War in Ukraine, technical and military aspects only

[ink]

11 hours ago, Roman Alymov said:

So as we see no need for the SPG crew to know what is the target (it is not necessary data), and even the result of the mission. Their task is to move fast and fire accurately at coordinates provided, laser guidance from drone/spotter will do the lest.

Yes, agreed. I wasn't suggesting that there's a need for them to know what the target is - I just surmised from the fact they don't know, that they're not in very direct communication with the drone team.

11 hours ago, Roman Alymov said:

Drone team is only communicating to SPG crew (or, rather, SPG battery command) when operaing in so called "ROK"(razvedyvatelno-udarny kontur, spotting and firing team where recon asset(s) are directly communicated to firing asset(s)).

Very interesting, thanks.

11 hours ago, Roman Alymov said:

In other cases, it is a lot of bureaucratic stages in between (that is why Iskander is often the weapon of coince to hit mobile targets as this type of weaoons got the least number of stages between command and launcher).

Wonder then how they do things for tother guided artillery, like Tornado.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Tornado does not seem to have played much of a role in this war, presumably at least partly for this reason. I had assumed that was because they didnt have many systems, Id not considered it could be bureaucracy at work.

 

[ink]

20 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Tornado does not seem to have played much of a role in this war, presumably at least partly for this reason. I had assumed that was because they didnt have many systems, Id not considered it could be bureaucracy at work.

 

I think it's hard to figure out how much of a role the system has played... Like Iskander, Tornado strikes will only be visible to us if there's a drone video of the strike. An additional problem is that Tornado strikes might be initially tough to distinguish from strikes by other artillery systems. But that doesn't mean they don't take place. It would be like saying, based on the paucity of video evidence, that Russian cruise missiles haven't played much of a role - where actually what's happening is that we can't make a reasonable assessment of the role they have/haven't played.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Well, judging by how much video footage put out of Iskander strikes, even 2S7 and 2S5, Im surprised that Russia has not seen fit to do so of Tornado S. Even the older rocket systems, such as Uragan have been seen, and occasionally destroyed. Of Tornado, nothing has been seen, other than an early capture of a reload vehicle by the Ukrainians.

Odd, right?

[ink]

2 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Well, judging by how much video footage put out of Iskander strikes, even 2S7 and 2S5, Im surprised that Russia has not seen fit to do so of Tornado S. Even the older rocket systems, such as Uragan have been seen, and occasionally destroyed. Of Tornado, nothing has been seen, other than an early capture of a reload vehicle by the Ukrainians.

Odd, right?

I mean, there definitely have been videos of strikes purported to by Tornado... Just not that many. But I don't think too many systems are available or have been deployed to Ukraine.

[alejandro_]

Accurate analysis of the lessons learned from UkAF Su-24 and Su-25 operations. Note that Su-25 uses a turbojet deriving from that used by MiG-21, and is famous for being sturdy and reliable.

Lessons learned from the Su-25 operations

The Su-25 is widely known as a robust, simple, easy to maintain and operate combat jet, capable of generating pretty high sortie rates, operating from poorly prepared airstrips. Mothballed airframes are also easy for returning to service, considering the much-relaxed wartime airworthiness requirements, while engines, parts and accessories are easy to repair and overhaul by the network of local maintenance facilities. 

The Frogfoot allows for a rapid training of young and inexperienced pilots to join the combat effort, with this ability having been used to a full extent by the Ukrainian air arm. The Su-25-equipped detachments were able, in general, to avoid serious losses from Russian retaliatory strikes targeted against the main base and their forward operating locations. This has become possible thanks to the dispersed basing, frequent change of the forward operating locations and hiding of the aircraft when on the ground for prolonged times. The losses on the ground occurred when these rules were not obeyed - for example in October 2023; an Su-25 was destroyed by a Russian Lancet-3 loitering munition while parked in the open at a concrete stand at Dolgintsevo airfield near Kryvyi Rih.

At the same time, the unguided ordnance and lack of longer-range guided weapons and a sophisticated self-protection suite have rendered the Frogfoot largely ineffective for use in any more or less demanding CAS and BAI missions, as the aircraft becomes easy prey for enemy GBAD and fighters. As a result, the still-live and kicking Frogfoot fleet has had an insignificantly low contribution to Ukraine's overall war effort so far.

