Jaroslav Posted October 11 Posted October 11 Soviet Military Objectives in the Arctic Theater https://www.jstor.org/stable/44637685?searchText=&searchUri=&ab_segments=&searchKey=&refreqid=fastly-default%3A8bb2bfa4c29b1b6ab4de9e2599ba2200&initiator=recommender&seq=1
Jaroslav Posted October 17 Posted October 17 What is the longest time a submarine can stay underwater? Warspite conducted the longest duration submerged submarine patrol made public from the dates of 25 November 1982 to 15 March 1983. A total of 111 days was spent submerged and unsupported, covering 57,085 km (30,823 nmi; 35,471 mi). https://www.studycountry.com/wiki/how-long-does-it-take-a-submarine-to-cross-the-atlantic
Jaroslav Posted October 17 Posted October 17 Your instincts are absolutely right. The whole "Seawolf can do 45 knots" myth probably started when an admiral said that she had gone faster than any American nuclear submarine had before. Of course, this only means that she was faster than the Skipjack or Los Angeles, both of which had top speeds of about 33 knots. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Some theory first, taken from Concepts in Submarine Design by Burcher and Rydill. The equation for drag is, D = CρAU^2 where D is the force of drag, C is the drag coefficient (determined empirically from tests), ρ is the density of seawater, A is the cross-sectional area, and U is velocity. For a submarine, we can rewrite this in terms of the displacement. Taking the cube root of the volume (displacement) gives a characteristic length, and squaring that gives a characteristic area. D = KV2/3U^2 where K is a drag coefficient lumping together C, ρ, and the trickery we did with the volume. Since work is force times distance, and power is work over time, power is force times velocity. At top speed, drag and power will be equal so, P = KV2/3U^3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Let's apply these to real submarines. First we must determine K. Since we don't have a model basin at our disposal, let's pick a submarine with a similar form to the Seawolf that we know the power and top speed. The Permit-class submarine has a similar length-to-beam ratio, and had the following characteristics with a 7-bladed screw (effective power based on Electric Boat estimates of Lafayette-class SSBN with 7-bladed screw), Submerged Displacement - 4,200 tons Turbine Power - 15,000 HP Effective Propulsor Power - 11,300 HP Top Speed - 28 knots Since 1 m3 of seawater weighs 1,025 kg and a long ton weighs 1,019 kg, let's say tonnage = displacement in cubic meters. In science units, this results in, Submerged Volume - 4,200 m3 Effective Power - 8,426 kW Top Speed - 14.4 ms-1 Rearranging our power equation to solve for K, it becomes, K = P/(V2/3U^3) Plugging in the numbers, we get K=0.0108. Specific numbers are harder to get for the Seawolf, but I will use a 1963 Electric Boat 85% estimate for pumpjet efficiency and the generally accepted public figure for turbine power. Submerged Displacement - 9,200 tons Turbine Power - 45,000 HP Effective Propulsor Power - 38,250 HP In metric, Submerged Displacement - 9,200 m3 Effective Propulsor Power - 28,520 kW Again rearranging our power equation, U = (P/K)1/3V-2/9 Plugging in the numbers, we get U=18.16 ms-1 or 35.3 knots. Here is the speed-power curve. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - In summary, the Seawolf cannot reach 45 knots, as is sometimes claimed. She would need about 100,000 shaft horsepower to do so (accounting for propulsor efficiency), and would need a substantially larger propulsion plant to achieve this power. 35 knots is a reasonable estimate given publicly available information for displacement and reactor power. Edit: Globalsecurity claims the S6W plant can output 52,000 SHP, which would result in a top speed of 37-38 knots based on the above power-speed curve. Naturally, if we ever do know the true power of the S6W, it won't be for a very, very long time.
Jaroslav Posted October 17 Posted October 17 Underwater speed records Submarines Established reports and manufacturer's claims indicate that a handful of submarines are capable of speeds exceeding 30 knots (56 km/h; 35 mph). In 1960, HMS Explorer S30 achieved an underwater speed of over 30 knots.[1] In 1965, the experimental USS Albacore reported a speed of 33 knots (61 km/h; 38 mph).[2] The Soviet November-class submarine was found in 1968 to have a speed of 31 knots (57 km/h; 36 mph).[3] In response the United States Navy developed the Los Angeles-class submarine, with a reported speed of 30–32 knots (56–59 km/h; 35–37 mph). The Akula (Russian: shark)-class vessel is reportedly capable of travelling submerged at 35 knots (65 km/h; 40 mph). Its predecessor, the Alfa class, could attain short speed bursts of 40–45 knots (74–83 km/h; 46–52 mph) while submerged.[4][5] There are also claims that the Soviet twin-propeller submarine K-222, with titanium inner and outer hulls, reached 44.7 knots (83 km/h; 51 mph), fully submerged, during sea trials in 1969. Torpedoes The British Spearfish torpedo, designed to counter high-speed Russian submarines such as the Alfa class, is reputed to reach speeds in excess of 70 knots (130 km/h; 81 mph). The Russian VA-111 Shkval rocket-powered supercavitating torpedo is reportedly capable of speeds over 200 knots (370 km/h; 230 mph).[6] The German press reported on an underwater anti-torpedo missile, formerly named Barracuda, allegedly capable of reaching 430 knots (800 km/h).[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Underwater_speed_records
Jaroslav Posted October 19 Posted October 19 Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Battlegroup, Carrier Group 8 - (Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, US) USS Theodore Roosevelt CVN-71 - Nimitz Class Aircraft CarrierCarrier Air Wing 8 - Tail Code: AJ VF-41 Black Aces - F-14A Tomcat VF-84 Jolly Rogers - F-14A Tomcat VFA-15 Valions - F/A-18A Hornet VFA-87 Golden Warriors - F/A-18A Hornet VA-35 Black Panthers - A-6E TRAM Intruder VA-36 Roadrunners - A-6E TRAM Intruder VAQ-141 Shadowhawks - EA-6B Prowler VAW-124 Bear Aces - E-2C Hawkeye VS-24 Scouts - S-3A Viking HS-9 Griffins - SH-3H Sea King USS South Carolina CGN-37 - California Class Cruiser - (Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, US) USS Leyte Gulf CG-55 - Ticonderoga Class VLS Cruiser - (Naval Station Mayport, Florida, US) USS Charles F. Adams DDG-2 - Charles F. Adams Class Destroyer (Naval Station Mayport, Florida, US) USS Sellers DDG-11 - Charles F. Adams Class Destroyer (Charleston Naval Shipyard, South Carolina, US) USS Conyngham DDG-17 - Charles F. Adams Class Destroyer USS Farragut DDG-37 - Farragut Class Destroyer - (Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, US) USS William V. Pratt DDG-44 - Farragut Class Destroyer - (Charleston Naval Shipyard, South Carolina, US)Submarine Squadron 8 (Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, US) USS Hyman G. Rickover SSN-709 - Los Angeles Class Attack Submarine https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_United_States_Navy_order_of_battle 1-CV 1-CGN 1-CG 5-DDG
Jaroslav Posted October 19 Posted October 19 USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER CVN 69 Battlegroup for 1988. was DD-978 USS Stump. Battlegroup for 1990. was CG-47 USS Ticonderoga, DD-969 USS Peterson, SSN-723 USS Oklahoma City. http://uscarriers.net/cvn69deploy.htm USS Dwight D. Eisenhower CVN-69 (8 to 24 August) - Persian Gulf Source:[4] USS Dwight D. Eisenhower CVN-69 USS Ticonderoga CG-47 USS Tattnall DDG-19 USS Scott DDG-995 USS Peterson DD-969 USS John Rodgers DD-983 USS John L. Hall FFG-32 USS Paul FF-1080 Carrier Air Wing 7 - Tail Code: AG Squadron Aircraft Notes VF-142 Ghostriders F-14A+ Tomcat F-14A+ renamed F-14B in 1992. VF-143 Pukin' Dogs F-14A+ Tomcat F-14A+ renamed F-14B in 1992. VFA-136 Knight Hawks F/A-18A Hornet VFA-131 Wildcats F/A-18A Hornet VA-34 Blue Blasters A-6E TRAM Intruder/KA-6D Intruder VAQ-140 Patriots EA-6B Prowler VS-31 Topcats S-3B Viking VAW-121 Bluetails E-2C Hawkeye HS-5 Night Dippers SH-3H Sea King https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War_order_of_battle%3A_United_States_Navy https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/us-navy-in-desert-shield-desert-storm/naval-units-in-desert-shield-storm.html
Jaroslav Posted October 22 Posted October 22 The Military Balance 1989-1990 https://web.archive.org/web/20200604103458/https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wQ5pY50C-DgEsu4vGQZLNEwlaPK5D3Z7/view
