Stuart Galbraith Posted August 5, 2022 Posted August 5, 2022 (edited) Ah shit, I put the amnesty report in here. Sorry about that, Ill take it out. As for that document, no I dont, thats all the guy has flagged up on twitter. I would encourage marking him though, he does come up with interesting stuff. He posted something a few months back about using Satellites for SIGINT. We already knew they did it, it was just astonishing they finally released something admitting it. I find it interesting, this is FAR earlier a capability than the later ASAT tests the yanks were doing in the 1980's. An interesting way to use up old Thor launchers. Edited August 5, 2022 by Stuart Galbraith
JWB Posted August 5, 2022 Posted August 5, 2022 8 hours ago, Perun said: Do you have link for pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Program_437
Perun Posted August 5, 2022 Author Posted August 5, 2022 21 minutes ago, JWB said: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Program_437 Thanks mate 🙂
Stuart Galbraith Posted August 5, 2022 Posted August 5, 2022 That's really interesting, always been a fan of Thor.
Perun Posted August 6, 2022 Author Posted August 6, 2022 INTEL REPORT ROLE OF INTERDICTION AT SEA https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005390331
Perun Posted August 6, 2022 Author Posted August 6, 2022 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CASPAR W. WEINBERGER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 1986 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90b01390r000100050003-1
Perun Posted August 8, 2022 Author Posted August 8, 2022 FY 1988: Annual Report to the Congress https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1988_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-151204-840
Perun Posted August 8, 2022 Author Posted August 8, 2022 FY 1990: Annual Report to the President and the Congress https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1990a_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-151621-343
Stuart Galbraith Posted August 8, 2022 Posted August 8, 2022 RN Submarine Commanders, fitted for, and with, 20 inch brass balls.
Stuart Galbraith Posted August 9, 2022 Posted August 9, 2022 Video from 1988 on air defence of Norway.
Perun Posted August 11, 2022 Author Posted August 11, 2022 ... In the 1980s, the Navy introduced a new Maritime Strategy, which was an aggressive forward deployment to the far north intent on bottling the Soviet surface and submarine power in their bases, while simultaneously conducting strikes against enemy bases in the frozen Kola peninsula. Naturally, such actions would—in theory—provoke the Soviets to sail their weaker force out to sea and engage in battle at sea. In short, De Tag! was back. ... https://mwi.usma.edu/poor-history-and-failed-paradigms-flawed-naval-strategy-and-learning-the-wrong-lessons-from-a-century-of-conflict/
Perun Posted August 11, 2022 Author Posted August 11, 2022 (edited) Spitfire vs Bf 109 and F-14 vs Su-27: the difference is always the pilot ... During the last decade of the twentieth century one of the deadliest adversary for the western air forces was the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker. The Su-27 belongs to the same class of the US F-14 and F-15, but unlike the American fighters it can fly at an angle of attack of 30 degrees and can also perform the “Pugachev Cobra”, an aerobatic maneuver in which the aircraft pitches the nose beyond the vertical at a rate of 70 degrees per second and after that recovers to level flight. Thanks to this maneuver, the Flanker has been the highlight of every air shows from the end of the 80s to the middle of the 90s. On 20 April this year an article written by Dave Majumdar for Flightglobal DEW Line, talk about Gerry Gallop, a former TOP GUN instructor and an experienced US Navy pilot who flown F-4, F-14A and B, F-15, F-16, F-18 (both Legacy and Super Hornet) and also A-4. Once Gallop ended its career he became senior vice president and chief operating of Tactical Air Support, a private operator which operated the Su-27 for short time and during this period he had the chance to fly the Flanker. During one of his sorties over the Ukraine, Gallop was very impressed by the acceleration and by how fast was the Russian fighter at high altitude. The power of its engines, along with its superb aerodynamics and with short range IR missile AA-11 Archer (which in the ‘90s was the best short-range AAM in the world that can be linked to the pilot’s helmet fire