Su-24M/MR lessons learned

Undoubtedly, the first and perhaps the most important lesson learned from the UkrAF's Fencer-D/E operations is related to the successful adoption of the agile combat employment concept. This has greatly contributed to the survival of the fleet despite the Russian systematic effort to strike the airfields suspected to house Fencer operations with cruise and short-range ballistic missiles. 

The constant movement of the aircraft between a network of airfields across the country and the concealed supply of hundreds of Storm Shadow/ SCALP EG missiles to the locations, from where combat missions are flown, is a very complex activity. It requires a lot of organisation and co-ordination of combat operations and related weapons supply and logistics support. This complex game has been mastered by the Ukrainians (thanks to significant foreign assistance) with the most solid proof being the lack of confirmed Fencer losses since the beginning of the Storm Shadow/SCALP- EG strike operations in May 2023. Another lesson learned calls for the importance of having trained reserve crews to operate a complex weapons delivery platform. Reservists and volunteers who returned from retirement were able to attain combat-ready status in a short time, having the motivation to assume the excessively high risks associated with flying combat missions against a superior foe, sporting potent GBAD networks and fighters armed with long-range air-to-air missiles.

The third important lesson derived from deep-strike operations concerns use of relatively small numbers of air-launched missiles with stand-off range - despite their high accuracy and low observability characteristics, they could not bring the desired game- changing effect of knocking out the Russian military machine, especially when dense GBAD networks are capable of gunning down a proportion of the missiles.

In addition, the real-world war effect depends on the optimal selection of the targets, but it is a well-known fact that the Ukrainian way of selecting the target set is far from meeting this requirement. This assertion could be well illustrated with the example of the strike on the Black Fleet HQ in the centre of Sevastopol, delivered on September 22, 2023, with two missiles. The HQ (used in peacetime) has been out of active use from the beginning of war as all of the Black Sea command authorities relocated to well-protected remote locations outside the city, provided with underground bunkers. So, this strike could be regarded as a clear waste of precious missile stocks, efforts and resources, and it is not an isolated case in the history of Ukrainian deep- strike operations.

Delivering systematic strikes against all known Russian ammunition dumps, at up to 170nm depth behind the front line, in addition to other important but less-defended military and infrastructure targets, mostly in the Donbas, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions, and also inside Crimea, could have led to a much better overall warfighting effect.

In this way, the Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG missiles have reportedly failed to play the important role of shaping the battlefield by inflicting serious damage to the Russian command-and-control networks and logistics chains supplying ammunition and fuel to the front line, in order to facilitate the much-touted counter- offensive in 2023 or some other large- scale operations on the ground or at sea in 2024.

AirForces Monthly 7/2024

[Perun]

10 minutes ago, alejandro_ said:

Accurate analysis of the lessons learned from UkAF Su-24 and Su-25 operations. Note that Su-25 uses a turbojet deriving from that used by MiG-21, and is famous for being sturdy and reliable.

Lessons learned from the Su-25 operations

The Su-25 is widely known as a robust, simple, easy to maintain and operate combat jet, capable of generating pretty high sortie rates, operating from poorly prepared airstrips. Mothballed airframes are also easy for returning to service, considering the much-relaxed wartime airworthiness requirements, while engines, parts and accessories are easy to repair and overhaul by the network of local maintenance facilities. 

The Frogfoot allows for a rapid training of young and inexperienced pilots to join the combat effort, with this ability having been used to a full extent by the Ukrainian air arm. The Su-25-equipped detachments were able, in general, to avoid serious losses from Russian retaliatory strikes targeted against the main base and their forward operating locations. This has become possible thanks to the dispersed basing, frequent change of the forward operating locations and hiding of the aircraft when on the ground for prolonged times. The losses on the ground occurred when these rules were not obeyed - for example in October 2023; an Su-25 was destroyed by a Russian Lancet-3 loitering munition while parked in the open at a concrete stand at Dolgintsevo airfield near Kryvyi Rih.

At the same time, the unguided ordnance and lack of longer-range guided weapons and a sophisticated self-protection suite have rendered the Frogfoot largely ineffective for use in any more or less demanding CAS and BAI missions, as the aircraft becomes easy prey for enemy GBAD and fighters. As a result, the still-live and kicking Frogfoot fleet has had an insignificantly low contribution to Ukraine's overall war effort so far.