Jaroslav Posted October 23 Posted October 23 Weaponeering Assistant Weaponeering Assistant is an Excel spreadsheet that helps you design suitable loadouts for your strike missions in DVG's Hornet Leader: Carrier Air Operations. When you enter the characteristics of your target and desired ordnance, WA will tell you how many weapons are statistically required to destroy the target (or whether the weapon is capable of destroying the target at all), the probabilities of each hit multiple, the "bang per pound" for your selected weapon against this particular target, and the weight points necessary to load those weapons on your aircraft. It also automatically calculates the hit/miss effects for each possible die roll outcome, taking into account all of the necessary modifiers. Version 0.95 adds an enemy fighter activity page, which helps you estimate how many hostile fighters are likely to make an appearance during the mission based on the theater fighter composition; a loadout page, which helps to distribute the appropriate weapons to the aircraft in your flight and applies pilot skill modifiers to all of your weapon effects calculations; and a flight page, which gives you a summary of your armed aircraft together with firepower distribution figures. Version 0.96 corrects a bug in the Weapon Effect Profile formula for small, dispersed, vehicular targets. Download Weaponeering Assistant v0.96. http://www.rjlee.org/resources/Weaponeering-Assistant-v0.96.xlsx https://www.rjlee.org/weaponeerasst/
Jaroslav Posted October 24 Posted October 24 Understanding the Soviet Navy : a handbook https://archive.org/download/understandingsov00bath/understandingsov00bath.pdf
Jaroslav Posted October 24 Posted October 24 The evolving Soviet Navy https://archive.org/download/evolvingsovietna00mcgr/evolvingsovietna00mcgr.pdf
Jaroslav Posted October 25 Posted October 25 Here's a reference regarding USSR SAG composition. From Soviet Naval Tactics by Milan Vego, pg. 234: “Tactical Organization The main provisional tactical-sized force of Soviet surface ships tasked with striking enemy formations of major surface combatants, amphibious task forces, convoys, and coastal targets is the ship strike group (KUG). Formed in the course of an operation or of systematic combat actions, these groups include several missile ships and gun-or torpedo-armed ships. Each ship strike group is organized into two or more strike group and on special-purpose group. A missile cruiser usually serves as the flagship…… Until recently the main provisional operational-tactical force has been the detachment of combat ships (OBK), usually composed of six to a dozen ships. However, it appears-although this is not certain-that the Soviets no longer envisage detachments of combat ships in their naval organization. Soviet cruisers and destroyers usually operate in groups of four, and small missile ships in groups of two to four.” https://forums.matrixgames.com/viewtopic.php?p=3611884#p3611884
Jaroslav Posted October 25 Posted October 25 So, once upon a time there is a KUG It consist from two project 956, one project 1155 and one project 1135 ships. Take a closer look? Project 956 "Boevoi"("Militant")under command of Captain 2nd Rank Yuri Romanov What can I say, good ship and good crew, they escorting soviet ships in Persian Gulf when Iran–Iraq war reached the point when the attacks began on neutral ships (legend told us they even shot down something like "Silkworm" but well,all depends on amount of Vodka on table, more Vodka and more and more "Silkworms" atacking our glorious ship [:)])Romanov excellent captain, really care for his crew and they tried not fail him His commander of the control of anti-aircraft missile division was Senior Lieutenant Sergei Samulyzhko good specialist but with problematic discipline. Project 956 "Osmotritelny"("Cautious") under command of Captain 2nd Rank Vladimir Pepeliaev This ship is usual p.956 , ship also participate in convoy in Persian gulf but create no legend about it before our story commander of the control of anti-aircraft missile division on this ship take promotion and now on this position "green" officer from academy (not necessarily a bad thing) Project 1155 "Admiral Tributs" and project 1135 "Poryvistyy"("Impetuous") This ships have own stories but in our tale they almoust "background characters" On "Tributs" watching for our KUG Vice-Admiral Igor Khmelnov, but our KUG led by the commander of the 175th brigade of missile ships captain 1 Rank Evgeniy Litvinenko. Romanov and Litvinenko is big friends,both from TAKR "Novorossiysk" so obviously Litvinenko choose "Boevoi" as KUG flagship. So it is 27 october 1989 and our KUG enter exercise area, this is annual event "Shooting for Binoculars from the Commander in Chief Fleet of the Soviet Union" Against our KUG planned to launch: 2 P-6(aka SS-N-3a) from K-127 submarine project 675, 2 KSR-5NM from Tu-16K ,2 P-35 (aka SS-N-3a) from coastal complex "Redut" and 1 unmanned target-plane La-17MM. Sounds easy? Planes Tu-16SPS-55 and Tu-16DOS (Tu-16P in database) from a distance 40 km use active and passive OECM So it has begun First column: "Boevoi" leads "Osmotritelny" folows Second column: "Tributs" leads "Poryvistyy" folows Green "clouds" is passive ECM Commander of "Osmotritelny" made big mistake, not trusting in his the shooter officer (remember? "green" man from naval academy) he start shooting with main guns( two AK-130 ),vibration led to malfunctions in both "Uragans" (SA-N-7 Gadfly [3S-90 Uragan] in database) electric chains..So, "Boevoi" left alone against the missiles: - first came P-35№1(PM-35№1 on picture)shoot down by "Osmotritelny" on distance 12km after that vibration "killed" his "Uragans" ,P-6№1(PM-6 on picture) shoot down by "Boevoi" 2 missiles both hit on distances 20,5km and 19km and P-35№2 shoot down by "Boevoi" with 2 missiles - second wave: P-6№2(PM-6№2 on picture),KSR-5NM№1(КСР-5НМ№1 on picture) and KSR-5NM№2(КСР-5НМ№2 on picture) computer of "Boevoi" mark KSR-5NM№1 as more dangerous target and fire 3 missile in it hit with first on distance 19 km,meanwhile shooting AK-130 against P-6№2 is ineffective and "Boevoi" fire two missiles both hit at 9 and 7 km,after that "Boevoi" fire 3 missiles against KSR-5NM№2 hit on distance 12km - 15 second after KSR-5NM№2 shoot down "Boevoi" fire 2 missiles at La-17MM (Ла-17ММ on picture) shot down with first on 12km between first and second wave interval 12 second "Osmotitelny"- fire 4 9М-38М1 and 48 130-mm shells UZS-44 hit 1 target "Boevoi"- fire 14 9М-38М1 and 84 shells UZS-44 hit 6 targets as Vice-Admiral Igor Khmelnov said "As in movie "Japan Navy in war" so this KUG win "Shooting for Binoculars from the Commander in Chief Fleet of the Soviet Union" in 1989[:)] https://forums.matrixgames.com/viewtopic.php?p=3611884#p3611884
Jaroslav Posted October 25 Posted October 25 6 minutes ago, Jaroslav said: Binoculars from the commander in chief. Prize-based anti-aircraft missile firing of the 175 Brigade of missile ships of the Pacific Fleet in 1989 From the author. Since the events described, a lot has changed in our lives. Naturally, the Pacific Ocean could not remain aloof from what was happening. fleet. The squadron has long since ceased to exist. Almost all the ships mentioned in the article have either been scrapped or are in storage, from which they will never emerge. Aircraft and cruise missiles- the targets are obsolete and have long been removed from service. Only the memory of the deeds remains, which can be proud of - so that new generations of Russian sailors have something to compare with. Missiles on feed PU "Combat" Naval gunfire, whether artillery, missile, torpedo or any other, are always a kind of summary, the finale of the entire stage of training of the military team. Regardless of the class of the ship - a minesweeper or a missile cruiser. Competitive shooting is the pinnacle of combat training of a ship, a formation for the academic year. And shooting for the prize of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is a test of the effectiveness of combat training for the year of the entire fleet, an indicator of readiness to solve the tasks set before it. Each of these annual shootings is unique, one of a kind and, due to the complexity of the conditions of implementation and the almost complete absence of elements of simplification, is as close as possible to a combat situation. Not all ships and formations are allowed to such shooting, but only those that have proven themselves to be the best in their combat purpose during combat training. The prize anti-aircraft missile firing of the 175th brigade of missile ships of the Pacific Fleet for the Navy Commander-in-Chief Prize for anti-aircraft training for 1989 was scheduled for October 27 in the combat training areas of Peter the Great Bay. To win the Commander-in-Chief Prize, the firing had to be not ordinary, which are constantly carried out during