naval warfare 3rd WW, battle for the Arctic (Cold war period)

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A SOVIET SSBN “BASTION”  STRATEGY?

It is important to periodically stand back and review accepted wisdom about Soviet military purposes and capabilities. One such “given” is the widely accepted notion that the primary rationale for the Soviet Navy is the protection and defense of the Soviet Union’s SSBN force -YANKEES, DELTAS, and TYPHOONS — in near-home waters, the so-called SSBN “sanctuaries” or “bastions.” This essay proposes that caution may be warranted in accepting and planning for the “reality” of a Soviet bastion strategy, especially in light of certain, seemingly anomalous features of the recently-deployed TYPHOON class SSBN.

The Soviet SSBN bastion concept has formally been sanctioned by the u.s. intelligence community as an authoritative estimate of Soviet peace and wartime SSBN deployment strategy, yet Soviet literature has little acknowledged either a “bastion” policy or the related idea of an SSBtJ strategic witholding posture. Although the bastion concept, as elaborated by Western, primarily u.s., analysts of Soviet naval affairs, offers a persuasive and logical explanation for Soviet SSBN deployment practices — so different from the U.S. Navy’s POSEIDON and TRIDENT fleet -it should be recognized nevertheless that “proof• depends heavily on logical inference and circumstantial evidence. A particularly disturbing anomaly in this pattern of bastion thinking is the TYPHOON class submarine. Its characteristics are such as to place a question mark on its role in an alleged “bastion” strategy, and warrant consideration of alternative options. What needs asking is why the Soviets would build a ballistic missile submarine almost three times the size of the DELTA class, yet increase its armament by only four missiles.

The process whereby Western analysts of Soviet naval affairs have arrived at the conclusion that the Soviets have fallen back on a bastion strategy needs review.

Early deployed a in the 1970’s, the Soviet Union new class of SSBNs, designated the DELTA class. Armed with the SS-N-8, a 4,500 nautical mile range missile, these boats are capable of striking continental U.S. targets from operating areas near the Soviet landmass. This capability, plus the estimated vulnerability of Soviet submarines to Western surveillance — SOSUS in particular — contributed to the conclusion that the DELTA/SS-N-8 deployment reflected a deliberate Soviet decision to henceforth safeguard the Soviet SSBN fleet from Western antisubmarine forces by limiting their operating areas to the seas within easy reach of protective “pro-SSBN” surface and subsurface forces. Admiral of the Soviet Fleet Sergei G. Gorsbkov’s literary references to the value of a fleet-in-being as a tool for late war bargaining were interpreted by some Western analysts as further evidence of a Soviet decision to “conserve” the YANKEES and DELTAS in home waters as a “strategic reserve force.” Additional “proof” of a Soviet bastion strategy came by way of the proposition by some analysts that keeping the SSBNs close to home was congenial to the Russian psyche and traditional Czarist/Soviet naval policy — based on a continental geography, naval inferiority, caution, and a cultural dislike of the open seas.

Against this background of developed logic it is important to recognize apparent flaws and inconsistencies. While it is granted that the intercontinental range of the SS-N-8 permits the DELTAS to empty their launch tubes near or even inside their home ports, and that staying within easy reach of friendly “pro-SSBN” general purpose forces offers an added degree of protection, it does not necessarily follow that the development and deployment of the DELTA/SS-N-8 combination reflects a deliberate Soviet bastion strategy, or that such a choice was forced by the acclaimed effectiveness of Western antisubmarine measures. The latter argument contains perhaps a touch of wishful thinking — a presumption that the Soviets have acknowledged the West’s superior antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Moreover, the recent trend in Soviet warship design toward greater endurance, larger displacements and larger weapon magazines could as readily be explained by a possible Soviet requirement to guard the Deltas through a protracted period of hostilities, not in home waters, but in greatly expanded and far removed ocean areas of the world.

Perhaps one of the most troublesome questions, however, is why the Soviets have gone to the trouble and expense of building ~ and ~ large nuclear SSBNs. If the DELTAS and TYPHOONS, particularly the TYPHOON class, are destined to spend their wartime patrols in local areas, it makes little obvious sense to invest in speed, endurance and great size. Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, then the Director of Naval Intelligence, informed a Congressional committee of the TYPHOON as follows in 1981: “We never dreamed that the thing would be that big. It is a monster ••• it can probably carry extra people, extra equipment ••• It can probably stay out for long periods.”

The TYPHOON is reportedly far quieter than previous Soviet SSBNs. Its large size and evident large reserve buoyancy indicate that the boat’s double-hulled construction with a wide separation between the outer and inner hulls, affords considerable protection against contemporary Western antisubmarine weapons. Moreover, a displacement of 25,000 tons prompts speculation about the presence of an array of active defenses — perhaps as a mother ship — to permit independent operations in remote areas of the ocean.

As to the alleged vulnerability of Soviet SSBNs to Western surveillance and detection, concentrating the YANKEES, DELTAS, and TYPHOONS inside geographically well-defined and limited sea areas might actually ease the Western detection and localization problem. If, as has been reported, the Soviets have made important strides in reducing the radiated noise of their submarines (Dr. Robert Cooper, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Technology told an audience in 1984 that Soviet submarines now “are as quiet as our (own)”), it seems inappropriate to help solve the opponent’s antisubmarine warfare problem in this fashion. Since the DELTAS are also reportedly being “quieted,” the Soviet rationale for bastion deployment becomes even less convincing. The survivability of the “pro-SSBN” surface forces that would presumably guard the Soviet SSBNs in their bastion areas is probably not very high under conditions of nuclear war. Yet, nuclear war is the contingency that the alleged role of the SSBNs as a “witheld reserve” implies.

The tempo of Soviet SSBN deployments is much lower than that of the U.S. POSEIDON/TRIDENT force, suggesting a possibly lower state of readiness. This pattern is not exclusive to the seabased strategic portion of the Soviet fleet; its surface component similarly deploys only a fraction of the time theoretically available. It has also been reported that the Soviet Union’s land-based ballistic missile force is generally kept in a lower state of readiness than is routine for its u.s. counterpart. The contrast between U.S. and Soviet strategic readiness postures may be a reflection of different estimates of the likelihood of a strategic surprise attack. The threat of a “nuclear Pearl Harbor” has pervaded U.S. defense thinking since the end of the Second World War. The Soviets do not share this concern to the same degree and evidently expect that a nuclear exchange will be preceded by a period of escalating tensions, giving them time to raise readiness levels. Thus keeping the bulk of the fleet, including the SSBNs, in port and home waters during peacetime makes good economic sense.

In conclusion, the evidence is not enough to reject the Soviet bastion theses; neither is it sufficient to asses its validity. Clear, however, is that the totality of facts and whunches” about Soviet naval activities, strategic thinking, and operational behavior leaves enough room for divergent interpretations of why the Soviets are doing what they are doing. Although the Western navies are in almost daily contact with their potential opponent, and the basic characteristics and operating routines of Soviet Navy platforms and weapons are reasonably well known, our understanding of Soviet operating doctrine and potential wartime strategies remains quite limited. The Soviets themselves publish a wealth of literature on military matters, but unfortunately, most of the information tends to be highly theoretical or couched in the most general terms. Western analysts are hence forced to decipher the significance of Soviet hardware and operating routines by reading-between-the-lines. This interpretive effort is absolutely necessary and has produced valuable insights. It is equally important, in the words or Alberta Wohlstetter, the author of Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, “to play with material from different angles and in the context of unpopular as well as popular hypotheses — whether the end is the solution or a crime or an intelligence estimate.”

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1985/a-soviet-ssbn-bastion-strategy

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1985/Summer/1985-July-OCRw.pdf

 

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FIGHTING IN DEFENDED WATERS

In the event of a major war, it is generally assumed that substantial numbers of Soviet SSBNs, general-purpose submarines and surface combatants will be committed to hiding-in or defending ocean areas adjacent to the USSR — under the cover of land-based air and surface warships. In light of the intense threats against U.S. surface forces operating near the periphery of the USSR at the start of war, the burden of initiating an early offensive against Soviet naval power is likely to fall to u.s. and allied SSNs.

However, in conducting a campaign against one or more high-priority classes of naval targets deployed in or near Soviet home waters, U.S. SSNs also must face and overcome an ASW threat of uncertain strength. In conducting a general offensive against all classes of Soviet submarines, u.s. SSNs must avoid or escape prosecution by mines, other supporting Soviet submarines, surface combatants and sea-and landbased ASW aircraft, cued by overhead and underwater surveillance systems. In a focused offensive against Soviet SSBNs, U.S. SSNs might properly regard all other Soviet submarines as secondary targets and part of the defense.

The purpose of this article is to quantitatively explore certain aspects of a submarine campaign in defended waters and briefly consider their planning implications — so as to raise some issues and stimulate discussion of this complex and important problem.

The exchange ratio is defined as the expected number of enemy submarines destroyed per SSN lost in fighting an unlimited number of engagements of a specified type. It is an important measure of the combat potential of an SSN. However, in fighting a number of enemy submarines protected by defending forces, a certain number of SSNs might be lost in encounters with the defense. These unproductive losses of SSNs to the defense mean that the attrition of target submarines will be less than that predicted, for sub vs exchange ratios.

Consequently, when fighting an undersea campaign in defended waters, the effective exchange ratio — will be less than the exchange ratio, absent defenses, as usually defined. How much less will depend upon the strength of the defense.