Su-24M/MR lessons learned

Undoubtedly, the first and perhaps the most important lesson learned from the UkrAF's Fencer-D/E operations is related to the successful adoption of the agile combat employment concept. This has greatly contributed to the survival of the fleet despite the Russian systematic effort to strike the airfields suspected to house Fencer operations with cruise and short-range ballistic missiles. 

The constant movement of the aircraft between a network of airfields across the country and the concealed supply of hundreds of Storm Shadow/ SCALP EG missiles to the locations, from where combat missions are flown, is a very complex activity. It requires a lot of organisation and co-ordination of combat operations and related weapons supply and logistics support. This complex game has been mastered by the Ukrainians (thanks to significant foreign assistance) with the most solid proof being the lack of confirmed Fencer losses since the beginning of the Storm Shadow/SCALP- EG strike operations in May 2023. Another lesson learned calls for the importance of having trained reserve crews to operate a complex weapons delivery platform. Reservists and volunteers who returned from retirement were able to attain combat-ready status in a short time, having the motivation to assume the excessively high risks associated with flying combat missions against a superior foe, sporting potent GBAD networks and fighters armed with long-range air-to-air missiles.

The third important lesson derived from deep-strike operations concerns use of relatively small numbers of air-launched missiles with stand-off range - despite their high accuracy and low observability characteristics, they could not bring the desired game- changing effect of knocking out the Russian military machine, especially when dense GBAD networks are capable of gunning down a proportion of the missiles.

In addition, the real-world war effect depends on the optimal selection of the targets, but it is a well-known fact that the Ukrainian way of selecting the target set is far from meeting this requirement. This assertion could be well illustrated with the example of the strike on the Black Fleet HQ in the centre of Sevastopol, delivered on September 22, 2023, with two missiles. The HQ (used in peacetime) has been out of active use from the beginning of war as all of the Black Sea command authorities relocated to well-protected remote locations outside the city, provided with underground bunkers. So, this strike could be regarded as a clear waste of precious missile stocks, efforts and resources, and it is not an isolated case in the history of Ukrainian deep- strike operations.

Delivering systematic strikes against all known Russian ammunition dumps, at up to 170nm depth behind the front line, in addition to other important but less-defended military and infrastructure targets, mostly in the Donbas, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions, and also inside Crimea, could have led to a much better overall warfighting effect.

In this way, the Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG missiles have reportedly failed to play the important role of shaping the battlefield by inflicting serious damage to the Russian command-and-control networks and logistics chains supplying ammunition and fuel to the front line, in order to facilitate the much-touted counter- offensive in 2023 or some other large- scale operations on the ground or at sea in 2024.

AirForces Monthly 7/2024

Interesting text, thanks

[ink]

Just now, Perun said:

Interesting text, thanks

Seconded.

[Perun]

 

[Perun]

1 minute ago, Perun said:

 

It seams that system translated Novogorodskoye (New City or New Town, rough closest translation) to New York 🙂

Edited July 3, 2024 by Perun

[mandeb48]

2 hours ago, alejandro_ said:

Accurate analysis of the lessons learned from UkAF Su-24 and Su-25 operations. Note that Su-25 uses a turbojet deriving from that used by MiG-21, and is famous for being sturdy and reliable.

Lessons learned from the Su-25 operations

 

 

I agree and the obsolescence of the original Su-25 was to be expected. I always sympathized with him but now he has no place on a modern battlefield. But the Su-25SM3 disappointed me. I expected a little more from it after abandoning the old Klen_Ps optical system

[alejandro_]

8 minutes ago, mandeb48 said:

I agree and the obsolescence of the original Su-25 was to be expected. I always sympathized with him but now he has no place on a modern battlefield. But the Su-25SM3 disappointed me. I expected a little more from it after abandoning the old Klen_Ps optical system

Maybe, but it is also worth remembering that Ukraine has received a huge number of MANPADS, up to the point that they could overwhelm defensive equipment installed in that variant.

[alejandro_]

Yesterday Poltava air base was attacked, and a Mi-24 likely damaged.
 

