The Donkeys- Worst commanders of WWII (and other periods)

[RichTO90]

26 minutes ago, FALightFighter said:

Ricks work is sketchy, IMO. I don't think his logic from relief to quality works- its too dependent on the whims of the higher commander.

For a partial counterpoint, see "Zero Defects", https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p124201coll1/id/488/

Ricks' work is based on Taafe IIRC, among others, and has always looked solid to me as an outsider looking in. Sorry, but Bolger's article has always looked superficial to me. He relies too much on Weigley's flawed Eisenhower's Lieutenant's (his thesis of a "constabulary army" affecting Wor;d War II tactics and generalship in the US Army is impossible to sustain from actual sources). His first page remarks regarding the Ardennes and Remagen are fatuous at best and stupid at worst. Taafe's much more nuanced view is much better.

[futon]

7 hours ago, Murph said:

Interesting.  Any others?  

Well not such an in-depth understanding as a whole but surely some others. General Masaharu Homma was in charge of the invasion of the Philippines. He ordered good treatment of the Filipionos. His subordinate, Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, went against those orders and instead passed down harsh treatment orders. For that, however good Tsuji may have been at planning military operations, his brutal approach was a big blow to Japan's cause and image.

No individual names come to mind but the whole Guadalcanal campaign pursued by the upper people in general. Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines were successful because of domination of the seas and air, time for planning and organizing, in which those factors contributed to better information gathering . At Guadalcanal, it was still contested in the air and sea. So a similar degree of success on the ground shouldn't have been hoped for. They should have either tried maintaining a presence on a corner of the island to keep it at a contested state instead of so hastedly attempting frontal assualts on Hinderson, or just given up on it entirely much sooner. 

[sunday]

32 minutes ago, futon said:

His subordinate, Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, went against those orders and instead passed down harsh treatment orders. For that, however good Tsuji may have been at planning military operations, his brutal approach was a big blow to Japan's cause and image.

That should help to explain some things.

Thanks.

[Stuart Galbraith]

6 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

Ricks' work is based on Taafe IIRC, among others, and has always looked solid to me as an outsider looking in. Sorry, but Bolger's article has always looked superficial to me. He relies too much on Weigley's flawed Eisenhower's Lieutenant's (his thesis of a "constabulary army" affecting Wor;d War II tactics and generalship in the US Army is impossible to sustain from actual sources). His first page remarks regarding the Ardennes and Remagen are fatuous at best and stupid at worst. Taafe's much more nuanced view is much better.

Ive not read any of his history pieces, but Ill say this in defence of Daniel Bolger, his two books on the 'modern' US Army, Dragons in the Mojave and The battle for Hunger Hill are truly excellent, and still have a lot to tell about small unit tactics. Perhaps he overreached himself somewhat.

[RETAC21]

On 11/2/2022 at 10:23 PM, Murph said:

Ok, I will start, here is my list based on reading various sources:

US:

Fredendall- Probably the worst, a moral and physical coward, vastly over-rated, and in retrospect probably one of the very worst examples of pre-war US Generals.

Hodges- Over his head, and went to pieces during the Bulge- only survived as a commander because Bradley was his former subordinate.  He only knew the head on attack, and did not care for casualties.

MacArthur- Over-rated, over there, and he should have been left to be a prisoner of the Japanese.   Maybe they would have done us a favor and shot him. 

Mark Clark- This man should never have been allowed to command anything more than a tub of rubber duckies.  He threw people under the bus for his mistakes, did not care about his troops due to his ego issues, and was a disaster as a commander.  He might have made a good palace syncophant, but that is about all.  Fragging would have done good for him.  He butchered the 36th Infantry division just so he could move his drinks cabinet six inches closer to Rome.  Note I had a great uncle who went in on Rapido with a company, and came out with less than a squad, he was never the same after that.

This is just a start.  The US suffered from really poor generalship during WWII, and it has just gotten worse since then.  Especially as generals never seem to get relieved these days despite desperately needing to be relieved.  Read Thomas Rick's; The Generals.  

