The Allies in North Africa

[Tim the Tank Nut]

Looking at the campaigns against the Germans in North Africa a lot gets said about the learning curve involved with the US forces and First Army.  As many know I am know fan of Fredenhall as I consider him one of the worst.  Despite all that the Allied commitment to Tunisia was a pretty successful venture.

The actual landings and the Naval side of things were planned out reasonably well.  Keep in mind how short the time was between Pearl Harbor and Casablanca.

The big thing that stands out to me is how incredibly fortunate the Allies were when the Germans decided to reinforce North Africa rather than abandon it.  This put an enormous fighting force out on a limb and played to the Allies advantages at interdicting the supply lines to German forces.  People talk about how long it took to free Tunis but the reality is that German victories such as Kasserine were ultimately self defeating.  Each day the North African campaign drug on more German forces added themselves to the pocket.

What was Germany thinking?

[glenn239]

Wasn't the decision to reinforce strictly Hitler's?  I seem to recall that he wanted to force the Allies to continue shipping around South Africa, which tied up a great deal of tonnage.  

[RETAC21]

41 minutes ago, Tim the Tank Nut said:

Looking at the campaigns against the Germans in North Africa a lot gets said about the learning curve involved with the US forces and First Army.  As many know I am know fan of Fredenhall as I consider him one of the worst.  Despite all that the Allied commitment to Tunisia was a pretty successful venture.

The actual landings and the Naval side of things were planned out reasonably well.  Keep in mind how short the time was between Pearl Harbor and Casablanca.

The big thing that stands out to me is how incredibly fortunate the Allies were when the Germans decided to reinforce North Africa rather than abandon it.  This put an enormous fighting force out on a limb and played to the Allies advantages at interdicting the supply lines to German forces.  People talk about how long it took to free Tunis but the reality is that German victories such as Kasserine were ultimately self defeating.  Each day the North African campaign drug on more German forces added themselves to the pocket.

What was Germany thinking?

The Germans weren't thinking very clearly in 1943, in between the part of the war in which they were winning and the part when they were losing.

[Stuart Galbraith]

You can see that very clearly in how much of the Luftwaffe was wrecked in the Mediterranean. They never really recovered from it.

I think it was just a natural extension of Hitlers 'Not one step back' mantra. Particularly acute after Stalingrad.

[johnthejock]

https://www.erwinrommel.info/post/me-323-on-the-tunisian-front

https://www.thevintagenews.com/2016/02/03/the-giant-of-wwi-me-323-was-the-largest-land-based-transport-aircraft-of-the-war/?chrome=1

The me 323 were slaughtered.  And thats what you get if you do not give enough escorts 

 

 

[Angrybk]

One pretty great outcome of the Med campaign is that Hitler called off Kursk partially because of the Sicily invasion, which was pretty stupid (not that they would have won anyway).

Most US military history about the North Africa campaign is about it being very useful because it blooded the Army and we were able to identify and get rid of a lot of useless generals (Fredendall etc). I think throughout the war we were extremely good at adapting and learning and brutally firing people who couldn't keep up. US involvement in WW2 lasted four years -- compare that to Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. which lasted for decades, and we failed to adapt. 

Edited September 9, 2022 by Angrybk

[futon]

"War" is a broad term. Iraq and Afghanistan were more like occupations, that failed. Not military vs military total war. The nature of WW2 was far different. Stakes were far greater and the bedrock of international global order was going to get melted down and remolded. Korean War, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, even Ukraine, don't come close to such stakes. So the state leaders will struggle to and so be unable to garner the degree of morale and will that was shown in WW2.

[lucklucky]

WW2 occupations worked because 3 things:  extreme punitive actions were allowed ,cultural proximity and occupation could have been permanent.

PS: and more tha 3 million Germans of soldier age men died before occupation.

Edited September 9, 2022 by lucklucky

[Tim the Tank Nut]

by its very nature Coalition warfare is exceedingly difficult.  The lessons of North Africa helped greatly in Europe.  Eisenhower, Montgomery, Patton, the execrable Omar Bradley all served in North Africa.  So did the estimable Alphonse Juin.  