The unique feature of a submarine campaign in the presence of a continuously acting ASW defense is that as the campaign proceeds and target submarines are found and destroyed, the density of targets in the theater will decline. As a result, the time between engagements with target submarines will tend to increase, on average. Since the continuously acting defense has a longer time to work between target engagements, the probability of an SSN encounter with some element of the defense, instead of a target submarine, will steadily rise throughout the course of the campaign.

This increase in the relative strength of the defense is most pronounced after a substantial fraction of primary targets has been destroyed. Indeed, in the limiting case in which all target submarines have been destroyed, surviving SSNs that are unaware oi’ the status of the campaign can only encounter elements of the defense.

Simply stated, each unit in a composite ASW defense can engage and destroy a searching SSN at a certain rate, characteristic of the interaction between that unit and an.SSN. The sum of these lethal rates of engagement, from all ASW units participating in the defense, sets the overall rate at which an SSN will be destroyed by the defense.

Similarly, a searching SSN will engage its primary submarine targets at a certain rate that is proportional to the number of such targets present in the theater. Hence, the rate of engagement with target submarines will fall during the course of a campaign as they are found and destroyed.

At any time during the campaign, the relative rate of engagement between the defense and target equals the odds that an SSN will next engage an element of the defense, instead of a primary submarine target. Hence, the probability of a lethal encounter with the defense, versus a target submarine, provides a useful measure of the strength of the enemy defense.

If the composition of the enemy’s defense remains constant throughout the campaign, then the odds of encountering the defense, rather than a target submarine, must increase as the campaign proceeds, while the enemy submarine population declines.

The aim in the rest of this article is to suggest answers to the following questions about an SSN campaign in defended waters — where there is an assumed SSN exchange in the absence of defense and an initial probability of a lethal encounter with the defense at the start of a campaign:

Compared to the SSN exchange ratio in the absence of a defense, what is the effective exchange ratio for the entire campaign and what degree of attrition can X SSNs expect to inflict on Y target submarines — protected by ASW defenses of different strengths?

Is campaign effectiveness influenced more by the exchange ratio or by the SSN’s ability to avoid the ASW defenses?

Is it advantageous to overcommit a larger force of SSNs and then withdraw them all as soon as a predetermined number of SSNs have been lost?

What advantage is gained by localization of target submarines in the pre-war period and then attacking these at the outbreak of war, before the ASW defense can have an effect?

Approach

These questions require quantitative answers, derived fronJ an undersea campaign that allows for the possibility of SSN attrition by a continuously acting defense.

A series of tables follow which show the predictions for a submarine campaign in defended waters, where the u.s. submarines enjoy a 5:1 exchange ratio. Specifically, the primary targets for a u.s. campaign are assumed to be 40 Soviet SSBNs deployed in Arctic seas. In this focused campaign, all other Soviet submarines are regarded as units of the defense — to be avoided — in addition to mines, surface combatants, sea-and land-based ASW aircraft and surveillance systems, in various combinations. The lethal encounters with the defense at the start of the campaign are then varied while u.s. losses are limited to a specific number of SSNs.

Question 1: Effective Exchange Ratio

As a base case, suppose that 10 BLUE SSNs with tbe exchange ratio of 5:1, hunt for 40 RED unprotected SSBNs. Table 1 summarizes the expected results of this campaign.

On average, the foroe of 10 SSNs can destroy all ~0 SSBNs, for the price of 8 SSNs.

Now suppose that RED defends the operations area with various types of ASW systems. The net effect is to raise the probability of a lethal SSN encounter with the defense — .05 at the start of the campaign. Instead of zero, 1-chance-in-20 is used, the expected results of this campaign can be shown. See Table 2.

Table 2 shows that, by confronting SSNs with a modest initial risk of a lethal encounter with the defense, RED can noticeably improve his effectiveness. Instead of losing all 40 SSBNs and destroying 8 SSNs, the addition of a low level.of defense preserves 9 SSBNs, destroys all 10 SSNs -4 by the defense — and reduces the exchange ratio from 5:1 in the absense of defense to an effective value of 3.1:1.

Although the chances of an encounter with a continuously acting defense might seem small at the start of a campaign, thi~ initial risk steadily grows as target SSBNs are destroyed. The cumulative effect of this increasing risk of an encounter with the defense is the reason for the, perhaps surprising, effectiveness of a seemingly low level of defense. This effect can be seen more easily by raising the strength of the defense.

Table 3 shows the results of campaigns by 10 and 20 SSNs, where the chances of engaging the defense, rather than an SSBN, are 1-in-10 at the start of the campaign.

Against this stronger defense, 10 SSNs are able to destroy only 25 of 40 SSBNs (as compared to 31 of 40 SSBNs in the case of Table 2) — for an effective exchange ratio of 2.5:1. This is half the exchange ratio when there is no defense. If 20 SSNs are committed to this campaign, then 36 of 40 SSBNs could be destroyed, but at an effective exchange ratio of 1.8:1.

Table 3 also reveals that by using 10 more SSNs, 11 more SSBNs are killed but 10 more SSNs are lost. Consequently, against moderately strong defenses, the cost of attempting to destroy a large fraction of an enemy force is likely to be high.

Finally, Table 4 shows the results of again doubling the probability of a defense encounter at the start of the campaign from 1-chance-in-10 to 1-chance-in-5.

At this level of defense, the effective exchange ratios have fallen well below 2:1 and the exchange ratios for incr·ements of force beyond the first 10 SSNs are 1:1 or less.

Question 2 : Defense Avoidance

The expected numbers of SSBN’s destroyed in a campaign in defended waters can be increased by improving either : (1) the SSN’s ability to avoid or survive attacks by enemy ASW systems or, (2) by improving the exchange ratjo against SSBNs. But it becomes readily apparent that defense avoidance is far preferable to improving exchange ratios against undefended targets. This is particularly true for “closely” protected SSBNs — and even more so if the weapons employed are not covert. If the SSN exchange ratio was improved 50~ to 7.5:1 (under Table 4 conditions) a calculation would show that 10 SSNs could destroy 19 SSBNs -only two more than for a 5:1 exchange, and only an 11% improvement.

However, a 50~ improvement in defense avoidance — by going from the .20% probability of loss to defenses of Table 4 to the .10% probability in Table 3 shows 8 more SSBNa destroyed for a 47% improvement in campaign effectiveness.

Thus, although the SSN exchange ratjo should be the best attainable, capabilities for defense avoidance have a higher priority when fighting in defended waters. It might also be true that there are more technical and operational possibilitie~ for improving SSN capabilities for defense avoidance of defenses as compared to increasing the exchange ratio. However, many relevant SSN subsystems contribute to both aspects of SSN performance.

Question 3: Overcommit and Withdraw

This question has an easy, and negative answer.

The larger the number of SSNs committed, the higher will be the force-wide rate or engagement with target SSBNs, but the rate at which the larger force of SSNs will encounter the defense will also increase in the same proportion. Thus, as shown by the Tables, an attack by 20 SSNs, followed by a withdrawal after the loss of 10 SSNs, would achieve the same result as an attack by 10 SSNs alone, but in a shorter period of time which might be an important consideration.

One additional option promises to increase the effectiveness of a campaign in  defended waters.

Question 4: Fast Start

It some number of target SSBNs can be localized or acquired and promptly attacked at the start of war, then the SSN force can gain an initial advantage before the ASW defense has an opportunity to be effective. In essence, a fast start enables the SSN force to destroy some initial number or SSBNs with maximum efficiency -and in a short time. In a parallel campaign started with no SSBNs vulnerable, after the destruction or the same number or SSBNs as in the initial case, the size of the SSN force will be smaller, because of its exposure to the defense.

However, against a weak defense the number or SSNs saved will not be so large as to make an appreciable difference in final campaign outcomes. On the other hand, against a strong defense the advantage of localization is greater. Fast Start will save a useful number or SSNs in the beginning. ~tit in continuing the campaign against a strong defense, these extra SSNs will exchange for SSBNs at generally less ratios, offsetting the initial advantage of the fast start.

Of course, the stronger the defense and the larger the number of SSBNs acquired, the greater the advantage or a fast start. Nevertheless, for force commitments likely to be of practical interest, this advantage does not appear to be great. This also means that the penalty against a fast start, in order to minimize the risk of compromising the mission by exposing SSNs to counter-detection in the pre-war period, should be small.

If SSBNs could be completely hidden from searching SSNs after war starts, a fast start becomes the only possible option for eventual attack.

Conclusions

When fighting in defended waters, SSNs should avoid the defense. However, in defended waters even seemingly small degradations in the SSN’s ability to avoid the defense translate into noticeable reductions in campaign effectiveness.

For instance, a 5:1 exchange ratio in the absence of defense might be reduced by oneMhalf, if the initial chances of encountering the defense, instead of a primary target, increase from zero to 1-in-10. And, the larger the number of SSNs committed, the greater the reduction in the exchange ratio. Such reductions in the exchange ratio must influence campaign planning by changing the relation between mission benefits and costs.

It is also difficult to overcome the effect of a modest level of defense by increasing the number of SSNs committed to a campaign.

The analysis also suggests that relatively small forces of SSNs, operating against weak or strong defenses, cannot substantially improve campaign effectiveness by a fast start against SSBNs. Viewed positively, this suggests that the SSN force need not be vulnerable in the preMwar period, for a small price in campaign effectiveness.

