Lessons (Already) Learned From The Ukraine War - Military, Political, Technical

[BansheeOne]

Probably a bit early, but with Russia apparently doing a double-take on its war aims in Ukraine, it might be good to have a thread on lessons in place as they emerge, separate from the wreck counting, mutual accusations of war crimes and meme trading on the "Kiev Is Burning" one (he said hopefully). Not looking for re-confirmation of truisms like "dictators should be believed when they talk about their plans" or "don't tell your invasion force it's just a drill" either, but what changes others might or might not want to make to their military, political and technological posture. For starters:

- So the Russian Army ain't ten feet tall. Systemic failure, or just the B team sent in unprepared? What does it mean for NATO - reduced threat, or its shift from conventional to nuclear out of Russian self-perception of weakness?

- Impact of latest AT weapons: are contemporary armies adequately equipped (materially and doctrinally) with and against them? What does it mean for contemporary tank design?

- The ballistic (and hypersonic) missile threat: a gap in Western capabilities, or just in Western defenses?

- Modern air war, or the lack thereof: where has air supremacy gone, and who needs it anyway if you got MANPADS?

- UAVs: lessons from the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict reinforced, or overhyped within the greater picture? Implications for further use and defensive measures?

- The electronic battlefield: communications, reconnaissance and countermeasures within a developed country's infrastructure.

- The information war: did Russia get beat at its own game, or were its perceived successes always superficial vs. the natural resilience of Western societies, most of it easily brushed away when the chips came down?

- Energy security: Where do we go from here?

Etc.

[bojan]

I think it is way, way too early to discuss lesson learned. We still don't know what we don't know, so any attempt on discussion is basically making WAG.

Edited March 26, 2022 by bojan

[sunday]

Do not trust mass media news.

Well that one is not new...

[Tim the Tank Nut]

History never stops and a nation always has to have the resources to defend itself.

Modern military equipment in storage requires FAR MORE upkeep than T34's did to remain functional.

Internet operations are part of warfare now and won't be going away.

Trump was right about importing energy from Russia.

Good infantry will NEVER be obsolete, modern war is not exclusively clean and technical

The mud in the theater of operations is as unforgiving as it has always been

and most importantly Nazis are everywhere, all of the time

[Stuart Galbraith]

It does point to the illogic of having remotely piloted trucks, as was in vogue in the US Army at one time, when you do army need soldiers to do basic maintenance like checking the central inflation system still works, and turning the wheels once a month.

Morale has been reinforced as a still important asset, not something left on the shelf with Clauswitz.

Keeping weapon stocks larger than you need seems an intelligent expenditure.

[RETAC21]

1 hour ago, BansheeOne said:

- The ballistic (and hypersonic) missile threat: a gap in Western capabilities, or just in Western defenses?

- Modern air war, or the lack thereof: where has air supremacy gone, and who needs it anyway if you got MANPADS?

- UAVs: lessons from the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict reinforced, or overhyped within the greater picture? Implications for further use and defensive measures?

- The electronic battlefield: communications, reconnaissance and countermeasures within a developed country's infrastructure.

- The information war: did Russia get beat at its own game, or were its perceived successes always superficial vs. the natural resilience of Western societies, most of it easily brushed away when the chips came down?

 

Some items can be singled out:

1) Balistic missiles: this is a state of the art war on that realm, the Russians have invested more than anyone except the Chinese, and this is clearly a menace. That said, there are limits: Ukrainian airbases remain operational, with little damage to runways and taxiways, so it's clear that a lot of missiles are required, unless you only use them for point targets

2) We don't know much about the air war. It looks like Russia has air superiority, but it doesn't translate into air supremacy because the Ukrainians air defences may inflict a cost the Russians are unwilling to pay, which leads to...

3) UCAVs. Why risk expensive aircraft and pilots when cheap UCAVs do the job? they can't do air superiority or CAS, but are doing BAI good enough and the price of the defence is substantial and completely ignored by NATO. The do not spell the end of anything, but no nation can ignore them anymore, as, for the price of a light arcraft, any nation can have credible air power to hit your rear (also, see the Houthi recent attack on Jedah)

4) Much we don't know here, but the Ukrainians clearly have learned that having an active transmitter is dangerous, while (apparently) the Russians haven't. Frequency hopping and coded comms are a must. Radio silence should be default, use landlines when you can, don't use the internet for your comms, delegate on subordinates to do what they need to do without comms.

