War in Ukraine, technical and military aspects only

[RETAC21]

2 hours ago, alejandro_ said:

Use of Tunguska in Ukraine

https://iz.ru/1838297/dmitrii-astrahan/ognennaa-reka-kak-zenitnye-kompleksy-tunguska-borutsa-s-bpla-protivnika

Interesting: Currently, UAVs are being detected using passive electronic reconnaissance equipment, so as not to endanger anti-aircraft installations with their search radar systems.

[Markus Becker]

3 hours ago, Yama said:

Ukraine does have some capability to produce new missiles, no? Surely these launchers can also use never ordnance.

Ukraine or someone else.

[Roman Alymov]

48 minutes ago, RETAC21 said:

Interesting: Currently, UAVs are being detected using passive electronic reconnaissance equipment, so as not to endanger anti-aircraft installations with their search radar systems.

Translated text

February 13, 2025, 10:00 a.m.
The River* of Fire: how do "Tunguska" anti-aircraft systems fight against enemy UAVs
The air defense team has dozens of downed drones, including a rare Polish Fly Eye drone.

The drone war that broke out during SVO came as a surprise to everyone. Infantrymen, tankmen, artillerymen, and even air defense troops had to urgently adapt to the new reality and learn how to deal with new attack weapons. 
Izvestia correspondents saw the Tunguska anti-aircraft missile and cannon launchers of the 110th brigade of the 51st Donetsk Army on combat duty. The crew of one of them has dozens of aircraft-type drones shot down.

Baba Yaga** doesn't count.
— We are mainly shooting down "wings" — these are aircraft-type drones. Tunguska has two twin 30-millimeter anti—aircraft guns with a rate of fire of 5,000 rounds per minute each, as well as eight anti—aircraft guided missiles - a good machine," says the commander of the installation with the call sign Beard respectfully.

The crew under his command destroyed dozens of aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs, including the Polish Fly Eye drone. And this is despite the fact that the fighters do not consider downed multi-engine heavy copters of the Baba Yagi type.

"If we don't shoot down the UAV, we must prevent it from working,— Beard continues. — Closer to the front line, the situation is very difficult due to the appearance of FPV drones. That's why we work a little deeper — in places where the enemy is interested in flying in and seeing what we have there.

Fighters with various electronic warfare equipment, machine guns and shotguns are deployed to cover the Tunguska.

Even at the moment when the vehicle is hidden in a shelter waiting for targets, a rifleman is on duty outside to defend against kamikaze UAVs, if they can reach the area.

"Beard" and his team
All the members of the crew have been fighting together since the moment of mobilization in the DPR. The comrades began their combat path in the infantry: in rifle units they got to the Kharkov direction, from there to the border of the Belgorod region, and after that they returned to the DPR, where they continued to participate in hostilities.

During the rearmament of units of the former People's Militia of the DPR with new equipment, they received an offer to become anti-aircraft gunners and did not refuse it.

"I joined the army on February 24, 2022,— Beard recalls. — I got a call from the university where I studied to become an information security specialist, and they said that a recruitment notice had arrived. After that, the guys who live in our urban area and I packed up and went to the military enlistment office. After that, our small group ended up near Kharkov.

Boroda tells how, after the first couple of unsuccessful trips, he was able to bring Tunguska to one of the terricons in order to provide a clear view of the sighting complexes. The goal was not long in coming. At first, he "scared" with guns, but then hit the Ukrainian Valkyrie UAV with a missile.

"This is not an ordinary Ukrainian UAV," he says. — There are only a few of them. And it is difficult to detect it using search radars, only visually or with the help of electronic transmission detection. It was she who aimed at the target. We left, quickly hit the Pole with a rocket and immediately moved," recalls Beard.

Combat situation
Currently, UAVs are being detected using passive electronic reconnaissance devices so as not to endanger anti-aircraft installations with their search radar systems.

The radars turn on when the target and its direction of movement are clarified, that's when the vehicles leave the shelter to open fire.

They try not to conduct long combat duty in search mode. Although two years ago it was a standard tactic.

"In fact, my job is simple," Beard explains. — I identify targets and make sure to capture the target with artillery cannons or missiles, and then destroy it.

But the enemy is becoming more sophisticated, innovating, and using tactical tricks, nevertheless Tunguska still finds enemy UAVs.