scheduled exercises when practicing course tasks of combat training, but with the use of innovative and more effective techniques, in a complex jamming environment, with the massive use of cruise anti-ship missiles by the "enemy". The Pacific Fleet command decided to conduct the first in the Navy, and therefore, to some extent, experimental firing at seven target missiles simultaneously approaching the order of ships from different directions. To carry out the task, a naval strike group (KUG) was formed Defense) as part of the destroyers of Project 956 "Boevoy" and "Osmotritelny", the large anti-submarine ship of Project 1155 "Admiral Tributs" и patrol ship pr 1135 "Gusty". The KUG was headed by the commander of the 175 th missile brigade, Captain 1 of the rank E.Ya. Litvinenko on destroyer "Fighting". The leader of the shooting is Rear Admiral I.N., commander of the 10 th operational squadron of the Pacific Fleet. Khmelnoff at the Admiral Tributs BOD. In accordance with the plan of the head of the ships lined up in a warrant. The equalizer of the shooting order was determined by the BOD "Admiral Tributs". The “Combat” destroyer was assigned a position from the 70 ° equalizer, in the 4 km distance, the “Prudent” destroyer position was located from the 305 ° bearing, in the 7,5 km distance, and the Impetuous CRS from the equalizer was located on the 280 ° bearing and was removed. 4 km. This provided electromagnetic compatibility of radar systems. The center of the firing positions of the air defense command post was determined by the location of the Admiral Tributs bpk on 16: 00 Khabarovsk time (time “H”, to which the shooting was assigned) - W = 42 ° 46 ', 0 north, D = 136 ° 00' 0 East The shooting rate is 105 °, the connection speed when shooting is at least 18-21 nodes. The aiming point for the carriers of anti-ship missiles was the Admiral Tributs. The nuclear missile submarine K-127 (Ave 675), armed with PM-6 boat target rockets (cruise missiles P-6), Tu-16K aircraft - complex carrier aviation cruise missiles KSR-5HM, coastal missile defense complex "Redut", having in service with a target missile RM-35 (cruise missiles P-35), and also used a radio-controlled target jet La 17MM. As conceived by the head of shooting, the SSGT K-127 launched the PM-0 two targets on the order from the 6 bearing exchange rate parameter 2 km at the stern of the BOD "Admiral Tributs". Starting distance - 65 km. The Tu-16K aircraft should have arrived in the area of shooting half an hour before the time "H", having on board two KSR-5HM target missiles. He was insured by the second Tu-16K, which also has two cruise target missiles on board, in case it is impossible to execute firing with the main carrier aircraft. The main Tu-16K launched its DAC-5HM from the 30 ° bearing. The launch distance is 70 and 65 km, respectively. The aiming point is Admiral Tributs, but, given the launch range and flight speed of 303 missiles m / s, their course parameter when approaching the order was to be 2 km at the stern of a large anti-submarine ship. The flight height of the DAC-5HM missiles was set at 200 m. The homing equipment of aircraft missiles, based on security considerations for unauthorized purposes, introduced restrictions: ± 16 ° for the course, 379 with flight time. With the 330 ° bearing, having the Admiral Tributs BOD target, from the firing positions at Cape Povorotny, two anti-ship cruise target missiles of the coast-based RM-35 Redut complex were launched. An unmanned aircraft La-17MM was launched from the coastal fire positions "Black Bush", which, after performing several maneuvers on the flight path, had to approach the order from the 90 ° bearing. The command appointed authorized firing sectors and responsible air defense sectors. In order to ensure the counteraction of foreign technical intelligence services, the time “H” (the missile approach to the warrant) was chosen taking into account the flight schedule of the American reconnaissance satellites (RISS). The Tu-16PS-55 and Tu-16-DOS aircraft were used to create a background of jamming conditions at the shooting. The active jamming area covering the strike with cruise missiles was determined in such a way as to reliably mask the missile approach. The active jammer Tu-16PSS-55 courses 10-190 ° at the height of 6300 m for 15 minutes before the time "H", for 25 minutes put interference in the range of radio waves 9,8-12,5 cm; The length of each aircraft tack is 80 km. The passive jammer Tu-16 DOS conducted, starting 2 h 30 minutes before the shooting, examining the area of the exercise with the course 210 ° before removing the 130 km and back, and from one hour to 30 minutes before starting the shooting put the field of passive jamming, also masking the approach of the target rockets to the order. The field of passive interference consisted of two lines: the first - at a distance of 40 km, the second - at a distance of 55 km from shooting ships, with a shift to the northeast. Noise field setting courses - 105-285 °. The length of each tack of the setting is 40 km, the height of the setting is 6000 m, the density is 8 of packs of dipole reflectors on the 100 m path. To create a passive interference field, dipole reflectors of DOS types A, B, C were used, with 33% of each type. The composition of the missile and artillery weapons and technical means of ships of the shock group included: 1. Air defense weapons KUG - collective defense anti-aircraft missile systems Urahan with KMSUO ZR-90 destroyers of the 956 Ave., one on each (total 4x1 PU MS-196, 96 of 9М-38М1 missiles); - universal artillery complexes AK-130 with the Lion-218 LMS and MP-184 ARLS destroyers, one on each ship (total 4x2 AU A-218, 2000 130-mm projectiles per EM); - self-defense anti-aircraft missile system "Dagger" with one radar module K-12-1 on a large anti-submarine ship of 1155 Ave. (3 modules for 8 SAM in each, total 64 ZUR9М330-2); - universal artillery complex AK-100 with the “Lev-214” LLL and ARLS MP-114 BOD (2x1 AUA-214); - self-defense anti-aircraft missile system "Osa-MA" on the patrol ship pr 1135 (2x2 PU ZIF-122, 48 ZUR9МЗЗ); - universal artillery complex AK-726 with SUO "Turel" and ARLS MP-105 SCR (2х2-76mm AU ZIF-67); - anti-aircraft artillery systems AK-630M with the Vympel-A LMS and MP-123 ARLS EM Ave 956 and BOD Ave 1155, two on each (total 12xXNNUMX AUA-6M, 213 4000-mm projectiles per unit, 30 per ship). 2. Funds EW KUG - PC-2 passive jamming systems with Tertiya SU on destroyers of 956 Ave. and BOD 1155 Ave. 6 and DS-2, shells TST-121, THB-102); - a set of passive jamming PC-16 1135 to CCJ etc. (convex-101, 82-mm projectiles turbojet TSP-60 different types -DS-50, DOS-15-16-17-19, DOS-19-22-26. ); - station active noise interference MP-407 on all ships; - sets of inflatable corner reflectors of NUO on all ships (at least 6 sets of NUO type A-4 on each); - Smoke bombs MDS on all ships. 3. Airborne lighting equipment - MRK MP-700 "Fregat-M2" on EM "Combat"; - radar MR-700 "Fregat-MA" on the BOD "Admiral Tributs"; - RLK MP-700 "Fregat-M" on EM "Prudent"; - Radar MR-XNUMHA "Angara" on TFR "impetuous". It should be noted here that the MRK MR-320 “Tackle” and the second radar module K-12-1 for the “Dagger” air defense system “Admiral Tributs” received after repair with modernization in the middle of the 90-s. It has long been known that the success of a battle depends on the stability and reliability of managing one's own strength. Therefore, the provision of continuous and hidden communications to firing ships was given special attention. Communication with the support forces of the shooting leader was carried out in a single-band telephony using a table of conventional signals, specially created for these exercises. The connection between the ships was provided by closed VHF radio channels in the control networks weapons, combat information centers and command. Only the CUG fire commandor worked in the weapons control network, he also was the air defense commander of the 175 DBK, captain of the 3 rank Alexander Polyakov, who was on the KUG air defense command post on the destroyer "Fighting", controlling the fire of the ships, as well as the deputy fire control officer, flagship missile specialist 175-th BRK captain 3 rank Alexander Zakharov, located on the gearbox of the AIA "Prudent". The network of combat information centers monitored the safety of maneuvering the MCG, the accuracy of holding positions, monitoring the purity of the shooting area, the absence of foreign targets in dangerous and forbidden sectors, monitoring ships and aircraft monitoring the compound, countering foreign technical intelligence, monitoring electromagnetic compatibility of ship radio equipment. The radio network