NATO return to Cold War force structure

[sunday]

19 minutes ago, urbanoid said:

Delenda as a regional player and geopolitical factor in Europe (except as a potential threat to be deterred) - great idea actually. 

Delenda physically? Nah, not possible to do that even with medium nuclear powers due to potential consequences, let alone major ones. Those can only defeat themselves if they try hard enough and... nobody really wants that either, as disintegration of a major power opens yet another pandora's box. 

Delenda.

Were Russia be reduced to a bunch of independent, instantaneous countrylets, instability in the zone would be African-like. Apparently that is the neocon goal, another Hispanic America full of irrelevant polities. But as you say, that is not possible with a nuclear power unless one wants to trigger a nuclear WWIII.

Of course, nobody would want to trigger WWIII, death cults excepted. And there are no death cults around, or at least that is what we think.

 

[urbanoid]

Yeah, well, I don't think there are death cults in either the US or Russia. Even assuming that Russia loses in Ukraine, loses even Belarus some time down the line, certain people would still remain owners of the state and they don't want to 'rule' from the bunker under the Urals. 

The dissolution of Russian Federation would be a security nightmare even if 'le ebil West' could do it without military response from Russia. Hell, it would be a nightmare even if the West wasn't involed at all. Just think of those nuclear weapons and who knows what else being sold to the highest bidder by everyone in a position to do so. Also migrations and shit. And even more migrations, from elsewhere if Russia fails to export grain (they export ~3 times as much as Ukraine and even the disruption of Ukrainian exports was worrisome).

Russia will remain a somewhat viable state even if it loses in Ukraine*, just like China in case of getting its ass kicked in Taiwan. The same applies to the US, naturally. 

*but not necessarily viable as a great power, despite nuclear potential, what will remain would be either 'splendid isolation', 'selling their asses' to the Chinese (which might happen regardless of the outcome tbh), 'selling their asses' to the West or trying to play both sides as a mining operation and a gas station, with the latter being the most likely.

[Perun]

7 hours ago, urbanoid said:

Delenda as a regional player and geopolitical factor in Europe (except as a potential threat to be deterred) - great idea actually. 

Delenda physically? Nah, not possible to do that even with medium nuclear powers due to potential consequences, let alone major ones. Those can only defeat themselves if they try hard enough and... nobody really wants that either, as disintegration of a major power opens yet another pandora's box. 

And what would you achive with that? What do you think how long would it take for Germany to go east again, or Turkey to go west or some other country to mess things up

[Perun]

 

[seahawk]

Unnecessary provocation. We need to remove the USA from Europe.

[Martineleca]

11 hours ago, ink said:

Anyway, if it hadn't come along back in the 19th century, it would still have emerged as an idea anyway. All those people, speaking very closely related languages. It doesn't take any special level of thinking to say that there should be some cooperation.

Pan-Slavism in its 19th century interpretation which absolutely never existed before emerged as an idea in the offices of the Russian foreign intelligence service then spread by their agents and useful idiots throughout the lands, some of whom were executed on the shore of the Danube in 1887 after a failed coup as their handlers watched from the other side. The propaganda push didn't appear to have much of an effect, apart from a few notable exceptions on the Balkans nobody in Eastern Europe wanted to live under russkie rule, those that did actively struggled against it during multiple uprisings to regain their national independence.

[ink]

7 minutes ago, Martineleca said:

Pan-Slavism in its 19th century interpretation which absolutely never existed before emerged as an idea in the offices of the Russian foreign intelligence service then spread by their agents and useful idiots throughout the lands, some of whom were executed on the shore of the Danube in 1887 after a failed coup as their handlers watched from the other side. The propaganda push didn't appear to have much of an effect, apart from a few notable exceptions on the Balkans nobody in Eastern Europe wanted to live under russkie rule, those that did actively struggled against it during multiple uprisings to regain their national independence.

It's rare you meet a retrospective 19th century-focused conspiracy theorist, yet here we are.

EDIT: for those not in the know, pan Slavism was not about Russian rule. 

Edited June 4 by ink

[Perun]

29 minutes ago, Martineleca said:

Pan-Slavism in its 19th century interpretation which absolutely never existed before emerged as an idea in the offices of the Russian foreign intelligence service then spread by their agents and useful idiots throughout the lands, some of whom were executed on the shore of the Danube in 1887 after a failed coup as their handlers watched from the other side. The propaganda push didn't appear to have much of an effect, apart from a few notable exceptions on the Balkans nobody in Eastern Europe wanted to live under russkie rule, those that did actively struggled against it during multiple uprisings to regain their national independence.

