War in Ukraine, technical and military aspects only

[bojan]

We don't know so much things about Russian logistics that I don't even know where would I begin. First, I could not find Russian source* how requests from unit level are handled. How are supply numbers requests estimated? How is planning done and on what level? I can not draw on local experience, since unit structure is sagnificantly different (due the different nature of expected opponent). etc, etc.

*Plenty of "we think this is how it works" from western analysts, but those are not primary sources and those also list no real sources, only other estimates.

So I think that just as with "future development of war fortune telling" we can not have a good picture of the Russian logistic problems other than to tell in the most wide terms that there are significant problems and bottlenecks. But no idea what is a reason for those, are they fixable in short/mid/long term, are they consequence of operating to a plan or operating against the plan etc, etc.

Like... the tires thing. How it came it has disappeared practically overnight? Is it due the it being solved, or due the it never being as significant as implied or due the different tempo of operations? Or all factors, or neither of those?

 

Edited November 17, 2022 by bojan

[seahawk]

The tire thing disappeared because the whole war became less mobile. If a truck has a tire failure now, it just waits for a spare. What we see however is a lot of signs of cannibalizing the fleet of vehicles to keep some runners going.

We also see that the whole supply train seems to be largely based on manual loading of individual crates. We do not see containers in meaningful numbers nor do we see much a pre-packed palletized stuff. This means that your whole handling is very labour intensive and will need a lot of manpower.

[alejandro_]

I thought this message by bd1 was worth copying here:

Here was a very interesting post about russian AF Su-34 tactics  in north Ukraine, written from rus POV. it was taken from here https://t.me/s/voenacher  and google-translated into estonian. unfortunately i can´t find the original here, so  short summary from estonian posts, hopefully not too many translation mistakes

- after rus. pullout from Kiev, they were sent to Izyum area, they were doing ground attacks (translat said TV-guided, but possibly mistake of pilot jargon?) against Ukr. rear area and logistics.

Ukraine also deployed their AD and aviation , that was still ´plenty at that time´ by orig. post. there were S-300 and ´quite a lot of  travelling Buk´s´´  (towed on trailers , i assume). Specifically, Buk´s were the main problem, being hard for rus. intel to discover .

As in Kiev, main Ukr. tactics was mobile ambushes by roaming Buks, that changed positions quickly and were generally as close to frontlines as possible . 

so, russians had to use flight profile that saw them get as close to target as possible in min. height, accelerate to 950-1000km/h on afterburner and do a sudden  pull-up to 5000-7000 meteres that was necessary, all-in-all that was very risky in those conditions. that was necessary in order to ´shine´ on ukr. radar screens as shortly as possible.  as a rule, flight on such height didn´ took longer than  30 sec., which was a lot, since S-300 needs after detection only 20 sec. to launch.

All this made the life of navigator quite complicated, since he had to look with one eye the target on ´TV set´  and compare that with the  satellite picture, all in 30 sec.   all this makes the Su-34 the best (rus) airplane for this , because the pilot can fly the aircraft and keep an eye on air and AD ready to maneuvering if necessary,  and the navigator  can look and destroy targets

on one such flight they met ukr. fighter. 

after approach to target , rising to 6500m. and turning around, they started their work, shooting 2 missiles to 2 different targets. things got tense when near Slovyansk area the Ukr. S-300 were turned on that were ´probing´ them. and on the air pilot heard  (Ukr. ?) command post´s report about unknown target

russian bomber pilots  had learned already at Kiev, that when Ukr ground control starts dictating target parameters on air, it´s a good idea to compare them to yours, just in case. so , hearing this this time the pilot started to compare the numbers and heard the ground control guide someone on  their direction, who was below them and slower. 

almost at once the Su-35 covering the Su-34 reacted and told them worriedly that it´s probably a Mig-29 coming at them .  Su-34 crew was close to releasing their second missile, but so was the Ukr fighter too. covering Su-35 was on the air , agitately reading  the distances from his radar and finally yelled  them to  GTFO or so. tensions arising, even Su-34  recognisition system (IFF? radar?) showed on screen ´F-16´ ( target library had Mig-29 filed under F-16).

at that moment navigator yelled ´got it, let´s go´, so pilot did some heavy maneuvering a´la Göring´s dive bombers. they told their cover that they started their pulling back, dropped down to 30 meters and, licking on local flora, started their way home at 1000kmh

i hope i did not make too many mistakes, the ´cover´ (or , ´roof´ in original text) being the Su-35 most of time i guess, possibly AEW or rus. ground control on one  case

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

My comments below:

Su-34 can use a Platan laser/TV targeting system placed ventrally. 