British:

Hmmmm, should I start the fight?  Nah, I will leave it to the Brits.

French: 

As a general rule, pretty poor, and too darn old.  

Russian

I'll think about it, but I also think Zhukov needs a second look as a decent commander with what he had to work with.  It is not hard to accept casualties when you are sure that Stalin will have you shot for failure.  The same goes for many Russian generals.  

 

Where is Ned Almond?

[Stuart Galbraith]

Wow. He sucks.

 

[FALightFighter]

4 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Ive not read any of his history pieces, but Ill say this in defence of Daniel Bolger, his two books on the 'modern' US Army, Dragons in the Mojave and The battle for Hunger Hill are truly excellent, and still have a lot to tell about small unit tactics. Perhaps he overreached himself somewhat.

I've read "Dragons at War", "Battle for Hunger Hill", "Deathground", and "Why We Lost". I actually found Bolger's work in Dragons and Hunger Hill pretty self-serving- especially in Dragons, its always "Wow, the X Co commander was a flaming moron, thank goodness the  B Co commander was there to save the day"- and then, at the end, you realize that the author was the B Co commander. Hunger Hill is better, but it is still pretty obvious stuff and written as if Bolger was the first and only to try anything like that- it seemed to me, as a LT in a similar unit when it was published, to be fairly routine. Deathground was better- less personal connection, and a decent overview. I was not impressed with Why We Lost. When I read it, I didn't think it really hit any of the real points, but I need to revisit it- I cannot recall details right now, just a general impression.

We read the Zero Defects article in the leadership curriculum at CGSC a decade+ ago. I thought it was a decent thesis for a short article- that despite its talk of Patton, the Army I was in acted more like Bradley/Hodges.

[Stuart Galbraith]

In fairness in Hunger Hill, he admits that he completely reamed his commander, and had a completely different perspective after doing the job of Battalion Commander himself.  As far as the Mojave book, I think it was about the best book Ive read about mechanised Infantry platoons being used in combined arms warfare. That isnt saying its perfect of course.

Besides he was an officer, name one that is completely self effacing.

 

[Murph]

16 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

 

Bradley was never subordinate to Hodges. Hodges was an Infantryman and never was able to think outside that box.

 

Clark was a highly competent, skillful organizer and staff officer but was inordinately obsessed with promotion and recognition. He nearly went to pieces at Salerno and left John Lucas out to dry at Anzio, before pursuing the "glory" of capturing Rome. He is probably the one who was truly his own worst enemy.

Who else were these "really poor generals"? Overall, army and corps-level leadership was quite good if not always exceptional. Divisional leadership was more uneven but never was a huge problem. AFAICT only the 90th Infantry Division really suffered from bad leadership and that was for a period of just seven weeks or so.

Ricks' thesis was that since the good generalship of World War II, fostered by Marshall, Army generalship descended into careerism that fostered mediocrity, preventing skillful generals from achieving high rank. Not that bad generalship in World War II got worse postwar. Mark Milley may eventually be the exception that proves that rule but otherwise none of the twenty Chairmen have been memorable and neither have any of the Army Chiefs of Staff.

Rick Atkinson relates that pre-war Bradley worked for Hodges.  Also reading his account of Hodges mess (dining area), was not really impressive, more of a general focused on non-essentials, rather than combat.  Clark was a good staff officer, he was a horrible commander, he should never have been allowed to command troops, ever.  Mark Milley might be one of the worst Chairman since Lyman Lemnizter.   Reading Atkinson, I agree many divisional commanders were decent, with, as you say, a few exceptions.  Once you get to Corps and above, I am less than impressed.  IMHO Simpson was THE outstanding general in the ETO.  All of Pattons virtues, and none of his vices.  

