War in Ukraine, technical and military aspects only

[alejandro_]

Good article by Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.

"It's a different war." The drone revolution is radically changing the face of warfare and the military

Ruslan Pukhov: During the SVO, the predicted triumph of unmanned aircraft took place
Ruslan Pukhov (Director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, member of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation)

The obvious successes of the Russian armed forces during the Central Military District in 2024, at the same time, did not lead to overcoming the predominantly positional nature of military operations that had developed since the end of 2022, which looks quite natural and, apparently, reflects the established trends in military affairs for a fairly long term.

The battlefield has become "transparent"

This positionality did not arise as a result of insufficient numbers or "density" of troops (forces) of the parties, as some still sometimes believe. On the contrary, the high dispersion and low density of troops (forces) and their battle formations were the result of dramatically increased capabilities for reconnaissance, detection, target designation and high-precision destruction. These capabilities predetermined a significant increase in the vulnerability of not only troop groups and concentrations, starting from the level of lower tactical units to operational and operational-tactical formations, but also of individual military equipment, combat vehicles, and even personnel on the battlefield. First of all, this is due to the almost total "transparency" of the battlefield, caused by the huge number of constantly deployed reconnaissance and surveillance assets, primarily small unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as a qualitative leap in the volume and speed of intelligence information transmitted and received using these assets. The latter leap is provided by means of universal globally accessible network communications, starting with the same Starlink.

As a result, in the zone of such "transparency" (now primarily near the line of combat contact, which is growing more and more) any covert transfer, deployment, concentration and use of forces become, in essence, systemically impossible. Any concentration of units and subdivisions will become an immediate target for destruction, and the more significant the concentration, the more "noticeable" it will be, attracting all sorts of strike weapons at virtually any distance from the line of combat contact. This naturally forces the use of troops in small groups, subdivisions and individual vehicles, dispersing them as much as possible. Moreover, modern and especially promising means of communication and control provide such an opportunity. The impossibility of concentrating and concentrating forces and means overturns all the foundations of military affairs, forcing war to be waged by small units and groups, as well as individual crews and fighters.

An important aspect of the current situation is that the "transparency" of the battlefield and the resolution of the issue of target designation in real time lead to the abolition of the need for line-of-sight fire in favor of safer fire from closed firing positions. For centuries, line-of-sight fire was the basis for destruction in combat, and the foundations of tactics were built around ensuring the effectiveness of such fire. Now there is no need to see the enemy (target) directly in front of you, it can be seen theoretically from any distance and destroyed with the same high accuracy. The survivability of remote dispersed platforms for destruction from closed positions and their crews is much higher than any weapon for conducting line-of-sight fire. This revolutionizes the entire system of fire and fire destruction of troops, and in the combat operations in Ukraine, such a revolutionary means of destruction are small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) - both loitering munitions and devices with the release of munitions and, finally, FPV drones.

Tank and Artillery Crisis

Accordingly, the tank crisis that has been so much talked about and clearly revealed in this war is caused not so much by the vulnerability of the tank as such to weapons, but by the loss of the tank's significance as a means of fire in direct line of sight. All fire missions performed by a tank in combat can now be assigned to much cheaper, more effective and covert means of high-precision destruction from closed positions - from FPV drones to guided artillery shells and tactical over-the-horizon missile systems such as ALAS or Spike-NLOS.

Experience from combat operations in Ukraine shows that tanks are now, as a rule, destroyed on the battlefield even before they reach the line of application of their weapons, which essentially makes the tank's place in the troop's weapons system meaningless. If a tank is still capable of direct fire somewhere, it is only because the number of FPV drones and similar weapons is still insufficient everywhere. Similarly, cavalry died as a significant means on the battlefield with the advent of shrapnel and machine guns.

