Lessons (Already) Learned From The Ukraine War - Military, Political, Technical

[bojan]

37 minutes ago, seahawk said:

No you can not, because for the same amount of ammo as the BMP-3 carries, the other vehicles would also be restricted in their usefulness as a IFV.

Yes you can, that turret has about same footprint in the hull that various CV-90 turrets have. Years ago that turret was offered on M113, CV-90 and Patria chassis as a "drop in sollution".

32 x 100mm, 500 x 30mm, 2000 x 7.62 + 3 x ATGM all come in this package, with turret ring being same as on CV-90 and depth of hull required being actually somewhat less than for 35 and 40mm armed turrets.

Edited March 29, 2022 by bojan

[Jaguar]

 "You can fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize

it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life but if you desire

to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization you

must do this on the ground, the way the Roman Legions did,

by putting your young men into the mud."

T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War

[RETAC21]

On 3/28/2022 at 9:29 AM, Ssnake said:

 

I think it's safe to say that if Russian AD was useless, UKR jets would fly more sorties. The absence of a signal is the signal here.

Sorry to revisit this. I don't think we have enough information yet to make a judgement. Ukrainians seem to use their Air force like the Vietnamese, as a air guerrilla force, nibbling at Russian air power here and there but unable to stop or contest air superiority.

In order to survive the onslaught of Russian missiles and planes, they have dispersed away from their bases before day one but that means they can't concentrate (so they are flying in penny packets) and seek to survive to fight other day rather than engage as they are outnumbered. They also seem to be coordinating with their air defence to cause attrition.

Their main objective is to deny the Russian ability to use air power unhindered, forcing them to escort and support their attack aircraft rather than give them freedom to task all their airpower for bombing missions.

The other element, the UCAVs, are being used in less defended areas to kill Russian AD and Command systems and for artillery spotting.

Of note, as Roman has pointed out, is that the Russian Army has learned in this month how to do the same and protect their comms.

[Junior FO]

...

Edited September 22 by Junior FO

[On the way]

On 3/26/2022 at 11:37 AM, BansheeOne said:

Probably a bit early, but with Russia apparently doing a double-take on its war aims in Ukraine, it might be good to have a thread on lessons in place as they emerge, separate from the wreck counting, mutual accusations of war crimes and meme trading on the "Kiev Is Burning" one (he said hopefully). Not looking for re-confirmation of truisms like "dictators should be believed when they talk about their plans" or "don't tell your invasion force it's just a drill" either, but what changes others might or might not want to make to their military, political and technological posture. For starters:

- So the Russian Army ain't ten feet tall. Systemic failure, or just the B team sent in unprepared? What does it mean for NATO - reduced threat, or its shift from conventional to nuclear out of Russian self-perception of weakness?

- Impact of latest AT weapons: are contemporary armies adequately equipped (materially and doctrinally) with and against them? What does it mean for contemporary tank design?

- The ballistic (and hypersonic) missile threat: a gap in Western capabilities, or just in Western defenses?

- Modern air war, or the lack thereof: where has air supremacy gone, and who needs it anyway if you got MANPADS?

- UAVs: lessons from the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict reinforced, or overhyped within the greater picture? Implications for further use and defensive measures?

- The electronic battlefield: communications, reconnaissance and countermeasures within a developed country's infrastructure.

- The information war: did Russia get beat at its own game, or were its perceived successes always superficial vs. the natural resilience of Western societies, most of it easily brushed away when the chips came down?

- Energy security: Where do we go from here?

Etc.

A, Lots of lessons can already be gleaned with the war in the second month.

1) The absence of an AMerican style Desert Storm "bomb them back to the stone age" in the initial phases is now coming back to haunt the Russians. They had many years to scout and pinpoint all the locations such as command, infrastructure, etc to target and destroy in the first few hours of the campaign. Done right, the Ukr should have no internet, cellphones, no ability to communicate with the various commanders and groups in the field, heck not even electricity should be available to them. Instead, you have Zelensky making broadcasts every day and talking to the leaders of every country that will let him. THis has turned the propaganda war very much in favour of the UKrs. Why weren't the russians able cut the head off? Inaccurate weapons? Poor planning? Insufficient resources? This is itself a lesson on what the Russian capability is. If it was the US attacking Ukr instead, world leaders would have been reading a handritten paper note written in the dark by Zelensky, that would have been the only way he can communicate with them.