Yes, many things went wrong but with the advantage of naval interdiction the end result was never in doubt which makes Germany's willingness to oblige the Allies so thoroughly even harder to understand.

In the main, North Africa was clean fighting as well.  Not marked with a lot of butchery of prisoners and such.  The PanzerArmee Afrika was also an undefeated force made of men who were used to winning.  This too helped the Allies as the myths of German invincibility were deflated.  All in all I'd call it a critical step in the war.

[Angrybk]

4 hours ago, Tim the Tank Nut said:

by its very nature Coalition warfare is exceedingly difficult.  The lessons of North Africa helped greatly in Europe.  Eisenhower, Montgomery, Patton, the execrable Omar Bradley all served in North Africa.  So did the estimable Alphonse Juin.  

Yes, many things went wrong but with the advantage of naval interdiction the end result was never in doubt which makes Germany's willingness to oblige the Allies so thoroughly even harder to understand.

In the main, North Africa was clean fighting as well.  Not marked with a lot of butchery of prisoners and such.  The PanzerArmee Afrika was also an undefeated force made of men who were used to winning.  This too helped the Allies as the myths of German invincibility were deflated.  All in all I'd call it a critical step in the war.

I've always wondered why we f*cked up the Sicily invasion so badly after that -- US and Brit troops would have been pretty blooded by that point and letting most of the Germans get away was pretty unforgivable. 

Edited September 10, 2022 by Angrybk

[glenn239]

12 hours ago, Angrybk said:

I've always wondered why we f*cked up the Sicily invasion so badly after that -- US and Brit troops would have been pretty blooded by that point and letting most of the Germans get away was pretty unforgivable. 

The Allies simply underestimated the power of the Siebel Ferry.  :^)

[sunday]

1 hour ago, glenn239 said:

The Allies simply underestimated the power of the Siebel Ferry.  :^)

You are a wicked, wicked man, Glenn 😆

[JWB]

15 hours ago, Angrybk said:

I've always wondered why we f*cked up the Sicily invasion so badly after that -- US and Brit troops would have been pretty blooded by that point and letting most of the Germans get away was pretty unforgivable. 

Allied intelligence believed the Germans were send troops into Sicily not pulling them out.

[RETAC21]

3 hours ago, glenn239 said:

The Allies simply underestimated the power of the Siebel Ferry.  :^)

Post Of The Year

[RETAC21]

16 hours ago, Angrybk said:

I've always wondered why we f*cked up the Sicily invasion so badly after that -- US and Brit troops would have been pretty blooded by that point and letting most of the Germans get away was pretty unforgivable. 

Same as Salerno, in retrospective, overestimation of German Air forces, and fear of coastal batteries.

[glenn239]

4 hours ago, sunday said:

You are a wicked, wicked man, Glenn 😆

I will giggling as I hit "post"...

[Tim the Tank Nut]

Sicily was a very unusual situation.  In my opinion many of the difficulties encountered in Sicily had more to do with confusion at the national level as to what strategic objectives were.  As it stands, the mission objectives were accomplished.  If you really want to see challenges in the Italian theater look at Clark's operations regarding Rome.

Dropping back to NA for a moment I've been thinking that the worst thing that could've happened for the Allies would've been for Blade Force to have had enough infantry to go on and seize Tunis.  Italy would've been a much tougher nut had the reinforcing troops stayed there in the German OOB.

[Markus Becker]

22 hours ago, glenn239 said:

The Allies simply underestimated the power of the Siebel Ferry.  :^)

I think I missed the context of the joke here. 

 

The Messina Stait is 3-8 km wide and 30 ish long. Probably shallow enough to mine the ends too. So good luck interdicting. 

[RichTO90]

7 hours ago, Markus Becker said:

I think I missed the context of the joke here. 

 

The Messina Stait is 3-8 km wide and 30 ish long. Probably shallow enough to mine the ends too. So good luck interdicting. 

The context is that glenn thinks the Siebel would win the war for Germany if the Germans had just been bright enough yo build more of them. His "evidence" for this is his imagination, as it is here. Kesselring began the planning for LEHRGANG as early as 14 July and its success had as much to do with that simple fact as it does with the massive concentration of Flak at the assembly areas and embarkation sites, the decision to cross only at night, the mining of the straits, and the maximum effort of the Luftwaffe (which amounted to 150 sorties daily compared to the 1,200 Allied sorties). That Pi-Landungs-Btl 771 contributed a half-dozen "Siebel" and 14 Pi-Landungsboote, compared to the 23 MFP deployed by 2. Landungs-Flotille, 31 MFP and 7 Infanterie-Transporter deployed by 4. Landungs-Flotille, and 14 "Siebel" and 13 Infanterie-Transporter by 10. Landungs-Flotille of the Kriegsmarine. So around 20 "Siebel", 14 Pi-Boote, 20 I-Boote, and 54 MFP were employed of which 8 MFP and 1 "Siebel" were reported lost (a measure of the effectiveness of the Flak defenses is that two of those MFP were apparently lost while running north out of the Messina Straits, I suspect for repairs at Naples).

So that was responsible for evacuating German forces totaling 39,569 men, 9,605 vehicles, 47 tanks, 94 artillery pieces, 2,000 tons of munitions and fuel, and 15,000 tons of other material...while a hodgepodge of civilian ferries, coasters, and other vessels sufficed to evacuate 62,000 Italians with 227 vehicles and 41 artillery pieces.

Indeed, the "Siebel" was responsible. 🙄

Edited September 11, 2022 by RichTO90

[glenn239]

Way to kill that moment of mirth, Rich.  That one's not getting up.

 

 

[RichTO90]

On 9/11/2022 at 10:32 AM, RichTO90 said:

The context is that glenn thinks the Siebel would win the war for Germany if the Germans had just been bright enough yo build more of them. His "evidence" for this is his imagination, as it is here. Kesselring began the planning for LEHRGANG as early as 14 July and its success had as much to do with that simple fact as it does with the massive concentration of Flak at the assembly areas and embarkation sites, the decision to cross only at night, the mining of the straits, and the maximum effort of the Luftwaffe (which amounted to 150 sorties daily compared to the 1,200 Allied sorties). That Pi-Landungs-Btl 771 contributed a half-dozen "Siebel" and 14 Pi-Landungsboote, compared to the 23 MFP deployed by 2. Landungs-Flotille, 31 MFP and 7 Infanterie-Transporter deployed by 4. Landungs-Flotille, and 14 "Siebel" and 13 Infanterie-Transporter by 10. Landungs-Flotille of the Kriegsmarine. So around 20 "Siebel", 14 Pi-Boote, 20 I-Boote, and 54 MFP were employed of which 8 MFP and 1 "Siebel" were reported lost (a measure of the effectiveness of the Flak defenses is that two of those MFP were apparently lost while running north out of the Messina Straits, I suspect for repairs at Naples).

So that was responsible for evacuating German forces totaling 39,569 men, 9,605 vehicles, 47 tanks, 94 artillery pieces, 2,000 tons of munitions and fuel, and 15,000 tons of other material...while a hodgepodge of civilian ferries, coasters, and other vessels sufficed to evacuate 62,000 Italians with 227 vehicles and 41 artillery pieces.

Indeed, the "Siebel" was responsible. 🙄

Its always interesting when someones clumsy attempt at humor sparks actual thought. In this case I decided to go beyond the standard secondhand sources on what happened and so went to the German records and, what do you know, it wasn't quite the clever and bloodless coup the Germans later pictured it. In fact, it was a despearte and bloody shambles, especially for the Kriegsmarine Landungs-Flotille and the Heer Landungs-Pionier-Bataillone 771. The figures above taken from the common historical sources are underestimates for both the number of vessels committed as well as the number of vessels lost. Evidently, a rule similar to the old "my Panzer ran out of gas and I blew it up and walked away so it wasn't really a battle loss" rule got applied. Anyway, here is more accurate info.

PiLBtl 771 committed 5 operational and 3 nonoperational PiLF (Pionier-Landungs-Fähre, i.e. Siebel ferry designed for use by pioneers) to the Messina Straits and lost 4, 1 boat operationally to air attack and the 3 nonoperational boats to scuttling in the withdrawal. They also committed 21 operational and 1 nonoperational PiLB (Pionier-Landungs-Boote, i.e. small landing craft) and lost 9 to air attack and scuttling and 2 were badly damaged and in repair for some months. 

2. Landungs-Flotille committed 30 MFP and lost 11, plus 1 badly damaged.

4. Landungs-Flotille committed 29 MFP and lost 9, plus 3 badly damaged. (In LEHRGANG they alone hauled 8,678 men (including 381 wounded), 120 Panzer, and 1,698 KFZ.)

10. Landungs-Flotille committed 16 SF and 30 IO (Infanterie-Transporter (landing craft) just to operations at Messina (it was also operating more vessels in Corsica and Sardinia). It lost 10 SF and 13 IO.

Total German losses, sunk and scuttled, were 20 MFP - one-third were lost, 14 SF/PiLF - over half were lost, 13 IO - over one-third were lost, and 9 PiLB - nearly half were lost.

The Italians also lost 14 MZ (Motorazatta, license-built MFP) but there is no record how many they had committed that I can find.

The commonly accepted loss figures of 8 MFP, 1 Siebel ferry, and "some motor boats" is a complete fiction. As near I can make out that excludes all vessels deliberately scuttled, many after they had suffered severe damage in air attacks, and all vessels sunk north of the Torre Faro, but even then is wrong.

The idea the Allied air power shied away from the Straits because of the Flak is also wrong. It is evident that air attack was constant and effective but was only able to strike during the day...and the troop movements were at night.

 

[RichTO90]

BTW, 4. Landungs-Flotille gives a good measure of the real-world capability of the MFP. In seven days the dozen-odd kept on the shuttle run moved 8,678 men (including 381 wounded), 120 Panzer, and 1,698 other vehicles. So roughly 103.3 men, 1.4 tanks and other armored vehicles, and 20.2 other vehicles per vessel per day in a vessel nominally capable of carrying 200 men or 3 tanks or 8-10 other vehicles. This on a roughly seven nautical mile round trip run, so less than an hour travel time.  I suspect they were averaging no more than two trips per night, which says a lot about their loading and unloading proficiency as well as the problems beaching and retracting landing vessels on tidal seas.

[RETAC21]

14 minutes ago, RichTO90 said:

BTW, 4. Landungs-Flotille gives a good measure of the real-world capability of the MFP. In seven days the dozen-odd kept on the shuttle run moved 8,678 men (including 381 wounded), 120 Panzer, and 1,698 other vehicles. So roughly 103.3 men, 1.4 tanks and other armored vehicles, and 20.2 other vehicles per vessel per day in a vessel nominally capable of carrying 200 men or 3 tanks or 8-10 other vehicles. This on a roughly seven nautical mile round trip run, so less than an hour travel time.  I suspect they were averaging no more than two trips per night, which says a lot about their loading and unloading proficiency as well as the problems beaching and retracting landing vessels on tidal seas.

tidal sea, the Med? 

"The Mediterranean sea does have tides, but they are are very limited as a result of the narrow outlet/inlet with the Atlantic ocean. Their amplitude is very low, averaging a few centimeters, (instead of 1 meter of so in the Atlantic ocean)."

Am I missing something here, Rich?

[RichTO90]

10 minutes ago, RETAC21 said:

tidal sea, the Med? 

"The Mediterranean sea does have tides, but they are are very limited as a result of the narrow outlet/inlet with the Atlantic ocean. Their amplitude is very low, averaging a few centimeters, (instead of 1 meter of so in the Atlantic ocean)."

Am I missing something here, Rich?

If the Germans were so bad at turnaround times in mild tidal conditions of the Med, how would they have done in the Channel? And they seemed to have real problems beaching and stranding in the Med, as well as in doing major damage to the boat sometimes when landing...was it a problem with the boat design or the boat handling?

[RETAC21]

12 minutes ago, RichTO90 said:

If the Germans were so bad at turnaround times in mild tidal conditions of the Med, how would they have done in the Channel? And they seemed to have real problems beaching and stranding in the Med, as well as in doing major damage to the boat sometimes when landing...was it a problem with the boat design or the boat handling?

Or both, despite the brilliant design of the Siebel ferry...