"We try to be three steps ahead so that the enemy is always surprised by what happened to his UAV," explains a senior operator with the call sign Grandfather.

According to him, almost all aerial targets, even modern UAVs, can be detected with the help of his combat vehicle. But not all types of missiles are reliably captured by drones. In addition, it is not always possible to quickly identify a low-flying UAV. Therefore, it is important to interact with other unitss.

— In our crew, everyone knows their job, we understand each other with half a glance and half a word, — says the Grandfather.

The "Tunguska" approach
Tunguska self-propelled anti-aircraft missile systems were adopted in the early 1980s. The machine did not just receive more powerful 30 mm rapid-firing cannons and a new generation of anti-aircraft missiles than its predecessors. For the first time in our army, she combined both types of short-range air defense in one installation.

At that time, such weapons and an armored tracked base were supposed to provide an opportunity to cover armored vehicles from attack helicopters and enemy attack aircraft.

Today, drones have become Tunguska's main aerial opponent, and tactics have completely changed.

It should be noted that the technique justified the hopes. Anti-aircraft missile and cannon systems — both Tunguska and the later Pantsiri — became the basis of our air defense at the front line, unpleasantly surprising the enemy."

* - Tunguska is originally the name of Siberian river

**  - Baba Yaga is fairytale character, got distant resemblence with multicopter

 

Edited February 13, 2025 by Roman Alymov

[alejandro_]

Statistics on fatal injuries from the Russian side:

Fatal injury statistics

Explosives (74.5%) and gunshot (14.7%) injuries were predominant.

Isolated injuries most often occur when injured by fragments of explosive devices and bullets fired from firearms.

Combined injuries are caused by gas-detonation and thermal effects during an explosion.

Considering the area of the body surface that falls on the damaged part, the head and neck are most vulnerable. In isolated (single?) cases, injuries to the head, chest and lower extremities are most often fatal.

труктура смертельного ранения

Преобладали взрывная (74,5%) и огнестрельная (14,7%) травмы.

Изолированные повреждения чаще возникают при ранении осколками взрывных устройств и пуль, выпущенных из огнестрельного оружия.
Сочетанные - в результате газово-детонационного и термического воздействия при взрыве. 

С учетом площади поверхности тела, приходящейся на повреждаемую ее часть, наиболее уязвимы голова и шея. В случаях изолированного характера смертельными чаще всего оказываются повреждения головы, груди и нижних конечностей.

https://t.me/Viktor_Murakhovskiy/744

Roman, can you confirm translation of highlighted word?

[Roman Alymov]

35 minutes ago, alejandro_ said:

Statistics on fatal injuries from the Russian side:

Fatal injury statistics

Explosives (74.5%) and gunshot (14.7%) injuries were predominant.

Isolated injuries most often occur when injured by fragments of explosive devices and bullets fired from firearms.

Combined injuries are caused by gas-detonation and thermal effects during an explosion.

Considering the area of the body surface that falls on the damaged part, the head and neck are most vulnerable. In isolated (single?) cases, injuries to the head, chest and lower extremities are most often fatal.

труктура смертельного ранения

Преобладали взрывная (74,5%) и огнестрельная (14,7%) травмы.

Изолированные повреждения чаще возникают при ранении осколками взрывных устройств и пуль, выпущенных из огнестрельного оружия.
Сочетанные - в результате газово-детонационного и термического воздействия при взрыве. 

С учетом площади поверхности тела, приходящейся на повреждаемую ее часть, наиболее уязвимы голова и шея. В случаях изолированного характера смертельными чаще всего оказываются повреждения головы, груди и нижних конечностей.

https://t.me/Viktor_Murakhovskiy/744

Roman, can you confirm translation of highlighted word?

I would translate it as "In cases of isolated <nature of trauma>,  injuries to the head, chest and lower lims are the most often reasons of death"

    Also worth adding the claimed source of the data: "The structure of deadly trauma in modern armed conflict , VMJ (Military mediacal Magazine) - No. 10, 2024."

Edited February 14, 2025 by Roman Alymov

[JWB]

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1890774912668664116

Remarkable footage of Ukrainian Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships engaging and downing Russian attack drones with a mix of door gun fire and nose-mounted minigun bursts.

