NATO return to Cold War force structure

[Sinistar]

the m1 and leopard 2 are the same generation and for all practical purposes are probably the same threat at the level of individual vehicles or crew comparison or the differences are of less concern

 

it is not just simply this vehicle versus that but locally what the terrain looks like and how defensible it is or sets up chokes to attrit and attacker - say the difference between the north german plain or the terrain in and around fulda and who or what is located there

 

add NBC warfare into it- assuming the opening rounds mean blanketing or destroying entire grid squares in order to create gaps before the tanks have arrived so that in theory the qualitative differences are already vetted and baked in but are less of a factor (soviet MBT doctrine favors a high load of HE shells vs anti-armor penetrators- which seems to assume priority for use against infrastructure, towns, soft rear echelon targets, headquarters units and fortifications and less of the requirement to engage and destroy armor, which is how nato prefers or views it - showing each side conceiving of the MBT somewhat differently in the way it conforms with what they expect actual objectives to look like)

 

then again it is likely that if that were to happen nato would resort to tactical nuclear weapons against  soviet / warsaw pact supply lines putting states like poland and east germany and czechoslovakia at extreme risk of quitting or knocking them out of the war

 

at that stage the political and state structures are falling apart on both sides

both sides also have the problem with maintaining cohesion and managing what turns out in reality not to be uniform in capabilities but composites of member states with different risk exposure, capabilities, morale, motivations to stay in the war, liabilities

 

in theory the soviet system has a more unified command structure whereas you are more likely to have disagreements between nato commands and where they overlap, but you probably can still anticipate that all collapsing as some states or their armed forces perceive themselves in more trouble or are being used more like battering rams - which they will be when commanders decide to use one another to cover a retreating force or to defend flanks or used up in frontal assaults to support another

the soviets intended to exploit where nato commands are overlapping and co-mingled to take advantage of that effect- again but while they somehow will need to manage a similar problem of their own

 

so i think in the soviet system looks at it across the whole spectrum within an operational - strategic - political framework and where they seem to spend more focus rather than success at the local level which when you factor all of the other problems in make local problems, gains or losses appear to be trivial if it gets to that level

 

it is also in the way that soviet organizations tend to be lean and spare- far more pure tank maneuver elements down to the tactical level but paradoxically look immense at higher echelons where the artillery and frontal aviation support come into it: m1 vs leopard 2- minimal difference, does not mean much with everything else going on

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Martineleca]

14 hours ago, seahawk said:

That is why they had identified the Belgians and the British as the weak links and planed to push in their sectors.

Wasn't this a sliding scale process as different militaries modernised separately? The armoured element of combined arms has always been most crucial, for instance during the mid 1970s BAOR fielded probably the toughest tank in the alliance Chieftain, but close by the Germans and Dutch still had a mixed force with Leopard 1s and older M48s while the latter still fielded up gunned Centurions.

[seahawk]

No, mostly because they were a lot shorter on reserves (ammunition, artillery) and lacked IFVs at the time. 

[Stuart Galbraith]

11 hours ago, Martineleca said:

Wasn't this a sliding scale process as different militaries modernised separately? The armoured element of combined arms has always been most crucial, for instance during the mid 1970s BAOR fielded probably the toughest tank in the alliance Chieftain, but close by the Germans and Dutch still had a mixed force with Leopard 1s and older M48s while the latter still fielded up gunned Centurions.

There was problem is, the Soviet offensive wouldnt have been in one area, it would have been in several.

One US Army guy whom was in intelligence claimed (with some logic) there would have been at least 3   different offensives. One to tie down the Americans, one against the British/Belgian corp boundary, and one in the North. Both the Dutch and the Belgians didnt place large chunks of their army forward, they were back in their host countries, so in a surprise attack, there was a chance of being able to take their positions before they had finished deployment.