You should change your source of information. It seams that now you are using either old german sources or bad english one or both but they are all wrong

[seahawk]

23 minutes ago, ink said:

It's rare you meet a retrospective 19th century-focused conspiracy theorist, yet here we are.

EDIT: for those not in the know, pan Slavism was not about Russian rule. 

Ľudovít Štúr.: "Slavdom and the World of the Future"

[urbanoid]

3 hours ago, Perun said:

And what would you achive with that? What do you think how long would it take for Germany to go east again, or Turkey to go west or some other country to mess things up

Higher degree of security in Central/Eastern Europe, obviously. Marginalized Russia kicked to the sidelines and isolated from European affairs, without Ukraine and possibly Belarus, would still be a major nuclear power and still untouchable, only their dreams of being a great power that *really* matters would be dead. Economically and politically they would still have choices, but those choices wouldn't really include going to war to 'rebuild an empire'. IMO Ukraine is their last ditch attempt, before internal problems like rather abysmal demographics catch up with them. With countries bordering them to the West (+ possibly Caucasus) being in Western structures and naturally cooperating with themselves as well and Central Asians (especially Kazakhstan) getting closer to China in order not to be subjected to their own special operations (northern Kazakhstan is largely ethnically Russian), there would be no room to maneuver as far as territorial expansion is concerned. There would still be a place at the table for them, but another, smaller one. 

Even assuming that Germany would want to do funny things (and I don't think they do), what deters them is not Russia, but internal Western security arrangements. Same for Turkey, though these ones maybe might have wanted to do funny things in Europe. What deters them is still not Russia though, it's the US/NATO/Greece.  

[Ssnake]

Germany has no territorial ambitions, and as an export-oriented economy is highly motivated to maintain a stable regional and geopolitical environment. Which is the explanation why even the Greens and the majority of the SPD have no problems supplying Ukraine with weapons. The idea that we'd march East again (with what???) is utterly ludicrous - par for the Perun course.

[sunday]

7 minutes ago, urbanoid said:

Higher degree of security in Central/Eastern Europe, obviously. Marginalized Russia kicked to the sidelines and isolated from European affairs, without Ukraine and possibly Belarus, would still be a major nuclear power and still untouchable, only their dreams of being a great power that *really* matters would be dead. Economically and politically they would still have choices, but those choices wouldn't really include going to war to 'rebuild an empire'. IMO Ukraine is their last ditch attempt, before internal problems like rather abysmal demographics catch up with them. With countries bordering them to the West (+ possibly Caucasus) being in Western structures and naturally cooperating with themselves as well and Central Asians (especially Kazakhstan) getting closer to China in order not to be subjected to their own special operations (northern Kazakhstan is largely ethnically Russian), there would be no room to maneuver as far as territorial expansion is concerned. There would still be a place at the table for them, but another, smaller one. 

Even assuming that Germany would want to do funny things (and I don't think they do), what deters them is not Russia, but internal Western security arrangements. Same for Turkey, though these ones maybe might have wanted to do funny things in Europe. What deters them is still not Russia though, it's the US/NATO/Greece.  

Russia was already marginalized during the 1990s.

That did not work well for Russia, as the country was on the way of ceasing to exist.

Trying to keep a large country on the verge of centrifugal dissolution driven by kleptocratic regional governments looks like a recipe for long term regional instability. A well-meaning recipe, undoubtedly. But one should remember the kind of paving stones used in the path to hell. Seems better to apply some Realism.

[Martineleca]

1 hour ago, ink said:

It's rare you meet a retrospective 19th century-focused conspiracy theorist, yet here we are.

You're saying the 1885 Serbo-Bulgarian war meant to re-subjugate the latter to Russian rule after a mere seven years of independence didn't happen? Someone should have told my geat-great-grandmother her husband wasn't really killed in combat, it was all just a conspiracy theory. 

[Perun]

7 minutes ago, urbanoid said:

Higher degree of security in Central/Eastern Europe, obviously. Marginalized Russia kicked to the sidelines and isolated from European affairs, without Ukraine and possibly Belarus, would still be a major nuclear power and still untouchable, only their dreams of being a great power that *really* matters would be dead. Economically and politically they would still have choices, but those choices wouldn't really include going to war to 'rebuild an empire'. IMO Ukraine is their last ditch attempt, before internal problems like rather abysmal demographics catch up with them. With countries bordering them to the West (+ possibly Caucasus) being in Western structures and naturally cooperating with themselves as well and Central Asians (especially Kazakhstan) getting closer to China in order not to be subjected to their own special operations (northern Kazakhstan is largely ethnically Russian), there would be no room to maneuver as far as territorial expansion is concerned. There would still be a place at the table for them, but another, smaller one. 