Unfortunately, the effect of SSN target classification capabilities on campaign effectiveness could not be examined. However, all measures that reduce erronious decisions which might reject valid targets or result in engaging elements of the defense, have significant value. Of course, peacetime estimates of exchange ratios, defense strengths and other relevant factor·s are uncertain at best, for both sides. Hence the attrition suffered by each side still would be known only probabilistjcally. Initially favorable situations could turn sour and unfavorable situations unexpectedly turn sweet.

Fighting an undersea campaign in defended waters js shrouded in uncertainties that should challenge SSN force planning at the levels of strategy, operations and tactics for a long tj n.e to come. Sound insight into the nature of such operations is a prerequisj te for· effective force development and employment plans.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1987/fighting-in-defended-waters

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1987/Winter/1987-Jan-OCRw.pdf

 

Edited July 17, 2022 by Perun

[Perun]

SUBMARINE ARCTIC OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS, CHALLENGES. PROGRESS

Driven by Cold War pressures in the early 1980s, under the CNO, Admiral James Watkins, the Navy committed itself to developing a robust and viable Arctic Warfare capability. Before then, submarines made periodic deployments to the Arctic but they did not participate in extensive Navy-wide R&D efforts. Since then, the Navy and the Submarine Force efforts to improve and to understand Arctic performance requirements better have been very fruitful. Significant advances in knowledge and Arctic technology have been made. Progress continues steadily, and yet, because the Submarine Force knows so much more, it also has become more sensitive to what it doesn’t know. The thought of knowledge begetting more knowledge clearly applies to the Arctic. However, when one says “Submarine Arctic Operations,” the response from those not deeply involved has usually been: “Why?”

First, there is the requirement of national security. Admittedly, with the Soviet Union in domestic chaos it is difficult for the general public to comprehend that the Soviets remain as strong as ever militarily. The Soviets continue to modernize their Submarine Force with quieter and higher quality platforms. Further, in recent years they have deployed fewer SSN/SSBN/SS units out of area, and have shown a tendency towards more extended operations close to their own shores. While the United States has a fairly good understanding of the individual capability of their new submarines, it remains somewhat a mystery as to the ultimate national/naval strategy to be supported by these added submarines.

One need only look at a world globe to see that the extremes of the USSR land mass extend from 300E Longitude to 1700W, or 160 degrees, which is almost 45 percent of the circumference about the North Pole. In various political forums the Soviets have viewed (quite incorrectly) the Arctic as their ocean. They continue to exploit the Arctic aggressively as an area for naval deployment as well as for scientific development. To keep pace with such activity and to be ready for whatever the current activity might lead to, the U.S. must continue regular Arctic operations for training and tactical development, as well as for research into future Arctic capable system improvements.

The collection of Arctic environmental data is also important, for embedded within the U.S. Navy’s military research requirements in the Arctic is the need for a better understanding of the Arctic environment by the world as a whole. Thus, environmental data from the Arctic, made available for both military and civilian use, is the object of increasing Navy interest and investment.

The Arctic area is not as yet the subject of any treaty accepted by the U.S., quite unlike the Antarctic Treaty, which creates a level of restraint and cooperation between nations involved in Antarctica. However, there is a requirement that we exercise our right to freedom of the seas. This is perhaps more important than one appreciates at first glance, because various Arctic nations have expressed expansive ideas about who should control (parts ot) the Arctic. As mentioned earlier the USSR unofficially has stated the Arctic Ocean is their sea. More formally, they claim the Arctic is divided into pie-shaped sectors originating at the North Pole with the sides extending south to the extreme eastward and westward limits of their national boundaries around the pole. This is called the Sector Principle, and is similar to one of the tenets of the Antarctic Treaty. This concept would enable the USSR to claim over 1/3 of the ocean. Canada would get the next largest piece of the Arctic, while the U.S., Denmark, and Norway would be able to claim very small sectors.

Canada, on the other hand, subscribes to the Archipelagic Principle. This concept allows a nation to draw its claimed territorial waters around contiguous islands in an archipelago. This concept precludes the right of innocent passage in those waters by vessels of other nations without their first receiving diplomatic approval.

Other concepts of territorial water definition, such as the Straight Baseline Principle, have been suggested. In this concept nations draw lines connecting the seaward extremes of their continental shores and adjacent islands over which they have sovereignty, and lay claim to all water within these lines. Again the USSR and Canada could claim the majority of the Arctic. For example, Libya’s claim to the Gulf of Sidra south of the line of death is based on this principle.

On the contrary, the U.S. concepts of the Arctic simply support and exercise rights to the twelve mile limit and a 200 mile economic zone, concepts which are generally accepted in the world’s temperate oceans. (The U.S. has also negotiated positively with Canada over passage through the Canadian archipelago.)

Diplomatically, people often make comparisons between the similarity of the Antarctic and the Arctic, and suggest that they should exist under similar international protocols. This is difficult to accept when one sees the Antarctic Treaty as one addressing a very remote continent with almost no economically (easily) exploitable resources; while the Arctic is an ocean with vast potential to provide needed natural resources in the near term. Truly, the Arctic Ocean is more like the Mediterranean, — a large, rich sea surrounded by several nations who seek and need to exploit these resources for their own benefit.

In this vein it is interesting to note that only one treaty, the Treaty of Barcelona signed in 1924, has ever been collectively ratified which relates to the international nature of the Mediterranean. Because of a similar competition among nations for natural resources, the Arctic Ocean area will probably see no significant international agreement in the near future.

From this discussion on territory, perhaps it is easier to see that the requirement for freedom of the seas is of more importance when one addresses the Arctic.

Fourth on the list of why the Arctic is important to the U.S., is the need to foster or ensure the well-being of high latitude people. This tenet is in keeping with the principles of a caring democratic nation, and although not directly connected to the Submarine Force, is certainly one of the prime reasons our nation supports a military organization.

Finally, there is the need to oversee and preserve our rightful access to the use or preservation {as appropriate) of the natural resources in the Arctic Ocean. These resources start with the obvious fossil fuels, but also include land based minerals, ocean life and seabed resources within the U.S. economic zone.

Next, let us examine the challenges facing the submarines in the Arctic. The unique facets of submerged operations under ice must be added to the already lengthy list of operational sensitivities one must possess in order to conduct submerged operations in the open ocean, – things for which the submariner continuously trains.

One must consider the bathymetry of the Arctic Ocean initially. First of all, the ocean is bigger than most appreciate. Its surface area is five times that of the Mediterranean. Hardly can the Arctic be identified as small. Second, the ocean possesses more critical shallow areas than the rest of the world’s oceans. It should be noted that the 50 fathom curve includes some very important areas — most notable the Bering Strait, where a submarine must traverse about 1000 nautical miles in water 50 fathoms deep (and frequently less) in order to complete entry or exit to the Arctic Ocean from the Pacific. In fact during this transit, the submarine spends days within twenty feet of the bottom, while concurrently within twenty feet of ice keels above the sail.

Next is the 200 fathom curve, which is generally treated as the limit of the continental shelf. It is important to note that ocean areas of tactical significance lie within this curve. For comparison, 36% of the Arctic Ocean and its adjoining seas are considered to be continental shelf areas, while the average for the temperate, ice free oceans is 15%.

Let us shift from concern for shallow water to the Arctic sea ice. It is large and thick, and its presence is limited to deep water areas. It is also dynamic; it is in constant motion pushed by the wind at speeds up to 0.8 knots.

The annual ice cover is that ice which grows and melts each year. Ultimately at the end of the winter growing season, it increases the size of the Arctic sea ice pack by over 40% and effectively covers the entire ocean. Its thickness normally reaches 6 feet, but because it is more easily set in motion, the collision of two ice floes can result in ice ridges 20 feet tall and ice keels which extend into the water over 100 feet Ninety-five percent of the annual ice cover is over shallow, easily mineable water.

When one summarizes both Arctic bathymetry and ice cover into a single picture, one can clearly see submarine Arctic operations assume an extremely challenging and unique character. The submariner must think constantly overhead as well as underneath. In essence he must be capable of conducting warfare in a tunnel. How does the submarine safely do this? Submarines possess an under-ice sonar suite that enables them simultaneously to look ahead for ice keels that may be positioned in the SSN’s path, to take soundings of the bottom and to profile the ice overhead for surfaceable features. The suite’s functional make up has not been significantly altered since the early 1960s. However, numerous improvements have been made to components and subsystems to eliminate performance shortfalls. A second (and perhaps less important) underice system is the precision bubble that enables the submariner to know the trim angle on the ship with high accuracy. This system is routinely used when operations are conducted near the ice canopy and/or near the bottom. The submariner under the ice knows that for a 1° change in trim angle on a SSN-637 class, the ship’s stem rises or lowers approximately 25 feet. During SSN passages of some of the shallow areas of the Arctic, such as the Bering Strait, every six inches of depth change is critical.

Other than when operating near the ice canopy, the ahead looking sonar is employed when in the vicinity of icebergs. Iceberg areas in the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent seas are found in Baffin Bay, Davis Strait, off Ellesmere Island, near Franz Josef Land and the Denmark Strait. We think we can appreciate just how massive icebergs are, but usually underestimate their size. A survey on one iceberg actually encountered a few years ago in the Arctic showed its peak to be 300 feet above the water and its draft to be approximately 1000 feet.

Another environmental factor which influences the submarine’s capability to operate in the Arctic Ocean is the large variation in salinity, — a phenomenon most frequently encountered in the warm months. This variation is caused by the large input of fresh water into the Arctic from melting sea ice and from fresh water (river) run-off from the Asian and North American continents the year around. It is surprising to know that the Arctic basin receives approximately 30% of the world’s fresh water continental run-off.