5) Clausewitzian classic: war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of. political intercourse, carried on with other means. Integrate the information war with your strategy, don't just clamp up because secrets may be leaked. Use information to get your message across to your people and other actors, and make it believable. 

[Junior FO]

...

Edited September 22 by Junior FO

[futon]

2 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Some items can be singled out:

1) Balistic missiles: this is a state of the art war on that realm, the Russians have invested more than anyone except the Chinese, and this is clearly a menace. That said, there are limits: Ukrainian airbases remain operational, with little damage to runways and taxiways, so it's clear that a lot of missiles are required, unless you only use them for point targets

Yeah. Just like Armania was an early lesson for air ground-attack drones, Syria and Iran/Iraq retaliation were earlier lessons about BMs (and cruise missiles). Effectiveness can be limited. In JSDF, counters to BMs have been implimented already. Small observation drones at base to quickly assess damage. A unit of construction vehicles are on standby to repair a crater on the runway with the aim of getting it done within an hour. There are also large runway mats that can be place over damaged runway spots. 

Edited March 26, 2022 by futon

[futon]

4 hours ago, BansheeOne said:

 

- UAVs: lessons from the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict reinforced, or overhyped within the greater picture? Implications for further use and defensive measures?

 

However big picture may be, it seems like having at least a wing of ground attack drones should be the standard.

[lucklucky]

We don't know much of combats. How many tanks were destroyed by ATGW vs by other means? Was there any Russian offensive stopped by ATGW? So i state the  importance but i am unable to qualify it and say by how much. I also don't know the answer to this question: could Russians have invaded with AFV but without tanks?

- the importance of cruise missile - and how it is convenient to have launchers in many ship types including in small combatants like 900t corvettes.

- the importance of ballistic missile

- the importance of Manpad SAM's

- the importance of ATGW

- the importance of drone

- the apparent absence of attack helicopters and significant low level losses of attack aircraft

- I think the only certainty is the the propaganda war, Russia lost heavily, first by being seen as an aggressor, second the Ukrainian resistance and apparent incompetence of its forces. Even if the effects are at moment mostly limited to Western World (including Japan, S.Korea)

 

[bojan]

3 minutes ago, lucklucky said:

...the apparent absence of attack helicopters and significant low level losses of attack aircraft...

Those are flying daily.

[RETAC21]

10 hours ago, Junior FO said:

Modern battle management systems mean data is flowing all the time to many stations. Technically probably most of them exchange steps every x minutes, but it's still a lot of data and it takes time to transmit.

This may be the case, but then it needs to go up and come down from a satellite, else it's just a beacon on the battlefiled.

[Rick]

13 hours ago, sunday said:

Do not trust mass media news.

Well that one is not new...

+1

[lucklucky]

9 hours ago, bojan said:

Those are flying daily.

Most of fight outside populated areas? i am not seeing many videos of them like at war start.

[Pavel Novak]

One thing I see here that like in Iraq 2003 one can not start such war with small forces. Back in ww2 and also during Cold war militaries were much bigger. In 1968 Soviets sent 500 000 men to occupy Czechoslovakia in incomparably better conditions. Russian built up with 200 000 men was not enough just like US built up for Iraq in 2003.

[John T]

35 minutes ago, RETAC21 said:

This may be the case, but then it needs to go up and come down from a satellite, else it's just a beacon on the battlefiled.

No, not really, are satelite comms ground equipment less a beacon ?

You need a mesh of communication nodes, and satelites could of course make it more redundant.
But I think cheap and resilent, and using whatever civilian infrastructure when possible.

 

[seahawk]

1. you need good SHORAD

is imho the one with the biggest impact on western forces, which have largely given up on frontline air defence systems.

 

[TrustMe]

It's been reported on the news that Ukraine com sat's had been hacked by Russia.

[John T]

Sorry if I'm  a bit off on modern arms,

late during the cold war, terminaly guided indirect fire was projected as the end of soviet tank armies.
(At least from the producers)
Like  SaDArm/Bonus et al.