Even assuming that Germany would want to do funny things (and I don't think they do), what deters them is not Russia, but internal Western security arrangements. Same for Turkey, though these ones maybe might have wanted to do funny things in Europe. What deters them is still not Russia though, it's the US/NATO/Greece.  

I doubt that Kazkhstan would be better with China then with Russia.

Germany and Turkey or some other player not jumping on their neighbours is because of, as you said, internal Western security arrangements which is based on outside disturbances

[ink]

4 minutes ago, Martineleca said:

You're saying the 1885 Serbo-Bulgarian war meant to re-subjugate the latter to Russian rule after a mere seven years of independence didn't happen? Someone should have told my geat-great-grandmother her husband wasn't really killed in combat, it was all just a conspiracy theory. 

Crikey.

Am I saying that Russia had no plans to use Pan-Slavism to exert all kinds of influence in "Europe"? Nope. That would be preposterous.

But are you saying the entire Pan-Slavism movement (and multiple iterations thereof) was a secretive Russian plot, rather than a multitude of different political and cultural and libguistic ideas and dreams colliding together and taking different forms? Because that's sure as shit what it sounded like.

[ink]

27 minutes ago, urbanoid said:

Higher degree of security in Central/Eastern Europe, obviously. Marginalized Russia kicked to the sidelines and isolated from European affairs, without Ukraine and possibly Belarus, would still be a major nuclear power and still untouchable, only their dreams of being a great power that *really* matters would be dead. Economically and politically they would still have choices, but those choices wouldn't really include going to war to 'rebuild an empire'. IMO Ukraine is their last ditch attempt, before internal problems like rather abysmal demographics catch up with them. With countries bordering them to the West (+ possibly Caucasus) being in Western structures and naturally cooperating with themselves as well and Central Asians (especially Kazakhstan) getting closer to China in order not to be subjected to their own special operations (northern Kazakhstan is largely ethnically Russian), there would be no room to maneuver as far as territorial expansion is concerned. There would still be a place at the table for them, but another, smaller one. 

Even assuming that Germany would want to do funny things (and I don't think they do), what deters them is not Russia, but internal Western security arrangements. Same for Turkey, though these ones maybe might have wanted to do funny things in Europe. What deters them is still not Russia though, it's the US/NATO/Greece.  

I like the way you think and it all makes perfect sense to me. However, it is all entirely founded on the projection of US power right to the Russian border. I have no problem with that. But just a word of warning, that state of affairs might last for another 1,000 years but it also might not. There needs to be a plan B always hidden away in a drawer.

Anyway, Russian power isn't going away even if it does get pushed back like you suggest. It'll just be dormant until a vacuum opens up somewhere. Same as for every other big power really.

The system of states is already under a lot of pressure. It'll be interesting to see how it handles upcoming challenges.

[Perun]

24 minutes ago, Ssnake said:

Germany has no territorial ambitions, and as an export-oriented economy is highly motivated to maintain a stable regional and geopolitical environment. Which is the explanation why even the Greens and the majority of the SPD have no problems supplying Ukraine with weapons. The idea that we'd march East again (with what???) is utterly ludicrous - par for the Perun course.

That is for now and nowdays security alliances and arangments. But what future bring no one knows. History is best teacher. I doubt that german expansion to the east for centuries was just to go for a walk somewhere

[urbanoid]

32 minutes ago, sunday said:

Russia was already marginalized during the 1990s.

That did not work well for Russia, as the country was on the way of ceasing to exist.

Trying to keep a large country on the verge of centrifugal dissolution driven by kleptocratic regional governments looks like a recipe for long term regional instability. A well-meaning recipe, undoubtedly. But one should remember the kind of paving stones used in the path to hell. Seems better to apply some Realism.

Nobody said about keeping them on the verge of dissolution, whether they're kleptocratic or not is up to them too. Same for stability, the difference would be they wouldn't be able to prop up their own stability by territorial expansion and hopes of recreating the empire, they'd have to learn new tricks.

[sunday]

1 minute ago, urbanoid said:

Nobody said about keeping them on the verge of dissolution, whether they're kleptocratic or not is up to them too. Same for stability, the difference would be they wouldn't be able to prop up their own stability by territorial expansion and hopes of recreating the empire, they'd have to learn new tricks.

A weak central government is an invitation for local strongmen, especially those of the kleptocratic ilk, to have their own toy state.

A strong central government shall not allow enemy nuclear missiles at its borders.