In the video you can see the Long Range Aviation Museum, which I visited in 2017.

https://alejandro-8.blogspot.com/2018/06/museo-de-aviacion-de-largo-alcance-y.html
https://alejandro-8.blogspot.com/2018/07/museo-de-aviacion-de-largo-alcance-y.html

[glenn239]

10 hours ago, Perun said:

 

One day someone in that war will figure out that they can quickly build a $50,000 enclosed hangers out of old shipping containers.  Won't stop a big warhead, but would do fine against drones and cluster bombs.

[TrustMe]

These old Soviet era airbases where considered so far away from the probably conflict area - East and West Germany - that they were not fitted with HAS's. Also both the Su27/30/35 and Su34 are so large that building a HAS for them is difficult. 

Edited July 3, 2024 by TrustMe

[crazyinsane105]

8 hours ago, alejandro_ said:

Accurate analysis of the lessons learned from UkAF Su-24 and Su-25 operations. Note that Su-25 uses a turbojet deriving from that used by MiG-21, and is famous for being sturdy and reliable.

Lessons learned from the Su-25 operations

The Su-25 is widely known as a robust, simple, easy to maintain and operate combat jet, capable of generating pretty high sortie rates, operating from poorly prepared airstrips. Mothballed airframes are also easy for returning to service, considering the much-relaxed wartime airworthiness requirements, while engines, parts and accessories are easy to repair and overhaul by the network of local maintenance facilities. 

The Frogfoot allows for a rapid training of young and inexperienced pilots to join the combat effort, with this ability having been used to a full extent by the Ukrainian air arm. The Su-25-equipped detachments were able, in general, to avoid serious losses from Russian retaliatory strikes targeted against the main base and their forward operating locations. This has become possible thanks to the dispersed basing, frequent change of the forward operating locations and hiding of the aircraft when on the ground for prolonged times. The losses on the ground occurred when these rules were not obeyed - for example in October 2023; an Su-25 was destroyed by a Russian Lancet-3 loitering munition while parked in the open at a concrete stand at Dolgintsevo airfield near Kryvyi Rih.

At the same time, the unguided ordnance and lack of longer-range guided weapons and a sophisticated self-protection suite have rendered the Frogfoot largely ineffective for use in any more or less demanding CAS and BAI missions, as the aircraft becomes easy prey for enemy GBAD and fighters. As a result, the still-live and kicking Frogfoot fleet has had an insignificantly low contribution to Ukraine's overall war effort so far.

Su-24M/MR lessons learned

Undoubtedly, the first and perhaps the most important lesson learned from the UkrAF's Fencer-D/E operations is related to the successful adoption of the agile combat employment concept. This has greatly contributed to the survival of the fleet despite the Russian systematic effort to strike the airfields suspected to house Fencer operations with cruise and short-range ballistic missiles. 

The constant movement of the aircraft between a network of airfields across the country and the concealed supply of hundreds of Storm Shadow/ SCALP EG missiles to the locations, from where combat missions are flown, is a very complex activity. It requires a lot of organisation and co-ordination of combat operations and related weapons supply and logistics support. This complex game has been mastered by the Ukrainians (thanks to significant foreign assistance) with the most solid proof being the lack of confirmed Fencer losses since the beginning of the Storm Shadow/SCALP- EG strike operations in May 2023. Another lesson learned calls for the importance of having trained reserve crews to operate a complex weapons delivery platform. Reservists and volunteers who returned from retirement were able to attain combat-ready status in a short time, having the motivation to assume the excessively high risks associated with flying combat missions against a superior foe, sporting potent GBAD networks and fighters armed with long-range air-to-air missiles.

The third important lesson derived from deep-strike operations concerns use of relatively small numbers of air-launched missiles with stand-off range - despite their high accuracy and low observability characteristics, they could not bring the desired game- changing effect of knocking out the Russian military machine, especially when dense GBAD networks are capable of gunning down a proportion of the missiles.

In addition, the real-world war effect depends on the optimal selection of the targets, but it is a well-known fact that the Ukrainian way of selecting the target set is far from meeting this requirement. This assertion could be well illustrated with the example of the strike on the Black Fleet HQ in the centre of Sevastopol, delivered on September 22, 2023, with two missiles. The HQ (used in peacetime) has been out of active use from the beginning of war as all of the Black Sea command authorities relocated to well-protected remote locations outside the city, provided with underground bunkers. So, this strike could be regarded as a clear waste of precious missile stocks, efforts and resources, and it is not an isolated case in the history of Ukrainian deep- strike operations.