Salt water salinity is nominally 34 to 36 parts per thousand. Salinity directly affects sea water density. It is approximately this range of salinity variation for which a submarine is designed. Any salinity below the lowest design limit causes the submarine to sink to a deeper depth (if it dispels no variable ballast}, finally reaching a point where the water density is sufficient to support the ship.

As this low salinity water enters the Arctic basin, it is lighter than the sea water already there. Thus it effectively forms a surface wedge above normal density (heavier) sea water. Further, because of the ice cover, there is little subsequent ocean mixing, which is strongly influenced by the sun’s heating and wind action. When a submarine under the ice attempts to come shallow for whatever reason, and encounters this low salinity water, its ascent is quickly stopped. The SSN then settles back to more dense water. Such a situation either delays the ascent significantly (while internal ballast is adjusted), or in worst case (if the need to come shallow is critical), forces the submarine to compromise its presence by expelling main ballast. In any case these effects just create another thing the submariner must think about while doing his job.

The salinity variation, when coupled with the ice cover, influences another aspect of Arctic submarining. They create a unique sound velocity profile (SVP). The water directly under the ice is usually the coldest in the water column. It is also the least saline. But temperature and salinity both increase as depth increases. These factors cause a positive SVP to exist, a condition which is much less frequently encountered in the open ocean. There is no deep sound channel, just a surface 1/2 channel. Therefore in the Arctic, in order to maximize the SSN’s acoustic effectiveness, being shallow is better. This is contrary to the open ocean. Here is one more different thing the submariner must consider when contemplating optimum detection or best counter detection depths.

The anomalies of Arctic acoustics lead to one real operational requirement. Here in the Arctic, — almost more than anywhere else, there is a strong need for the use of tactical oceanography. And yet, we know less about the Arctic than any other ocean when it comes to oceanography and bathymetry. At this point it is only fitting to acknowledge other elements outside the USN Submarine Force that have contributed to our Navy’s ever improving Arctic ASW and operational capabilities.

The first of these are the ice camps which are staged by the Navy to conduct submarine-related R&D during each ice exercise. Like all things related to the Arctic, they are expensive to establish and maintain; and are time dependant and fragile in the face of mother nature. Second is the emerging warfare capability of our own maritime patrol aircraft. Their Arctic ASW performance has been considerably enhanced by repeated participation in Arctic exercises. The ASW skills of the maritime patrol aircraft now are able to nicely complement those of the submarine, which still must be considered the ultimate Arctic ASW platform. Lastly, the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom has been active in the Arctic through the last decade, performing R&D work, sometimes in concert with our submarines. They, too, have developed an Arctic operational capability and technological understanding in parallel with our submarine force. In summary, our Navy has made real progress in Arctic operations over the last decade. Arctic capability specifically designed into warfare systems has been confirmed to be effective. Significant understanding has been gained in the Navy’s under-ice tactics. Submarines can now employ tactics to mitigate the effect of the Arctic environment and to optimize their ASW capability under the ice. By virtue of an increased operating tempo in the Arctic, the Submarine Force has gained more operational platform experience and personnel training than ever before.

The reservoir of the Navy’s Arctic submarining skills is now quite full and broadly distributed within the force. In conclusion, the Navy is constantly improving its Arctic Warfare capability. Progress over the last decade has been both measurable and noteworthy. The goal — to be every bit as effective when operating under the ice as when in the open ocean, is clearly achievable. Understanding and thus exploiting the environment remains the key. For as the Navy, R&D project teams and the Submarine Force learn during every ice exercise, the Arctic is the most complex and dynamic ocean (acoustic) environment on earth!

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1991/submarine-arctic-operations-requirements-challenges-progress

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ATTACKING SOVIET ARCTIC COMMERCE

In deciding how to deploy U.S. SSN’s in a future war with the Soviet Union, commerce destruction has taken a back seat to higher priority missions such as interdicting Soviet SSN’s, destruction of land targets, .and threatening Red fleet SSBN’s in their bastions. Yet commerce destruction, particularly in the Soviet Arctic, remains, for American SSN’s, a viable mission which has tactical and strategic importance much greater than the resources necessary to accomplish it.

We generally think of the Soviet Union as the prototypical land power: a nation little of whose trade is seagoing and for whom the effects of a campaign of commerce destruction at sea would be negligible. Is this really so? For instance, the Soviet Union’s merchant fleet is the most numerous in the world (apart from those flying flags of convenience), comprising over 2,000 ships. A large fraction of these ships carry commodities mined, pumped, or harvested from the Soviet Union, which provide much of her hard currency earnings. Many manufactured goods, like bulk commodities such as timber and ores, can only be transported cost-effectively on ships, or are destined for overseas customers. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of hard currency earned abroad to the Soviet Union, and in war her need for foreign exchange would be greater, particularly with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. While the Soviet Union is not as vulnerable is this regard as Japan or Great Britain, a campaign of blockade and commerce destruction might exert useful pressure in the event of war.

A significant fraction of Soviet shipping (80% of coastal traffic) is within the Soviet Arctic. From our perspective, this shipping has some interesting features. First, owing to the poor road and railroad system in Siberia, much of what is produced there must be moved down rivers for trans-shipment from ports on the Arctic coast. Similarly, shipping along the Soviet Arctic coast provides most of the supplies for many settlements in Siberia, particularly those along the Lena, Ob, and Yenisey rivers. Apart from the Trans-Siberian Railway and air routes, the Arctic sea lanes represent the main connection between Europe and Siberia and the Soviet Far East. Blocking these routes would tend to isolate the Soviet Far East from supplies of fuel and other bulk commodities. One is reminded of the Germans having to re-base their U-boats in Norway after the Normandy invasion in 1944 cut off supplies of fuel to the Biscay ports. Consider the environment and character of Arctic shipping. The Arctic coast east of the White Sea is typically icebound eight months of the year, and the Soviets maintain a fleet of more than fifty icebreakers to permit shipping operations. In 1983, a difficult year, the summer lasted only three weeks. It is the extreme character of the conditions which give commerce along the Arctic coast its unique character, and additionally make it so easy to interdict.

Let us consider these merchant vessels from a targeting standpoint. In the presence of ice, vessels travel in line ahead following icebreakers at an average rate of advance of less than five knots. In general the most southerly practicable route is taken, as the ice makes any other route difficult or impossible. Thus such vessels are easier targets than surface vessels on the open ocean, since they travel a predictable course at a slow speed, and have essentially no freedom to maneuver or change course. Moreover, most vessels must travel during the short Arctic summer or run the risk of being immobilized in the ice pack or frozen in harbor. Even minor disruptions and delays thus are magnified, and a blockade need only be active for a short period to shut down shipping for eight months. Targeting by satellite overhead imagery should be possible with even SPOT-level resolution (10 meters or so), since as they break through the ice the ships leave a wake of more or less open water. Also, the ships’ slow rate of advance and predictable course makes even low frequency coverage (one pass per day) adequate.

This theater of operations would appear to offer several advantages for submarine warfare. The ice pack renders useless ASW sensors such as radar, air-laid sonobuoys and dipping sonar, and degrades the effectiveness of all acoustic detection near the marginal ice zone. For surface vessels, operating a towed array might prove difficult in the ice, and a bow-mounted sonar would quickly become a casualty. Even emplaced hydrophone systems like our SOSUS are at risk from grounding ice keels, and are difficult to install and maintain. Similarly, airand surface-launched antisubmarine weapons might be stymied by the lack of open water. Of great importance is the extended length of the coastline, being three times the length of our own East Coast. This is a lot of territory to patrol, and as mentioned above, patrolling by aircraft would be ineffective. Minelaying against the surface targets might be a very effective tactic due to the circumscribed routes shipping must take, and the extreme difficulty of mine hunting and sweeping amidst the ice. Since the fmt vessel in line is typically an icebreaker, crippling or sinking her quickly immobilizes the whole group of ships. Indeed, sinking the icebreakers would pretty much stop the music for the entire Arctic coast. Mines also have the virtue that they were the first fire-and-forget weapons, and enable an attacking submarine to be two places at once. Mines .could be laid piecemeal over a period of months in several places, but would only become apparent during the summer when shipping passed by. Torpedoes might have to be reprogrammed to attack vessels amidst the ice due to the presence of ice keels. However, the facts that the targets are moving slowly and cannot evade suggest the use of torpedoes at long ranges with slow speeds, to conceal the bearing of the attacking submarine. Missiles such as HARPOON might be less effective since they may not cause a hull penetration below the waterline, and an ice ridge may provide a radar return that confuses the seeker. Note that towing a disabled ship through the ice is difficult, and that the ice is likely to finish off any abandoned ship.

There is a downside to such a submarine campaign. The minimal effectiveness of air and surface ASW assets is perfectly apparent to the Soviets, and they will respond with their own SSN’s to hunt our SSN’s. While from a tactical standpoint this is undesirable, it is certainly acceptable from a strategic standpoint. In particular, having several Soviet SSN’s tied down defending an extended coastline against a few attacking American SSN’s who can pick the time and place of their attack is good strategy. Every Soviet SSN along the Arctic coast chasing U.S. SSN’s is one less attacking our own shipping or protecting their SSBN’s. While the shallow water along the Soviet Arctic coast makes submerged navigation very demanding, it also provides poor acoustics which limit detection ranges. These circumstances favor us, since a shorter detection range implies the use of many more platforms to find our subs. By comparison, we need not find their subs, nor even detect our targets acoustically to complete our mission. Moreover, the Soviet subs must be SSN’s to operate in the Arctic, not dieselelectric SSK’s; therefore our convoy escorts elsewhere will face proportionately more Kilos, Tangos and Foxtrots, and fewer submarines altogether.