was submitted to the combat information centers of the KUG ships, as well as to the KUG flagship command post on the destroyer “Fighting”. An open VHF radio channel with the senior anti-aircraft missile commander of the air defense forces functioned at the air defense command ship. The command post of electronic warfare KUG, from which the control of radioelectronic warfare and the use of EBC KUG, was carried out on the destroyer "Fighting". It also housed the flagship post KPUNIA (command post control and guidance of fighter aircraft) 175 th BRK. Radio and radio intelligence was conducted on all ships. The control of the RR and the RTR was carried out by the flagship reconnaissance brigade of missile ships with the FKP-R destroyer "Fighting". The exchange of intelligence information was carried out in a separate radio network using a table of conditional signals. At Admiral Tributs, they launched a flagship command post for the head of the shooting, made up of officers from the headquarters of the 10 OPESK. According to the plan of execution of shooting and on the basis of the governing documents, the consumption of missiles at dangerously flying targets was not limited. Aviation missiles of the DAC-5HM, as well as all previously fired, but not shot down missiles, were considered to be dangerous flying. It was recommended to fire at them with three launches of 9М-38М1 missiles each. Then ensured the probability of guaranteed shot down target not less than 0,75. The AK-130 and AK-630 artillery systems were supposed to be used by firing continuous bursts with target designation at the most dangerous or already fired target missiles. The launch of missiles on target rockets was recommended to be carried out from the 25 km, that is, from the ultimate range for the Uragan air defense system. It was planned by the AK-130 artillery complexes not to open fire until the moment the anti-aircraft missiles came off, so that the shaking of the ship’s hull from gunfire shots did not bring down the target tracking by the Uragan operators. In order to prepare for the execution of prize shooting and testing the interaction of the ships of the strike group, control (October 23) and test (the next day) tactical exercises on air defense were conducted, as well as test anti-aircraft artillery and missile firing on the anti-submarine missile 85RU launched from the BOD "Admiral Spiridonov ”(October 24) and on target missiles — one RM-6 with the K-127 SSGN and two KSR-5HM from the Tu-16K (October 25) aircraft. On firing practice, we worked out schemes for the use of the air defense missile system, ZAK and EW facilities. The main attention was paid to the implementation of security measures and technical readiness of the complexes. Since, according to the plan for prize shooting, the combat sector of the “Combat” air defense included only three targets (La-17MM and two KSR-5HM), and practically all targets flew into the permitted sector of the squadron of the destroyer before the commander of the missile-artillery combat unit of the ship XUM The rank of Vladimir Kharlanov set the task of issuing target designation to anti-aircraft fire weapons on all detected targets. And before the shooting manager of the Uragan air defense missile system, the commander of the control group of the anti-aircraft missile division, senior lieutenant Sergey Samulyzhko, fire at all targets included in the permitted sector, as well as outside it, provided that there is no CCG missile system in the dangerous or prohibited area. Giving such a rather risky order, the commander of the ship was completely confident in the skill and unconditional accuracy of his execution by the ship's rocket ship. After all, it was not for nothing that the brigade commander called the “Combat” chief “miner” among all the ships of his unit. Excellent results of shooting in recent years, the richest experience gained on the combat cover of Soviet navigation during the Iran-Iraq war in the Persian Gulf put the destroyer among the best ships of the operational squadron on missile and artillery training. The commander of the Hurricane control group, Sergey Samulyzhko, despite his youth, was considered the best specialist at the compound and was not even afraid to once enter into a dispute with the chief designer of the complex, defending the correctness of his actions regarding the anti-aircraft missile launch distance during one of the firing sessions. achieved the maximum range of meeting missiles with targets. Shooting began on the planned "scenario." Stations of active jamming against carriers of anti-ship missiles were used conditionally. With the arrival of the Tu-16K aircraft at the 130 km frontier, the CUG ships began setting false misinforming targets (LDC) with the PK-2 and PC-16 complexes, having each ship set two false misinforming targets from two projectiles to a point. With the detection of the launch of cruise missiles, each ship began to set three false diversion targets (LOCs) from two projectiles at each point. The setting of false distracting targets was carried out before the missiles reached the 50 km line. With the announcement of “Time Controllers”, the controllers reported on the cleanliness of the shooting area and the absence of unauthorized targets in hazardous areas when shooting with “Uragan” complexes - ± 13 ° from the ADMS shooting bearing to the removal of 80 km. The head of shooting approved the time "H" and allowed the shooting. The launch of target rockets was planned so that they approached the order, having an interval of no more than 20 with each other. In fact, the interval between the rockets turned out to be smaller. The first coastal rocket RM-35 approached the order simultaneously with the first boat rocket RM-6. With the launch of targets, when everything began to depend only on the commanders of firing ships, it became clear that the destroyer "Prudent" decided to move away from the established plan. His commander, being confident in the skill of his artillerymen, was the first to start firing the PM-35 rocket with the AK-130 rocket with the maximum 27 distance of km, without much fear that the shock of the destroyer corps firing two turrets with the maximum rate of fire were reduced by the accuracy of target tracking by the operators LAW "Hurricane." And only from a distance of 19 km, he launched two anti-aircraft missiles 9М-38, which hit the first PM-35 at a distance of 12 km. At the same time, the destroyer “Fighting”, firing the “Hurricane” complex in automatic mode, fired the first PM-6 with two 9М-38М1 SAMs, which met the target at the 20,5 and 19 km, respectively, resulting in the PM-6 rocket succeeded shoot down, the second pair of its anti-aircraft missiles launched on the PM-35 No. XXUMX. The “Prudent” destroyer, firing at the “semi-automatic”, hitting the first PM-2, launched his second pair of PM-35 SAMs #35 on 2 from later on the “Combat” missiles of which reached the second coastal target of the RM-15 and destroyed it on a few seconds before the Prudent Missiles. The precautionary anti-aircraft missiles hit the debris of the target scattered in the air. The second PM-6 boat target rocket approached the order simultaneously with the first KSR-5HM aviation missile. “Combat” discovered this KSR-5НМ No. 1 in 30 ° bearing and at a distance of 42 km, running at an altitude of 230. The KMSUO ZR-90 “Combat” computer complex considered the aviation anti-ship anti-ship missile system as running at a lower altitude and, practically, without course heading on the ship, the most dangerous goal. The target designation on it was issued on the Uragan air defense missile system. Target acquisition time was 12 s. At the same time, the Lev-218 and Vympel-A anti-aircraft artillery systems received a target designation for the PM-6 rocket. In support of the Uragan complex, the KSR-5HM No. 1 was taken over 29 ° bearing at the 35 km distance. The launch of three 9М-38М1 missiles was carried out at a distance of up to the rocket 24, 21, and 19 km, respectively. At this time, the artillery towers of the universal destroyer caliber crashed. The hull of the ship vibrated, swaying synchronous volleys of guns and, as it seemed, sank into the water, pressed against it by the impact of gun barrels. The sky in the north began to become covered with dirty spots of gaps, gradually merging into a solid gray cloud. On the round-up view of the Sapphire information processing and display system at the main command post of the Combat, the upper part of the radar “picture” was almost a solid green field through which the barely visible point of the anti-ship rocket stubbornly wade. It is difficult to shoot down a missile with anti-splinter armor, a direct hit