Lessons (Already) Learned From The Ukraine War - Military, Political, Technical

[PCallahan]

As I've watched this unfold, I've begun to wonder if the Russian military planners never actually expected to have to go through with the invasion.  Told to develop a plan, they generated one that assumed best case for most variables, confident it would never be put to the test.  Then, rather unexpectedly, they were tasked with executing it...

[Markus Becker]

1 hour ago, PCallahan said:

As I've watched this unfold, I've begun to wonder if the Russian military planners never actually expected to have to go through with the invasion.  Told to develop a plan, they generated one that assumed best case for most variables, confident it would never be put to the test.  Then, rather unexpectedly, they were tasked with executing it...

From what we are seeing it very much looks to me that they did not expect much if any serious resistance and instead it would go like Crimea 2014.

[Ssnake]

...because, every new war goes exactly like the last one.

[Stuart Galbraith]

If you remember rightly, about a week before the war began, Putin announced his army was to prepare planning to start the conflict. Ive always been intriged by the idea that actually WAS the start of the planning process, and he didnt let them do it before then, for fear of letting the Ukrainian intelligence services know about it.

The counterpoint to that, the Ukrainians claim to have found maps and plans dated to January, so clearly some level of planning was ongoing. Which suggests to me there may have been some level of planning, but there was no real head of the operation, and no apparent operational plan. its almost as if they allowed each army to go ahead and do its own thing.

[RETAC21]

4 hours ago, Markus Becker said:

From what we are seeing it very much looks to me that they did not expect much if any serious resistance and instead it would go like Crimea 2014.

I don't think so, they have fought a war on the Donbas on the basis of that assumption, so I would say they expected the Ukrainians to fight if push came to shove, but they didn't expect to actually do the invasion, but given the signals from the West that Ukraine was going to be thrown under the bus, they decided this was their chance.

[glenn239]

7 hours ago, PCallahan said:

As I've watched this unfold, I've begun to wonder if the Russian military planners never actually expected to have to go through with the invasion.  Told to develop a plan, they generated one that assumed best case for most variables, confident it would never be put to the test.  Then, rather unexpectedly, they were tasked with executing it...

My guess would be that the Russian military developed a series of options for Putin to consider, and the one he picked was a more aggressive widescale advance that presumed Ukrainian resistance would be weaker.  They are now in the process of switching over to a more conservative plan focusing more narrowly on achievable goals - the main elements of which probably were in a more conservative plan that Putin rejected back in January.

Maybe a bit like how the German army presented two plans for the Battle of the Bulge and Hitler picked the more ambitious one.

Edited March 31, 2022 by glenn239

[RETAC21]

Not a lesson, but interesting: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf

[Daan]

What about the issue and value of camouflage uniforms in future conflicts when both sides have modern camouflage patterns? In this conflict both sides have different styles of camouflage, yet wear brightly colored strips of cloth and plastic to distinguish themselves, but which also negate part of the camouflage value of their uniforms. 

See this picture of a Ukrainian soldier. His camouflage matches the background reasonably well, then his blue strips stick out like a sore thumb. An additional observation is that very few troops on both sides bother to apply facial camouflage.

[Josh]

This is a rather unique conflict in that almost all the equipment of both sides is identical. Even if uniforms were similar, equipment difference would probably make one side visually easy to identify. But in this case, due to similar equipment and uniforms both sides decided clearly marking friend and foe was more important than cammo.

[Daan]

I agree about the similarity of larger equipment and small arms, but the uniforms, helmets and backpacks etc. look dissimilar, from close-up, al least for the more regular troops. I wonder if you could easily tell a moving Finnish, Polish or even American infantry squad apart from a Russian squad 100-200 meters out in a natural environment, even in bright sunlight. In such a potential mix-up I can see the value of bright markers that decrease the camouflage characteristics of their uniforms.

[Josh]

I think the US uses IR reflective tape and strobe markers in some instances, especially at night. Wouldn't be a good idea against a peer competitor though, obviously.

[darkkwulfe]

They do, usually on the back of the helmets with 2 small strips.

 

[Nobu]

Makes sense. I don't think either side came in with IFF as their SOP. They both probably learned the necessity of it the hard way.

I think there is still time for the Ukrainians to collapse, although the chances of that are not increasing.

Lessons learned: Don't dig trenches in irradiated soil? There is work to be done in separating the stupid from the learnable moments in this one.