[urbanoid]

8 minutes ago, ink said:

I like the way you think and it all makes perfect sense to me. However, it is all entirely founded on the projection of US power right to the Russian border. I have no problem with that. But just a word of warning, that state of affairs might last for another 1,000 years but it also might not. There needs to be a plan B always hidden away in a drawer.

Anyway, Russian power isn't going away even if it does get pushed back like you suggest. It'll just be dormant until a vacuum opens up somewhere. Same as for every other big power really.

The system of states is already under a lot of pressure. It'll be interesting to see how it handles upcoming challenges.

Yeah, plan B would be EUrope (if the US decides to fuck off from the continent) AND arrangements between regional players 'between Germany and Russia', the most critical being Poland, Ukraine and Romania.

[urbanoid]

Just now, sunday said:

A weak central government is an invitation for local strongmen, especially those of the kleptocratic ilk, to have their own toy state.

A strong central government shall not allow enemy nuclear missiles at its borders.

Nobody is going to 'keep nuclear missiles on their borders', that's so... 1960s. It's simply not needed technically anymore. Even if they did, you have US nuclear weapons in Japan and South Korea, in 'China's backyard', it doesn't seem too affect Chinese stability.

The price for Russian internal stability shouldn't be paid with Russia's neighbours.

Even assuming that 100% of what I said is achieved Russia would still have all means to remain a viable state, would still be able to achieve a fairly comfortable standards of living, it just wouldn't be able to project power to their 'near abroad' to stir shit up.

[sunday]

Just now, urbanoid said:

Nobody is going to 'keep nuclear missiles on their borders', that's so... 1960s. It's simply not needed technically anymore. Even if they did, you have US nuclear weapons in Japan and South Korea, in 'China's backyard', it doesn't seem too affect Chinese stability.

The price for Russian internal stability shouldn't be paid with Russia's neighbours.

Even assuming that 100% of what I said is achieved Russia would still have all means to remain a viable state, would still be able to achieve a fairly comfortable standards of living, it just wouldn't be able to project power to their 'near abroad' to stir shit up.

Capabilities, Urbanoid, capabilities...

It is not needed to be paranoid to realize that trust on the future intentions of other countries could be suicidal. Governments could change, for instance, and having a defensive glacis of neutral countries is a reason for having tranquility of mind. A tranquil mind is something you really want at the helm of a foreign country armed with nuclear weapons.

Also, it is possible that what you see so clearly is not so clear to the Russian leadership.

[urbanoid]

3 minutes ago, sunday said:

Capabilities, Urbanoid, capabilities...

It is not needed to be paranoid to realize that trust on the future intentions of other countries could be suicidal. Governments could change, for instance, and having a defensive glacis of neutral countries is a reason for having tranquility of mind. A tranquil mind is something you really want at the helm of a foreign country armed with nuclear weapons.

Also, it is possible that what you see so clearly is not so clear to the Russian leadership.

The US could very well deploy nuclear weapons even now to Poland, Finland and Romania if it wanted to. Due to technical considerations it's largely irrelevant anyway, as there are ICBMs, SLBMs and cruise missiles with thousands of kilometers in range. Having nukes closer to potential enemy doesn't really translate into an advantage, in a sense quite the contrary - as they're more vulnerable there.

Being neutral on Russian border is more often than not an invitation for Russia to try to exert influence on such country, lessons learned. The drive to join Western institutions is local, precisely because of the character of (any) Russian state. It was us here working on Western leaders to persuade them to let us in, not the other way around.

I maintain the position that Russia isn't fighting for its physical security (though obviously they will say so), as this is achieved even by nuclear capabilities alone, they're fighting to stay relevant as a great power and a major player in international relations. Nobody will take their nuclear stockpile away, but it's possible to take away their opportunities to exert influence in their immediate surroundings. Obviously that would undermine the capability of the Kremlin to tell stories to their population about how great and stronk they are, to distract them from the fact that they're being plundered by the very same Kremlin.

[sunday]

USSR nuclear capabilities did not help at all in 1991 to prevent its dissolution

The Ukrainian nuclear stockpile was taken away.

Those are the historical facts that a Russian leader would -and must- remember, not some theories, even the most logical and reasonable.

Edited June 4 by sunday

[Ssnake]

7 minutes ago, urbanoid said:

Having nukes closer to potential enemy doesn't really translate into an advantage, in a sense quite the contrary - as they're more vulnerable there.

It's not just that. They also have an destabilizing effect due to the much reduced reaction times. If you detect a missile launch and have 20 minutes to read intent and check for false alerts, that's one thing. Try to do it in under two minutes.