is almost required, or a close projectile rupture leading to rudder jamming. The meeting of the first missile defense system with the DAC-5HM No.1 occurred at a distance of 19 km. The missile was shot down. And only after this, the KMSUO ZR-90 “Combat” issued a command for firing PM-6 No. 2 with two missiles. Their meeting took place at a distance of 9 and 7 km, respectively, therefore the cruise missile crashed and falling apart fell in close proximity, three or four cables from the left side of the BOD Admiral Tributs and three kilometers aft of the Battle. The next target, fired by the destroyer “Fighting”, was the second aviation anti-ship missile KSR-5HM, which was escorted by 29 ° bearing at a distance of 41 km. According to it, as on the first APCR, they released three XURUM 9М-38М1. KSR-5HM №2 shot down at a distance of 12 km. Of the six anti-aircraft missiles launched by aviation anti-ship missiles, four came off the aft launcher, and two came off the MS-196 nasal launcher. The latter to the order through to 15 after firing DAC 5NMm №2, at an altitude of 1500 m approached the target La 17MM fired two missiles 9M-38M1 with bow PU "combat" and knocked the first of them at a distance 11 km. The undermining of the second ZUR launched near the already hit and falling target occurred at a distance of 8 km from the shooting ship. The artillery of both destroyers also actively participated in anti-aircraft fire. In addition, the “Prudent” conducted the shooting of X-NUMX-mm AK-130 A-218 artillery systems at the first PM-130 rocket, before it was shot down by an anti-aircraft missile, with its six-barrel 35-A-30 A-213 rocket, from the sight sight left side column, fired at the falling debris of the second target PM-630. The destroyer "Fighting" from a distance of 21 km with an AK-130 complex fired a PM-6 rocket No.2 with the subsequent transfer of fire along LA-17MM. On the PM-6 No. 2, both A-218 “Combat” towers fired. On the La-17MM from a distance of 14 km, only the nose tower fired, giving 10 volleys, while the stern gun-mounted machine was in the danger zone. The AK-630 artillery complex No. 2 of the left side of the “Combat”, accompanying the ARLS MP-123, fired at the shot down and falling PM-6 rocket. The AK-630 artillery complex No. 1 fired from the starboard sighting column on the downed La-17MM, which collapsed, leaving behind a fiery yellow-orange smoke trail of burning kerosene in the sea in one or two cables along the nose of the Admiral Tributs. Because of this, the BOD had to change course in order to bypass the target site where the remaining fuel burned on the surface of the water. The squadron flagship captain 2 rank Vladimir Andreev later said that everyone who was on the bridge of the flagship, including the commander 10-YOPESK, involuntarily sat below the portholes, trying to hide from flying debris. Vice-Admiral Igor Nikolaevich Khmelnoye only said: “Like in the movie“ Japan in the wars ”!” The whole sky was covered with gray blots of 130-mm anti-aircraft projectile gaps and dashed crimson trails with 30-mm automata queues. Around the ships, the sea was boiling from the falling debris of downed rockets, missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles. From the sky to the water fiery sleeves of burning rocket fuel and smoky traces of falling smoked debris destroyed targets. Over the compound by a giant fan, like the splayed fingers of hands protecting themselves from the threat from the air, the white plumes from the burnt powder of engines of anti-aircraft missiles slowly blurred. In total, the destroyers used 9М-38М1 anti-aircraft missiles for firing: the “Combat” - 14, “Prudent” four. The consumption of artillery ammunition was as follows: 130-mm anti-aircraft missiles UZS-44 "Fighting" released 84, "Prudent" - 48; 30-mm shells "Fighting" shot 120, "Prudent" - 160. BOD "Admiral Tributs" and TFR "Pryvisty" target designation of target missiles took, accompanied them, but did not participate in the shooting of their own self-defense complexes, since all the missiles destroyed the destroyers collective defense complexes. The Hurricane anti-aircraft missile system of the destroyers of the 956 Ave. once again proved and justified the opinion of itself as the best medium-range anti-aircraft missile system in the world to date. The prize of the commander-in-chief of the Navy 1989 in air defense training won the RUG 175 th BRD 10 th OPEC TOF as part of the Combat destroyers "Fighting" and "Prudent". On the analysis of the firing of the target missile RM-35 №2 counted "prudent". Therefore, despite the fact that “Fighting” actually shot down six of seven targets, the report states: “Fighting” - shot down by 5, “Prudent” - shot down by 2. Commander of the Navy Brigade of the Soviet Union, Commander of the Navy Brigade, Commander of the Combat Engineer for the Navy, awarded with the Commander of the Navy Brigade of the Soviet Union for the first place in air defense training in the Navy. Alexander I. Nazarov. Ad•16+ 6 comments Information Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in. moremansf +5 18 November 2013 09: 51 In addition to the article on the combat effectiveness of our ships in air defense matters. "In 1994, the TARKR" Admiral Nakhimov "as part of the KUG ships of the 7th OPESK SF (TARKR project 1144.1 and 2 EM project 956) performed anti-aircraft missile firing according to the plan for performing combat exercises for the prize of the Main Committee of the Navy. Shooting was carried out at 7 air targets (1 target of the LA-17 type and 6 targets of the RM-120 type) The command planned that 4 targets (1 target LA-17 and 3 targets RM-120) would destroy the cruiser, and the remaining 3 targets of the RM-120 would destroy the destroyers. probably stayed in the fleet, the shooting was as complicated as possible and planned in such a way that the targets entered the firing zone with an interval of no more than 5 seconds. During the shooting, it turned out that all seven targets were destroyed by the cruiser, although the destroyers were able to fire (but not hit) 2 targets. The LA-17 target was destroyed by the launch of one 5V55RM missile defense system right at the far border of the affected area - 18 km. " The combat readiness of our Navy in air defense was at its best, this was preceded by constant combat training and excellent training of crews. Ships did not stand at the berths, for the sole purpose of a solemn meeting of officials of various ranks - they went to sea and solved combat missions !!! The combat training was at its best !!! For reference: Vice-Admiral Igor Nikolayevich Khmelnov, before being appointed to the post of commander of the 10 OPESK Pacific Fleet, was NSh 7 OPESK SF ... moremansf +4 18 November 2013 10: 04 TARKR "Admiral Nakhimov" since 1999 has been under repair at "Sevmash" in Severodvinsk, so far no work has been carried out. With the surrender of the Indian Navy to AV Vikramanditiya (Baku-Gorshkov), the modernization of the cruiser will begin. The heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, after being repaired and modernized, will enter the combat composition of the Russian fleet in 2018. Earlier, Sevmash signed a contract with the RF Ministry of Defense for the repair and modernization of Admiral Nakhimov. "The next serious stage for the ship is docking in the hydroelectric complex, and it is planned for 2014. In accordance with the signed contract, the ship should enter the combat composition of the fleet in 2018," the press service of Sevmash OJSC said. In turn, the first deputy general director of "Sevmash" Sergei Marichev noted that the volume of work on the cruiser is comparable to the level of work on the repair and modernization of the aircraft carrier "Vikramaditya". "" Admiral Nakhimov "should become the most modern TARKR in the navy. It will be equipped with modern types of weapons that have passed tests," he concluded. In addition to replacing worn-out units, it is planned to equip the ship with a modern air defense system based on the S-400 and universal naval rifle complexes; the main weapon is supposed to be the Caliber and Onyx missiles (the development of which began after the construction of the lead ship of the 1144 project, at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's). I hope that upon completion of work, the level of air defense will increase many times over. NOMADE +2 19 November 2013 04: 18 Eh) Thank you, the author! Immediately I remembered my childhood and youth) My father took me to the shooting, he served on the "Combat") Just an unforgettable experience, especially when shooting the AK 130 and launching the Mosquito, when you watch, standing in the navigator's office on the bridge. I