Instead of a tank in the combat conditions of the Ukrainian war, modern infantry fighting vehicles, the purpose of which is to transport, evacuate and support personnel, show the greatest usefulness of all classes and types of armored vehicles for the main type of combat operations. When hit, such IFVs demonstrate high survivability, and their complete incapacitation or destruction usually require multiple hits.

On the battlefield, IFVs of this class now play a central role, replacing tanks in this role, which do not have transport capabilities, but have a useless large-caliber gun, designed primarily to destroy their own kind.

Thus, we are witnessing a crisis in the forms, methods and techniques of warfare that generations of soldiers have been trained in. The very idea that the concentration of forces and resources in the traditional "regulatory" manner or the concentration of tanks and armored vehicles in the current conditions is more likely a path to defeat and beating, rather than to success, still does not fit into the heads of many commanders on both sides.

The Triumph of Drones

During the SVO, the long-predicted triumph of unmanned aviation finally took place. But this triumph was expressed not in the replacement of manned aircraft by MALE class drones hovering at altitude with significant range and altitude (the legendary Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and our "Amblers" - "Orions" have already been almost forgotten), but in the hordes of micro-devices - "mavics" and FPV drones - tht filled the battlefield - hunting literally every object and every infantryman.

That is why the current war in Ukraine has become a drone war. We are essentially seeing a paraphrase of the famous formula of the French Marshal Petain about artillery: "Drones destroy, infantry fills." The drone revolution is radically changing the face of combat operations and the army. It has provided not only the above-mentioned unprecedented "transparency" of the battlefield, but has also begun to push back not so much aviation as artillery and group infantry weapons. It is obvious that tanks, and in the future artillery, are losing their significance. Drones, firstly, are a universal means of destruction, secondly, they are already capable of operating at the full range of artillery, thirdly, they allow covert action and from closed positions. And, fourthly, they simultaneously solve the issue of reconnaissance and target designation, which has not been solved until now. Therefore, drones, unlike any other means, make it possible to identify all enemy targets and objects to tactical depth and clear everything to tactical depth - and in the future, with the development of technology, this will also become possible to operational depth. This is a revolution in military affairs, which, as has already been said above, fatally affects such a key element of military affairs as the concentration of forces and means. Moreover, maneuver to ensure defeat also becomes unnecessary, and this is also a fundamental change not only in tactics, but also in operational art. All this will sooner or later lead to radical changes not only in the forms of combat operations, but also in the appearance and structure of armies.

Due to its unprecedentedly favorable cost-effectiveness ratio, the FPV drone is becoming the main means of tactical destruction on the battlefield, and we are already talking about their production in the millions. With such a scale of application, FPV drones will essentially displace all group infantry weapons, all anti-tank weapons, and will take on most of the tasks of artillery. The appearance of military units and subdivisions, apparently, will ultimately be a combination of squads of "grenadiers" - FPV operators and "assault" - shooters, supported by UAV reconnaissance operators and electronic warfare systems. Accordingly, the most important area of military affairs will also be the fight against enemy FPV drones. Finally, one of the key components of the structure of promising military units and subdivisions should be forward target designers, providing target designation and guidance of high-precision weapons by long-range weapons and aviation.

It is the mass use of UAVs and high-precision weapons that, in theory, can become a means of overcoming positional conflict, including in military operations in Ukraine, so in the foreseeable future in this conflict, tactical success on the battlefield will depend on the parties increasing production of FPV drones and loitering munitions, as well as more modern types of high-precision weapons (guided aerial bombs, missiles, long-range ATGMs and ALAS/NLOS missiles, etc.).

A look into the future

In summary, it can be predicted that if a military victory is won in a war of this type, it will be won by the one who has more precision weapons at both the tactical and operational levels. This will allow for the effective "grinding down" and destruction of the enemy's troops and strongholds, as well as his warehouses, communications and command centers, and in the long term (including the use of aviation as carriers) to lead to the isolation of the combat zone - the solution of the second key equation of positionality, along with overcoming and destroying the actual positional defense.