Delivering systematic strikes against all known Russian ammunition dumps, at up to 170nm depth behind the front line, in addition to other important but less-defended military and infrastructure targets, mostly in the Donbas, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions, and also inside Crimea, could have led to a much better overall warfighting effect.

In this way, the Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG missiles have reportedly failed to play the important role of shaping the battlefield by inflicting serious damage to the Russian command-and-control networks and logistics chains supplying ammunition and fuel to the front line, in order to facilitate the much-touted counter- offensive in 2023 or some other large- scale operations on the ground or at sea in 2024.

AirForces Monthly 7/2024

Regarding long range missile usage…didn’t the Russians spread out all their ammo dumps to the point where a few missile strikes wouldn’t have had caused sufficient damage? Same with fuel dumps. Matter of fact, there hasn’t been a significant ammo dump explosion on Russian held territory for a very long time. 
 

 

[Soldier36]

Footage of an attack by two Ukrainian naval drones, presumably MAGURA, on Russian ships in the Black Sea near the city of Novorossiysk. Perhaps the attack was aimed at the Russian patrol ship “Ladny” of Project 1135 and a large landing ship of Project 775. Judging by the video, the ships did not repel the attack of sea drones; the fire was fired from the shore or from other ships not included in the video. As a result of the battle, both sea drones were destroyed.

 

 

[Soldier36]

Attack on the Yuzhmash defense plant of Ukraine on July 3. Powerful explosions occurred at the Yuzhmash plant in the Dnepropetrovsk region. According to Ukrainian media, a combined attack on the largest defense enterprise in eastern Ukraine, the Yuzhmash plant, was carried out by the Russian army.
The attack used Iskander-M, Iskander-K and Kh-59 missiles, as well as kamikaze drones Geran and Orlan-10. According to Ukrainian media, the air defense shot down everything except two Iskander-K missiles.

 

 

[Soldier36]

In Nizhny Tagil, near the Uralvagonzavod buildings, a new Russian heavy infantry fighting vehicle was spotted. The BMP was created on the basis of the T-72 tank and has a large landing compartment; it is remotely similar to the BMO-T heavy combat vehicle. While the new heavy infantry fighting vehicle does not have a combat module, it is possible that the Berezhok combat module from the BMP-2M will be installed, information about it is on the channel.

 

 

[Josh]

7 hours ago, glenn239 said:

One day someone in that war will figure out that they can quickly build a $50,000 enclosed hangers out of old shipping containers.  Won't stop a big warhead, but would do fine against drones and cluster bombs.

What would you fit in it , outside UAVs?

[alejandro_]

14 hours ago, crazyinsane105 said:

Regarding long range missile usage…didn’t the Russians spread out all their ammo dumps to the point where a few missile strikes wouldn’t have had caused sufficient damage? Same with fuel dumps. Matter of fact, there hasn’t been a significant ammo dump explosion on Russian held territory for a very long time. 

If you mean the attacks in the early phase of the conflict, the majority were carried out with HIMARS, not cruising/ballistic missiles. Russian Army adapted by placing ammunition dumps further away from the front, and reducing the size of them by having more with less ammunition.

[Ssnake]

...and as a consequence, the logistical effort on the Russian side has gone way up, requiring more trucks and more truck crews to haul the ammo from distant dumps to artillery positions. Also, it reduced the Russian ammo stockpile by a considerable margin, to the point they're now firing North Korean shit with 30% dud rate. All in all, a resounding success.

[Stuart Galbraith]

You have to wonder how many of that supposed Russian troop advantage all went to driving trucks full of rubber dogshit from dump A to dump B.

Edited July 4, 2024 by Stuart Galbraith

[alejandro_]

RUSI report on production, some excerpts:
 

In addition, Russia has set about refilling and restoring the approximately 20% of its pre-war munitions stockpile that was severely degraded. Combined with munitions orders from Iran, Belarus, Syria and North Korea22 – also heavily
sanctioned – Russian overall munitions availability is likely to remain steady at  4 million munitions for 2024 and 2025. Despite efforts to curb this increase among Ukraine’s international partners, Russia has continued to be able to import
nitrocellulose from Germany, Türkiye and Taiwan, and other precursors for explosive energetics from around the world, to sustain this rapid expansion of its munitions production.