saw familiar names in the article)) And then, you remember how much your father and colleagues put in their efforts to save the "Combat", agreed with the administrator. Sverdlovsk, for help in replacing the pipes in the boilers .., it seemed that they were rescued, but no ..., they did not give it. I then, with bitterness, watched as the skeleton of the "Battle" stood in the remote factory for several years (((( xomaNN 0 24 November 2013 21: 13 Yes, it’s joyful but also sad to read materials about the peak of development of the Navy in those years through the eyes of the crew. Hope appeared that at least partially the Russian Navy will achieve similar combat readiness parameters. I'd like to believe in it! mine -1 10 February 2014 04: 35 and her little analysis http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=4329&p=1 Kudrevkn 0 April 18 2017 12: 14 Is it also possible to "tell" in detail (write) about the "heroic" firing of our EM "Prudent" in the Nakhodka area at the end of 1988 (immediately after the BS) - the first missile firing of the URO (the first firing after the death of the "Monsoon") and when Napoleov was a drop of their "one hundred and thirty" and the target. and drowned the tug .. for the prize of MO? With respect and greetings to all my fellow soldiers, Konstantin Nikolayevich Kudrev is "the most greyhound lieutenant of the KTOF" (Vice-Admiral Dymov). dranthqu 0 30 May 2021 13: 42 Each of these annual firing sessions is unique, one-of-a-kind, and due to the complexity of the performance conditions and, in fact, the complete absence of elements of simplification, it is as close as possible to a combat situation. Not all ships and formations are allowed to such firing, but only those that, in the process of combat training, have proven themselves to be the best in their combat mission. With respect to all those involved and the work done, I want to ask: why were the ships admitted to such firing generally not the rule, but the exception? Reflecting a missile strike on the KUG - is it like one of the main elements of a naval battle? © 2010-2025 "Military Review" https://en.topwar.ru/36087-binokl-ot-glavkoma-prizovaya-zenitno-raketnaya-strelba-175-y-brigady-raketnyh-korabley-tof-v-1989-g.html?utm_medium=organic&utm_source=yandexsmartcamera
Jaroslav Posted October 26 Posted October 26 DTIC ADA159414: USSR Local War Doctrine as Rationale for the Development of the Soviet CTOL Aircraft Carrier. https://archive.org/download/DTIC_ADA159414/DTIC_ADA159414.pdf
Jaroslav Posted October 26 Posted October 26 DTIC ADA223975: Soviet Airlift Doctrine & Capabilities -- An Outsider's View in 1990 https://archive.org/download/DTIC_ADA223975/DTIC_ADA223975.pdf
Jaroslav Posted October 26 Posted October 26 DTIC ADA366257: Prowler Integration into USAF Strategic Attack and Air Interdiction Missions https://archive.org/download/DTIC_ADA366257/DTIC_ADA366257.pdf
Jaroslav Posted October 26 Posted October 26 Military Intelligence January-March 1980: Vol 6 Iss 1 https://archive.org/download/sim_military-intelligence-professional-bulletin_january-march-1980_6_1/sim_military-intelligence-professional-bulletin_january-march-1980_6_1.pdf
Jaroslav Posted October 31 Posted October 31 THE ALFA ENIGMA An Alfa on the surface, showing how her sail blends into her hull. A mast is raised forward of the windshield. When the masts were retracted they were covered over to minimize water flow disturbance over the sail structure. Although a titanium-hull submarine, the Alfa-like the Papa SSGN-was not a deep diver. (U. S. Navy) There was a growing sense of unease in the West. Russian maritime power was fast evolving into a giant whose intentions were an enigma, providing endless hours of debate for NATO intelligence analysts, but no definitive answers. By 1973, the Soviet Navy was rapidly gaining on, if not edging ahead of, the Americans. A quarter of its 400 submarines were by now nuclear-powered. The USSR was building up to 15 nukes a year, while the USA could manage only an average of 4.5. It was estimated the Soviets would soon field more SSBNs than the USA. American submarine construction yards declined while the Russians expanded theirs; the variety of Soviet boats increased rapidly. They had managed six new designs of nuclear-powered submarine since 1963. The USA had sent only two new types to sea in the same period. Observing all this, a former Royal Navy officer tried to divine exactly why the Soviets were building so many. Commander Nicholas Whitestone, who at one time served in the Naval Intelligence Division, suggested there were three possibilities. • the Soviets were preparing to refight the Battle of the Atlantic. In any war they would send out submarines to sink troop ships and supply vessels, depriving NATO of reinforcements and starving the West’s civilian populations. • They wanted to have enough submarines to match and kill the Polaris boats (and also to attack American and British aircraft carriers). • The Soviet Navy was a political weapon, to exert pressure on the West. Its burgeoning might was a means of underwriting Russia’s diplomatic moves. The likely answer was that it was a mix of all three – ready to attack shipping, seek out enemy submarines, and intimidate the capitalists with its numbers and growing firepower. While Whitestone pondered the big picture of the stand-off, other professional analysts scrutinised the boats themselves. What exactly was the Charlie Class cruise missile-armed submarine for? Attacking carriers? Or land targets? How exactly were the Charlie’s weapons guided to target? Until the day hostilities erupted, nobody in the West would know for sure, though efforts to provide answers would be made by submarines on intelligence-gathering missions. The Soviet predilection for continuing investment in submarines that bordered on the obsolete puzzled a former British submarine captain, turned writer, Capt. J. E. Moore; he remarked sarcastically that it showed yet again how indifferent the Soviet Union is to heavy arms expenditure . . .’ The Soviets were also fielding the Delta II SSBN, with a submerged displacement estimated by Western sources to be 16,000 tons, as large as a small aircraft carrier. Such leviathans were sliding down the slipways in the early 1970s at a rate of seven a year. Captain Moore issued a warning: ‘All these monster ships are being built at the vast complex at Severodvinsk [on the shores of the White Sea], which has a greater construction potential than all the submarine yards in the USA combined. The Deltas are in most respects the most potent warships ever operated.’ When it came to surface ship killers, by 1973 there were 15 Echo IIs in the Northern Fleet alone. While unsophisticated, they had their uses. Like other Soviet submarines that did not pass the West’s quality test, the Echos offered Admiral Gorshkov the benefit of decoying NATO away from the key units, such as SSBNs. Each Echo II would, he hoped, require thinly stretched NATO forces to exert themselves on the hunt. The most feared of the Soviet hunter-killers (at this time) was the Victor. Around 20 of them were in service by the mid-1970s – thought to be capable of at least 33 knots dived. With their eight 21-inch tubes, a submerged displacement of 4,200 tons and a length of 285ft, it was reckoned their torpedoes were equal to Western tinfish. The Achilles heel of the Victors, despite a highly streamlined, broad hull – indicating deep diving ability – was free flood holes in the outer casing. Water constantly flowing through them made a Victor much noisier than NATO hunter-killers, particularly when it became a burbling rush at speed. Still, Capt. Moore pointed out, ‘they are extremely fast and dangerous craft, able to sink virtually any kind of surface vessel’. Across the Atlantic, Admiral Hyman Rickover, father of the US Navy’s nuclear submarine force, reckoned the West had a lot to be worried about. He believed the Soviets were creating other types of boats that were faster, could dive deeper and were quieter than ever. In 1969 the CIA received intelligence from what it described as ‘strollers’ who had spotted an intriguing new super-streamlined submarine taking shape in Leningrad, at the Sudomekh Yard on the banks of the River Neva. American naval attachés twice made forays into forbidden areas around the shipyard. Somehow they managed to retrieve material, which they would later claim fell off the back of a lorry. It was sneaked back to laboratories in the USA for analysis. Ironically, the most tantalising clue would ultimately be retrieved on American soil. A naval analyst working for the CIA teamed up with a US Navy researcher to call on a scrapyard in Pennsylvania that specialised in purchasing