It is worth noting that Russia has serious capabilities to increase the production of high-precision weapons and UAVs. The most decisive systems on the modern battlefield in Ukraine (FPV drones, Mavics, small UAVs, loitering munitions, guided bombs, high-precision missiles of certain types) are the least dependent in production on Western sanctions - rather, their scaling is a matter of vision and understanding by leaders and commanders at all levels of the main trends and prospects of the war.

https://rg.ru/2025/02/17/ruslan-puhov-v-hode-svo-sostoialsia-predskazyvavshijsia-triumf-bespilotnoj-aviacii.html

[ink]

28 minutes ago, alejandro_ said:

Good article by Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.

"It's a different war." The drone revolution is radically changing the face of warfare and the military

 

Thanks alejandro, that made for a very interesting read!

[TrustMe]

Echo that.

[Roman Alymov]

Corrected few translation flaws

"It's a different war." The drone revolution is radically changing the face of warfare and the military

Ruslan Pukhov: During the SVO, the predicted triumph of unmanned aircraft took place
Ruslan Pukhov (Director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, member of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation)

The obvious successes of the Russian armed forces during SVO in 2024, at the same time, did not lead to overcoming the predominantly positional nature of military operations that had developed since the end of 2022, which looks quite natural and, apparently, reflects the established trends in military affairs for a fairly long term <to come>.

The battlefield has become "transparent"

This positionality did not arise as a result of insufficient numbers or "density" of troops (forces) of the parties, as some still sometimes believe. On the contrary, the high dispersion and low density of troops (forces) and their battle formations were the result of dramatically increased capabilities for reconnaissance, detection, target designation and high-precision destruction. These capabilities predetermined a significant increase in the vulnerability of not only troop groups and concentrations, starting from the level of lower tactical units to operational and operational-tactical formations, but also of individual military equipment, combat vehicles, and even personnel on the battlefield. First of all, this is due to the almost total "transparency" of the battlefield, caused by the huge number of constantly deployed reconnaissance and surveillance assets, primarily small unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as a qualitative leap in the volume and speed of intelligence information transmitted and received using these assets. The latter leap is provided by means of universal globally accessible network communications, starting with the same Starlink.

As a result, in the zone of such "transparency" (now primarily near the line of combat contact, which is growing more and more) any covert transfer, deployment, concentration and use of forces become, in essence, systemically impossible. Any concentration of units and subdivisions will become an immediate target for destruction, and the more significant the concentration, the more "noticeable" it will be, attracting all sorts of strike weapons at virtually any distance from the line of combat contact. This naturally forces the use of troops in small groups, subdivisions and individual vehicles, dispersing them as much as possible. Moreover, modern and especially future means of communication and control provide such an opportunity. The impossibility of concentrating and concentrating forces and means overturns all the foundations of military affairs, forcing war to be waged by small units and groups, as well as individual crews and fighters.

An important aspect of the current situation is that the "transparency" of the battlefield and the resolution of the issue of target designation in real time lead to the abolition of the need for line-of-sight fire in favor of safer fire from closed firing positions. For centuries, line-of-sight fire was the basis for destruction in combat, and the foundations of tactics were built around ensuring the effectiveness of such fire. Now there is no need to see the enemy (target) directly in front of you, it can be seen theoretically from any distance and destroyed with the same high accuracy. The survivability of remote dispersed platforms for destruction from closed positions and their crews is much higher than any weapon for conducting line-of-sight fire. This revolutionizes the entire system of fire and fire destruction of troops, and in the combat operations in Ukraine, such a revolutionary means of destruction are small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) - both loitering munitions and devices with the release of munitions and, finally, FPV drones.

Tank and Artillery Crisis

Accordingly, the tank crisis that has been so much talked about and clearly revealed in this war is caused not so much by the vulnerability of the tank as such to weapons, but by the loss of the tank's significance as a means of fire in direct line of sight. All fire missions performed by a tank in combat can now be assigned to much cheaper, more effective and covert means of high-precision destruction from closed positions - from FPV drones to guided artillery shells and tactical over-the-horizon missile systems such as ALAS or Spike-NLOS.