[JWB]

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/02/16/nato-ukraine-soviet-battlefield-tactics-squandered-weapons/

[Roman Alymov]

7 minutes ago, JWB said:

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/02/16/nato-ukraine-soviet-battlefield-tactics-squandered-weapons/

 

[Ssnake]

8 hours ago, JWB said:

Well, soldiers tend to fall back to their training in combat. Pretty much all armies fight like they train. Some train as they fight. Changing training in a way that you also change culture ... well, trying to force substantial shifts in culture in an army is difficult enough in peacetime. Trying to do that in the middle of a war sounds like setting oneself up for failure. I'm surprised that these people are surprised.

The best forces that Ukraine had - just like Russia's best - died in the first 12...18 months in this war. They were the ones that might have made biggest progress with those doctrinal shifts. They are all gone now. What's left are the old commanders and the very young recruits, so it's kinda predictable.

 

As usual, the front tends to eat fresh troops faster than can be trained, which is in parts a consequence of decisions made two years ago - an inadequate size of the training organization, and the non-rotation of troops. It's always very tempting to sacrifice long-term benefits by addressing short-term deficits.

We've seen that in pretty much all the longer-duration wars of national survival in modern times - inadequate training in order to rush new formations into a crumbling front line (everybody in WW1), inadequate rotation of troops and setting up new units rather than reinforcing existing units with a healthy mix of experienced soldiers and new ones (US, WW2). Emasciated NCO corps and top-down command culture.

 

In all fairness, I think that many "western advisors" often do not fully appreciate the full picture at the front lines. We had these nuggets of wisdom like "on the attack, bypass mine obstacles" that were completely detached from reality. We send ammo loadouts with a heavy emphasis on APFSDS when tank duels practically don't happen. With blunders like these, why should Ukrainian commanders accept the authority of advisers who don't know the frontline realities?

[Yama]

7 hours ago, Ssnake said:

Well, soldiers tend to fall back to their training in combat. Pretty much all armies fight like they train. Some train as they fight. Changing training in a way that you also change culture ... well, trying to force substantial shifts in culture in an army is difficult enough in peacetime. Trying to do that in the middle of a war sounds like setting oneself up for failure. I'm surprised that these people are surprised.

I think "Soviet vs Nato tactics" aspect of the article is quite misguided, or at very least obsolete. Force densities and compositions in Ukraine are so different from anything NATO - much less USSR - envisioned, that any generic doctrinal differences fly right out of the window.

Also, time and resources are insufficient to really instill "combined arms doctrine" for Ukrainians. They teach individual soldiering skills and small unit tactics, but for 'combined arms' you would need to train brigade level maneuvering and I really doubt they do that. So instead of a 'brigade' you get bunch of squads and platoons vaguely organized to look like a brigade. In addition there are language barriers, some of the trainees having poor motivation, and some of the training being just plain obsolete...so it's no wonder it doesn't work like in a computer game.

I seem to remember that during 2014 war, there was criticism from pro-Donbass forces that Russian army tried to organize them to comply to nominal Russian organization charts, and it didn't really work. Maybe Roman can confirm/deny that.

[alejandro_]

Note on T-62M and T-62MV reactivation:

There was also a place in the combat formations of the Russian army for older vehicles, of which there are still many in storage bases. We are talking primarily about the T-62M and T-62MV medium tanks, produced in the USSR from 1962 to 1975. During the first two years of the special operation, about 700 vehicles of these types were returned to service. Despite their venerable age, they are successfully used for firing from closed positions and are, in fact, howitzers with tank armor. The thick "skin" saves them from a close explosion of a high-explosive fragmentation shell of enemy artillery. And the power of the 115-mm smoothbore 2A20 cannon is enough to successfully destroy light armored vehicles of the enemy.

https://ria.ru/20250216/tanki-1999470349.html

[seahawk]

29 minutes ago, Yama said:

I think "Soviet vs Nato tactics" aspect of the article is quite misguided, or at very least obsolete. Force densities and compositions in Ukraine are so different from anything NATO - much less USSR - envisioned, that any generic doctrinal differences fly right out of the window.