 

[Josh]

I don't think either side has a possibility of complete collapse, but I think both could easily fall into stagnation and be more easily pushed around. But Russia has a big advantage in that it can just stop attacking for the most part until it feels it is ready. Fuel has to be tight for the UA, and driving around under an unfriendly sky isn't healthy.

[darkkwulfe]

I wonder if Russia will invest more in supply and other non-combat support equipment/vehicles. Perhaps studying and evaluating in new methods/tactics for maintaining a good supply flow.

[R011]

6 hours ago, Daan said:

I agree about the similarity of larger equipment and small arms, but the uniforms, helmets and backpacks etc. look dissimilar, from close-up, al least for the more regular troops. I wonder if you could easily tell a moving Finnish, Polish or even American infantry squad apart from a Russian squad 100-200 meters out in a natural environment, even in bright sunlight. In such a potential mix-up I can see the value of bright markers that decrease the camouflage characteristics of their uniforms.

One could very easily tell British from American from german in 1944.  With everyone wearing uniforms more or less the same colour, even if the patyterns differ slightly, and close fitting, not very distinctive helmets, it's a lot harder.

[R011]

I suppose the Ukrainians could wear Blue tunics with yellow facings and the Russians Imperial white.  Be easty to tell sides then.

[sunday]

8 hours ago, R011 said:

I suppose the Ukrainians could wear Blue tunics with yellow facings and the Russians Imperial white.  Be easty to tell sides then.

Like the Swedes at Poltava?

[Dark_Falcon]

We seem to have completely ignored the biggest threat to BMP-3s:

 

[Mighty_Zuk]

I don't know what was already written here, because so much is written every time I turn off my phone, but I'll throw my 2 cents on lessons learned:

1. Do not neglect high level exercises, from brigade to army level. Every brigade, division, or army, must have a commander (or deputy) that took part in at least 1 exercise of the highest level in his military, in his current discipline.

2. Maintain strategic reserves of withdrawn weaponry. Do not scrap when phased out.

3. Part of point #2, every armed force must have a plan in place at all times to flex quickly to several times its current size in a matter of weeks. What this might entail is an comprehensive reserve program.

4. Modernization should not eat up the parts and ammo budget. If ammo is not one of the biggest budget items, if not the biggest, there's something fundamentally wrong.

5. Insensitive munitions are a must.

6. Light infantry and units are a vital part of every force, whether as a supporting unit or as a fixing one.

7. Precision guided munitions should take a substantial part of the inventory and must be distributed as a carried, not a called upon, asset, to light units.

[Mighty_Zuk]

On 3/26/2022 at 9:37 PM, BansheeOne said:

So the Russian Army ain't ten feet tall. Systemic failure, or just the B team sent in unprepared? What does it mean for NATO - reduced threat, or its shift from conventional to nuclear out of Russian self-perception of weakness?

Combination of many factors like corruption, drawing wrong lessons from past conflicts including Syria, lack of proper training (e.g Zapad is very 1 dimensional) and so on. What WE should do is try to seize the opportunity for geopolitical gains BUT be careful not to underestimate Russia in the future as it could silently improve drastically in our carelessness, otherwise the next surprise will not be like in Ukraine, but like we had recently in Afghanistan.

On 3/26/2022 at 9:37 PM, BansheeOne said:

Impact of latest AT weapons: are contemporary armies adequately equipped (materially and doctrinally) with and against them? What does it mean for contemporary tank design?

The gold standard for AT weapons is Spike versions which are very common in the west, and the counter to them is APS, with whom thousands of western AFVs were already fitted, but none of them operationally in Europe. Western AT defenses are inadequate in most countries.

Other weapons like drones dropping AT and GP weapons, and artillery fire can be countered by installing more side armor and jammers or APS. Since we covered APS, jammers are fairly straightforward. The tank's radars or comms suit should be able to double as jammers if programmed to do so.

Additional armor should allow tanks to survive artillery in any case other than a direct hit, and that's within the capacity of almost any modern MBT.

Every western country can commit to a crash program to substantially increase the survivability of its armored units within months, but the decisions must be made ASAP, not when crisis arrives.

But really, other than ad hoc solutions, there isn't much to infer regarding our current armor designs. Not that we should infer much, considering most tanks are conceptually at the end of their lives and replacement is due in the 2030's.

On 3/26/2022 at 9:37 PM, BansheeOne said:

The ballistic (and hypersonic) missile threat: a gap in Western capabilities, or just in Western defenses?