Experience from combat operations in Ukraine shows that tanks are now, as a rule, destroyed on the battlefield even before they reach the line of application of their weapons, which essentially makes the tank's place in the troop's weapons system meaningless. If a tank is still capable of direct fire somewhere, it is only because the number of FPV drones and similar weapons is still insufficient everywhere. Similarly, cavalry died as a significant means on the battlefield with the advent of shrapnel and machine guns.

Instead of a tank in the combat conditions of the Ukrainian war, modern infantry fighting vehicles, the purpose of which is to transport, evacuate and support personnel, show the greatest usefulness of all classes and types of armored vehicles for the main type of combat operations. When hit, such IFVs demonstrate high survivability, and their complete incapacitation or destruction usually require multiple hits.

On the battlefield, IFVs of this class now play a central role, replacing tanks in this role, which do not have transport capabilities, but have a useless large-caliber gun, designed primarily to destroy their own kind.

Thus, we are witnessing a crisis in the forms, methods and techniques of warfare that generations of soldiers have been trained in. The very idea that the concentration of forces and resources in the traditional "regulatory" manner or the concentration of tanks and armored vehicles in the current conditions is more likely a path to defeat and beating, rather than to success, still does not fit into the heads of many commanders on both sides.

The Triumph of Drones

During the SVO, the long-predicted triumph of unmanned aviation finally took place. But this triumph was expressed not in the replacement of manned aircraft by MALE class drones hovering at altitude with significant range and altitude (the legendary Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and our "Inikhidets" - "Orions" have already been almost forgotten), but in the hordes of micro-devices - "<DJI> Mavics" and FPV drones - tht filled the battlefield - hunting literally every object and every infantryman.

That is why the current war in Ukraine has become a drone war. We are essentially seeing a paraphrase of the famous formula of the French Marshal Petain about artillery: "Drones destroy, infantry fills." The drone revolution is radically changing the face of combat operations and the army. It has provided not only the above-mentioned unprecedented "transparency" of the battlefield, but has also begun to push back not so much aviation as artillery and group infantry weapons. It is obvious that tanks, and in the future artillery, are losing their significance. Drones, firstly, are a universal means of destruction, secondly, they are already capable of operating at the full range of artillery, thirdly, they allow to act in covert way and from closed positions. And, fourthly, they simultaneously solve the issue of reconnaissance and target designation, which has not been solved until now. Therefore, drones, unlike any other means, make it possible to identify all enemy targets and objects to tactical depth and clear everything to tactical depth - and in the future, with the development of technology, this will also become possible to operational depth. This is a revolution in military affairs, which, as has already been said above, fatally affects such a key element of military affairs as the concentration of forces and means. Moreover, maneuver to ensure defeat also becomes unnecessary, and this is also a fundamental change not only in tactics, but also in operational art. All this will sooner or later lead to radical changes not only in the forms of combat operations, but also in the appearance and structure of armies.

Due to its unprecedentedly favorable cost-effectiveness ratio, the FPV drone is becoming the main means of tactical destruction on the battlefield, and we are already talking about their production in the millions. With such a scale of application, FPV drones will essentially displace all group infantry weapons, all anti-tank weapons, and will take on most of the tasks of artillery. The appearance of military units and subdivisions, apparently, will ultimately be a combination of squads of "grenadiers" - FPV operators and "assault troops" - riflemen, supported by UAV reconnaissance operators and electronic warfare systems. Accordingly, the most important area of military affairs will also be the fight against enemy FPV drones. Finally, one of the key components of the structure of future military units and subdivisions should be forward target designers, providing target designation and guidance of high-precision weapons by long-range weapons and aviation.