In summary then, it is proposed that it would be strategically very favorable to attack Soviet Arctic shipping in any general war with the Soviets. The reasons for doing this are to prevent the output of the eastern Soviet Union from coming to market and earning foreign exchange; to isolate Siberia and the Soviet Far East from the rest of the Soviet Union; and to compel the redeployment of Soviet SSN’s from other theaters.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1991/attacking-soviet-arctic-commerce

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A PERSPECTIVE OF SOVIET STRATEGIC SUBMARINE BASTIONS

bas-tion n. 1: a fortified area or position that is considered to be a stronghold

Strategic nuclear weapons systems are under intense review. This review is motivated by the changing world political climate, domestic economic and budgetary demands, and increasingly difficult technical challenges in maintaining a credible landbased strategic deterrent in an era of highly accurate missiles. SSBN submarines comprise a potent and central element of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union’s strategic ballistic missile arsenal. The likelihood of a preemptive, short-notice nuclear war appears genuinely to have decreased. The prospects or protracted, low-level conventional military conOlcts that raise the risks or Inadvertent nuclear escalation caD.DOt be discounted. While not attempting to predict the outcome of the current strategic weapons systems debate, it is likely that SSBN’s will continue to play a central role in future strategic political and military policy debates. Consequently, an examination of Soviet SSBN operational strategies is appropriate.

Increasingly quiet and capable, the Soviet Union’s SSBN force structure and deployment strategy pose a unique challenge to U.S. warfighting capabilities. The 1989 Soviet Militarv Power summary published by the Department of Defense continues to indicate that a significant number of Soviet submarines are deployed in coastal bastions – namely, the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. The 1988 summary outlines this strategy, and provides estimates of the actual SSBN force levels deployed in each area; those estimates are provided in Table 1. A deployment strategy that holds SSBN’s in areas that are in close proximity to land-based defensive forces of the Soviet Union may significantly reduce the risk to them of the U.S. surface and airborne ASW pressures. The inherent stealth and mobility of the attack submarine makes it the ASW platform of choice, and necessity. This article explores these bastions, and attempts to provide some perspective on some of the challenges U.S. submarines might face if called upon to contest this strategy.

Bastions
Bastions have rarely fared well in land combat. Immobile and frequently by-passed or neutralized, land bastions often provided security to the occupants only in times of peace. Soviet strategic submarine bastions incorporate attributes similar to those historically sought on land; namely,

Controlled access.

Defensive cover in depth.

Bolt holes (escape routes) for the SSBN’s in case the first two defense strategies fail.

The inherent stealth and mobility of nuclear submarines, however, inject new dimensions to the bastion concept. Consider now, the attributes of Soviet submarine bastions from a U.S. submarine’s ASW perspective.

Submarine Access Into Soviet Bastions
The Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk are contiguous to the Soviet land mass and sheltered from the open ocean by island formations along the seas’ ocean-facing perimeters. The Soviet Union’s three major deep-water, ocean-access ports (Murmansk, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy) all are located in or near these marginal seas, making the Barents and the Sea of Okhotsk prominent in any naval warfare planning. The general geography of both seas establishes natural ASW barriers that can be exploited by the Soviet Union to channel access into the postulated SSBN deployment areas through a few, defensible routes.

The principal passages into the Barents Sea (from the Norwegian Sea to the west, and the Arctic Ocean from the north) are relatively shallow (less than 1300 feet deep), and easily accessible from either the Soviet mainland or nearby islands within easy reach from the Soviet Union.

Access into the Sea of Okhotsk is more restricted than into the Barents Sea. Entry from the west is hindered by Sakhalin and Hokkaido Islands, and from the south and east by the Kuril Islands and the Kamchatka peninsula. The principal western approaches are through the Tatary Strait between Sakhalin Island and the Soviet mainland, and through La Perouse Strait between Sakhalin and Holckaido, Japan. Navigable passages are available between some of the Kurils. The Kuril Island passages are more narrow than those of the Barents, but are significantly deeper, with some passage depths approaching 900 fathoms.

Both the Barents and the Sea of Okhotsk have extensive shallow water areas where average depths are less than 100 fathoms (Figures 1 and 2). Ice cover is an important tactical consideration in both areas during winter when much of the surface area of both seas is ice-covered. The winter ice cover in the Sea of Okhotsk is widespread, frequently extending out into the Pacific off the Kurils and the Kamchatka peninsula. The Kola peninsula coast of the Barents Sea (off Murmansk) remains relatively ice-free during the winter, with the remainder of the sea ice covered. All of the Sea of Okhotsk and all but the northernmost area above Spitsbergen and Franz Joseph Land in the Barents are ice-free during the summer.

The Barents Sea’s varied bathymetry reflects the effects of extensive glaciation during the last glacial period. Significant bottom relief features resulting from that glaciation include submerged troughs and ridges, and coast lines that are broken by numerous fjords. The potential operational implications are discussed in a later section.

Jane’s Underwater Warfare S,ystems 1989·90. credits the Soviet Union with significant ASW mine capabilities. Invento· ries are estimated to include a deep·water 1000-fathom deploy· able vertically·rising acoustic influence mine as well as shallow water magnetic, electric influence, and contact mines. Soviet MilitaD’ Power postulates that ASW mines may be an integral part of the defensive strategy for their coastal bastions. The combination of naturally-restricted access into the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk, the close proximity of these areas to the Soviet mainland, and the ready availability of ASW mine resources makes an aggressive defensive ASW mining strategy a credible military option. Such a strategy would significantly challenge safe, unrestricted U.S. submarine access into these areas were mine barriers actually deployed and activated.

Defensive Cover Ia Depth
The Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk are home to major organizational components of the Soviet Union’s naval surface, air, and submarine ASW assets. The Defense Department’s annual review of Soviet military power identifies several major military ground combatant, naval, and air facilities near Munnansk in the Barents, and Petropavlosk-Kamchatskiy, Sovetskaya Gavan, and Vladivostok in the Sea of Okhotsk areas. Geographic atlases show that both seas are also ringed by commercial and secondary airfields capable of handling up to commercial-sized aircraft. Helicopters could readily be deployed from any of these aviation facilities. Some of these secondary fields might also be capable of handling intermediate-range ASW aircraft such as the MAY as well.

The combination of favorably positioned in-place organic surface and submarine ASW forces together with an ASW aircraft surge deployment option provides a defense-in-depth for both submarine bastion areas. Defensive minefields could provide both an initial early warning and possible attrition of non-Soviet submarines entering either sea. Defensive minefields could have the additional impact of shepherding entering submarines into pre-defined ASW prosecution areas. Submarine contact datums in these ASW free fire zones could rapidly be prosecuted. Such a coordinated, multiple ASW platform defensive strategy, if successful, could reasonably be expected to help insulate bastion-deployed Soviet submarines from U.S. or Allied ASW pressures during a future conflict. Bolt Holes for Soviet SSBNs

Medieval fortresses are renowned for secret passageways bolt holes for the owners to use to escape or hide should the fortress defenses fail. The Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk offer a strong natural analogue to this concept. As presented earlier, the bathymetry of the Barents Sea reflects the effects of heavy glacial activity during the last ice age. Numerous deep-water fjords are found along the Kola, Novaya Zemlya, and Franz Joseph Land coasts. The deep water axes of many of these fjords extend out into Barents Sea, the results of glacial scouring. As the ancient ice sheets moved offshore, sediments from the coastal shelves were deposited at many locations in the Barents basin. The periodic advance then retreat of ice left an almost corrugated landscape of depositional ridges and meltwater erosional valleys. Many of these nowsubmerged features have a relative relief of 50 fathoms or more. Examples include the Novaya Zemlya Trough east of Novaya Zemlya, the Kanin Trough northeast of Murmansk, and the Dyprent depression extending seaward from the Parsanger fjord at North Cape, Norway. The submerged channels are often flanked by shallow banks, potentially affording an evading submarine opportunities to exploit topographic shielding from search sensors.

The Sea of Okhotsk reflects a different geologic history. The sea itself was closed off from the Pacific by volcanic islands (the Kuril Islands) landward of the Kuril-Kamchatka ocean trench. There the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk rises from 1500 fathom depths along the Kuril Islands in the south to broad, shallow shelves to the north. Several large gulfs and bays indent the coastline, sometimes leading to protected, deeper water small basins such as the Shelikhova Gulf in the northeast. Several shallow water banks north of Sakhalin Island also create isolated pockets of navigable deepwater off Iony Island southwest of Okhotsk and Magadan. AU of these areas offer naturally-sheltered havens for deployed submarines. Should the Soviet Union elect to deploy defensive minefields in the Sea of Okhotsk, these naturally-occurring evasion opportunities could be significantly enhanced.

A Question or Mines
The defensive ASW mining option figures prominently in both the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. The geographic configuration of the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk encourage the use of mines as front-line defensive systems. The benefits could be many. Mine fields placed within the primary entry passages could provide some initial attrition of ingressing hostile (U.S. or Allied) submarines, and could also help improve ASW cueing by concentrating inbound submarines through the few deep entry passages. Mine fields within the seas themselves could also be used as they were during the Second World War as defensive barriers to protect SSBN deployment areas or escape routes. According to R C. Duncan, in America’s Use of Sea Mines, the U.S. and Great Britain laid over 300,000 offensive and defensive mines during World War ll. By early 1942, the U.S. Army had completed the laying of defensive mine fields off the major ports in the northeast U.S., San Francisco, . and the Panama Canal. These mine fields were remotely controlled from shore to allow transit to known, friendly vessels Similar remotely controlled mine fields in either the Barents or the Sea of Okhotsk would pose a serious mobility problem to U.S. submarines attempting to operate in Soviet submarine bastions. Soviet submarines, on the other hand, could be allowed to operate at will over the entire areas.