[On the way]

On 3/26/2022 at 11:37 AM, BansheeOne said:

Probably a bit early, but with Russia apparently doing a double-take on its war aims in Ukraine, it might be good to have a thread on lessons in place as they emerge, separate from the wreck counting, mutual accusations of war crimes and meme trading on the "Kiev Is Burning" one (he said hopefully). Not looking for re-confirmation of truisms like "dictators should be believed when they talk about their plans" or "don't tell your invasion force it's just a drill" either, but what changes others might or might not want to make to their military, political and technological posture. For starters:

- So the Russian Army ain't ten feet tall. Systemic failure, or just the B team sent in unprepared? What does it mean for NATO - reduced threat, or its shift from conventional to nuclear out of Russian self-perception of weakness?

- Impact of latest AT weapons: are contemporary armies adequately equipped (materially and doctrinally) with and against them? What does it mean for contemporary tank design?

- The ballistic (and hypersonic) missile threat: a gap in Western capabilities, or just in Western defenses?

- Modern air war, or the lack thereof: where has air supremacy gone, and who needs it anyway if you got MANPADS?

- UAVs: lessons from the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict reinforced, or overhyped within the greater picture? Implications for further use and defensive measures?

- The electronic battlefield: communications, reconnaissance and countermeasures within a developed country's infrastructure.

- The information war: did Russia get beat at its own game, or were its perceived successes always superficial vs. the natural resilience of Western societies, most of it easily brushed away when the chips came down?

- Energy security: Where do we go from here?

Etc.

2) The technological base of the country matters a lot. 3rd world countries like Astan can't repair captured or damaged Russian AFVs and put them back into service. They can't convert their mechanic garage into making improvised weapons. They can't strip parts from one vehicle to use on another. They can't use cellphone to report on Russian movements. Its a lot harder to one country like the Russians to attack another country similar in technological base to theirs. Quite different then attacking SYria, for example. Or the US vs 3rd World Team.

 

On 3/26/2022 at 11:37 AM, BansheeOne said:

Probably a bit early, but with Russia apparently doing a double-take on its war aims in Ukraine, it might be good to have a thread on lessons in place as they emerge, separate from the wreck counting, mutual accusations of war crimes and meme trading on the "Kiev Is Burning" one (he said hopefully). Not looking for re-confirmation of truisms like "dictators should be believed when they talk about their plans" or "don't tell your invasion force it's just a drill" either, but what changes others might or might not want to make to their military, political and technological posture. For starters:

- So the Russian Army ain't ten feet tall. Systemic failure, or just the B team sent in unprepared? What does it mean for NATO - reduced threat, or its shift from conventional to nuclear out of Russian self-perception of weakness?

- Impact of latest AT weapons: are contemporary armies adequately equipped (materially and doctrinally) with and against them? What does it mean for contemporary tank design?

- The ballistic (and hypersonic) missile threat: a gap in Western capabilities, or just in Western defenses?

- Modern air war, or the lack thereof: where has air supremacy gone, and who needs it anyway if you got MANPADS?

- UAVs: lessons from the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict reinforced, or overhyped within the greater picture? Implications for further use and defensive measures?

- The electronic battlefield: communications, reconnaissance and countermeasures within a developed country's infrastructure.

- The information war: did Russia get beat at its own game, or were its perceived successes always superficial vs. the natural resilience of Western societies, most of it easily brushed away when the chips came down?

- Energy security: Where do we go from here?

Etc.

3) I think small cheap attack UAVs are here to stay. Small companies you never heard of, like Baykar can now make UAVs here you can hang a missile on it and use it very effectively. Or suicide drones. I think its the wave of the future.

[Stuart Galbraith]

3 hours ago, Ssnake said:

Slow burn suggests however that there's still a chance for crew and squad to evacuate.

Complete obliteration often means, nobody got out in time.

That's how I'm reading it.

 

[Jaguar]

1 hour ago, On the way said:

A, Lots of lessons can already be gleaned with the war in the second month.

1) The absence of an AMerican style Desert Storm "bomb them back to the stone age" in the initial phases is now coming back to haunt the Russians. 

Why weren't the russians able cut the head off? Inaccurate weapons? Poor planning? Insufficient resources? This is itself a lesson on what the Russian capability is. If it was the US attacking Ukr instead, world leaders would have been reading a handritten paper note written in the dark by Zelensky, that would have been the only way he can communicate with them.

Simple, the initial objectives.

That´s a important lesson in judging RA effectiveness, it seems the Kremlin wasn´t expecting this kind of resistence (if that´s really the case, a intelligence blunder of epic proportions) therefore the multi pronged invasion with minimal damage  to civilian and infrastructure initially.

RA is showing many flaws indeed, but appraisal of those must be done in light of this constraints.

Edit: can we imagine the US army in the same situation? Difficult proposition.

Edited March 29, 2022 by Jaguar

[Stuart Galbraith]

That is assuming the intelligence was wrong. It may be the guy making the decision to invade ignored it.

