designed primarily to destroy their own kind. Thus, we are witnessing a crisis in the forms, methods and techniques of warfare that generations of soldiers have been trained in. The very idea that the concentration of forces and resources in the traditional "regulatory" manner or the concentration of tanks and armored vehicles in the current conditions is more likely a path to defeat and beating, rather than to success, still does not fit into the heads of many commanders on both sides. The Triumph of Drones During the SVO, the long-predicted triumph of unmanned aviation finally took place. But this triumph was expressed not in the replacement of manned aircraft by MALE class drones hovering at altitude with significant range and altitude (the legendary Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and our "Inikhidets" - "Orions" have already been almost forgotten), but in the hordes of micro-devices - "<DJI> Mavics" and FPV drones - tht filled the battlefield - hunting literally every object and every infantryman. That is why the current war in Ukraine has become a drone war. We are essentially seeing a paraphrase of the famous formula of the French Marshal Petain about artillery: "Drones destroy, infantry fills." The drone revolution is radically changing the face of combat operations and the army. It has provided not only the above-mentioned unprecedented "transparency" of the battlefield, but has also begun to push back not so much aviation as artillery and group infantry weapons. It is obvious that tanks, and in the future artillery, are losing their significance. Drones, firstly, are a universal means of destruction, secondly, they are already capable of operating at the full range of artillery, thirdly, they allow to act in covert way and from closed positions. And, fourthly, they simultaneously solve the issue of reconnaissance and target designation, which has not been solved until now. Therefore, drones, unlike any other means, make it possible to identify all enemy targets and objects to tactical depth and clear everything to tactical depth - and in the future, with the development of technology, this will also become possible to operational depth. This is a revolution in military affairs, which, as has already been said above, fatally affects such a key element of military affairs as the concentration of forces and means. Moreover, maneuver to ensure defeat also becomes unnecessary, and this is also a fundamental change not only in tactics, but also in operational art. All this will sooner or later lead to radical changes not only in the forms of combat operations, but also in the appearance and structure of armies. Due to its unprecedentedly favorable cost-effectiveness ratio, the FPV drone is becoming the main means of tactical destruction on the battlefield, and we are already talking about their production in the millions. With such a scale of application, FPV drones will essentially displace all group infantry weapons, all anti-tank weapons, and will take on most of the tasks of artillery. The appearance of military units and subdivisions, apparently, will ultimately be a combination of squads of "grenadiers" - FPV operators and "assault troops" - riflemen, supported by UAV reconnaissance operators and electronic warfare systems. Accordingly, the most important area of military affairs will also be the fight against enemy FPV drones. Finally, one of the key components of the structure of future military units and subdivisions should be forward target designers, providing target designation and guidance of high-precision weapons by long-range weapons and aviation. It is the mass use of UAVs and high-precision weapons that, in theory, can become a means of overcoming positional crisis problem, including in military operations in Ukraine, so in the foreseeable future in this conflict, tactical success on the battlefield will depend on the parties increasing production of FPV drones and loitering munitions, as well as more modern types of high-precision weapons (guided aerial bombs, missiles, long-range ATGMs and ALAS/NLOS missiles, etc.). A look into the future In summary, it can be predicted that if a military victory is won in a war of this type, it will be won by the one who has more precision weapons at both the tactical and operational levels. This will allow for the effective "grinding down" and destruction of the enemy's troops and strongholds, as well as his warehouses, communications and command centers, and in the long term (including the use of aviation as carriers) to lead to the isolation of the combat zone - the solution of the second key equation of positionality, along with overcoming and destroying the actual positional defense. It is worth noting that Russia has serious capabilities to increase the production of high-precision weapons and UAVs. The most decisive systems on the modern battlefield in Ukraine (FPV drones, Mavics, small UAVs, loitering munitions, guided bombs, high-precision missiles of certain types) are the least dependent in production on Western sanctions - rather, their scaling is a matter of vision and understanding by leaders and commanders at all levels of the main trends and prospects of the war. The tank is dead because of drones, but the IFV is not? I suspect tanks become a FPV magnet, leaving the IFV to last.
Roman Alymov Posted February 27, 2025 Posted February 27, 2025 3 hours ago, Yama said: I suppose this was to be expected, as same had happened with many Western GPS guided munitions. Many thought that in static warfare, satellite guided munitions would prove to be particularly effective, and for a while this seemed to be true, but static frontlines also encourage deployment of very powerful jamming platforms. Yes, see my analysys above - yes GPS guidence is also evolving, but this evolution got physical limitations. Note GPS jamming do not need to be cery powerful as it is relatively weak signals.....
Roman Alymov Posted February 27, 2025 Posted February 27, 2025 1 hour ago, Colin said: The tank is dead because of drones, but the IFV is not? I suspect tanks become a FPV magnet, leaving the IFV to last. Not exactly so: everything in prone to IFVs, but while tanks in their current CW-developed form do not have practical reasons to be in killzone now (next to no enemy tanks to fire at), IFV became even more important as now "grey zone" became tens of miles wide. So while tanks are hidden somewhere, IFVs are actively used, despite of losses.
RETAC21 Posted February 27, 2025 Posted February 27, 2025 How FPVs came to be and become cheap and popular: https://x.com/akapoor_av8r/status/1894795258728456606
Stuart Galbraith Posted February 27, 2025 Posted February 27, 2025 14 hours ago, Roman Alymov said: Censure? Have i said you can't post something? What i have done is pointing out your rush to post it is indicative. Feel free to continue, please. I just thought someone might be interested, thats all. if you have a problem with that, please stick me on ignore, because frankly I really dont give a shit what you think. There, I hope we have cleared that up.
Stefan Kotsch Posted February 27, 2025 Posted February 27, 2025 (edited) ... Edited February 27, 2025 by Stefan Kotsch
Roman Alymov Posted February 27, 2025 Posted February 27, 2025 3 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said: I just thought someone might be interested, thats all. if you have a problem with that, please stick me on ignore, because frankly I really dont give a shit what you think. There, I hope we have cleared that up. Again, as i have allready said above, please feel free continue. It is your right to rush to report your stories, and it is my right to comment. You are not impressed - so what
seahawk Posted February 27, 2025 Posted February 27, 2025 9 hours ago, Colin said: The tank is dead because of drones, but the IFV is not? I suspect tanks become a FPV magnet, leaving the IFV to last. The tank is not useful, because tank battles are rare and most fortifications by the infantry are either below ground, so that neither an IFV nor tank can hit hit with direct fire or are weak enough to be destroyed by the guns of the IFVs.
JWB Posted February 27, 2025 Posted February 27, 2025 https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1895135381525323995 Finland will supply Ukraine with €660 million in new arms production, the country's Ministry of Defense announced.
Stuart Galbraith Posted February 27, 2025 Posted February 27, 2025 6 hours ago, seahawk said: The tank is not useful, because tank battles are rare and most fortifications by the infantry are either below ground, so that neither an IFV nor tank can hit hit with direct fire or are weak enough to be destroyed by the guns of the IFVs. You do realise the tank was invented not to fight tanks, but be an infantry bully? It can and does that role really well.
glenn239 Posted February 27, 2025 Posted February 27, 2025 14 hours ago, Roman Alymov said: Yes, see my analysys above - yes GPS guidence is also evolving, but this evolution got physical limitations. Note GPS jamming do not need to be cery powerful as it is relatively weak signals..... New videos released of FAB attacks in the past 24 hours, at the 7:20 and 13:10 marks, Negotiations For Every Dollar💵 Russians Disrupt UA Offensive Plans🚫 Military Summary For 2025.02.27
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