Also, time and resources are insufficient to really instill "combined arms doctrine" for Ukrainians. They teach individual soldiering skills and small unit tactics, but for 'combined arms' you would need to train brigade level maneuvering and I really doubt they do that. So instead of a 'brigade' you get bunch of squads and platoons vaguely organized to look like a brigade. In addition there are language barriers, some of the trainees having poor motivation, and some of the training being just plain obsolete...so it's no wonder it doesn't work like in a computer game.

I seem to remember that during 2014 war, there was criticism from pro-Donbass forces that Russian army tried to organize them to comply to nominal Russian organization charts, and it didn't really work. Maybe Roman can confirm/deny that.

I think it starts at a much more basic level and one must acknowledge that some units in Ukrainian army are different to others, with some acting kind like a divisional command to the parts of the front that they are deployed to.

But imho he main think is Mission-type tactics, which provides the local commanders with the initiative and access to resources. We would also probably see less orders of the "hold this village or this tree line until told otherwise" orders.

[Yama]

2 minutes ago, seahawk said:

But imho he main think is Mission-type tactics, which provides the local commanders with the initiative and access to resources. We would also probably see less orders of the "hold this village or this tree line until told otherwise" orders.

With modern communications and visual reconnaissance capabilities, I think that temptation for high command to micromanage the front is bigger than ever. I don't know, but I wonder, if 'mission tactics' are more an ideal rather than reality nowadays.

I agree that 'Festung Bakhmut' type orders probably often were more hurtful than helpful. It's not a simple dilemma though, as withdrawal tends to be harmful for the army even without considering political aspects of giving up territory. 

[Stuart Galbraith]

12 minutes ago, Yama said:

With modern communications and visual reconnaissance capabilities, I think that temptation for high command to micromanage the front is bigger than ever. I don't know, but I wonder, if 'mission tactics' are more an ideal rather than reality nowadays.

I agree that 'Festung Bakhmut' type orders probably often were more hurtful than helpful. It's not a simple dilemma though, as withdrawal tends to be harmful for the army even without considering political aspects of giving up territory. 

I dont know. I keep thinking of Verdun. Politically the French couldnt evacuate it, and so the Germans calculated they could bleed the French Army white. The French seemingly took more casualties, but it bled the German Army white to do so.

Im not sure we can easily evaluate the political significance of some of these objectives. If they dont fight for them, we would say the Ukrainians have given up. if they do fight for them, we say they are being too positional. Im not sure there is a middle ground between these positions.

 

[seahawk]

But we still see some units with a lot more operational mobility and cohesion than others. Imho what we lack is a crops or division layer of command, that would be able to manage the individual battalions and provide corp level assets. It would also make it easier to co-ordinate the individual units. Which is now largely something they have to figure out on their own, or you see greener units accepting experienced units as a kind of divisional command.

[ink]

5 hours ago, Yama said:

I think "Soviet vs Nato tactics" aspect of the article is quite misguided, or at very least obsolete. Force densities and compositions in Ukraine are so different from anything NATO - much less USSR - envisioned, that any generic doctrinal differences fly right out of the window.

Also, time and resources are insufficient to really instill "combined arms doctrine" for Ukrainians. They teach individual soldiering skills and small unit tactics, but for 'combined arms' you would need to train brigade level maneuvering and I really doubt they do that. So instead of a 'brigade' you get bunch of squads and platoons vaguely organized to look like a brigade. In addition there are language barriers, some of the trainees having poor motivation, and some of the training being just plain obsolete...so it's no wonder it doesn't work like in a computer game.

I seem to remember that during 2014 war, there was criticism from pro-Donbass forces that Russian army tried to organize them to comply to nominal Russian organization charts, and it didn't really work. Maybe Roman can confirm/deny that.

Worth remembering that Ukrainian officers have been training with their NATO counterparts for literally 30 years. And that the Telegraph will be desperate to feed its readers stories that maintain some semblance of Western superiority. Blaming the USSR in a West=good, commies=bad type of dichotomy is perfect for them.

Can't very well print a story that says "hey, you know all that military equipment we've spent trillions developing and fielding, well, turns out that even in the hands of a well-trained and highly motivated army it still isn't fit for the modern battlefield".

[Stuart Galbraith]

It takes longer than 30 years to beat the Soviet out of the Ukrainian military. Look at the Russian military. Its still practically a carbon copy in some ways.