Lack of targeting pods has been pointed out as a problem in Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), although perhaps it is not so relevant due to lack of guided ammunition stocks. Russia does produce a targeting pod, T220, developed by NPK SPP. It was acquired by Egypt and seen in small numbers in Su-35.

Edited November 17, 2022 by alejandro_

[bojan]

There was also link that Retac posted that discussed some aspects of air war that has stayed hidden from most of the public, including confirming long range air-air hit by R-37M missile and incredible importance (and neglect in replacement) of higher levels of AD for Ukraine.

[TrustMe]

3 minutes ago, bojan said:

There was also link that Retac posted that discussed some aspects of air war that has stayed hidden from most of the public, including confirming long range air-air hit by R-37M missile and incredible importance (and neglect in replacement) of higher levels of AD for Ukraine.

The Russians are using the R37M on both modified MIG31's and also the Su35's.

[Der Zeitgeist]

9 minutes ago, bojan said:

There was also link that Retac posted that discussed some aspects of air war that has stayed hidden from most of the public, including confirming long range air-air hit by R-37M missile and incredible importance (and neglect in replacement) of higher levels of AD for Ukraine.

That's the report "The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence" by RUSI. Well worth reading, especially the parts about Russian fixed-wing and helicopter operations.

https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-final.pdf

[Angrybk]

Interesting analysis of the Kerch Bridge attack: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/11/17/world/europe/crimea-bridge-collapse.html

Quote

But the experts differed on whether the sequence indicated a sophisticated plan.

It was possible that planners of the attack hoped the fuel tanks would explode and inflict major damage on the railway bridge, said Adam Evans, a structural engineer at Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates. But he said it was unlikely that the explosion was intentionally timed at a sweet spot to cause damage to the roadway.

“I would be hard-pressed to believe that,” Mr. Evans said. “I think it’s probably more like, ‘We’ll drive a bomb over this bridge and we’ll cause a lot of damage.’ ”

In fact, several engineers said, the damage from the explosion might have been greater if the bomb had gone off a minute or two later. The truck had already started up the incline to the large, raised section of the bridge held up by a set of soaring steel arches.

 

 

 

 

 

Source: AP By Nailah Morgan and Sarah Kerr

A large enough blast there might have been able to damage the arches and disable the entire roadway bridge, engineers say.

“It almost seems as if this was a mistake that it blew up where it did,” said Shankar Nair, a structural engineer based in Chicago with more than 50 years of experience designing bridges.

That raises questions about how the explosion was timed and whether the driver of the truck knew about the bomb.

A remote detonation could be difficult to time precisely. But a suicide bomber might have been expected to hold off until the truck made it to the arched span, Mr. Nair said. A direct hit to the arch, with its enormous amount of steel, could have taken far longer to repair, he said.

“If it were a suicide truck bomb,” Mr. Nair said, “I would think the guy would have destroyed the main span.”

But the trigger for the bomb is still unknown. Suicide bombers often behave erratically, and it is unclear if the truck bomb that was used was large enough to take down the arched section of the bridge.

 

[Josh]

3 hours ago, seahawk said:

The tire thing disappeared because the whole war became less mobile. If a truck has a tire failure now, it just waits for a spare. What we see however is a lot of signs of cannibalizing the fleet of vehicles to keep some runners going.

We also see that the whole supply train seems to be largely based on manual loading of individual crates. We do not see containers in meaningful numbers nor do we see much a pre-packed palletized stuff. This means that your whole handling is very labour intensive and will need a lot of manpower.