There was to my mind, no likely hood of a major offensive against the British corp sector, for a very good reason. They knew our engineering capablitie and minefield laying capablities. The relative age of our armour was a concern. But considering how many T55s and T62's the Soviets still had in reserve formations, perhaps not as aged as one might think. Even the original Leopard1's that Belgium fielded (not to mention the Dutch Centurions) would have done perfectly fine against such opponents.

[TrustMe]

5 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

There was problem is, the Soviet offensive wouldnt have been in one area, it would have been in several.

One US Army guy whom was in intelligence claimed (with some logic) there would have been at least 3   different offensives. One to tie down the Americans, one against the British/Belgian corp boundary, and one in the North. Both the Dutch and the Belgians didnt place large chunks of their army forward, they were back in their host countries, so in a surprise attack, there was a chance of being able to take their positions before they had finished deployment.

There was to my mind, no likely hood of a major offensive against the British corp sector, for a very good reason. They knew our engineering capablitie and minefield laying capablities. The relative age of our armour was a concern. But considering how many T55s and T62's the Soviets still had in reserve formations, perhaps not as aged as one might think. Even the original Leopard1's that Belgium fielded (not to mention the Dutch Centurions) would have done perfectly fine against such opponents.

 

The best Soviet tanks were in the group of Soviet forces Germany consisting of T80's and T72's. The Iraqi's generally considered their T72's as being better than the Iranian Chieftons even when they were using steel core APDS penetrators.

Edited November 26, 2025 by TrustMe

[Stuart Galbraith]

GSFG used T64, but not T72. All the T72 units were either in Poland or European Russia.

T64 was superior to Chieftain in gun, though I believe the sights in Chieftain were superior, particulary commanders view. Rounds on the soviet side were superior, particularly AT8. Armour on T64 was superior, though Stillbrew helped little a bit. Chieftain got TOGs but T64 never did get thermal. Chieftain had a better reverse gear. As far as engines, honours even.

Oh, and Chieftain had BV, so they were screwed.

[Martineleca]

2 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Rounds on the soviet side were superior, particularly AT8.

Do you think either a contemporary Leopard 1, M48 or M60 could shrug off a frontal strike from the Soviet 115mm or 125mm guns like a Chieftain? Ironically enough the older Centurion still had pretty decent protection, explains why the Israelis snatched up the retired Dutch examples as soon as they became available...

[bojan]

Chieftain could not stand 125mm APFSDS, or even 115mm at shorter ranges, it had only ~10% more armor that M60A1. and about 20-30% more than T-62. Also, practically any kind of HEAT, including 85mm could penetrate it frontally. Stillbrew increased protection factor somewhat, but still it was not really immune to anything serious.

Leo 1 could not stand 100mm AP, let alone 115/125mm.

Centurion protection was so-so, M60A1 had better protection, and even that was not nearly enough.

 

 

[seahawk]

No tank of the time (M1 withstanding) could take a Soviet heat round and not be penetrated. 

[Stuart Galbraith]

10 hours ago, Martineleca said:

Do you think either a contemporary Leopard 1, M48 or M60 could shrug off a frontal strike from the Soviet 115mm or 125mm guns like a Chieftain? Ironically enough the older Centurion still had pretty decent protection, explains why the Israelis snatched up the retired Dutch examples as soon as they became available...

Well Im not sure Chieftain ever really could. With Stillbrew perhaps, but not as built. Armour wise it was designed to protect against 100mm, though later 100mm rounds it didnt really. Where it scored is that it could kill a T62 at a range where the 115mm was still inaccurate (the Israeli's claimed it was better than a 105mm below 1500 metres). That was the case with RMG, and it actually stepped up when they put a laser rangefinder on it. 

T64/72, it was outclassed by them. After all they were a 10 years younger tanks with composite armour on it. We could have redressed that balance by adopting FV4211 relatively quickly, but we didnt, because we were broke.

The M60 was actually pretty well armoured as well, in places even better than Chieftain. For the 70's, its a much better tank than its given credit for. 