[Murph]

13 hours ago, futon said:

Well not such an in-depth understanding as a whole but surely some others. General Masaharu Homma was in charge of the invasion of the Philippines. He ordered good treatment of the Filipionos. His subordinate, Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, went against those orders and instead passed down harsh treatment orders. For that, however good Tsuji may have been at planning military operations, his brutal approach was a big blow to Japan's cause and image.

No individual names come to mind but the whole Guadalcanal campaign pursued by the upper people in general. Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines were successful because of domination of the seas and air, time for planning and organizing, in which those factors contributed to better information gathering . At Guadalcanal, it was still contested in the air and sea. So a similar degree of success on the ground shouldn't have been hoped for. They should have either tried maintaining a presence on a corner of the island to keep it at a contested state instead of so hastedly attempting frontal assualts on Hinderson, or just given up on it entirely much sooner. 

You are so right on Masanobu Tsuji, he was a cancer on the Japanese Army.  It seems that the higher commanders wanted to behave in a chivalrous manner, but both cultural and military realities got in the way.  I don't think that they anticipated the sheer number of prisoners that they would end up with due to the incompetence of the Allied command.  I have been on a Pacific War reading schedule lately, and there is a dearth of really good books I am finding (by good, I mean well written, unbiased, and plenty of local detail).  I so wish someone would do to the Pacific War what Atkinson did to the European theater.  

[Murph]

3 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Where is Ned Almond?

I added him later.  It is a pity that Ned Almond was not fragged.

[RichTO90]

29 minutes ago, Murph said:

Rick Atkinson relates that pre-war Bradley worked for Hodges. 

I don't know how? The closest their careers intersected was when Bradley took over from Hodges as Commandant of the Infantry School.

Quote

Also reading his account of Hodges mess (dining area), was not really impressive, more of a general focused on non-essentials, rather than combat.  Clark was a good staff officer, he was a horrible commander, he should never have been allowed to command troops, ever. 

Clark's worst enemy was C;ark.

Quote

Mark Milley might be one of the worst Chairman since Lyman Lemnizter.   Reading Atkinson, I agree many divisional commanders were decent, with, as you say, a few exceptions.  Once you get to Corps and above, I am less than impressed.  IMHO Simpson was THE outstanding general in the ETO.  All of Pattons virtues, and none of his vices.  

Who are the corps commanders that don't impress you?

Sandy Patch could have Simpson a run for his money on that measure.

[Murph]

3 minutes ago, RichTO90 said:

I don't know how? The closest their careers intersected was when Bradley took over from Hodges as Commandant of the Infantry School.

Clark's worst enemy was C;ark.

Who are the corps commanders that don't impress you?

Sandy Patch could have Simpson a run for his money on that measure.

Sandy Patch was an excellent commander I will agree with you here.  I am away from the house so it will be a little while before I can respond to your other questions.  On the Bardley/Hodges thing, all I know is what Atkinson wrote in his books.  But it seemed that Bradley was an adequate if vindictive Divisional, then Corps commander, I think he was out of his comfort zone as an Army Group commander.  I also dislike how he treated Terry Allen, and Theodore Roosevelt in Sicily.  Granted both were tired, but Allen would most likely have made a superb Corps commander if not higher, and Roosevelt would have done fine at Division level.  

In the Pacific Ralph Smith of the 27th Infantry division comes to mind of a general out of his depth, who was perhaps a fine staff officer, but perhaps not a leader of men.  But he also allowed Howling Mad Smith to dictate his deployments on Saipan.  I also think that Edwin Harding was mistreated by MacArthur in New Guinea.  I think he took it in the neck for MacArthur's foul up. Also I think Fuller of the 41st Infantry Division was also unjustly treated by the BigMac.  

[futon]

12 minutes ago, Murph said:

You are so right on Masanobu Tsuji, he was a cancer on the Japanese Army.  It seems that the higher commanders wanted to behave in a chivalrous manner, but both cultural and military realities got in the way.  I don't think that they anticipated the sheer number of prisoners that they would end up with due to the incompetence of the Allied command.  I have been on a Pacific War reading schedule lately, and there is a dearth of really good books I am finding (by good, I mean well written, unbiased, and plenty of local detail).  I so wish someone would do to the Pacific War what Atkinson did to the European theater.  