Though unskilled manpower is not something the Russian army lacks at this point. Presumably any mobilized person could handle moving crates around with basically no training. Lack of containerization/palletization will still take a toll.

Edited November 17, 2022 by Josh

[Josh]

24 minutes ago, Angrybk said:

Interesting analysis of the Kerch Bridge attack: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/11/17/world/europe/crimea-bridge-collapse.html

 

The timing of blowing up the train on the adjacent bridge filled with oil tanks seems too perfect to be an accident to me, but I suspect it is one of those things we will never know the truth of. The information is probably held by whoever set the detonator, be it timed, remote, or the driver.

[seahawk]

11 minutes ago, Josh said:

Though unskilled manpower is not something the Russian army lacks at this point. Presumably any mobilized person could handle moving crates around with basically no training. Lack of containerization/palletization will still take a toll.

That is one of the big mysteries. One would assume that those mobilized troops would be used that way, so that better trained troops are freed from doing the logistical tasks, but that does not seem to be the case. It seems to be a lot easier to make a person a decent truck driver in a week compared to making him a soldier. But yet those troops seem to be used for combat.

[Josh]

4 minutes ago, seahawk said:

That is one of the big mysteries. One would assume that those mobilized troops would be used that way, so that better trained troops are freed from doing the logistical tasks, but that does not seem to be the case. It seems to be a lot easier to make a person a decent truck driver in a week compared to making him a soldier. But yet those troops seem to be used for combat.

I'm assuming all the logistical positions have already been filled? I can't believe that wouldn't be the first place mobilized were sent.

[RETAC21]

Lessons learned for France

 

[bojan]

1 hour ago, Josh said:

The timing of blowing up the train on the adjacent bridge filled with oil tanks seems too perfect to be an accident to me, but I suspect it is one of those things we will never know the truth of. The information is probably held by whoever set the detonator, be it timed, remote, or the driver.

IIRC Russians claim remotely detonated and driver being unaware of cargo. I see no reason why would they lie about that.

[RETAC21]

3 minutes ago, bojan said:

IIRC Russians claim remotely detonated and driver being unaware of cargo. I see no reason why would they lie about that.

I think the Russian narrative in this case is accurate, the Ukrainian secret services sent a truck bomb to Russia and got an innocent guy to drive it, plus I suspect they followed the truck to make it go off at the best possible time.

[Josh]

34 minutes ago, bojan said:

IIRC Russians claim remotely detonated and driver being unaware of cargo. I see no reason why would they lie about that.

That seems most likely to me in any case. I would assume that the original plan would be to blow the truck over the main spans, with the fuel train being a target of opportunity that was deemed worthy of detonating at another area of the bridge. I don't think the train could have been part of the original plan just because I doubt whoever set the bomb had much control over the timing of the delivery if the driver didn't know about it.

[alejandro_]

11 hours ago, TrustMe said:

The Russians are using the R37M on both modified MIG31's and also the Su35's.

Also, large numbers of R-77-1 were available. Two contracts were signed in 2015 and 2020 for 15 and 65 billion roubles. This missile is the Russian equivalent to AIM-120. I have not seen older R-27 in Russian fighter aircraft.

A good summary of an article written by Alexander Mladenov.

An attempt to objectively analyze the actions of Russian fighter aircraft and air defense in the SMO (Special Military OPeration) zone from the well-known expert on Russian aviation Alexander Mladenov.

Thus, Mladenov notes that the number of Russian fighters participating in the operation does not exceed 120 Su-35S, Su-30SM and MiG-31BM. All known cases of dogfights have involved a pair of Russian fighter jets. The interception of Ukrainian aircraft was carried out using guidance from AWACS aircraft or ground operators, all launches were carried out out of sight.

Russian air defense was also mostly successful. Significantly reducing the threat from Ukrainian Tochka-U ballistic missiles, combat aircraft, UAVs and large-caliber rockets.