Centurion was never fully proof against Soviet guns. What it did have was a well laid out crew compartment, an excellent gun, and putting all the ammunition in a place where it was less likely to explode. That is what the M48/M60 got wrong, putting ammunition above the turret ring. 

Edited November 27, 2025 by Stuart Galbraith

[Stuart Galbraith]

45 minutes ago, seahawk said:

No tank of the time (M1 withstanding) could take a Soviet heat round and not be penetrated. 

And the same was true of 120mm HESH. Even 120mm APDS in its day was perfectly adequate plinking T55 and T62.

In the 60's and 70's, everyone could kill each other. its just some could do it at rather greater ranges than others, which is the point that is usually missed. When the Iranians used Chieftain in range of Iraqi guns, it suffered. When the Kuwaitis used stand off from a good defensive position, as they were supposed to do, it chewed them up.

The armour of Chieftain is  overrated. It gave adequate protection to the crew, and reduced after armour effects, but it was never proof. In fact, the large weight of Chieftain was rather down to having to redesign the engine compartment to incorporate L60. In reality I think Chieftain was initially envisaged to be 45/50 tons. It ended up 56, so its no surprise the engine and transmission was always complaining about it.

Still the best tank in the world till T64 came along though, even with its troubles, if just because of the excellent gun.

M1 didnt arrive till what, 80, 81? By then the Leopard 2A1 was taking delivery, which was a better tank than anyone elses.

 

Edited November 27, 2025 by Stuart Galbraith

[bojan]

5 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

...Still the best tank in the world till T64 came along though...

M60.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Nah, still only had a 105mm gun, and im not a huge fan of optical rangefinders. It was rock solid though, and unlikely to have to break down in the ideal fire position, so there is that.

[bojan]

Coinc RF was best one you could have. RMG was useless at ranges where it was actually needed, past 1500m, hence why Israelis removed them from their Cents.

105mm gun had adequate performaces vs T-54/55/62, vs T-64/72 neither 105mm nor 120mm was enough.

M60 was pretty reliable and it's engine did not try to die every second day.

 

[Josh]

53 minutes ago, bojan said:

Coinc RF was best one you could have. RMG was useless at ranges where it was actually needed, past 1500m, hence why Israelis removed them from their Cents.

105mm gun had adequate performaces vs T-54/55/62, vs T-64/72 neither 105mm nor 120mm was enough.

M60 was pretty reliable and it's engine did not try to die every second day.

 

120mm L60? Surely the Rhienmetal was sufficient.

Did not the Israelis dislike the M-60?

[Stuart Galbraith]

9 hours ago, bojan said:

Coinc RF was best one you could have. RMG was useless at ranges where it was actually needed, past 1500m, hence why Israelis removed them from their Cents.

105mm gun had adequate performaces vs T-54/55/62, vs T-64/72 neither 105mm nor 120mm was enough.

M60 was pretty reliable and it's engine did not try to die every second day.

 

Information I have is that by the 1970's at least, RMG had tracer that would burn out at 1800 metres, and had recently developed one that would burn out at 2500 metres. I doubt if anyone on the Golan would have been engaging much beyond those ranges anyway.  Page 66.
https://archive.org/details/mcv-01-chieftain_202312/page/64/mode/2up

As for the Israelis, Im not sure any of the Centurions they got ever had   .50 RMG fitted. Most during the Yom Kippur war seem to be upgraded Mk3's or Mk5's, many of which were supplied with just 20 pounder, and so never fitted with them. We held onto the later Centurions that did have them, most like. Besides, the Israelis removed the smoke dischargers as useless, so clearly not everything they did to Centurion at that time stands up to scrutiny, then or later.

Interestingly several DID have a .50 mounted over the barrel. Though that might have been school examples at the school they had on the Golan. Persumably they were trying to save on main gun rounds as they went through drill, presumably similarly as the British Army did with a .22 rifle in a Chieftain turret and rubber targets.