I don't have a handle on these commanders as much as I would like but with Tsuji, I suspect his hard approach was arrived from experience/analysis with the fighting in Mainland China. Outside Chinese communities of various types such as MPAJA were suppprting via donations the Nationalists and/or Communists and a hub of such was Singapore. So while Sook Ching was brutality, some level of reasoning for it was there. The British were helping with recruiting/training various Chinese for guerilla warfare in outskirt mountain/jungle areas in Malaysia. But Filipinos didn't have their interest tied to the mainland, just the Philippines. Yeah, the Japanese did end up with a lot more POWs than expected but still, Japan was in a moment of victory and not starving yet like they were 3 or 4 years later. If there was a place to prove their worth in conquest, it was here, they could have done so if following Homma's order.

One more for the list came to mind; Renya Mutaguchi, for pressing for approval to go on the diasaterous offensive in '44 Myanmar.

[FALightFighter]

1 hour ago, Murph said:

Rick Atkinson relates that pre-war Bradley worked for Hodges.  Also reading his account of Hodges mess (dining area), was not really impressive, more of a general focused on non-essentials, rather than combat.  Clark was a good staff officer, he was a horrible commander, he should never have been allowed to command troops, ever.  Mark Milley might be one of the worst Chairman since Lyman Lemnizter.   Reading Atkinson, I agree many divisional commanders were decent, with, as you say, a few exceptions.  Once you get to Corps and above, I am less than impressed.  IMHO Simpson was THE outstanding general in the ETO.  All of Pattons virtues, and none of his vices.  

Corps Commanders of the Bulge, but Harold Winton, is a good read. Discusses Leonard Gerow, Troy Middleton, Matthew Ridgway, John Millikin, Manton Eddy, and J. Lawton Collins.

I was impressed by Devers, as well- he replaced Eisenhower twice, as the theater commander in Europe (when Eisenhower went to North Africa) and then in the Mediterranean (as the US theater commander and deputy allied commander, when Eisenhower went back to England), and then became an Army Group Commander (the US-French 6th Army Group). APpropriate to this forum, before deploying to England, he replaced Chaffee as Chief of the Armored Force and instrumental in the development, equipping, and training of the US Armored Divisions and separate tank battalions.

[Murph]

Devers was possibly the only man who could have replaced Ike,  and done I suspect as good a job.  But Ike hated Devers since he would not release extra B-17's to North Africa.  Reading Atkinson, you find that much of the high command were egotistical prima donnas.  

[Murph]

Sorry, got home, and I mistyped, you are correct that most Corps commanders were pretty darn good.  I think that Krueger might also be one of the over-rated commanders, as was Simon Bolivar Buckner.  Not bad per se, but not as good as they thought they were.  I think in the Pacific Eichelberger was the best of the bunch.

Also Leslie J. McNair's greatest gift to the American army was being killed, so he could no longer muck things up.

[R E lee]

1 hour ago, Murph said:

Sorry, got home, and I mistyped, you are correct that most Corps commanders were pretty darn good.  I think that Krueger might also be one of the over-rated commanders, as was Simon Bolivar Buckner. 

 

Your mean Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr,  ( http://1-22infantry.org/commanders/bucknerpers.htm ) his father of the same name fought in the WBTS. His son, Simon Bolivar Buckner III fought in Italy/France/N Africa and Germany in WW2. Having 3 generations with the same name is a bit of an oddity to me. 

Edited November 4, 2022 by R E lee

[FALightFighter]

3 hours ago, Murph said:

Devers was possibly the only man who could have replaced Ike,  and done I suspect as good a job.  But Ike hated Devers since he would not release extra B-17's to North Africa.  Reading Atkinson, you find that much of the high command were egotistical prima donnas.  

I really need to read Atkinson- among a myriad of other things!