During the first four days of the SMO, Russian aircraft shot down at least four MiG-29s and two Su-27s (or under one Su-27 and L-39) of the Ukrainian Air Force without loss. Ukrainian applications for downed Russian planes have not received confirmation. At a subsequent stage, Ukrainian aircraft were deployed to safer places in the country in order to avoid missile attacks, as well as to intercept Russian aircraft and missiles heading into the depths of the country. Ukrainian pilots acknowledged that it was practically impossible to intercept for launches of radar-guided missiles, all successful interceptions were carried out by infrared-guided missiles.

By the beginning of the conflict, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had about 30 MiG-29s, 20-25 Su-27s, about 30 Su-25 attack aircraft, 15 Su-24M front-line bombers and several Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft. At the same time, in March-April, the Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to increase the number of serviceable MiG-29s due to the supply of spare parts from abroad, most likely from Poland.

Speaking about the operations of the Aerospace Forces, it is noted that from the first day of hostilities, a pair of Su-35S regularly performed patrols over the territory of Russia, and the aircraft were armed with both air-to-air missiles and anti-radar missiles to destroy identified Ukrainian air defense systems. The defeat of air targets, which were considered a threat to the Russian ground forces, was carried out with the help of R-77-1 missiles. Su-35S turned out to be quite good for gaining local air supremacy and countering Ukrainian attack aircraft and helicopters. The N035 radar turned out to be quite sufficient for the chosen tactics, it could detect and capture low-flying targets at long ranges.

There is a case of a Ukrainian aircraft being intercepted by three R-77-1 missiles (presumably in May over the Kharkiv region) at a distance of 50 km. Moreover, after the launch of the last missile, the Su-35S turned 90 degrees, but the N035 radar was able to maintain contact with the target.

Speaking about the MiG-31BM fighter, two cases of interception of Ukrainian aircraft are reported. The first occurred in April, when a Su-24M front-line bomber was shot down by a R-37 missile, and the second on July 9, when a Su-25 attack aircraft was shot down.

Air defense, which is part of the Aerospace Forces and the Ground Forces, has shown itself well in terms of the control system. Long-range air defense systems were used to intercept Ukrainian Tochka-U missiles and Tu-143 UAVs. SAM calculations noted that the American M31 missiles turned out to be very difficult targets with a small effective scattering area and high speed, and the time window for a successful interception is only 10 seconds. The Buk-M3 was named the best complex for combating such targets.

In order to break through the Russian defenses, the Armed Forces of Ukraine often used a mixed volley of old Soviet rockets and new American ones to force the crews to shoot the ammunition.

[Ssnake]

22 hours ago, bojan said:

Like... the tires thing. How it came it has disappeared practically overnight? Is it due the it being solved, or due the it never being as significant as implied or due the different tempo of operations? Or all factors, or neither of those?

Tires that burst were replaced if the vehicle wasn't lost, so now they have fresh tires that still have their elasticity. Insofar it was only a significant thing when it happened early on, frequently, and all over the place, with the resulting (and somewhat avoidable) loss in materiel. That at least is my explanation.

[Daan]

22 hours ago, bojan said:

There was also link that Retac posted that discussed some aspects of air war that has stayed hidden from most of the public, including confirming long range air-air hit by R-37M missile and incredible importance (and neglect in replacement) of higher levels of AD for Ukraine.

Yeah, see for example here: https://rutube.ru/video/054d109bb856dc7b49d526a17080e6ac/

(I posted this in another thread as well.)

[Daan]

11 hours ago, alejandro_ said:

Also, large numbers of R-77-1 were available. Two contracts were signed in 2015 and 2020 for 15 and 65 billion roubles. This missile is the Russian equivalent to AIM-120. I have not seen older R-27 in Russian fighter aircraft.

A good summary of an article written by Alexander Mladenov.

An attempt to objectively analyze the actions of Russian fighter aircraft and air defense in the SMO (Special Military OPeration) zone from the well-known expert on Russian aviation Alexander Mladenov.