Im not buying the idea that being able to engage out to 2500 metres range, a full 1000 metres beyond which the effective range of the armament of T62,  was not very useful. If we had the Americans or Israelis come in on it, we would have had ammunition that would have been perfectly effective against frontally again T64 im sure. As it was, it wasnt, they didnt get that till 1984, and then only marginally. Yes, thats our failing, but   if we had put the money into it, as XL26 demonstrates, we could have done it earlier. Call it bureaucratic intertia, not any inherent failing of the gun.

  On every level the Continental was a far better engine, there is no point debating that. On the other hand, the narrative 'L60 always broke down' belies the truth, that if you had a good crew performing all the checks and driving it properly, you didnt generally have a problem. When you hear a Chieftain commander tell you that a Mk2 (in theory the most unreliable of the lot) could go through a 2 week exercise without breaking down once, then you have to question several narratives.  Not least, why are so many still drivable today  if its such a dogs breakfast to keep running? You just kept the governor topped up with oil, have half a dozen spare fanbelts, generally the engine was adequate enough.  Exercise Sundance meant that the worst problems (exacerbated by lack of track miles I suspect) generally went away by the early 1980's. But yes, it was a silk purse made out of a sows ear, no doubt.

What is seldom less debated is whether the T64 engine was any better. It came from the same technology, it was excessively loud, it even (certainly on 1980's Soviet fuel) produced excessive white smoke in the tour footage I saw. It also had a reputation for breaking down early on (again, the Ukrainians to their credit seem to have resolved that).

If we are going to credit T64 with being the best tank of its time, but saddled with what was an engine of questionable reliablity early on, then no, I dont think we can avoid saying precisely the same about Chieftain, for about 5 years anyway.

[Stuart Galbraith]

8 hours ago, Josh said:

120mm L60? Surely the Rhienmetal was sufficient.

Did not the Israelis dislike the M-60?

Israelis liked the M60 fine, they just didnt like the hydraulic traverse. Ironically they apparently fitted a hydraulic traverse to Shot Kal  to replace the electrical system, which was a bit janky as it aged. Go figure.

He is just saying the L11 was unnecessary, because 105mm was adequate. Overlooking the range advantage that the L11 gave the crews, as demonstrated in 1991. Perhaps less important on the Golan  or in Fulda Gap, on the North German plain, very important.

 

[Stefan Kotsch]

1 hour ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Interestingly several DID have a .50 mounted over the barrel. Though that might have been school examples at the school they had on the Golan.

An additional 12.7 mm at the barrel/craddle is quite common in Israeli MBTs. I remember a technical article that said that 12.7 was mounted as a supplement. To combat the target for which 7.62 mm  was not effective enough, but the 105 mm was an unnecessary overkill.

Edited November 28, 2025 by Stefan Kotsch

[Stuart Galbraith]

It was certainly very common during the 1982 Lebanon war. The Merkavas and Centurions, probably the M48's and M60s as well, had them fitted, reportedly so they could engage snipers in blocks of flats in Beirut. I did read that they originally got the idea from Schools vehicles, which reputedly did quite well in the role, before expanding the idea across the fleet.

But it was news to me they had this as early 1973, albeit in only a few vehicles. There is quite a good modellers book by Robert Manasherob that  shows tanks before/during the Golan battle, and there were certainly some centurions fitted with .50's over the barrel fighting on the Golan. I think some captions indicated they were also schools vehicles. There was an armour school on the Golan that donated its tanks as replacements.

Perhaps more interestingly for me was the retrofitting some of the fleet with Luna Searchlights from T55 and T62. Im not entirely clear why, for I dont think their Centurions ever got any of the IR gunners sights we developed for our Centurions. But there was a report that the commanders had American IR binoculars, so possibly they were providing IR light for those, and then cueing the gunner onto the target.There was certainly at least one highly successful night time ambush that suggets they were using this capablity.