unusual scrap metals from the Soviet Union. After painstakingly examining every potentially relevant item on the site, the two men discovered a piece that seemed promising. Etched into it was a series of numbers that began ‘705’. To expert eyes this was something very intriguing indeed. Analysis of the machined metal soon revealed it to be titanium and, as would subsequently be discovered, the mystery boat was known in the Soviet Navy as the Project 705 Lira. At first, it was believed to be a new form of diesel boat. A senior US Naval Intelligence submarine analyst named Herb Lord suggested, after studying photographs and other data, that it was a radically new form of SSN. Lord maintained it was a ‘super submarine’ made from titanium. With advanced weaponry and sensors, it could pose a serious threat to Western naval operations. He told colleagues and superiors the Soviets had – at least in this case – abandoned their cautious approach to submarine design – the incremental, career-preserving way of doing things. This boat was different. Lord’s claims did not immediately take root. According to a recently declassified CIA case study, the sceptics in US naval intelligence circles maintained ‘the shaping and welding of heavy titanium hull sections, especially in the generally “dirty” shipyard atmosphere, was impractical, if not impossible’. The idea of creating whole sections of a titanium submarine in the open air was too ridiculous – usually when titanium was welded it had to be carried out in specially enclosed areas filled with fire-retardant argon gas. Nothing this big could be made from it, they said. An entire submarine hull made from titanium? Impossible. Regardless of its powerplant or hull composition, a single unit of what would be labelled the Alfa Class by NATO was completed in 1970. What was her precise role? Anti-shipping? Anti-submarine? It took several more years for Herb Lord’s analysis to prevail over the sceptics – and he actually retired before his views became accepted. The CIA analyst Gerhardt Thamm ultimately took up Lord’s cause and he confessed: ‘it became my mission to convince the US Navy that the Soviets were building high-threat submarines using advanced construction technology’. While Rickover’s team believed the Soviets were improving submarine construction they, and others in the USA, remained very dubious about the Alfa being an SSN. They refused to believe it would be anything more than a dead-end experiment, whatever it was. In reality one of the most revolutionary submarines ever constructed, the Alfa spotted moored at a fitting-out quay on the banks of the Neva in 1969 was merely a one-off prototype. There would ultimately be a class of six commissioned examples, whose capabilities chilled the blood of NATO commanders. The fastest and deepest-diving attack submarine the world had ever seen, the first Alfa was a rare and mysterious beast. She was a product of the most brilliant minds in the Soviet submarine design world. Latter-day Norse gods had applied their knowledge of metallurgy to try and secure mastery of inner space for the Kremlin. Russian naval architects, scientists and mathematicians were brilliant, their products simply amazing. With the Alfa – because they were hoping to achieve a massive leap ahead of the West – the Russians took their time about pushing the prototype to the limits. The roots of what would become the Alfa programme went back to the early 1960s, when the Holy Grail was the so-called Interceptor submarine. A type of hunter-killer tailored to the flash-bang nature of any likely war, it would be able to hit hard and fast, then disappear. The new Delta Class SSBNs, armed with the SS-N-8 (Sawfly) missile, could bombard America from the comparative safety of the Greenland and Norwegian Seas. Any hunter-killer riding shotgun would not need long endurance, for the Bombers would be relatively close to home. Such a fast deep-diving submarine could make quick forays in the hunt for surface and submerged targets. The Interceptor submarine could be small, with a modest crew, and also a minimal fit for sonar. Detection abilities of Maritime Patrol Aircraft and helicopters, or other elements of detection equipment (including seabed sensors), would aid the mission. Generally the reason nuclear-powered submarines were so much bigger than diesels was the need for complex and extremely powerful machinery and powerplant. That in turn increased weight, which decreased speed. The answer was to keep the propulsion plant as small as possible while constructing the boat from lightweight material. The Soviet solution was a liquid-metal reactor while using titanium for the boat’s hull. Titanium offers huge advantages, for not only is it much lighter than steel, but it is also extremely strong. It has a very low magnetic signature and is not so vulnerable to corrosion. Hard to obtain, and expensive, it does not have the same give as steel. This lack of elasticity under the extreme pressures experienced by deep-diving submarines meant it could crack more easily. Aluminium and manganese alloys were introduced to try and restore elasticity. Titanium was also difficult to bend into the radical, streamlined shape the Soviet naval architects devised for the space age Alfa. With an ultra-streamlined exaggerated hump for a fin, she looked like something conjured up by Arthur C. Clarke. One Russian submarine officer who saw an Alfa under construction thought her lines stunningly beautiful. She was a work of art rather than a product of industry. On joining the Alfa’s crew, composed of the best and brightest the Soviet Navy could assemble, he was overcome with pride. He exulted: ‘I felt as if I had just discarded my tractor and boarded a spaceship.’ With six tubes and packing a maximum of 18 ASW missiles or torpedoes, the acceleration of the new wonder submarine was incredible. It could go from 6 to 42 knots in just 120 seconds. The Alfa had a remarkably small crew of just 45. Thanks to high levels of automation, it could be reduced to as few as 31. The use of liquid metal for reactor coolant was extremely radical – and very dangerous. The US Navy had commissioned USS Seawolf in 1957 with a liquid-metal reactor. Not much more than a year later she was brought into a dockyard to have it removed and replaced with a pressurised-water reactor. A major challenge was ensuring the liquid metal did not actually solidify, bringing the system crashing to a halt. The Alfa had two compact reactors to offset that annoying tendency. A major advantage of using liquid metal was that it did not become radioactive, so it wasn’t necessary for the steam-generating machinery it passed through to be clad in heavy (bulky) and expensive radiation shields. The top turn of speed achieved by the Alfa with a five-bladed screw was phenomenal – up to 45 knots. Maximum diving depth was 2,460ft. This was more than twice any other contemporary Western or Soviet boat. The problem with such a high turn of speed – the fastest ever achieved by an SSN – was the noise, which was likened to a jet engine roar. The prototype was worked hard, frequently clocking up those impressive high speeds, under huge pressure at great depth. There were several problems with hull cracking and reactor ‘freezes’. Pipework, torpedo launch equipment and even the compressed-air system were subjected to extreme stress. In 1974 the exhausted prototype was cut to pieces, allowing a full autopsy. The results were studied and adjustments made to both design and construction methods before a limited production run went ahead. Admiral Gorshkov lavished attention and money on the Alfas – so expensive but highly capable, they were dubbed golden fish’. They were the elite of Russia’s submarine force. No wonder, for the Alfas appeared to offer technological parity and even superiority over the West. The CIA’s Gerhardt Thamm eventually won his battle to convince the US Navy the titanium SSN was reality, confirming that Herb Lord (who had passed away in the meantime) was right. Thamm felt he proved ‘that the Soviets had indeed built a submarine that was “better than good enough’”. Despite huge costs, ‘the Soviets continued the Alfa project with tenacity unmatched by Western navies’. The Americans were working on their 688 Class attack submarines (also known as Los Angeles Class). The first of these would be launched in 1974 and enter service in 1976, with another 37 commissioned by June 1989. A major part of Britain’s attempt to respond would depend on safely proving and bringing into service another brand-new kind of SSN. https://soviethammer.blogspot.com/2019/11/the-alfa-enigma.html?m=1