It is the mass use of UAVs and high-precision weapons that, in theory, can become a means of overcoming positional crisis problem, including in military operations in Ukraine, so in the foreseeable future in this conflict, tactical success on the battlefield will depend on the parties increasing production of FPV drones and loitering munitions, as well as more modern types of high-precision weapons (guided aerial bombs, missiles, long-range ATGMs and ALAS/NLOS missiles, etc.).

A look into the future

In summary, it can be predicted that if a military victory is won in a war of this type, it will be won by the one who has more precision weapons at both the tactical and operational levels. This will allow for the effective "grinding down" and destruction of the enemy's troops and strongholds, as well as his warehouses, communications and command centers, and in the long term (including the use of aviation as carriers) to lead to the isolation of the combat zone - the solution of the second key equation of positionality, along with overcoming and destroying the actual positional defense.

It is worth noting that Russia has serious capabilities to increase the production of high-precision weapons and UAVs. The most decisive systems on the modern battlefield in Ukraine (FPV drones, Mavics, small UAVs, loitering munitions, guided bombs, high-precision missiles of certain types) are the least dependent in production on Western sanctions - rather, their scaling is a matter of vision and understanding by leaders and commanders at all levels of the main trends and prospects of the war.

[sunday]

1 hour ago, ink said:

Thanks alejandro, that made for a very interesting read!

+1

[Roman Alymov]

8 hours ago, ink said:

It would be crazy if they "instantly changed" but for us to still be talking about a Soviet military culture a third of a century later is at the very least preposterous.

P.S. Interestingly, fresh from Alexey Arestovich on "Soviet legacy" (sometimes it seems as if he is reading This Great Forum)

1. Most of people in Ukraine who are saying that UkrArmy is "small Soviet Army" have no idea of what Soviet Army was (for simple reason of age)

2. Yes both UkrArmy and RusArmy got some Soviet legacy - but while RusArmy have inhereted both good and bad features, UkrArmy only inheerted bad ones, while having good ones thrown away

 

[Roman Alymov]

Improvised pro-Rus "MLRS" on remotely controlled chasis (i think it is set of Schmel termobaric RPGs on some sort of frame) https://t.me/infomil_live/15099

[Roman Alymov]

HMMWV with anti-drone "barn" and lots of EW antennas https://t.me/milinfolive/142246

[alejandro_]

Zala has anounced that the 3,000th Lancet loitering munition has been used. If you plot previous announcements it is possible to see that launch rate has not slowed down. Maybe it's use is not as documented as few months ago (this was discussed in this topic a few pages ago).

https://rg.ru/2025/02/19/tri-tysiachi-lancetov-nanesli-ukraine-uron-na-milliardy-dollarov.html

[JWB]

Looks like Europe will do more than anybody expects.

[JWB]

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1891920308451336380

"Two of the diplomats said the €6 billion was a starting point which could increase to €10 billion or more as countries dig into their inventories to see what they can send to Ukraine."

[mkenny]

1 hour ago, JWB said:

Looks like Europe will do more than anybody expects.

Sure, they will fight to the last Ukrainian...................

[Pavel Novak]

11 hours ago, mkenny said:

Sure, they will fight to the last Ukrainian...................

It is up to Ukrainians if they want to die on battlefield or in invader's death camps (see Roman Alymov notes that there are no Ukrainians).

 

Anyway some SA-6 action:

https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1888314324008997032

 

Edited February 20, 2025 by Pavel Novak

[mkenny]

11 minutes ago, Pavel Novak said:

It is up to Ukrainians if they want to die on battlefield or in invader's death camps

As the kidnapping-recruits off-the-street clips show this is not always true.

The intensity of the 'fight-to-the-death' mindset varies  greatly depending on how far you are from  serving in the front line. It appears to be very strong on places like this where  balding fat wheezing old men are resolute in their desire to die for the cause, if only they could.

But they can't..............

So they won't!