Western defenses, not capabilities. Western countries like Israel have holistic solutions spanning from mortars and small drones to ICBMs. Why do others not invest similarly? Because European countries generally take a shitty approach to defense - one of a crippled defense ecosystem and blindness to the threat.

Every western country that wishes to create a full spectrum IAMD solution can acquire all pieces off the shelf. 

Germany for example only now started, and is said to consider systems like Arrow 3 and THAAD.

On 3/26/2022 at 9:37 PM, BansheeOne said:

Modern air war, or the lack thereof: where has air supremacy gone, and who needs it anyway if you got MANPADS?

If you're on the defense and your mindset is 'If I survive and can eventually repel them, I count it as a win', then aerial superiority or supremacy is a luxury.

If you want to dominate all the way and a defeat isn't even perceived as possibility (e.g US vs anyone), then air supremacy is necessary.

Cases:

1. Russia in Ukraine - Russia has no solution for Ukrainian air defenses, and has no PGKs to use on its aircraft. So tempo is very slow at all times, and the RuAF is inconsequential at large.

2. Israel in Lebanon/Gaza - Israel has a solution for Palestinian/Lebanese air defenses (MANPADS and EW, up to SAMs in Lebanon), and has plenty of PGKs. So the tempo is very high and the IAF is key to combat success.

Air superiority will be vital to conducting multi domain ops. So I'm not sure what's up with this question.

On 3/26/2022 at 9:37 PM, BansheeOne said:

UAVs: lessons from the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict reinforced, or overhyped within the greater picture? Implications for further use and defensive measures?

UAVs in both cases (Nagorno Karabakh and Ukraine) are not good cases to study from. In the former, one side had a clear technological superiority and the other had no tools necessary to deal with many of the modern weapon systems.

In the latter, the technologically superior and better organized force turned out to have massive deficiencies in all aspects, and even EW which was used effectively in the Donbass in the years prior, appeared ineffective in all its mission sets. So we cannot draw conclusions from that either.

On 3/26/2022 at 9:37 PM, BansheeOne said:

The electronic battlefield: communications, reconnaissance and countermeasures within a developed country's infrastructure.

Secure comms are a make it or break it tech, and without it you take out one of the main pillars of modern warfare, which is coordination through connectivity.

On 3/26/2022 at 9:37 PM, BansheeOne said:

The information war: did Russia get beat at its own game, or were its perceived successes always superficial vs. the natural resilience of Western societies, most of it easily brushed away when the chips came down?

Plenty of information was presented on both sides. Ukraine had the inherent advantage of first being geographically close and thus relevant to the western audience, second being perceived as a defender against a regional aggressor, and third being perceived as an event in a larger war between democracy and tyranny.

All that Russia could try to do is cut Ukraine off the internet and prevent any data from pouring out, but that would not necessarily be beneficial to Russia. Such a situation could demoralize Ukrainians and lower Russian losses, so it would be beneficial on the micro level (albeit many Russians relied on local networks to communicate). But it would also raise western fears of Russia and thus a response would be harsher - more sanctions, more military buildup, and higher chances of non-NATO countries to join quickly. So a backlash on the macro level.

And what matters more when you believe in a swift victory, is the macro.

On 3/26/2022 at 9:37 PM, BansheeOne said:

Energy security: Where do we go from here?

What we have always known - everyone produces at least 100% of its own energy, and trade surplus like any commodity due to climate differences.

[bojan]

No amount of armor will save tanks from artillery making them mission incapable and immobilized..

Edited April 1, 2022 by bojan

[Mighty_Zuk]

8 hours ago, bojan said:

No amount of armor will save tanks from artillery making them mission incapable and immobilized..

Or any other weapon. There is more value in keeping the crew alive than the tank intact. More side armor, in an amount we see on some MBTs, will save the crew in most artillery strikes.

Maintain a good enough stock of spare parts, field maintenance capabilities, and logistics, and you might get those damaged tanks in working order within hours or days, and won't have to write them off.

[Angrybk]

The biggest takeaway for me so far is that there are a lot of people on this forum who are experts on the mm size of a BMPs gun or whatever who think that makes them an expert on what’s going to happen in this war. 

[Stuart Galbraith]

Well logistics are a good guide. Russia was having logistics issues on day two of the war, almost within sight of the border. By contrast Ukraine was able to get Starstreak in country and right to he other side of the country in Luhansk inside of a week.

Doesnt mean Ukraine will win. Does mean Ukraine is doing a much better job of keeping its forces supplied, which if 1944 is any guide, is half the mission.