Jaroslav Posted November 18 Posted November 18 Navy’s Carrier Airpower – 1991 Gulf War A U.S. Navy F-14 lifts off over arrow of A7 Corsairs on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy in the Red Sea late, Jan. 25, 1991. Allied forces flew more than 8,000 missions in the first five days of Operation Desert Storm; carrier-based fighter bomber were used extensively. Iraq’s sudden and unexpected invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 presented naval aviation, in particular, with a new and unfamiliar set of challenges. Over the course of the six-week Persian Gulf War that began five and a half months later, the Navy’s carrier force found itself obliged to surmount a multitude of new adjustment needs that only came to light for the first time during that campaign. Few of the challenges that were levied on naval aviation by that U. S.-led offensive, code-named Operation Desert Storm, bore much resemblance to the planning assumptions that underlay the Reagan administration’s Maritime Strategy that had been created during the early 1980s to accommodate a very different set of concerns. Although naval aviators had routinely trained for and were wholly proficient at over-the-beach conventional strike operations, the Navy’s carrier battle groups during that period were geared, first and foremost, to doing open-ocean battle against the Soviet Navy. As such, they were not optimally equipped for conducting littoral combat operations. They also were completely unaccustomed to operating within the Air Force’s complex air tasking system for managing large-force operations involving 2,000 or more sorties a day that dominated the Desert Storm air war. Simply put, the 1991 Gulf War in no way resembled the open-ocean battles that the Navy had planned and prepared for throughout the preceding two decades. To begin with, there were no opposed surface naval forces or enemy air threat to challenge the Navy’s six carrier battle groups that participated in that war. Moreover, throughout the five-month buildup of forces in the region that preceded the war and the six weeks of fighting that ensued thereafter, the Navy did not operate independently, as was its familiar pattern throughout most of the Cold War, but rather in shared operating areas with the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps. During the initial planning workups before the start of Operation Desert Storm, some senior naval aviators sought for a time to push for a distribution of route packages between the Air Force and the Navy along familiar Vietnam-like lines. However, the designated joint-force air component commander (JFACC) for the impending campaign, Air Force then-Lieutenant General Charles Horner, rejected that proposal as an unacceptably suboptimal use of American air assets in joint war- fare. Although Horner did not exercise formal command over the air assets of the Navy and Marine Corps that were deployed to the Gulf, he did wield operational control over them to an extent that empowered him to task them as he deemed appropriate to support the joint- force commander’s air apportionment decisions. That arrangement was unprecedented in Navy experience. In the end, all four participating U. S. services came to accept, at least in principle, the need for a single jurisdiction over allied air power in Desert Storm. Yet three of them (not only the Navy but also the Marine Corps and Army) frequently chafed at the extent of authority given to General Horner to select targets and determine the details of flight operations. Furthermore, the naval air capabilities that had been fielded and fine-tuned for open-ocean engagements, such as the extremely long- range (90-plus miles) Phoenix air-to-air missile carried by the F-14 fleet defense fighter, were of little relevance to the allied coalition’s predominantly overland air combat needs. Navy F-14s also were not assigned to the choicest combat air patrol (CAP) stations in Desert Storm because, having been equipped for the less-crowded outer air battle in defense of the carrier battle group, they lacked the redundant onboard target recognition systems that the rules of engagement promulgated by U. S. Central Command (CENTCOM) required for the denser and more conflicted air operations environment over Iraq. Relatedly, because of the Navy’s lack of a compatible command and control system that would enable receipt of the document electronically, the daily air tasking order (ATO) generated by the Air Force– dominated combined air operations center (CAOC) in Saudi Arabia had to be placed aboard two S-3 antisubmarine warfare aircraft in hard copy each day and flown to the six participating carriers so that the next day’s air-wing flight schedules could be written. As for the Navy’s other habit patterns and equipment items developed for open-ocean engagements, such as fire-and-forget AGM-84D Harpoon antiship missiles, ordnance supply planning purely to meet anticipated mission needs, and decentralized command and control, all were, in the words of the former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Admiral William Owens, “either ruled out by the context of the battle or were ineffective in the confined littoral arena and the environmental complexities of the sea-land interface.” Naval aviation performed commendably in Desert Storm only because of its inherent professionalism and adaptability, not because its doctrine and weapons complement had been appropriate to the demands of the situation. As examples of its deficiencies in equipment that impeded naval aviation’s performance during the Gulf War, although it had clearly been equipped with advanced and capable combat aircraft by the time the war began, the Navy mainly dropped Vietnam-era unguided munitions, primarily the Mk 80-series 500-, 1,000-, and 2,000-lb general- purpose bombs. Throughout the war, the only carrier-based attack aircraft that was capable of self-designating laser-guided bombs (LGBs) was the A-6E. The A-7 and F/A-18 could also carry and deliver LGBs but only with the enabling support of nearby A-6Es that could laser-designate their targets for them, which was not an advisable tactic in heavily defended enemy airspace. Moreover, to remain safely above the enemy’s man-portable infrared SAM and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) threat envelopes, they were required to operate solely from a standoff perch at medium and high altitudes, where visual weapon delivery techniques were less accurate because of the longer slant ranges to targets. The Navy’s electro-optically guided Walleye munition could be used only in daylight and in visual meteorological conditions. Carrier- based ground-attack aircraft also did not have anything like the weapons system video capability that was installed in the Air Force’s F-111, F-117, F-15E, and F-16. Because of the Navy’s lack of a significant precision-strike capability when its call to deploy for Desert Storm arose, its six carrier air wings that participated in the campaign were denied certain targets that were assigned to the Air Force instead by default. The participating carrier air wings also had to turn down some target-attack opportunities because of their lack of a penetrating munition such as the Air Force’s Mk 84 improved 2,000-lb bomb. Other unmet Navy needs were for more LGBs, for automatic laser target designators for all strike aircraft, and for state-of-the-art mission recorders for conducting better bomb-damage assessment (BDA). One strike-fighter squadron’s after-action report not long after the Gulf War ended remarked that the Navy’s general lack of the sort of precision-attack capability that the Air Force had used to such telling effect in the war “was eloquent testimony that naval aviation had apparently missed an entire generation of weapons employment and development.” https://warhistory.org/@msw/article/navys-carrier-airpower-1991-gulf-war
Jaroslav Posted November 23 Posted November 23 NEW SOVIET NAVAL SAM SYSTEM https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83T00574R000102590001-9.pdf
Jaroslav Posted November 23 Posted November 23 Standard Missile: Snapshots in Time Captured by Previous Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest Articles https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/techdigest/pdf/V34-N02/34-02-Palumbo.pdf
Jaroslav Posted November 23 Posted November 23 The Talos Missile https://secwww.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/Home/Detail?Journal=J&VolumeID=3&IssueID=2
Recommended Posts
Create an account or sign in to comment
You need to be a member in order to leave a comment
Create an account
Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!
Register a new accountSign in
Already have an account? Sign in here.
Sign In Now