Mines can serve as either defensive or offensive weapons. Consider the U.S. Command’s offensive mine campaign in the Pacific Theater against Japan’s sea lines of communication with southeast Asia. It is interesting to note that the tonnage lost to offensive mines with minimal U.S. platform losses is almost half the total lost to direct submarine combat in the Pacific.

The effectiveness of submarine-deployed, offensive mine fields during World War II with relatively unsophisticated mines raises the prospect that offensive submarine mine operations might offer a possible counter to bastion-sequestered targets. Unfortunately, mines are indiscriminate weapons whose effectiveness is strongly dependent upon the number of mines used, whether the mines’ presence is known, and the number density of targets. Target selection and priorities cannot be ensured, and large numbers of mines might be required if used over broad areas of the Barents or Sea of Okhotsk. Therefore, the value of offensive submarine mining relative to the use of that weapon space for torpedoes is an open question.

The Submarine’s Perspective of Soviet Bastions
History has not been kind to faxed, military defensive systems. The Maginot Line was rendered ineffective by highly mobile German armor. The guns of Singapore were outflanked by a landward attack by the Japanese. Japan’s Pacific island fortresses were by-passed by a U.S. “island-hopping” strategy. Numbers, technology, and tactics all work to the benefit of the offensive combatant.

Yet, a Soviet SSBN bastion deployment strategy will present formidable challenges to a viable, forward-oriented maritime policy in a major conflict The combination of large, naturallyprotected geographies, the ready availability of combined-arms ASW defensive cover, and the inherent mobility of the real target – the Soviet SSBNs – all will work against a U.S. strategic ASW campaign. The implications of permitting Soviet strategic submarine bastions to go unchallenged are, however, severe:

U.S. surface and air ASW forces would effectively be eliminated as viable options in the heavily defended bastion areas, leaving U.S. SSNs to bear the brunt of a bastion ASW campaign.

U.S. SSNs would be left to press the anti-SSBN campaign while operating in a severe, combined-arms defensive ASW cover, a cover that in all probability could see an extensive use of ASW mines.

By using air and surface defensive ASW forces in the bastion area to help protect their SSBNs, the Soviet Union creates the option to release front-line SSNs otherwise employed in pro-SSBN operations for out-of-area offensive missions compounding the demand for U.S. SSNs already pressed to the forward areas.

Whatever the outcome of contemporary events in the Soviet Union and its allies, we must not lose sight that the U.S. attack submarine force must remain capable of exerting military pressure on Soviet SSBNs, whatever their deployment strategy may be. A critical examination of technological, tactical, and offensive options must be made to develop a viable submarinebastion counter. The strategic military and political implications of acquiescing the bastion areas are simply unacceptable .

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1991/a-perspective-of-soviet-strategic-submarine-bastions

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ARCTIC SUBMARINE WARFARE

In an informal interview with newsmen on 19 May 1983, Admiral James D. Watkins publically articulated for the first time the U.S. Navy’s strong new interest in the strategic opportunity and threat posed by U.S. and Soviet submarine operations under the Arctic Ocean ice. In a carefully worded but frank discussion he acknowledged that the Navy is “putting increased emphasis” on under ice operations to counter the “strong interest” of the Soviets in having their submarines there.

The CNO’s significant comments may signal a shift in the focus of both U.S. and Soviet naval strategy to the Arctic Ocean which like a frozen Mediterranean separates the East from the West at the top of the world. The naval power that can control the depths beneath the ice cover of this central northern ocean will establish a dominant strategic position that can count heavily in both deterring war and terminating it on favorable terms if it begins. It is unfortunate that the traditional naval mercator perspective of the world and possibly a misreading of Soviet naval strategy linked with other organizational factors prevented us from using the foundation of our pioneering nuclear submarine under ice operations to secure the Arctic Ocean in the 1960’s. Now we are apparently engaged in a scrambling technical and tactical developmental race with the Soviets to fill an Arctic naval strategic vacuum. The winner will have gained leverage that will be virtually impossible for the loser to offset at
any cost in other maritime areas. Oil not withstanding, it could be plausibly argued that
naval control of the Arctic Ocean is worth more than control of the Indian Ocean with the South Atlantic and South Pacific thrown in.

First, let’s look at what the Arctic means to the Soviets. The technological transformation by nuclear power of the Arctic icecap from a barrier to a potential access route has made Russia more vulnerable than at any time in its history. Both Tsarist and Soviet security policy has been directed to building a buffer around the Russian homeland. This buffer policy has been successful. The approaches to the Great Russian economic, political, and emotional core of the Soviet Union are blocked by satellite states, distance and maritime chokepoints. A single unbuffered exception is the 8, 000 mile long Soviet Arctic maritime frontier. In April, the edge of the Marginal Sea Ice Zone of the Arctic Ocean is less than 300 miles from the Kola Peninsula. Many of the things the Soviets value most are directly exposed to submarine seapower projected from the Arctic.

During the past 10 years, a Soviet naval strategy has emerged that is keyed to the protection of its SSBN force in homewater ocean bastions near and under the ice; which Admiral Watkins notes is “a beautiful place to hide.” Soviet Navy general purpose forces have two interlocking primary missions. One is to ensure the survivability and flexible readiness of their SSN force to launch nuclear strikes; the other is to defend the Soviet homeland from attack from the sea. Both of these compatible missions require Soviet sea control of a sizeable portion ofthe Arctic Ocean. In any case, about twothirds of the Soviet Navy general purpose forces and perhaps eventually all of its SSBNs will operate in peacetime and fight in wartime near or under the Arctic ice.

In an interesting aside, Admiral Watkins by saying  “…if there are forces up in that area of the world, we’d better know how to fight them,” seems to have made reference to strategic ASW.
Such words also seem to put to bed the naive idea that holding the Soviet SSBN force at risk is destabilizing. Indeed a credibile U.S. wartime capability to attrit Soviet SSBN’s could be a convincing deterrent to war.

The implications of a possible Soviet shift of Soviet SSBN forward patrol areas to the deep Laurentian basin on the Canadian side of the North Pole must be considered. The unusually highmissile deck freeboard of the TYPHOON class SSBN may indicate that it can surface through the ice and immediately send as many as 420 nuclear warheads on express routes into the SAC bases and missile fields of the interior of the United States — without a pause to clear blocks of ice from its missile tube doors. SLBM’s launched from forward Arctic patrol areas would give as little or less warning as those launched from the current exposed YANKEE patrol areas off the U.S. coasts. The use of forward polar basin patrol areas would end the requirement for YANKEE open ocean transits and make them available to strike theater targets from protected Soviet homewaters. Additionally, if the Soviets wished to off-set NATO deployment of Pershing II missiles to Europe, the Soviet use of polar basin patrol areas, with their shortened missile arcs into the North American “heartland,” would be much less provocative than Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba.

Control of the Arctic Ocean, on the other hand, may mean more to the United States than it would to the Soviet Union. It would firmly anchor a forward naval strategy on NATO’s Northern Flank. And, in addition to denying havens and patrol areas to Soviet SSBNs there are other advantages that would accrue to the U.S. from Arctic naval dominance.

Access to the Soviet Homeland

The polar ice offers a direct, covered submarine route to the Soviet homeland. Ballistic
and cruise missile arcs to the vitals of the USSR are short from the Arctic Ocean. The advantages of a seabased power presence directly adjacent to the Soviet Union as a politically and militarily more flexible adjunct to our NATO land presence is apparent.

Neutralization of the Soviet Northern Fleet

Two-thirds of the Soviet Navy’s offensive power is concentrated in the Soviet Northern Fleet and in wartime would be held close to the Soviet Supreme High Command’s vest in northern homewaters. This “fleet in being” made up of SSBNs and supporting general purpose forces is vulnerable to U.S. Navy SSNs, some of which could use polar approach routes to the Northern Fleet operating area. Early and vigorous attrition of the Soviet Northern Fleet would: (1) downgrade it as a factor in war termination negotiations, (2) limit damage to the United States and its allies in the event of escalation to nuclear war, and ( 3) open the way for the projection of the full range of naval power, including the use of Carrier Battle Groups, against the Soviet Union-at a juncture in a war when it would be most
effective.

Forcing the Soviet Northern Fleet to cover the edge of the polar ice in the Barents Sea would extend its defensive perimeter and exacerbate its force allocation problems, particularly for modern SSNs. This, in turn, would ease NATO penetration through the Greenland-Iceland-Norway gap.

Pressure from the Arctic on the flank of the Soviet Northern Fleet and its Kola bases would deter or help check any Soviet offensive into northern Norway. If NATO can remain solidly anchored in Norway the security of Iceland, the keystone of our North Atlantic naval strategy, will be virtually assured. Arctic naval pressure would also divert Soviet submarines from an antiSLOC mission whose importance may be increasing once again with apparent Soviet preparations for a protracted, all- onventional war option.

In summary, U.S. naval dominance of the Arctic is a solid foundation for operations that can lock the Soviet Northern Fleet into a defensive posture, neutralize it, and eventually unravel and destroy it as an effective fighting force.