Photos of those are non existent, though there are pictures of the mounts, and a bracket at the rear of the turret for holding either American Xenon searchlights (as on the M551) or Luna's when they werent using it.

[kokovi]

3 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Israelis liked the M60 fine, they just didnt like the hydraulic traverse. Ironically they apparently fitted a hydraulic traverse to Shot Kal  to replace the electrical system, which was a bit janky as it aged. Go figure.

He is just saying the L11 was unnecessary, because 105mm was adequate. Overlooking the range advantage that the L11 gave the crews, as demonstrated in 1991. Perhaps less important on the Golan  or in Fulda Gap, on the North German plain, very important.

 

Having lived in Northern Germany for my entire life, I do not understand why the North German plain is thought by so many people as being some kind of open terrain. It is actually full of small forests, hedges, tree lines, towns and villages, and I highly doubt that the average line of sight is much more than 1500 meters.

[bojan]

13 hours ago, Josh said:

120mm L60?

Yes.

Quote

Did not the Israelis dislike the M-60?

They did not like certain aspects, like TC cupola and hydraulic system. But those were easily fixable ones vs Chieftain engine issues that was never fixed.

[bojan]

4 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

...Interestingly several DID have a .50 mounted over the barrel. Though that might have been school examples at the school they had on the Golan. Persumably they were trying to save on main gun rounds as they went through drill, presumably similarly as the British Army did with a .22 rifle in a Chieftain turret and rubber targets.

It was US training setup. Telfare (sp?) device for cheap training, something that has existed in various forms in various armies since early 1900s. Israelis just modified it a bit (to accept larger ammo box) and used it in combat as additional MG. It has nothing to do with RMG use however.

Also, while tracer burnout in theory was at 1800/2500m in practice it was next to impossible to spot during sunny day at ranges over ~1500m. It was possible during night/dusk, but good luck engaging anything at 2500m during night/dusk at that time period unless it is nicely contrasted by background.

Overall RMG was not useless, it was useful when using ammo other than APDS, but optical RF was way better in practice.

 

PS. Reason why Israelis removed SGDs was same Germans removed them in WW2 and both US  and Soviets refused to use external ones in WW2/post-WW2 for quite a while, if hit by small arms fire/fragments those tended to burn, and smoke would be getting into crew compartment and suffocating crew. Later they started returning them, but in the armored box type mount on the Merks, which reduced that hazard chance.

[Stuart Galbraith]

58 minutes ago, bojan said:

Yes.

They did not like certain aspects, like TC cupola and hydraulic system. But those were easily fixable ones vs Chieftain engine issues that was never fixed.

Mark 13A redtop, rebuilt by Rolls Royce by my understanding. It was as reliable as any L60 ever got, and whilst its possible to overstate that because it wasnt never an Continental and Maybach, by and large it worked.

1 hour ago, bojan said:

It was US training setup. Telfare (sp?) device for cheap training, something that has existed in various forms in various armies since early 1900s. Israelis just modified it a bit (to accept larger ammo box) and used it in combat as additional MG. It has nothing to do with RMG use however.

Also, while tracer burnout in theory was at 1800/2500m in practice it was next to impossible to spot during sunny day at ranges over ~1500m. It was possible during night/dusk, but good luck engaging anything at 2500m during night/dusk at that time period unless it is nicely contrasted by background.

Overall RMG was not useless, it was useful when using ammo other than APDS, but optical RF was way better in practice.

 

PS. Reason why Israelis removed SGDs was same Germans removed them in WW2 and both US  and Soviets refused to use external ones in WW2/post-WW2 for quite a while, if hit by small arms fire/fragments those tended to burn, and smoke would be getting into crew compartment and suffocating crew. Later they started returning them, but in the armored box type mount on the Merks, which reduced that hazard chance.