[seahawk]

Funny that people already know there will be death camps, yet ignore the forced conscription of fighters for the pro-Ukrainian side.

Obviously after Russia wins, there will be a large scale denazification of the Ukraine and the population will have to be re-educated.

[alejandro_]

2 hours ago, mkenny said:

As the kidnapping-recruits off-the-street clips show this is not always true.

The intensity of the 'fight-to-the-death' mindset varies  greatly depending on how far you are from  serving in the front line. It appears to be very strong on places like this where  balding fat wheezing old men are resolute in their desire to die for the cause, if only they could.

I get the same feeling when I read many analysis in twitter. It's very easy to write about Russia reaching the Pyrenees and the need to continue the war no matter what, but no one volunteers to go to the front line. 

Regarding 7 billion € package, the US has approved similar ones in the past. This is a summary of Presidential Draw Down and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). There is also FMF (Foreign Military Financing), worth about 4 billion $.

[mandeb48]

Ignorant question on the subject, when a minefield is, for example, in the rear of an army because the front has moved, is it possible to reuse those mines to plant another minefield or do they only have to destroy them due to the danger in handling.

[bojan]

If you set a minefield and you have plans and notes on how it was set you could reuse it. All mines would have to be inspected for signs of damage and fuses changed at least.

Opponent's set minefield - you should not do that, but it is done.

[TrustMe]

36 minutes ago, bojan said:

...Opponent's set minefield - you should not do that, but it is done...

In most cases it just has to be done.

[bojan]

Problem with reusing enemy ordnance is that you have no idea what has happened with it. You have no idea how long mines were buried, what conditions they survived etc. Yes, most land mines use cast TNT which is as stable as explosives go, but still..

[alejandro_]

Analysis of Ukraine's UAV acquisition:

In October, the Ministry of Defense reported that in the first ten months of 2024, together with the Ministry of Digital Transformation, 1.6 million UAVs of various types were contracted for a total amount of over UAH 114 billion. Most likely, these were purchases under closed defense procedures.

https://zn.ua/ukr/macroeconomics/ukrajina-zbilshila-zakupivli-bezpilotnikiv-u-shist-raziv-khto-jikh-zakupovuje-najbilshe.html

[JWB]

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1892421365262680512

Ukrainian engineers at CRAF have developed and deployed a low-cost armor kit for soft HMMWVs supplied by the US. 

The kit fully aligns to STANAG level 3 standards (7.62x51 AP, 8kg landmine, nearby 155mm shell detonation), and will reportedly enter mass production soon.

[mandeb48]

5 hours ago, bojan said:

If you set a minefield and you have plans and notes on how it was set you could reuse it. All mines would have to be inspected for signs of damage and fuses changed at least.

Opponent's set minefield - you should not do that, but it is done.

 

Thank you Bojan for your response. I guess that doesn't apply to minefields laid by rockets, etc.

[alejandro_]

Our database of Ukrainian losses in the war has been expanded to include missing soldiers and PoW, bringing the total figure since 2022 to over 127k, with 56k MIA and 6k PoW. As demonstrated by the chart below, MIA rates have soared in recent months.

Our decision to incorporate MIA into our tally stems from KIA figures no longer being representative of the real level of losses. Due to territorial losses and organizational issues, bodies are retrieved only a quarter or third of the time, which precludes official status as KIA.
UALosses

The MIA data is sourced from Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs' database of missing persons. The database includes both soldiers and civilians, but we applied filters to remove the latter, based on sex, age, disappearance near the frontline, and not being a local resident.

Moreover, we have crosschecked the data with other databases that focus solely on missing civilians. It must be noted that the MVS database does not include AWOL / desertion cases. As we have already substracted known PoW, the overwhelming majority of the 56k MIA are likely dead.

https://x.com/LossesUA/status/1892902871609340069
https://ualosses.org/en/soldiers/

[RETAC21]

Our favorite colonel is back: