State theory, was: Kiev Is Burning

[KV7]

Very good post by Branko Milanokiv
 

'The lack of belief in the system stemmed from the failure of the Soviet Union in the economic arena, and inability to propose a system of participation in the decision-making that appealed to, or was acceptable to, most of its population. The roots of the debacle were both economic and ideological.  Once the party loses the control of the ideology, Xi argues, once it fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for its own rule, objectives and purposes, it dissolves into a party of loosely connected individuals linked only by personal goals of enrichment and power.

The party is then taken over by “ideological nihilism”. While in some cases, this ideological void caused by the disappearance of communist ideology was filled by nationalism, it was almost nowhere filled by liberalism (as I argued many years ago in this piece, namely that the revolutions of 1989 were not revolutions of democracy but of national independence and self-determination). This however was not –as we can see from Xi’s speech—the worst outcome. The worst outcome, and perhaps what Xi fears for China, is that the country be taken over by people with no ideology whatsoever but with an entirely cynical and self-serving desire to rule. This is what happened in Russia where the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was succeeded, and the country hijacked, by the ideological nihilists of the intelligence services.'

'Unlike the original and very ebullient commentators of the end of communism who liked to think that its end will bring forth the flowering of democracy, Xi rightly puts the emphasis on something much more grim and perhaps realistic: “ideological nihilism” that opens the way to adventuresome policies devoid of any ideological or even logical justifications. They might have been, as in the case of Putin’s Russia’s attack on Ukraine, adopted either because of misjudgment or because of a desire to provide same superficial nationalist veneer to an otherwise ideologically empty regime. Whatever the case, they were unmoored from any ideology. Xi is right to argue that once belief in a better society of the future and focus on economic success that is supposed to bring that future society along are abandoned, the power is surrendered to “opportunistic cliques” who may plunge their countries into wars and destruction either because they believe in nothing or because they are in search of some justification for their nihilistic rule.'

https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/the-rule-of-nihilists

[Stefan Kotsch]

1 hour ago, KV7 said:

Very good post by Branko Milanokiv

...

Xi rightly puts ...

In China, as in Russia, the 'party in power' takes precedence over the law. This will remove all fuses. And society is deprived of the opportunity to recognize and correct undesirable developments.

This is the Leninist-Stalinian principle of the new-type party. The party that is ALWAYS right. 

Quote

The party is then taken over by “ideological nihilism”.

Nihilism in place of 'The Party'? Then I have to ask what are the basic pillars of Russian (Chinese) society?

 

 

Edited July 9, 2022 by Stefan Kotsch

[KV7]

16 hours ago, Stefan Kotsch said:

In China, as in Russia, the 'party in power' takes precedence over the law. This will remove all fuses. And society is deprived of the opportunity to recognize and correct undesirable developments.

This is the Leninist-Stalinian principle of the new-type party. The party that is ALWAYS right. 

Nihilism in place of 'The Party'? Then I have to ask what are the basic pillars of Russian (Chinese) society?

In China there are corrections to undesirable developments and compared to the west they arguably happen with high frequency and rapididity. Ultimately everywhere policy is decided upon and implemented by some political class and technocracy and the degree of responsiveness to problems depends largely on the prevailing ideology and the psychology of these classes and the sort of 'insulated from democracy' institutions they inhabit (i.e. central banks, various commissions and departments etc.).

In China the prevailing ideology along these classes is Dengism, aka 'pragmatic national developmentalism and remnant though very limited Marxism-Leninism'. This ideology is somewhat highly attuned to social and economic problems which can impede development, as broadly defined. The problem is that this is a bit of a weak sauce, and so there is a risk it becomes too weak to drive out the power or money hungry 'nihilists'. Certainly by the mid to late 1990's this was very much happening, as shown by a large number of officials who seemed to believe only in getting rich and how the 'market reform' process was starting to become simply a license for high inequality and indifference to the situation of the poor.

Hence from around the time of Hu there is a sort of correction, where the commitment to at least some mild egalitarianism is made and there is a re-stressing of the developmental imperative. And over time the long term project moves away from a pragmatic and selective convergence to the western developed world (i.e one where the U.S. has sort of 'got it right' but where shock therapy etc. is ruled out) to one where the Chinese economic and politcal system is seen as having certain advantages which features which should not, even if slowly, be reformed away.

In the west the previewing ideology is neoliberalism, in which the major role of the state and bureaucracy and politcal class is to inhibit and restrict governments responding to public pressure, especially where this could lead to some egalitarian and especially social democratic or developmentalist policy. And hence for example which party forms the government only has a weak impact on economic policy, because the ideology and institutions constrains greatly the feasible set for policy and because the ideology thoroughly dominates all of the major parties themselves.

Edited July 10, 2022 by KV7

[BansheeOne]

3 hours ago, KV7 said:

In the west the previewing ideology is neoliberalism, in which the major role of the state and bureaucracy and politcal class is to inhibit and restrict governments responding to public pressure, especially where this could lead to some egalitarian and especially social democratic or developmentalist policy. And hence for example which party forms the government only has a weak impact on economic policy, because the ideology and institutions constrains greatly the feasible set for policy and because the ideology thoroughly dominates all of the major parties themselves.

"Neoliberalism" as used today is essentially a leftist buzzword claiming a pervasive Western ideology, similar to like right-wingers use "socialism". If you listened to both, you'd have to conclude that contemporary Europe and even the US are neoliberal and socialist at the same time, based upon individual elements that could be construed to be derived of either. Freed of the terms' ideological underpinnings, they might even be right in that various Western nations follow an amalgam of market liberal and social democratic policies, like Germany's "Social Market Economy", the "Nordic Model", etc.; sometimes trending more to one side, sometimes to the other based upon domestic and global influences.

I've said before that the real difference is that liberal Western democratic governments generally have to win over the silent majority at the next election rather than rushing to placate popular sentiment expressed by a loud minority, thus slowing down extensive change. Quick marked shifts due to public pressure are rather a sign of authoritarian governments which derive their legitimacy from being seen to execute the purported "will of the people" on a daily basis, and must either adapt to widespread dissent, crush it, or be overthrown. Though it's not like liberal democratic governments can't change policy quickly if faced with vital challenges - just look at Germany's recent 180 on defense, executed by some of the most unlikely political parties for it.

Speaking of which, Germany seems to have secured ammunition supply for the Gepard SPAAGs to be delivered to Ukraine after Switzerland vetoed Rheinmetall's ex-Oerlikon production. Reportedly a Norwegian maker (so probably Nammo) will step in; be interesting to see if they will now make FAPDS etc. which apparently they haven't so far. If it was just about some traditional 35 mm, I don't think there wouldn't have been a problem in finding alternate suppliers, so I suspect the hangup was in transfering production rights from Rheinmetall.

[Huba]

40 minutes ago, BansheeOne said:

I've said before that the real difference is that liberal Western democratic governments generally have to win over the silent majority at the next election rather than rushing to placate popular sentiment expressed by a loud minority, thus slowing down extensive change. Quick marked shifts due to public pressure are rather a sign of authoritarian governments which derive their legitimacy from being seen to execute the purported "will of the people" on a daily basis, and must either adapt to widespread dissent, crush it, or be overthrown. Though it's not like liberal democratic governments can't change policy quickly if faced with vital challenges - just look at Germany's recent 180 on defense, executed by some of the most unlikely political parties for it.

Can't agree more. Perceived ineptitude and inertia of democracies, the fact that "nothing can be done" and "leaders are weak/ impotent" are the greatest strengths of democracies, as it gives us the true stability, not directly related to any single personality.

 

44 minutes ago, BansheeOne said:

Speaking of which, Germany seems to have secured ammunition supply for the Gepard SPAAGs to be delivered to Ukraine after Switzerland vetoed Rheinmetall's ex-Oerlikon production. Reportedly a Norwegian maker (so probably Nammo) will step in; be interesting to see if they will now make FAPDS etc. which apparently they haven't so far. If it was just about some traditional 35 mm, I don't think there wouldn't have been a problem in finding alternate suppliers, so I suspect the hangup was in transfering production rights from Rheinmetall.

A probably quite obscure fact related to that is that Poland had a license for both KDA guns and FAPDS ammo for them. We produces some of both in the late 90's for our cancelled SPAAG PZA Loara. I'm sure production lines were re-tooled since then unfortunately.

Loara itself was quite interesting, it was very similar to Gepard, but 20 years later with contemporary tech. Reportedly it was able to shoot down 81mm mortar rounds with FAPDS routinely (with some ammo expenditure of course). It got cancelled cause ain't nobody got money for that in the peace dividend times 😕 And now we're stuck with ZU-23 and MANPADS for point defence....

 

[urbanoid]

11 minutes ago, Huba said:

Can't agree more. Perceived ineptitude and inertia of democracies, the fact that "nothing can be done" and "leaders are weak/ impotent" are the greatest strengths of democracies, as it gives us the true stability, not directly related to any single personality.

Well, sometimes 'nothing can be done' or can be done only on a limited scale until shit really hits the fan. Sometimes democracies have to exhaust all the wrong options to choose a correct one under pressure in the end.

  

11 minutes ago, Huba said:

Loara itself was quite interesting, it was very similar to Gepard, but 20 years later with contemporary tech. Reportedly it was able to shoot down 81mm mortar rounds with FAPDS routinely (with some ammo expenditure of course). It got cancelled cause ain't nobody got money for that in the peace dividend times 😕 And now we're stuck with ZU-23 and MANPADS for point defence....

Maybe one day, updated and on a different chassis...

[urbanoid]

2 minutes ago, Huba said:

Well, we can always enact a dictator with emergency powers for the time of war or other crisis, it always works great in the long run... 😜

I'm not saying we should, just pointing out that democracy has its deficiencies as well. 

[Huba]

Just now, urbanoid said:

I'm not saying we should, just pointing out that democracy has its deficiencies as well. 

There's no doubt about that, just different than authoritarian systems.

[Stefan Kotsch]

The way and the ability to deal with one's own deficiencies makes the big difference. 

[ink]

Not sure what's going on over there in continental Europe but guys with all your talk of democracy haven't been paying close attention to what's been happening in the US and UK for the last couple few 10 15 20 25 years, have you?

Also... Hungary... Poland... the EU is increasingly having a democracy deficit problem that it doesn't have the tools to tackle. Is it just a matter of time before this spreads to Germany too? In terms of the structure of international relations and the world system at the moment, I would say yes*.

 

* With the proviso that that is just a guess.

[Huba]

@ink Nobody's denying that there are problems, but all those that you listed pale compared to issues in non-democratic countries. Seriously, I can't think of any that is doing better relatively, at least as far as personal and political  liberties and standard of living are concerned.

I agree though that UE is in a need of reform now, especially if a number of new members is to be admitted in the next decade. Getting rid of some of the unanimity in decision making would be a good start. And more efficient mechanisms to deal with rule-of-law violations in the members state too. Thing is, this things are within reach - as Stefan pointed out, democracy is capable of self-improvement much more so than systems based on personalities.

[ink]

1. I don't disagree with your point that "democracy is the worst form of government – except for all the others that have been tried". I just wanted to point out that democracy itself is backsliding in many of the world's most important countries. However, if you want to look to countries that aren't democratic but are making it work - look to Asia. Even in democratic Asian countries, the term democracy (as it is understood in Europe, for example) is severely stretched, and yet they are largely able to manage their populations with impressive effectiveness.

2. I don't see the EU accepting any new members in the next decade... or perhaps even longer. Maybe Montenegro and Macedonia. That's a big "maybe", though. As for reforming the EU, I think this is unlikely. Certainly not to make it more democratic. What is more likely that more and more key EU countries will experience democratic backsliding and this will begin to infect EU institutions. What this will ultimately mean for the bloc, I cannot say. But I certainly don't see the EU undergoing any fresh democratisation in a climate in which its member states are broadly headed in the other direction.

[Huba]

Well I'm not gonna argue about the course particular European countries will follow in next years or so, there's simply no way to tell IMO. At least in Poland I don't believe the current party will hold to power much longer, due to inflation and economic crisis alone. And even if they remain, the need to keep closer to EU when faced by external threats is acknowledged now.

As for the EU, who said anything about democratization? It isn't a country, it is an international institution, which I hope will become more effective in what it does. Removing the need for unanimity is a step exactly in that direction, it strips members of some rights ( you could argue it makes it "less democratic"), but promotes effectiveness. 

But of course, we shall see how it will go, I on my end remain moderately optimistic.

[Stuart Galbraith]

1 hour ago, ink said:

Not sure what's going on over there in continental Europe but guys with all your talk of democracy haven't been paying close attention to what's been happening in the US and UK for the last couple few 10 15 20 25 years, have you?

Also... Hungary... Poland... the EU is increasingly having a democracy deficit problem that it doesn't have the tools to tackle. Is it just a matter of time before this spreads to Germany too? In terms of the structure of international relations and the world system at the moment, I would say yes*.

 

* With the proviso that that is just a guess.

The UK gets a proper slamming these days for not being a proper Democracy. But you know, for all I hate Brexit for, it was voted for. That is Democracy in action, far more so in fact than was Britains entry into the EU, which was done without any reference to public sentiment.

Here is the thing, possibly one of the most Populist UK politicians was run into the ground by breaking all the rules. Yes, the UK constituion is famously flexible, overly so. But when it comes to it, its seemingly more capable of curbing the powers and running out of office a rulebreaker than many European written constitutions.

The UK has a lot of problems, but I do think the tone of them or the direction of our politics is largely misunderstood by outsiders. In many respects the one of our Politics is considerably to the left of where it was 40 years ago. The direction, in my mind at least, is away from the extremes and towards the centre ground, if the failure of Bojo's particular brand is any guide.

 

 

[ink]

Surely we can all agree that voting (particularly in referendums) does not a democracy make.

Anyway, one needn't take my word for it on Britain's democratic backsliding (particularly since 2010 but I would put the start date closer to the end of the Cold War), the internet is awash with articles on the subject. We don't need to get drawn into that debate here.

It isn't all about Britain either. The US is in no more enviable a state.

Of course, nobody's talking about either country as some sort of oligarchy - democracy sure is clinging on in both systems. In both countries, however, the general direction is most definitely not towards greater and greater democracy.

Overall, I am Huba's opposite number in that I remain moderately pessimistic.

[Markus Becker]

2 hours ago, Stefan Kotsch said:

The way and the ability to deal with one's own deficiencies makes the big difference. 

Depends, depends, depends! 

[Markus Becker]

1 hour ago, ink said:

 

Also... Hungary... Poland... the EU is increasingly having a democracy deficit problem that it doesn't have the tools to tackle. Is it just a matter of time before this spreads to Germany too? In terms of the structure of international relations and the world system at the moment, I would say yes*.

 

* With the proviso that that is just a guess.

Pffrt! Perfectly democratic but not at all left ruled countries that both reject the idea of EU supremacy of the member states and are thus the target of much slander from the unelected bureaucrats in Brussels. 

Edited July 10, 2022 by Markus Becker

[Stefan Kotsch]

4 minutes ago, Markus Becker said:

Depends, depends, depends! 

Unfortunately, the danger of encrustation is always present. But the probability of correction is much higher than in the Putin system.

The right-wing nationalist German AfD (Alternative for Germany party) politicians would already sitting in Russia in the GULAG for a long time. Because of terrorism or tax crimes or [insert any reason here] or they would have been offered tea.

 

 

[Angrybk]

54 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

The UK gets a proper slamming these days for not being a proper Democracy. But you know, for all I hate Brexit for, it was voted for. That is Democracy in action, far more so in fact than was Britains entry into the EU, which was done without any reference to public sentiment.

Here is the thing, possibly one of the most Populist UK politicians was run into the ground by breaking all the rules. Yes, the UK constituion is famously flexible, overly so. But when it comes to it, its seemingly more capable of curbing the powers and running out of office a rulebreaker than many European written constitutions.

The UK has a lot of problems, but I do think the tone of them or the direction of our politics is largely misunderstood by outsiders. In many respects the one of our Politics is considerably to the left of where it was 40 years ago. The direction, in my mind at least, is away from the extremes and towards the centre ground, if the failure of Bojo's particular brand is any guide.

 

 

There’s a lot of deep thinking on our side of the pond that a parliamentary democracy is a better system than what we’ve got, and I sort of agree. It’s definitely better at dealing with psycho outliers. 

Edited July 10, 2022 by Angrybk

[KV7]

4 hours ago, BansheeOne said:

"Neoliberalism" as used today is essentially a leftist buzzword claiming a pervasive Western ideology, similar to like right-wingers use "socialism". If you listened to both, you'd have to conclude that contemporary Europe and even the US are neoliberal and socialist at the same time, based upon individual elements that could be construed to be derived of either. Freed of the terms' ideological underpinnings, they might even be right in that various Western nations follow an amalgam of market liberal and social democratic policies, like Germany's "Social Market Economy", the "Nordic Model", etc.; sometimes trending more to one side, sometimes to the other based upon domestic and global influences.

I've said before that the real difference is that liberal Western democratic governments generally have to win over the silent majority at the next election rather than rushing to placate popular sentiment expressed by a loud minority, thus slowing down extensive change. Quick marked shifts due to public pressure are rather a sign of authoritarian governments which derive their legitimacy from being seen to execute the purported "will of the people" on a daily basis, and must either adapt to widespread dissent, crush it, or be overthrown. Though it's not like liberal democratic governments can't change policy quickly if faced with vital challenges - just look at Germany's recent 180 on defense, executed by some of the most unlikely political parties for it.

Neoliberalism is a fluffy term but here I mean something very specific. It is the replacement for the semi-egalitarian post-war consensus which held until around 1980 across much of the western world. I.e. a commitment to low inequality, full employment, a substantial role for trade unions, Keynesian macroeconomic management, mixed economies, industry policy etc. - and one which even conservative parties largely adhered to (e.g. see for example 'Butskellism' in the UK)

From the oil shock onward parts of the elite started to defect from the model but the emerging view wasn't just that the earlier model was a policy error, but that it was a result of excess public pressure leading to e.g. 'unsustainable expenditures' or 'uncompetitive wages'  The solution was to implement views mooted earlier in the post war period by Hakek, which would involve to a large extent taking economic policy out of the hands of politicians and giving it to some technocracy, for example independent central banks or productivity commissions etc. who would rule out or moderate any sort of 'policy backsliding'. The canonical case here is the EMU, which would take monetary policy (and much of trade policy) entirely away from national governments, in which case fiscal policy could not be financed by an accommodating central bank. Or in the word's of Mundell:

"It puts monetary policy out of the reach of politicians . . . without fiscal policy, the only way nations can keep jobs is by the competitive reduction of rules on business."

This model itself came under pressure after the GFC, when various EU mechanism designed to limit fiscal expenditures were incompatible with post-GFC stabilisation, (see for example Draghi's 'whatever it takes) though it was only a partial break.

[Stuart Galbraith]

1 hour ago, ink said:

Surely we can all agree that voting (particularly in referendums) does not a democracy make.

Anyway, one needn't take my word for it on Britain's democratic backsliding (particularly since 2010 but I would put the start date closer to the end of the Cold War), the internet is awash with articles on the subject. We don't need to get drawn into that debate here.

It isn't all about Britain either. The US is in no more enviable a state.

Of course, nobody's talking about either country as some sort of oligarchy - democracy sure is clinging on in both systems. In both countries, however, the general direction is most definitely not towards greater and greater democracy.

Overall, I am Huba's opposite number in that I remain moderately pessimistic.

No, but I think we can agree that NOT voting is certainly a building block of all repressive regimes. You dont see us trying to reduce the people who can vote.

Once again, you are remembering the 1980's differently from me. Britains Democratic backsliding, if there was any, was tried in the 1980's when Police were kicking the snot out of hippies or Miners, and using the Army to spy on them. Blacks were being beaten up by police, just for protesting en mass at being beaten up by police. They were even at one famous point using the American end, using GCHQ to spy on Thatchers cabinet ministers when they were visiting Canada. All that is considerably more repressive than anything that has occurred, even on Bojo's watch. Im sure he aspired to more, but he didnt have the talent to get close.

Here is the problem, all those whom say Britain is on the slide into a repressive right wing regime, really need to explain the success of facing down most of what Boris Johnson wanted to do. Even the much publicised Rwanda deportations were an unmitigated failure, because law here still counts for something. Even his effort to prorogue Parliament utterly failed, and was largely counterproductive.

Im more worried about the US, although to be fair, that also fails to take into account the increasing success of the Capitol inquiry. In a truly repressive regime, as was portrayed by the left about Donald Trump, no such thing could have happened. And whatever Trump wanted to do, pretty much everything he failed to achieve, or succeed at longer than his term.

Its very easy to keep calling the death of representive Democracy. Except people were doing precisely the same thing in the 1930's and the 1970's. Change needs to come, but it will come. But It wont for regimes that are repressive, because they have no tools to be different.

Its perfectly justificable to be pessimistic about what has occurred. Personally im a lot more optimistic by recent events. Bojo is on the way out the exit door, Drumpf is increasingly discredited, Putin is in a meatgrinder of a war from which he is unlikely to achieve ends superior to the material he expended. This is good news, and even a depresive cynic like myself cant help but see it.

 

[Stuart Galbraith]

46 minutes ago, Angrybk said:

There’s a lot of deep thinking on our side of the pond that a parliamentary democracy is a better system than what we’ve got, and I sort of agree. It’s definitely better at dealing with psycho outliers. 

I continually lament the flaws in our system. I loathe the unelected house of lords for example, which should be elective by now. OTOH, its interesting to look at our broken, flawed, abitrary system, and reflect it seems to have worked a lot better to keep Bojo in line than the clearly superior, well considered, well documented US system kept Trump in line. There is a case for saying a poorly documented system is a forest full of mantraps for the unwary, particularly someone whom loathes the rules like Johnson.

I wouldnt boast of the superiority of our system in any way, anymore than I would boast of the superiority of a Constitutional Monarchy. The strange thing is, its rather like Pratchetts Rimworld. It seems to work despite all logical analysis, which is presumably why so many foreigners deprecate it. IMHO its less a political system than performance art.

 

 

Edited July 10, 2022 by Stuart Galbraith

[BansheeOne]

24 minutes ago, KV7 said:

Neoliberalism is a fluffy term but here I mean something very specific. It is the replacement for the semi-egalitarian post-war consensus which held until around 1980 across much of the western world. I.e. a commitment to low inequality, full employment, a substantial role for trade unions, Keynesian macroeconomic management, mixed economies, industry policy etc. - and one which even conservative parties largely adhered to (e.g. see for example 'Butskellism' in the UK)

From the oil shock onward parts of the elite started to defect from the model but the emerging view wasn't just that the earlier model was a policy error, but that it was a result of excess public pressure leading to e.g. 'unsustainable expenditures' or 'uncompetitive wages'  The solution was to implement views mooted earlier in the post war period by Hakek, which would involve to a large extent taking economic policy out of the hands of politicians and giving it to some technocracy, for example independent central banks or productivity commissions etc. who would rule out or moderate any sort of 'policy backsliding'. The canonical case here is the EMU, which would take monetary policy (and much of trade policy) entirely away from national governments, in which case fiscal policy could not be financed by an accommodating central bank. Or in the word's of Mundell:

"It puts monetary policy out of the reach of politicians . . . without fiscal policy, the only way nations can keep jobs is by the competitive reduction of rules on business."

This model itself came under pressure after the GFC, when various EU mechanism designed to limit fiscal expenditures were incompatible with post-GFC stabilisation, (see for example Draghi's 'whatever it takes) though it was only a partial break.

I'd posit that the above is just one of the periodical trends within the existing systems, with the exact kind of slow changes between different poles typical for Western democracies. Yeah, from the 80s deregulation and privatization became fashionable with Reagan and Thatcher, but others like France or Germany never followed to the same extent; arguably the high point was just after the millenium, before various crises showed the dangers of government retreating too much, and the electorate began to make its displeasure known about the effects. Locally we've seen a reverse trend for some years, and current crises are likely going to reinforce that.

It may be different in the US, as one of the trans-Atlantic culture disconnects is Europeans tending to puzzle how Americans keep embracing politics which to our eyes make an ever-growing share of them living in precarious economic conditions because those profiting tell them any deviation leads to Hell and Communism; but that again shows there is no common ideology ruling the West. In fact I suspect the attempt to identify one is just (non-Western) ideologues like Xi trying to analyse within their own frame of reference, and they just can't imagine that there is no such thing in other systems.

[ink]

1 hour ago, Markus Becker said:

Pffrt! Perfectly democratic but not at all left ruled countries that both reject the idea of EU supremacy of the member states and are thus the target of much slander from the unelected bureaucrats in Brussels. 

Not at all, sir. You have taken your eye off the ball. There are extremely worrying undemocratic trends in both countries. Sure, Poland is much further down that road than Hungary (and, indeed, Polish democracy is much more robust) but that does not mean these trends are not a cause for concern. Hungary, however, is already just a skip hop and a jump away from being a "controlled democracy".

EDIT: Gah! Sorry. Forgot to clarify, when it comes to Hungary, I'm not talking about "culture wars" stuff - not sure how much I care about that - but about constitutional changes that make it extremely difficult for other parties to win elections and, if they do, hard for them to stay in power beyond a single election cycle.

Edited July 10, 2022 by ink
clarifying something

[Markus Becker]

1 hour ago, Stefan Kotsch said:

Unfortunately, the danger of encrustation is always present. But the probability of correction is much higher than in the Putin system.

The right-wing nationalist German AfD (Alternative for Germany party) politicians would already sitting in Russia in the GULAG for a long time. Because of terrorism or tax crimes or [insert any reason here] or they would have been offered tea.

 

 

And this is relevant to the inability of the German political class to correct mistakes say in energy or agricultural policy in what way?