Yeah, British army used a sectioned Chieftain turret and .22 rifle in the bore. Cheap! We slightly compensated for it later by putting in a tank gunnery game in Challenger 1's digitized IFCS though.

During dusk, fair point that, though I would suggest low light conditions could be just as much a problem with an optical rangefinder.

Advantages of RMG against an optical rangefinder, less chance of being damaged by shellfire, easier to use, easier to maintain, quicker to dial in a range. Yes, undoubtedly an optical rangefinder was capable of greater accuracy (In theory, I know Kennethy Macksey didnt particularly think so) and you can see that that warships used them for donkeys years instead of doing ranging shots. So as far as long range shots in good visiblity, its beyond dispute. But the crews seemed to like RMG, it worked and, even better for the treasury, it was cheap. The only real negative I can see is you are telling your enemy you are going to shoot at them soon. But if they are 500-1000 metres out of effective range, that isnt a huge advange to them, particularly in an era when they didnt have indirect fire or air support on instant call.

Yeah, I entirely get why they removed them. But   the chance of crew incapacitation was significantly less than that of the tank being hit by a Sagger. It was a threat they utterly underappreciated, and whilst it didnt turn out to be that big a problem on the Golan (the majority of the hits seem to have been tanks or RPGs), it certainly was in the Sinai. 

 

[JWB]

Poland aims to produce anywhere from 150,000-200,000 155mm shells per year.

https://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/polska/news-czy-wroci-obowiazkowa-sluzba-wojskowa-szef-mon-zabral-glos,nId,8044265#

[LouieD]

On 11/28/2025 at 6:16 AM, kokovi said:

Having lived in Northern Germany for my entire life, I do not understand why the North German plain is thought by so many people as being some kind of open terrain. It is actually full of small forests, hedges, tree lines, towns and villages, and I highly doubt that the average line of sight is much more than 1500 meters.

This is exactly BAOR noticed in the mid to late 1970’s and was further developed by Bagnall. The concept that reached its nadir in the late 1980’s as The GOODWOOD PLAN. BAOR looked at the German defences in Op GOODWOOD (which was the subject of many Staff Rides) and came to the conclusion that using the terrain features and plethora of towns/villages in 1 BR Corps sector it could re-enact a GOODWOOD defence to stop the Soviet First Echelon in its tracks. The reason that there were so many non-mech Inf planned to reinforce BAOR was because of the GOODWOOD Defence. ALL the MILAN FPs in the UK and the TA Inf Bns who had MILAN but were in the RCZ were included with a ratio of 4 or 5 MILAN FPs per two Inf Pls. These would be dug into key terrain or set up in towns/villages. To help direct the Soviet Echelons into these kill zones, the mine warfare plan was also extensive and would attempt to channel the Soviets in. There were three types of minefields envisioned; nuisances, nudges, and no-gos. Nuisances were just enough to slow the Soviets down, nudges were extensive enough to divert the Soviets in the direction 1 BR Corps wanted and no-goes were sos thick and deep that they would stop the Soviets cold. 
Artillery control, suggested by some, was the best in NATO, a FOO could call down anything from a battery to every gun in range Corp wide. The Mech Bdes (all Chieftain and FV432/Warrior equipped) would conduct a mobile defence between the minefields and “islands” of MILAN. The Armd Bdes (7 & 20) would be for local counterattacks or counter strikes. 3 Armd Div, the first to be completely outfitted with Chally/Warrior, was to be kept back with only release by Com NORTHAG/BAOR to conduct a more extensive counterstroke.

i have also been told that from the early 1980’s MILAN Training included telling operators that (thanks to BRIXMIS) MILAN was not going to penetrate the frontal arc of most T-64s/80s (I can’t recall the mark, @Stuart Galbraith I believe you know the exact ones) so they would be prepared to do side shots on the Soviet tanks which hopefully would have found them without accompanying Infantry since all BTRs & BMPs were vulnerable.