[Jaguar]

39 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

That is assuming the intelligence was wrong. It may be the guy making the decision to invade ignored it.

True, to me this is the great question of this war.

[Ssnake]

27 minutes ago, Jaguar said:

True, to me this is the great question of this war.

Whether Putin didn't want to hear truthful advice or it never reached him is for the historians to decide. Either way, we probably agree that the opening moves of the war were botched. Maybe not irrecoverably so, but it definitely resulted in much higher losses of men and material.

To me personally, it fits into a bigger picture of a Russian culture of lying that permeates all levels of society except, maybe, the private homes. As Alexandr Solshenizyn put it, “We know they are lying, they know they are lying, they know we know they are lying, we know they know we know they are lying, but still they keep lying.”

We can but speculate whether accurate knowledge of the Ukrainian population's disposition would have achieved deterrence. But it would reflect on the not very new lesson that it is the wrong appraisal of the situation by autocratic leaders that facilitates decisions to go to war. This is the greatest weakness of autocracies.

[Ssnake]

4 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Ssnake wrote:

I think it's safe to say that if Russian AD was useless, UKR jets would fly more sorties. The absence of a signal is the signal here.

 

4 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

I don't think we have enough information yet to make a judgement. Ukrainians seem to use their Air force ... as a air guerrilla force, nibbling at Russian air power here and there but unable to stop or contest air superiority. ... Their main objective is to deny the Russian ability to use air power unhindered, ...

I'm not entirely sure where you see the contradiction. I agree with your assessment, and your conclusions appear plausible. I'm sure, the Ukrainian Air Force would fly more sorties if the situation allowed for it. But under the prevailing conditions they can only deny Russia to take full advantage of its air power.

[Angrybk]

20 minutes ago, Ssnake said:

Whether Putin didn't want to hear truthful advice or it never reached him is for the historians to decide. Either way, we probably agree that the opening moves of the war were botched. Maybe not irrecoverably so, but it definitely resulted in much higher losses of men and material.

To me personally, it fits into a bigger picture of a Russian culture of lying that permeates all levels of society except, maybe, the private homes. As Alexandr Solshenizyn put it, “We know they are lying, they know they are lying, they know we know they are lying, we know they know we know they are lying, but still they keep lying.”

We can but speculate whether accurate knowledge of the Ukrainian population's disposition would have achieved deterrence. But it would reflect on the not very new lesson that it is the wrong appraisal of the situation by autocratic leaders that facilitates decisions to go to war. This is the greatest weakness of autocracies.

I think Iraq and Afghanistan prove that autocracies don't have a monopoly on stupid going-to-war decisions.

[Josh]

Iraq in particular seemed to very much be a regime trying to go to war and willing to massage the intel to make it fit.

[Ssnake]

Sure, but that was at a time when the Bush administration felt very little resistance from the US government apparatus, congress, or the general public, so it was much easier to suppress the cognitive dissonance by plugging ears with freedom fries. As such, it was rather the exception for a democracy. For autocracies, this is more like the norm.

[seahawk]

12 hours ago, bojan said:

Yes you can, that turret has about same footprint in the hull that various CV-90 turrets have. Years ago that turret was offered on M113, CV-90 and Patria chassis as a "drop in sollution".

32 x 100mm, 500 x 30mm, 2000 x 7.62 + 3 x ATGM all come in this package, with turret ring being same as on CV-90 and depth of hull required being actually somewhat less than for 35 and 40mm armed turrets.

But that is carrying less 100mm ammo and less AT-10s than the BMP-3. The guns are not the problem, the whole vehicle design is.

[Stuart Galbraith]

8 hours ago, Ssnake said:

Whether Putin didn't want to hear truthful advice or it never reached him is for the historians to decide. Either way, we probably agree that the opening moves of the war were botched. Maybe not irrecoverably so, but it definitely resulted in much higher losses of men and material.

To me personally, it fits into a bigger picture of a Russian culture of lying that permeates all levels of society except, maybe, the private homes. As Alexandr Solshenizyn put it, “We know they are lying, they know they are lying, they know we know they are lying, we know they know we know they are lying, but still they keep lying.”

We can but speculate whether accurate knowledge of the Ukrainian population's disposition would have achieved deterrence. But it would reflect on the not very new lesson that it is the wrong appraisal of the situation by autocratic leaders that facilitates decisions to go to war. This is the greatest weakness of autocracies.

Its precisely what happened with Afghanistan in 1979. And I suspect the same causes may be present. An increasingly frail, muddle headed leader, Sycophants telling him what he wants to hear. The military aping for a war to try all the new kit out. And then it crashes at top speed into the wall of the real world of reality.