Yeah, I don't know that you can get to, let alone perform at that level without some ego. It may only be the result of coming from a small, close-knit community (the pre-war Regular Army), but it seems that many of the decisions were based on personality clashes instead of the demonstrating the ability to put the mission first. I've seen the same thing happen at the 3* and 4* level- not necessarily poor decisionmaking, but listening to 1* and 2* folks that are trusted but don't really understand, and inability to look past personalities to the good of the organization/mission. My opinions, from limited perspectives. YMMV.

 

[Angrybk]

It’s always seemed to me that a lot of evaluations of Western generals/admirals  in Ww2 are based around whether or not they were righteous people and good managers vs whether they made any brilliant operational/strategic decisions. I guess that was the nature of the war for the West (ie, their major job was to not do something horrifyingly stupid, (cough, Montgomery) ) but other than Midway I can’t think of a major risky decision made by any of them.

Ike/Nimitz/Slim are definitely in the pantheon of badass humans, but none of them had an Austerlitz or something. 

Edited November 4, 2022 by Angrybk

[Angrybk]

1 hour ago, FALightFighter said:

I really need to read Atkinson- among a myriad of other things!

Yeah, I don't know that you can get to, let alone perform at that level without some ego. It may only be the result of coming from a small, close-knit community (the pre-war Regular Army), but it seems that many of the decisions were based on personality clashes instead of the demonstrating the ability to put the mission first. I've seen the same thing happen at the 3* and 4* level- not necessarily poor decisionmaking, but listening to 1* and 2* folks that are trusted but don't really understand, and inability to look past personalities to the good of the organization/mission. My opinions, from limited perspectives. YMMV.

 

The Atkinson books are great but very much general-interest history, I don’t think he really uncovered anything new. 
 

What I would really like to read is an “industrial” history of the US in Ww2. Few other countries in history did what we did in terms of increasing output in a couple years, and it would be a great lesson for modern day civilian industry leaders etc. It could be totally dramatic too — Higgins with the boats, Curtiss totally f&cking up, mass migrations, race riots, etc. 

Edited November 4, 2022 by Angrybk

[R E lee]

53 minutes ago, Angrybk said:

 

What I would really like to read is an “industrial” history of the US in Ww2. Few other countries in history did what we did in terms of increasing output in a couple years, and it would be a great lesson for modern day civilian industry leaders etc. It could be totally dramatic too — Higgins with the boats, Curtiss totally f&cking up, mass migrations, race riots, etc. 

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Economics-World-War-International-Macroeconomic/dp/0521785030  Or more in depth just for USA?

[Angrybk]

8 minutes ago, R E lee said:

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Economics-World-War-International-Macroeconomic/dp/0521785030  Or more in depth just for USA?

Naw we need an Atkinson style popular history!

[Rick]

1 hour ago, Angrybk said:

The Atkinson books are great but very much general-interest history, I don’t think he really uncovered anything new. 
 

What I would really like to read is an “industrial” history of the US in Ww2. Few other countries in history did what we did in terms of increasing output in a couple years, and it would be a great lesson for modern day civilian industry leaders etc. It could be totally dramatic too — Higgins with the boats, Curtiss totally f&cking up, mass migrations, race riots, etc. 

Just my opinion, but I think the Soviets might take first place on industry mobilization and relocation. 

[Angrybk]

On 11/3/2022 at 10:08 AM, Stuart Galbraith said:

're Westmoreland, I remember General Montgomery excoriating Westmoreland to photographer Don McCullen. I'd love to have known how Montgomery would have run it. 

ive also read some curious things about Creighton Abrams, that he was abrasive towards SF. 

Slim was abrasive towards SF as well, his belief was that any well trained infantry unit could do anything SF people could do (his quote was something along the lines of “you may as well have a royal corps of tree climbers, with a leaf sprig in their berets”). I think that was a legit opinion in ww2 and maybe even Vietnam. SF really came into their own once they got modern man-portable technology etc.