Thus, Mladenov notes that the number of Russian fighters participating in the operation does not exceed 120 Su-35S, Su-30SM and MiG-31BM. All known cases of dogfights have involved a pair of Russian fighter jets. The interception of Ukrainian aircraft was carried out using guidance from AWACS aircraft or ground operators, all launches were carried out out of sight.

Russian air defense was also mostly successful. Significantly reducing the threat from Ukrainian Tochka-U ballistic missiles, combat aircraft, UAVs and large-caliber rockets.

During the first four days of the SMO, Russian aircraft shot down at least four MiG-29s and two Su-27s (or under one Su-27 and L-39) of the Ukrainian Air Force without loss. Ukrainian applications for downed Russian planes have not received confirmation. At a subsequent stage, Ukrainian aircraft were deployed to safer places in the country in order to avoid missile attacks, as well as to intercept Russian aircraft and missiles heading into the depths of the country. Ukrainian pilots acknowledged that it was practically impossible to intercept for launches of radar-guided missiles, all successful interceptions were carried out by infrared-guided missiles.

By the beginning of the conflict, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had about 30 MiG-29s, 20-25 Su-27s, about 30 Su-25 attack aircraft, 15 Su-24M front-line bombers and several Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft. At the same time, in March-April, the Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to increase the number of serviceable MiG-29s due to the supply of spare parts from abroad, most likely from Poland.

Speaking about the operations of the Aerospace Forces, it is noted that from the first day of hostilities, a pair of Su-35S regularly performed patrols over the territory of Russia, and the aircraft were armed with both air-to-air missiles and anti-radar missiles to destroy identified Ukrainian air defense systems. The defeat of air targets, which were considered a threat to the Russian ground forces, was carried out with the help of R-77-1 missiles. Su-35S turned out to be quite good for gaining local air supremacy and countering Ukrainian attack aircraft and helicopters. The N035 radar turned out to be quite sufficient for the chosen tactics, it could detect and capture low-flying targets at long ranges.

There is a case of a Ukrainian aircraft being intercepted by three R-77-1 missiles (presumably in May over the Kharkiv region) at a distance of 50 km. Moreover, after the launch of the last missile, the Su-35S turned 90 degrees, but the N035 radar was able to maintain contact with the target.

Speaking about the MiG-31BM fighter, two cases of interception of Ukrainian aircraft are reported. The first occurred in April, when a Su-24M front-line bomber was shot down by a R-37 missile, and the second on July 9, when a Su-25 attack aircraft was shot down.

Air defense, which is part of the Aerospace Forces and the Ground Forces, has shown itself well in terms of the control system. Long-range air defense systems were used to intercept Ukrainian Tochka-U missiles and Tu-143 UAVs. SAM calculations noted that the American M31 missiles turned out to be very difficult targets with a small effective scattering area and high speed, and the time window for a successful interception is only 10 seconds. The Buk-M3 was named the best complex for combating such targets.

In order to break through the Russian defenses, the Armed Forces of Ukraine often used a mixed volley of old Soviet rockets and new American ones to force the crews to shoot the ammunition.

If you have not seen the R-27, you must not have been paying attention. It is still regularly seen on the Su-30SMs in this conflict (for example the Su-30SMs in this footage), as well as older Su-27 family variants that play more of a side-role in this conflict (intercepts over the Black Sea of NATO aircraft, including baseline Su-27Ps). While the Su-35 in Syria was still observed carrying the R-27 next to the R-77 by default, in this conflict the aircraft is generally seen with a R-77 / R-73 combination, or, since a few months, 1-2 R-37Ms in addition, mainly carried between the engines. 

The Irbis E of the Su-35 has a maximum azimuth of 60 degrees to each side. That is why the follow-on, the Su-57, mounts additional antennae in addition to the radar in the nose.  

[Stuart Galbraith]

I think I recall reading on the DCS forums, the Su27 generally is not able to fire R77  without upgrade to its radar system. Which being so old, they generally dont get.