A similar story can be told about Russia’s manufacture of long-range missiles. One of the cruise missiles most widely employed by Russian forces during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been the Kh-101.24 In 2021, prior to the fullscale invasion, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) had a target of producing 350 of these missiles per year. Actual production was just 56 missiles. In 2022, the Russian MoD set a target of producing 460 Kh-101s per year. By 2023, actual production had reached 420 Kh-101s per year, not only dwarfing pre-war production, but also closing the gap between Russia’s ambitions and its outputs. At the beginning of 2023, Russia had approximately 50 9M723 ballistic missiles left in stock. Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia produced approximately six of these missiles per month. Production has since more than tripled, such that, despite using Iskanders throughout 2023, Russia began 2024 with 180 9M723 and 9M727 in stock.

Shahed-136 production, meanwhile, has similarly expanded drastically. Original Iranian production rates were close to 40 per month. Between Russia and Iran, current production of these munitions has surpassed 250 per month. Given that all these munitions are critically dependent on US- and foreign-origin microelectronics, these figures clearly demonstrate that sanctions and other measures have entirely failed to slow production. Indeed, in some instances,
access to specific components has increased. When the Russian military began to drop aerial bombs with UMPK glide kits, they were guided by Kometa-M satellite navigation modules using antennae from the Irish company Taoglas.30
Despite these components being identified early in 2023, Russia has not only significantly increased production of Kometa-M, now using it across a number of UAVs including Geran-2s, but has also developed an eight-antennae array for the UMPK, doubling the number of Taoglas antennae used per system. 

The Russian MoD assesses that the impact of Western sanctions on production of key weapons systems has been to impose a 30% increase in the price of microelectronic components.32 This is not trivial, but it is also manageable

For example, Russia is producing approximately 1,500 tanks and 3,000 other armoured fighting vehicles in 2024 and is set to produce a similar number in 2025.33 Approximately 85% of these are vehicles refurbished from storage. Nevertheless, the number of newly produced vehicles has also been rising. For example, the Kurganmashzavod plant produced 100 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles during Q1 2023. In Q2, this rose to 108 vehicles. In Q3, 120 BMP-3s rolled off the production line and in Q4, 135 were produced.34 This increase may seem modest, but it shows that Russia is steadily expanding production capacity. In some cases, this is achieved by cutting corners and reprioritising. For example, in 2023, Russia produced 728 Tigr-M, a rate that is anticipated to fall to 721 in 2024, while the level of environmental protection from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats on the vehicle is being reduced. 

Russian artillery – the backbone of its battlefield successes – consumes vast quantities of ammunition. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 2022, Russian industry was producing a mere 250,000 rounds of 152 mm ammunition per year. By the beginning of 2023, it had increased production to 1 million rounds per year. Over the course of 2023, Russian production of 152 mm shells rose further, so that the country expects to manufacture 1.325 million rounds in 2024. Meanwhile, 122 mm artillery ammunition increased to an expected output of 800,000 rounds over 2024.

The production of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) started from a much lower base, but has increased at a faster rate. In 2023, Russian 122 mm Grad production was just 33,000 rounds, but in 2024, production is on track to exceed 500,000 rounds. Similarly, 220 mm Uragan rocket production was just 2,800 rounds in 2023, but is on track to reach 17,000 rounds in 2024, with a similar rate of increase anticipated into 2025. This prioritisation of MLRS production is intended to compensate for shortages of replacement barrels in 2025.

https://static.rusi.org/methodology-degrading-arms-russia-rusi-op-june-2024.pdf

Note that Shahed use against Ukraine has been way higher than 250 per month. In 2024 the lowest monthly figure was 287, and the highest 513. so far ~5,000 have been used. 

Kh-101 - 1,153 launched since January 2023 (the category also includes Kh-555).

 

 

[Pavel Novak]

15 hours ago, TrustMe said:

These old Soviet era airbases where considered so far away from the probably conflict area - East and West Germany - that they were not fitted with HAS's. Also both the Su27/30/35 and Su34 are so large that building a HAS for them is difficult. 

There were HASes for them and in 1980s it becomed standard for new constructions. Even other Warsaw Pact states started to built them. But yes definitely issue here is that it was so far from expected battlefield.