control system and is capable to be fired at targets until 45 degrees off the axis of the aircraft: both these capabilities were not possessed by the AIM-9M Sidewinder, the main western short range missile at the time) made of the Su-27 probably the best dogfighter of the 90s, a very tough adversary for every western jet. When strictly compared to the F-14, the Tomcat is not less fast than the Su -27, but for the American fighter the Flanker is more than a match in a close combat. In fact, against a more maneuverable fighter like the Su-27, the Tomcat is disadvantaged even if the F-14 is a B or a D model powered with the extremely potent General Electric F110-GE-400 engines. Sometimes the advantage of an agile adversary can be reduced thanks to the presence of a well trained backseater, but the Tomcat gives the best of itself on long distances where the AIM-54C Phoenix can be used. As explained by some Tomcat drivers, it doesn’t matter how a more agile fighter can get a F-14 in a dogfight, because thanks to Tomcat’s combination of tactics, sensors (such as the F-14D’s AAS-42 which it has a greater range and resolution than the IRST seeker mounted by the Su-27) and weapons every enemy fighter is going to be destroyed at an unparalleled distance. So, which was the best among these two fighters? It is very hard to answer to this question, but as explained by the most experienced F-14 pilot, Dale “Snort” Snodgrass, in some ways the Su-27 is superior to the F-14 and to the F-15 while in some others, American fighters are better than the Flanker: but what really makes the difference is how well a pilot is trained. https://theaviationist.com/2013/05/31/spit-vs-bf109-dogfighters/ Edited August 11, 2022 by Perun
Stuart Galbraith Posted August 16, 2022 Posted August 16, 2022 Im just working up some NPIC documents on satellite imagery of the Leningrad Military District into Google Earth marker files. Really quite interesting to see how many Barracks they had up on the Norwegian Border,and how many now lie abandoned. Will up the file on here when I get it completed.
Perun Posted August 16, 2022 Author Posted August 16, 2022 (edited) POLITICAL AND POPULATION SURVEY MURMANSKAYA OBLAST NO. 111 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-01043r003700190004-3 It is from 1959. but stil interesting Edited August 16, 2022 by Perun
Perun Posted August 31, 2022 Author Posted August 31, 2022 AIR DEFENSE WARSAW PACT DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80b01500r000100090003-2
Perun Posted August 31, 2022 Author Posted August 31, 2022 12 октября 1994 года крейсер выполнил зенитную стрельбу на приз главкома ВМФ, завоевав этот приз как лучший корабль по ПВО. Примечательно то, что отличная стрельба крейсера не дала в тот раз получить высокой оценки за стрельбу корабельной ударной группе (КУГ) в целом, поскольку «Адмирал Нахимов» самостоятельно сбил почти все мишени. КУГ из состава 7-й оперативной эскадры, помимо атомного крейсера, включала в себя эсминцы «Расторопный» и «Безудержный»; руководителем стрельбы и командующим КУГ был командир 43 дивизии ракетных кораблей контр-адмирал В. Ф. Лякин, а старшим был командир эскадры контр-адмирал В. Г. Доброскоченко, находившийся на ТАРКР «Адмирал Нахимов». Для проведения стрельб пришлось закрывать для судоходства район с радиусом около 300 км; условия стрельбы были максимально усложнены, и 11 имитирующих низколетящие крылатые ракеты мишеней входили в зону обстрела с интервалом не более 5 секунд. В результате стрельб семь мишеней уничтожил крейсер комплексами «Форт», а эсминцы успели сбить только две ракеты РМС-35 и обстрелять две мишени РМ-120 своими 130-мм универсальными пушками комплексов АК-130. Расход боекомплекта ЗУР 5В55РМ комплекса «Форт» крейсера составил 19 штук, а кроме этого было выпущено 2 ракеты 9М31 комплексом «Оса-МА» и расстреляно семьдесят 130-мм снарядов универсального калибра. Мишень РМС-35 была уничтожена первой ракетой 5В55РМ прямо на рубеже дальней границы зоны поражения, а на поражение остальных мишеней понадобилось 18 ЗУР 5В55РМ, четыре из которых сошли с траектории и самоликвидировались[9]. Стрельба получилась очень плотной - пуски ЗУР со второй по девятнадцатую уложились в отрезок времени 69 секунд, хотя по ТТХ интервал между пусками составляет не менее 5 секунд. Во время стрельбы впервые один комплекс вёл обстрел сразу четырёх мишеней - так, что одновременно в воздухе находилось семь нацеленных на них зенитных ракет. По результатам анализа стрельбы были выработаны практические