[alejandro_]

36 minutes ago, Daan said:

If you have not seen the R-27, you must not have been paying attention. It is still regularly seen on the Su-30SMs in this conflict (for example the Su-30SMs in this footage), as well as older Su-27 family variants that play more of a side-role in this conflict (intercepts over the Black Sea of NATO aircraft, including baseline Su-27Ps). While the Su-35 in Syria was still observed carrying the R-27 next to the R-77 by default, in this conflict the aircraft is generally seen with a R-77 / R-73 combination, or, since a few months, 1-2 R-37Ms in addition, mainly carried between the engines. 

The Irbis E of the Su-35 has a maximum azimuth of 60 degrees to each side. That is why the follow-on, the Su-57, mounts additional antennae in addition to the radar in the nose.  

Thanks, maybe it is still used for interceptions rather than in combat missions over Ukraine. 

Regarding N035 Irbis, the lock was kept on the beam: "After the firing of the last of the three missiles, the Su-35S began turning to the left at about 90º, but its NO35 radar was still able to keep tracking the target in the ‘on-the-beam’ position."
 

29 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

I think I recall reading on the DCS forums, the Su27 generally is not able to fire R77  without upgrade to its radar system. Which being so old, they generally dont get.

Su-27 and early Su-30 would need new modes added to radar, but it was done (Venezuela and China Su-30s for example), same with upgraded SM. Now Soviet built Su-27s are being retired because of age. Interesting enough, in 2009 Russian MoD placed an order for 12 newly-built Su-27, named Su-27SM3. It is likely that this batch was produced with leftover components from China's license production, cancelled in 2004.

[Daan]

1 hour ago, alejandro_ said:

Thanks, maybe it is still used for interceptions rather than in combat missions over Ukraine. 

Regarding N035 Irbis, the lock was kept on the beam: "After the firing of the last of the three missiles, the Su-35S began turning to the left at about 90º, but its NO35 radar was still able to keep tracking the target in the ‘on-the-beam’ position."

I think it is much simpler: the modern units with offensive counter air as their primary focus get prioritized when it comes to being supplied with new and expensive missiles, that means those equipped with the Su-35S and MiG-31BM. The Su-30SM, often seen with a mix of R-27 / 73 / 77 or R-27 / 73 alone, is more of a multirole aircraft with a slightly less advanced radar.

The Russians are not the only one to do so. I have seen pictures taken this year of Israeli F-15s carrying a mix of Python 3s, 5s, AIM-120Bs and AIM-7Ms, as well as a flight of US F-16Cs with a mix of AIM-9Ms and AIM-9Xs. The older AIM-120B is also regularly seen on US aircraft.

Regarding the Irbis-E I did some searching, supposedly there is 60 degrees of azimuth allowed by electronic beam steering, boosted by 60 degrees of mechanical steering, all according to vague sources. So, perhaps it is possible.

Edited November 18, 2022 by Daan

[TrustMe]

7 hours ago, Daan said:

I think it is much simpler: the modern units with offensive counter air as their primary focus get prioritized when it comes to being supplied with new and expensive missiles, that means those equipped with the Su-35S and MiG-31BM. The Su-30SM, often seen with a mix of R-27 / 73 / 77 or R-27 / 73 alone, is more of a multirole aircraft with a slightly less advanced radar.

The Russians are not the only one to do so. I have seen pictures taken this year of Israeli F-15s carrying a mix of Python 3s, 5s, AIM-120Bs and AIM-7Ms, as well as a flight of US F-16Cs with a mix of AIM-9Ms and AIM-9Xs. The older AIM-120B is also regularly seen on US aircraft.

Regarding the Irbis-E I did some searching, supposedly there is 60 degrees of azimuth allowed by electronic beam steering, boosted by 60 degrees of mechanical steering, all according to vague sources. So, perhaps it is possible.

 

Mechanical steering is what us Brits are doing to our Eurofighters AESA radar variants. It's a compromise in achieving bigger electronic steering but less reliability.

[Daan]

Here is a picture of the Irbis E, showing the mechanical steering mechanism:

 

Edited November 18, 2022 by Daan

[alejandro_]

Ukrainian TAB-71M in Kherson. 
 

https://vk.com/milinfolive