Now when the front in Ukraine  becomes more static, can a tank or BMP just dig in and expect to survive?
Any similar non- Soviet Russian rounds for Ukraine? (122 and 152 mm guns) 

Or should they go for a simple rocket launcher with guided submunitions?
As I expects counter battery fire would be one of the main threats. And both sides have similar capacity.
Anything seen can be killed, then you need to remain unseen. and huge MRLS systems seems to me as too easily identified and destroyed

 

 

And question 2:
If a NLAW todays costs like USD 40 000, produced in relative small quantities.
Will PGM cost more than a iPhone if produced in bigger quantities?

 

 

[Helmutkohl]

15 hours ago, Tim the Tank Nut said:

Trump was right about importing energy from Russia.

 

I think Reagan was the first one to point it out

[futon]

1 hour ago, Pavel Novak said:

One thing I see here that like in Iraq 2003 one can not start such war with small forces. Back in ww2 and also during Cold war militaries were much bigger. In 1968 Soviets sent 500 000 men to occupy Czechoslovakia in incomparably better conditions. Russian built up with 200 000 men was not enough just like US built up for Iraq in 2003.

Yeah, 200,000 was quite small really considering the goal of takng Ukrainian major cities. In 1991 Iraq, Schwarzkopf wanted overwhelming superiority and so always pushed for greater forces despite some resistance in deploying more and more prior to the Gulf War.

[RETAC21]

7 hours ago, John T said:

No, not really, are satelite comms ground equipment less a beacon ?

You need a mesh of communication nodes, and satelites could of course make it more redundant.
But I think cheap and resilent, and using whatever civilian infrastructure when possible.

 

Yes, let me be clear, at the frontline, more tactical comms are good, but as you go up the chain, they become a liability. You shoudln¡t count on civilian infrastructure for anything, because it may be destroyed or compromised (by cyberwarfare)

[rohala]

9 hours ago, futon said:

Yeah, 200,000 was quite small really considering the goal of takng Ukrainian major cities. In 1991 Iraq, Schwarzkopf wanted overwhelming superiority and so always pushed for greater forces despite some resistance in deploying more and more prior to the Gulf War.

+1

There isn't much reliable information about this war but so far it seems clear that the Russians just don't have the numbers to pursue all their objectives simultaneously. 

[Gorka L. Martinez-Mezo]

I too think it’s too soon for really meaningful analysis but still…..

Battlefield ballistic missiles have long been a specialty of Soviet/Russian forces, maybe as a way to counteract Western predilection for air power. Their use and results haven’t been overwhelming, but let’s not forget they’ve used in quite small numbers. It’s difficult to put and airbase out with three Iskander… or three Kalibr. Used in large numbers we’ll be speaking about how incredible they’re… once in range. The fact that old Tochkas have started to appear on the Rus side doesn’t say much about the Rus missile stocks. Same for other PGMs including cruise missiles, with Kalibrs being used sparingly and not in large numbers, Western (US really) style.

MANPADS: very effective within their envelope. But it you can cripple ADA and leave your opponent just with MANPADS, you’re mostly safe operating over 5000m and at night lobbing “cheap” PGMs like JDAMs

Tanks: while scores have been captured/damaged/destroyed I believe we still need more information about how they were operationally used and how they were suppressed. The fact they’re very vulnerable to top attack and the need to separate ammo for the crew is, again, being shown to full effect. Also, would like to know how heavy ERA has been doing.

Air superiority: surprised to see Ucranian air defenses still operational, but looks like the Rus AF dominate the front line and, apparently, few A/C are being put out by forward defenses. Several Ucranian aircraft have been destroyed over the frontline but, as we don’t know how many attacks they’re performing it’s difficult to assess how good the Rus AD are doing at the frontline although they’ve deployed their best.

Drone warfare: a real must for any modern military, although as they became widespread, neutralization systems, either hard or soft kill will be become widespread too.

 

[Ssnake]

 

55 minutes ago, Gorka L. Martinez-Mezo said:

Several Ucranian aircraft have been destroyed over the frontline but, as we don’t know how many attacks they’re performing it’s difficult to assess how good the Rus AD are doing at the frontline although they’ve deployed their best.

I think it's safe to say that if Russian AD was useless, UKR jets would fly more sorties. The absence of a signal is the signal here.