Perhaps the biggest oriented U.S. submarine payoff of an Arctic offensive against the Soviet Navy would be psychological. An immediate submarine counterforce campaign against the most
important element of Soviet seapower the Northern Fleet — in its own homewaters would have
an excellent chance of highly visible success. This could have a potent effect on a Soviet Navy
that has neither a tradition of victory nor a position of leadership in the military hierarchy.

In a sense, under-ice operations will serve as a force multiplier for the U.S. submarine force. Soviet diesel submarines make up a significant percentage of their combat power and can be a formidable adversary, particularly in their homewaters. Their newer boats have demonstrated impressive endurance on battery power. But their ultimate dependence upon the atmosphere for propulsion prevents them from operating in the polar basins and much of the Arctic coastal waters most of the year. This causes a welcome reduction in Soviet submarine players under the ice, although diesel submarines might remain a lethal factor in ice-edge ambush positions.

As another bonus, under-ice operational capability is a useful hedge against any unexpected Soviet technical breakthrough in nonacoustic detection of submarines. Most nonacoustic submarine signatures are blocked or attenuated by ice. If some hypothetical nonacoustic sensor made the oceans transparent, the ice would probably still remain sufficiently opaque to conceal submarines.

In spite of the pioneering under-ice voyages of NAUTILUS, SKATE, SEADRAGON, and perhaps most of the 637 class; much of the existing base of u.s Naval technology may be inappropriate for warfare
in the Arctic. Current U.S. submarines and their weapons and sensors were designed for deep water
open ocean operations with little if any attention to under-ice capability. Some technological areas
where there are serious shortfalls as well as promising opportunities are described below.

Submarine Weapons

The under-ice effectiveness of submarine weapons designed for open ocean use is highly suspect. The  ombination of ice cover and shallow water, often encountered in the Arctic, is a most difficult environment for acoustic homing torpedoes. u.s. ability to fight under the ice now hinges almost entirely on how well the MK48 torpedo works in the that demanding environment. Any attempt to execute an Arctic submarine strategy without a reliable under-ice torpedo is a waste of time and lives.

Now more than ever the outcome of encounters between submarines is driven by weapon
effectiveness. Torpedo launch is a rare event that culminates hundreds of hours of search and
usually many hours of tracking. Submarine vs. submarine combats are, in Admiral Gorshkov’s
words, a “battle of the first salvo.” When a u.s. submarine launches a torpedo its initial
significant acoustic advantage over a Soviet adversary dissolves, it is then subject to an
immediate snap-shot counterattack from a fully alerted Soviet submarine. The exchange ratio in
Arctic submarine vs. submarine torpedo combat is thus likely to be much lower than is presently
estimated. The premium placed on the relative quietness and superior long range passive sonar
detection of u.s. attack submarines is considerably lessened in Arctic waters. In situations where long range detections usually lead to short range attacks, exchange ratios may approximate those of the AIMVAL/ACEVAL air combat exercises. Kill ratios in these exercises were much less than anticipated for the more sophisticated platform with their superior detection capability. If extensive under-ice
tests reveal that the MK48 is not highly effective, a program should be initiated at once
to develop a suitable Arctic torpedo. It may be necessary to sacrifice guidance sophistication
for reliability.

The current vertical launching system (VLS) program to put TOMAHAWK launchers in the 688 class
will significantly increase SSN Arctic firepower. But larger missile/torpedo tubes than the 21-inch
variety are indicated for future submarines. A good big missile/torpedo is better than a good
little missile/torpedo. The Soviets understand this truism and we should too.

Arctic Mine Warfare

Under-ice mine warfare is a little explored topic. The prevailing mismatch between minelayer and minesweeper is nowhere greater than in the Arctic. currently there is no technique to deal with mines planted under the ice. There, they remain a menace until they either claim a victim or wear out. The mining of Soviet SSBN under-ice patrol areas and transit routes is a high-leverage ASW option. It depends, however, upon the development of suitable Arctic mines and mining techniques. CAPTOR with its MK 46 payload may not be very satisfactory in this environment.

Arctic Surveillance

As Admiral Watkins observed, the Arctic is na whole new ball game.n There are two quite different acoustic regimes in the Arctic. Ambient noise is low in the deep polar basins — partly because of the absence of shipping. Acoustic propagation is excellent, particularly at the very low frequencies associated with submarine blade rate tonals. In contrast, the Marginal Sea Ice Zone has a high ·ambient noise level caused by ice breakup and movement and, in some areas, it has the propagation problems inherent to shallow waters. There also may be unusual temperature and salinity gradients in Arctic waters because of the layer of ice at the surface.

Hard-wired acoustic surveillance systems may be impractical to place and maintain in the grinding
ice environment. However, concepts for self-contained line and three-dimensional arrays
that may be air dropped for self-penetration through the ice or planted by submarines are
promising. Such arrays could be radio linked via satellite or through high altitude unmanned
vehicle systems. It would take only a relatively few arrays to maintain adequate surveillance of
the quiet, deep polar basins. In the sea-ice zone, the use of surface ship towed arrays to look under the edge of the ice may be useful.

Submarines lying motionless in narrow leads of open water between rough, hummocky Arctic ice are
difficult targets to detect acoustically, visually, or by radar. This phenomena should be investigated from both the ASW and pro-submarine perspective.

Submarine Communications

Submarine communications have always been difficult in the trying physical and electromagnetic
environment of the Arctic. Long range communications with our submarines in the Arctic
are a requirement. Some techniques, such as the use of a trailing-wire antenna, may not be
practical for a submarine submerged beneath the ice. Interestingly, the pre-Cambrian granite
most suitable for extremely-low-frequency (ELF) antenna fields underlies most of the Soviet
Union, Canada, Norway, and Alaska surrounding the Arctic Ocean. Relatively small and highly
survivable ELF transmission systems for low data rate communications to deeply submerged
submarines in the Arctic could be quickly and cheaply constructed on the shores of the Arctic
basin.

Submarine Detection of Aircraft

Submarines surfaced in the Arctic ice should passively detect non-emitting Soviet aircraft at longer ranges than the submarine can be counterdetected by the aircraft. Acoustics in air may be one approach to winning this passive sensor duel, along with the reduction of relevant submarine signatures. An encapsulated, leavebehind anti-aircraft missile such as the developmental SIAM (self-initiated anti-aircraft missile) might be useful for a submarine submerging in a polynya under aircraft pressure.

Ice Hardening

All first-line SSNs must be ice-hardened for Arctic operations. The desirability of designing a capability into SSBNs for surfacing through the ice for an immediate launch of missiles needs to be evaluated.

Summary

The U.S. submarine force tactics which are well suited for a deep water, open ocean scenario might
be less usable in the Arctic. The time has come for a rigorous series of new Big Daddy type exercises benchmarked to under-ice operations and shallow sea-ice waters and should include the
penetration of barriers comprised of several diesel submarines operating together. Naval
domination of the ice covered reaches of the Arctic Ocean would give a very significant
strategic advantage to either the United States or the Soviet Union. An unhindered use of the Arctic
polar basins by one Navy would also dangerously affect the strategic balance. Conversely, the
Arctic provides a new axis for the leveraged projection of U.S. seapower against the Soviet
Navy and other elements of national power that are valued highly by the Soviets. A u.s. Navy Arctic
offensive strategy is a practical option that needs to be set in place.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1983/arctic-submarine-warfare

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THE SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT

Since Admiral Sergei Gorshkov’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Nayy in 1956, the development of the Soviet submarine fleet has enjoyed the highest priority among the Soviet naval programs. Today, the USSR has an impressive fleet of nuclear and diesel-powered ballistic missile, as well as nuclear and diesel attack submarines.

The purpose of this article is to examine Gorshkov’s views on the submarine, to relate the chief events in submarine construction, and to note those major submarine operations that regularly occur on the high seas. The article concludes with a discussion of this fleet’s implications to the West. It is hoped that this will provide a base for further discussion concerning the Soviet submarine threat in subsequent issues of this journal.

GORSHKOV ‘s  VIEWS

Gorshkov’ s writings are  a  clearing house  for Soviet naval views and positions. Since they embody naval perceptions concerning the need for a strong Soviet Navy, they are an indispensible part of a total understanding of Soviet submarine development.

Gorshkov’ s views are most completely developed in his eleven-part series of articles entitled “Navies in War and Peace,” and in his book, ·Sea Power  of  The    State.1 In   them, he  maintains   that the    navy    fulfills two  missions: fighting naval engagements, and  participating  in anti-shore operations. He views naval engagements or “ship against ship” as the least important, saying that these rarely were of strategic value in history. Concerning operations against the shore, Gorshkov says that these date back hundreds of years in naval history. Due to technological advances, these became more important in the twentieth century, and included amphibious operations, shore bombardment, and then carrier strike operations against land targets. However, Gorshkov believes that a crucial turning point was reached when nuclear technology was applied to naval missiles and     propulsion.   The    result  was the nuclear powered ballistic missile-equipped submarine (SSBN), which projected the navy into the preeminent position among the several branches of the Soviet Armed Forces. Vastly increasing the strike capability of the navy, this technology has made anti-shore operations the primary mission of the service.2

Gorshkov goes even further. He asserts that the navy possesses weapons with such long ranges that it is now capable of conducting operations that can have devastating impact on the operations in the land theater and the development of Soviet strategic submarines has the highest priority in naval thinking.