рекомендации, внедрённые впоследствии на всех кораблях эскадры. https://wiki.wargaming.net/ru/Navy:Адмирал_Нахимов_(1986)#.D0.98.D1.81.D1.82.D0.BE.D1.80.D0.B8.D1.8F_.D1.81.D0.BB.D1.83.D0.B6.D0.B1.D1.8B Translate: On October 12, 1994, the cruiser performed anti-aircraft fire for the prize of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, winning this prize as the best air defense ship. It is noteworthy that the cruiser's excellent firing at that time did not give a high rating for firing to the ship's strike group (KUG) as a whole, since the Admiral Nakhimov shot down almost all the targets on its own. The KUG from the 7th operational squadron, in addition to the nuclear cruiser, included the destroyers "Quick" and "Unrestrained"; Rear Admiral V.F. Lyakin, the commander of the 43rd division of missile ships, was the commander of the shooting and the commander of the KUG, and the commander of the squadron, Rear Admiral V.G. Dobroskochenko, who was on the Admiral Nakhimov TARKR, was the senior. For firing, an area with a radius of about 300 km had to be closed to navigation; firing conditions were extremely complicated, and 11 targets simulating low-flying cruise missiles entered the firing zone with an interval of no more than 5 seconds. As a result of firing, the cruiser destroyed seven targets with Fort complexes, and the destroyers managed to shoot down only two RMS-35 missiles and fire at two RM-120 targets with their 130-mm universal guns of the AK-130 complexes. The ammunition consumption of the 5V55RM missiles of the Fort complex of the cruiser was 19 pieces, and in addition, 2 9M31 missiles were fired by the Osa-MA complex and seventy 130-mm shells of universal caliber were fired. The RMS-35 target was destroyed by the first 5V55RM missile right at the turn of the far border of the affected area, and it took 18 5V55RM missiles to hit the remaining targets, four of which went off the trajectory and self-destructed [9]. The shooting turned out to be very dense - launches of missiles from the second to the nineteenth fit within the time interval of 69 seconds, although according to the performance characteristics, the interval between launches is at least 5 seconds. During the shooting, for the first time, one complex fired at four targets at once - so that at the same time there were seven anti-aircraft missiles aimed at them in the air. Based on the results of the shooting analysis, practical recommendations were developed, which were subsequently implemented on all ships of the squadron.
Perun Posted September 1, 2022 Author Posted September 1, 2022 (edited) DTIC ADA159564: Declaratory Policy for the Strategic Employment of the Soviet Navy https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7005.html DTIC ADA149481: The Strategic Employment of the Soviet Navy in a Nuclear War https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA149481 Edited September 1, 2022 by Perun
Perun Posted September 1, 2022 Author Posted September 1, 2022 The new Soviet military doctrine and the future of the Maritime Strategy https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA202003.pdf
Perun Posted September 3, 2022 Author Posted September 3, 2022 The GIUK Gap’s strategic significance https://www.iiss.org/~/publication/799791dd-7be1-4484-abfd-05fa3a400889/the-giuk-gaps-strategic-significance.pdf
Perun Posted September 3, 2022 Author Posted September 3, 2022 Soviet Navy: Intelligence and Analysis During the Cold War https://www.cia.gov/static/9b0cfd3d25dfa5d8f4d2cdfcc3835b7d/Soviet-Navy-Intelligence-and-Analysis-During-the-Cold-War.pdf
Perun Posted September 3, 2022 Author Posted September 3, 2022 The Soviet Navy http://forposterityssake.ca/RCN-DOCS/CCCP.htm
Perun Posted September 3, 2022 Author Posted September 3, 2022 CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/cia-analysis-soviet-navy
Perun Posted September 3, 2022 Author Posted September 3, 2022 It is related and interesting: Confrontation in the Sargasso Sea: Soviet Submarines During the Cuban Missile Crisis http://cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol13/tnm_13_3_1-19.pdf
Perun Posted September 3, 2022 Author Posted September 3, 2022 Assessing the Soviet Navy https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44641938.pdf
Perun Posted September 3, 2022 Author Posted September 3, 2022 Understanding the Soviet Navy https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/CAB-2018-U-017105-Final.pdf
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