[bojan]

3 hours ago, seahawk said:

But that is carrying less 100mm ammo and less AT-10s than the BMP-3.

Yes, 8 x 100mm and 5 x ATGM. So what? 32 x 100mm, 500 x 30mm, 2000 x 7.62mm and 3 x ATGM is better than what most IFVs have in the pretty compact package.

Quote

The guns are not the problem, the whole vehicle design is.

Vehicle design od BMP-3 was not driven by it's armament, but by other facts, primary need to be amphibious. In fact layout was decided on before guns, on Obj.688, that had low-profile turret (ala Marder) with 30mm only.

Hence, BMP-3 layout is irrelevant, as we are discussing benefits and drawbacks of it's armament, not the vehicle itself.

Edited March 30, 2022 by bojan

[Josh]

6 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Its precisely what happened with Afghanistan in 1979. And I suspect the same causes may be present. An increasingly frail, muddle headed leader, Sycophants telling him what he wants to hear. The military aping for a war to try all the new kit out. And then it crashes at top speed into the wall of the real world of reality.

I did not get the impression the Russian military wanted this at all. I obviously have no hard source for the matter but a lot of retired officers seem to express a lot of doubts publically.

[seahawk]

3 hours ago, bojan said:

Yes, 8 x 100mm and 5 x ATGM. So what? 32 x 100mm, 500 x 30mm, 2000 x 7.62mm and 3 x ATGM is better than what most IFVs have in the pretty compact package.

Vehicle design od BMP-3 was not driven by it's armament, but by other facts, primary need to be amphibious. In fact layout was decided on before guns, on Obj.688, that had low-profile turret (ala Marder) with 30mm only.

Hence, BMP-3 layout is irrelevant, as we are discussing benefits and drawbacks of it's armament, not the vehicle itself.

It started with Stuart commenting on his views of the BMP-3 having a problem with the autoloader and blowing up more often than comparable vehicles. So imho we can not leave out the vehicle. The armament combo is fine imho, the vehicle design has too many compromises though, few of the a result of the armament option chosen. 

[Stuart Galbraith]

I like the 100mm, I think it even makes some sense, particularly as it can launch a missile.

The autoloader to service it was, I think, a  mistake. Even that would be less of a problem, if they had plastered the vehicle with reactive armour, as they did on some demonstration models years ago. Aps would be even better. Even urban uparmour kits, as introduced in warrior, would be something.

 

Edited March 30, 2022 by Stuart Galbraith

[Stuart Galbraith]

2 hours ago, Josh said:

I did not get the impression the Russian military wanted this at all. I obviously have no hard source for the matter but a lot of retired officers seem to express a lot of doubts publically.

I didn't see any of them standing up whilst in uniform. They have been at war with Ukraine for 8 years. How many resigned over it? 

It's probably like the wehrmacht, none of them complained when the money was rolling in, they only grew a spine when they started losing.

Just read this, which is interesting if true.

 

Edited March 30, 2022 by Stuart Galbraith

[darkkwulfe]

    

                 

Unsure what these are. The one looks like a 57mm on a BMP-3 body the others unsure.

[bojan]

3 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

I like the 100mm, I think it even makes some sense, particularly as it can launch a missile.

The autoloader to service it was, I think, a  mistake. 

No way to put 100mm inside w/o autoloader. And even if they did not, it would not increase safety, as ammo would still have to be stored somewhere. Missile through the tube is worst aspect of that combo, as it complicates autoloader (not critically, but it does) and limits missile diameter.

5 hours ago, seahawk said:

...BMP-3 having a problem with the autoloader and blowing up more often than comparable vehicles...

There are no mechanical problems with BMP-3 autoloader, Stuart is just being Stuart.

Unless it blows immediately before crew gets out it does not really matter if it melted and blew up or "just" burned down, it is a scrap in any case.

[crazyinsane105]

12 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

I didn't see any of them standing up whilst in uniform. They have been at war with Ukraine for 8 years. How many resigned over it? 

It's probably like the wehrmacht, none of them complained when the money was rolling in, they only grew a spine when they started losing.

Just read this, which is interesting if true.

 

It’s one thing to be in a low level conflict against Ukraine for 8 years. Quite another story to actually launch a full scale invasion.  The amount of bloodshed involved in one versus the other, along with a host of other factors, is enormous. So it’s not surprise that many in Russia didn’t think too much about the 8 year conflict 

And sadly enough, quite a few folks in Ukraine were also oblivious to it as well. Many folks in Kiev and Lviv had the attitude that ‘ah, it’s happening in the east, life will go on here.’ My wife encountered many, many people both in ordinary walks of life to high level politicians who had this attitude.