[seahawk]

1 hour ago, ink said:

Worth remembering that Ukrainian officers have been training with their NATO counterparts for literally 30 years. And that the Telegraph will be desperate to feed its readers stories that maintain some semblance of Western superiority. Blaming the USSR in a West=good, commies=bad type of dichotomy is perfect for them.

Can't very well print a story that says "hey, you know all that military equipment we've spent trillions developing and fielding, well, turns out that even in the hands of a well-trained and highly motivated army it still isn't fit for the modern battlefield".

And in the early phase one can not deny that they were (on most fronts) flexible and used a mobile and active defence. Some units still do, but the new units are either green or manned by reservists, few will have been trained by NATO. Not as if NATO training would make them win, but you can see a difference between individual units that is at least remarkable.

[RETAC21]

2 hours ago, ink said:

Worth remembering that Ukrainian officers have been training with their NATO counterparts for literally 30 years. And that the Telegraph will be desperate to feed its readers stories that maintain some semblance of Western superiority. Blaming the USSR in a West=good, commies=bad type of dichotomy is perfect for them.

Can't very well print a story that says "hey, you know all that military equipment we've spent trillions developing and fielding, well, turns out that even in the hands of a well-trained and highly motivated army it still isn't fit for the modern battlefield".

No, they haven't. Re-training the Ukrainian armed forces didn't start until 2014 and even then, it was mostly lower level stuff. A professional NCO corps wasn't formed by 2022, the General Staff and higher level officers had been trained in Soviet times when they were junior officers. "NATO" training was just peacekeeping operations

[ink]

15 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

No, they haven't. Re-training the Ukrainian armed forces didn't start until 2014 and even then, it was mostly lower level stuff. A professional NCO corps wasn't formed by 2022, the General Staff and higher level officers had been trained in Soviet times when they were junior officers. "NATO" training was just peacekeeping operations

Cooperation and exchanges between the Ukrainian military and US and NATO counterparts started before Ukraine officially joined PfP in 1994.

Since then, Ukraine has also participated in actual NATO operations. Not to mention them restructuring their entire military multiple times over. Or the actual war they'd been engaged in with the Russians since 2014.

How is it that people are imagining a mythical Soviet-era officer, still doing things according to how they were trained 30+ years previously, as though nobody had told him the Cold War had ended?

It's total BS and I'm flabbergasted anybody buys into it.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Culture takes decades to overturn. You recognised Devotschina in the Soviet Army didnt exactly disappear when it became the Russian Army. Its a thing.

Ukrainian military culture is essentially Soviet military culture. Its naive to think they instantly changed, just because their soldiers received some foreign training.

[Roman Alymov]

3 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Culture takes decades to overturn. You recognised Devotschina in the Soviet Army didnt exactly disappear when it became the Russian Army. Its a thing.

Ukrainian military culture is essentially Soviet military culture. Its naive to think they instantly changed, just because their soldiers received some foreign training.

I'm sorry but when you are trying to use foreign language words you do not understand to insist your point and show your expertise, it is reasonable to at least check the spelling of them, othervice you are risking to have opposite effect. The word "Devotschina" do not exist in Russian, but the meaning of it would be "girl's way" (as "Deva" is "maiden, girl" (and also "virgin"). Probably you was tryng to address "DeDovschina" (where "ded" is "grandfather" and also "conscript soldier in the last period of his mandatory conscript service term").  I'm affraid you have no idea about what "dedovschina" actually was and use it the same label for "something bad" (the same way as "Soviet tactics" must be by definition bad and outdated, while "Nato tactics" is by definition something good and progressive)

[ink]

1 hour ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

 

Ukrainian military culture is essentially Soviet military culture. Its naive to think they instantly changed, just because their soldiers received some foreign training.

It would be crazy if they "instantly changed" but for us to still be talking about a Soviet military culture a third of a century later is at the very least preposterous.

Edited February 18, 2025 by ink
to correct spellinh

[Roman Alymov]

Just now, ink said:

It would be crazy if they "instantly changed" but for us to still be talking about a Soviet military culture as third of a century later is at the very least preposterous.

There were numerous Soviet jokes about Soviet officials attempts to blame any problems on "the heavy legacy of the tsarist regime".......

[sunday]

Well, things in Russia move slowly...