Gorshkov’s    preoccupation  is  not limited to ballistic missile submarines, however,  but includes attack submarines as well. His observations of German submarine operations in World ·Wars I and II confirm this. He says that German submarine operations against Great Britain had a great effect on the courses of these wars, that Allied naval losses required great expenditures on new ship construction and antisubmarine warfare forces and that German submarine warfare finally failed because the submarines were not adequately supported and protected by surface combatants. In spite of this failure he recognizes that submarine warfare inflicted impressive casualties on allied shipping. Secondly. Gorshkov notes that, given the vast expenditures that the Allies made on ASW and the great numbers or men and amounts of equipment that the Allies devoted to ASW, their results were meager. He concludes that, in World War II, “of all of Germany’s naval arms, the U-boat fleet alone continued to pose a threat of serious dimensions, and the underseas war’ ended only arter German territory was occupied by the Allied armies.”

Thus in Gorshkov’ s writings, no weapon system receives as much praise as the submarine, the so-called “main striking arm” of today’s navy.

SUBMARINE  CONSTRUCTION

In naval construction, the submarine has received paramount emphasis. Since the submarine is integrally tied to the strategic defense of the USSR, it has dominated Soviet naval construction. This emphasis has been so great that it appears that decisions on whether to begin classes of air capable ships, surface combatants and amphibious  ships has rested on whether ongoing submarine construction was sufficient to meet national defense requirements. The following brief summary of Soviet submarine construction since 1956 reflects this emphasis.

Ballistic Missile-equipped Submarines

Soviet ballistic missile submarine development began with the ZULU class diesel powered ballistic missile submarine (SSB). Six ZULU hulls were completed as or converted to SSBs, but all but one have reverted to attack submarine status. 4 The ZULU V was armed with two SS-N-4 SARK missiles, making them the first submarines in the world to carry ballistic missiles. The limited 350 nautical mile missile range and the fact that the ZULU had to surface to fire its missiles, reduced the strategic threat that ZULU posed. The GOLF-class SSB and HOTEL-class SSBN which succeeded ZULU provided operational improvements. The early units of both classes carried the SS-N-4 SARK, which had to be fired on the surface. However, several GOLFs and HOTELs were modified to carry the SS-N-5 SERB, which could be launched while the submarine was submerged. These made the GOLF and HOTEL less detectable, thereby enhancing the threats that they posed.

The appearance of YANKEE in 1968 was a dramatic improvement in the Soviet SSBN fleet. YANKEE was initially equipped with sixteen SS-N-6 missiles, which had a range of 1300 nautical miles (nm) Subsequent missile variants increased this range to 1600 nm. YANKEE patrols began in the Atlantic off the u.s. east coast in 1969, and off the u.s. Pacific coast in 1971. These patrols significantly increased the Soviet SSBN threat against the United States.

The   DELTA-class    SSBN,  which   appeared  in 1971, further enhanced the SSBN threat. Armed with twelve SS-N-8 ballistic missiles with a range of 4300 nm, the DELTA I could launch missiles against the U.S. east coast while remaining in Northern Fleet waters. Fr011 the Pacific, the DELTA needed to voyage only a few hundred miles eastward from its home base at Petropavlovsk to be in range of the U.S. west coast. Such range vastly enhanced the invulnerability of DELTA, with a concomitant increase in the threat it posed. DELTA II, which carries sixteen SS-N-Bs, and DELTA III, which carries the MIRV capable ss-N-18, represent further enhancements.

Finally, the latest class of SSBN is the TYPHOON, which was launched in 1980. This new 25,000 ton submarine carries twenty SS-X-20s, a MIRY-capable missile with a range of 5000 nm.

This dramatic progression in Soviet SSBN · development has insured the strategic defense of the USSR and has established Soviet strategic parity  with  Western  SSBN  develoments. Ongoing  controversies center on several issues. One pertains to submarine positioning and employment . . .  whether the Soviet SSBNs would be used in a Soviet first strike or whether they would be held in reserve to be used in a third strike. A second controversy considers the Soviet MIRV capability and characteristics, strengths and vulnerabilities of DELTA and TYPHOON to determine if and how much of a superiority the Soviets have in the SSBN field . One thing is certain. The Soviet SSBN program has been hallmarked by remarkable progress which has negated the traditional U.S. superiority in this area.

Cruise Missile-equipped  Submarines

Developments in the cruise missile (SSG/SSGN) program have been equally impressive. The first units were the ECHO SSGN and the JULIETT SSG. Sixteen JULIETTs were built in the early 1960s, each were equipped with three SS-N-3 SHADDOCK surface launched missiles. The five ECHO Is were also armed with the SS-N-3, each unit carrying six missiles. The necessity of surfacing in order to fire increased their vulnerability, with a resultant decrease in the threat that they posed. The ECHO II was an improvement. Each was armed with eight SS-N-3s and, for years, was considered the primary anticarrier threat.

The  CHARLIE-class  SSGN was  a significantimprovement. The CHARLIE I, which became operational in 1968, carries eight SS-N-7 missiles that can be fired while CHARLIE is submerged. The improved CHARLIE II may carry the SS-N-9, with a nm range, double that of the ss-N-7. CHARLIE’s capability of firing missiles while submerged, drastically increased the Soviet ACW threat, and CHARLIE is still one the the greatest threats to US carrier operations. A succeeding class, the PAPA SSGN, never went into series production.

The most recent addition  to the Soviet  SSGN inventory is the OSCAR. The initial unit was launched in 1980. At 12-14,000 tons, OSCAR is the largest general purpose submarine in the world. With an armament that includes 24 SS-N-19 missiles (having an estimated range of 250 nm), and torpedoes, it poses a formidable threat. A controversy exists as to OSCAR’s mission, but the best estimate comes from Captain William Rube, u.s. Navy (Retired), who sees OSCAR as an anticarrier weapon system. Over twice the size of CHARLIE, OSCAR probably relegates CHARLIE to anti-convoy operations.5

In summary, the Soviet SSBN fleet has been complimented with an impressive fleet or SSGNs. Today, these SSGNs pose a potent threat against u.s. attack  aircraft  carriers  and convoy operations. As such, they are an important factor in the US-Soviet balance of power equation.

Attack Submarines

Captain Rube is correct in his observation that the term “SSGN” is a misnomer, since today’s attack submarines also have impressive missile arsenals.6 In the context of this blurred distinction, the Soviets have made impressive progress in their attack submarine construction program. This began with several diesel powered classes, the most notable being WHISKEY, ZULU and FOXTROT. WHISKEY relied heavily on German design concepts, and 235 of these units were built. 26 ZULUs were built from 1952 to 1955. ZULU had a longer range and more torpedo tubes than WHISKEY, and therefore was capable of more significant operations. However, a very significant advance was made in FOXTROT. Introduced in the late 1950s, FOXTROT was a very popular fleet attack submarine. For years, FOXTROT has been the mainstay of the Mediterranean Fleet submarine force, and has also been deployed to the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean Sea.

Whereas some FOXTROTs continue to deploy regularly to the open seas, WHISKEYs and ZULUs are now used less frequently for naval missions other than training. (Some exceptions immediatety come to mind, the most notable being the WHISKEY which ran aground in Swedish waters in 1981, creating an international incident and severely damaging an ongoing Soviet peace initiative in Europe). Continued Soviet interest in diesel powered attack submarines was evident when TANGO beca~~e operational in 1973. Several units have been constructed. TANGOs deploy regularly to the Mediterranean Sea, and a TANGO was included in the latest combatant deployment to the Caribbean, which began in November 1982.

Turning to nuclear powered attack  submarines (SSNs), the Soviets have  five  classes: ECHO, VICTOR, NOVEMBER, ALFA and YANKEE. ECHO is a conversion from the ECHO I SSGN and deploys periodically for operations on the high seas. (An ECHO SSN had an internal accident off Okinawa in August 1980, in which several of the orew were killed or injured). Similarly, the YANKEE SSN is a conversion of the YANKEE SSBN, converted because the continued construction of DELTAs required YANKEE conversions in order to conform to the provisions of SALT I.

The NOVEMBER SSN, the first Soviet nuclear powered submarine, became operational in 1959. The most famous is the NOVEMBER which sank in the eastern Atlantic  in April  1970. TheVICTOR SSN appeared in 1967. Armed with torpedos and possibly ASW missiles, VICTOR was a significant improvement over NOVEMBER. Follow-ons, including VICTOR II, established VICTOR as the mainstay of the SSN fleet in the 1970s.

The   appearance  of  ALFA, the latest  in Soviet SSN design, has had great significance. With a non-magnetic titanium alloy hull which mkes it difficult to detect, and a maximum speed of over 40 knots which makes it difficult to destroy, ALFA  is a very crictical threat. Controversy exists concerning ALFA’ s purpose, but protection of Soviet SSBNs appears to be the most plausible.

In summary, Soviet naval construction has conformed to the pro-submarine emphasis found in Gorshkov’s writings. To be sure, Soviet submarines are not without their liabilities. Crew        habitability,   for example,  is  low. Nonetheless, one marvels at  Soviet progress. Since 1956, they    have   neutralized  the  US strategic advantage  by building  an opposing  SSBN  force of about 70 units and have constructed attack submarine fleets which pose serious threats to US aircraft carrier and shipping operations. It remains to explain how these submarines have been used.

SUBMARINE  OPERATIONS

The   Soviet Navy’s  use of  its  submarine   fleet has been innovative and efficient. The result has been a continually increasing submarine threat to U.S. operations in most of the world’s major ocean areas.7

Ballistic Missile Submarine  Operations

With the appearance of YANKEE, the Soviets posed a critical SSBN threat against the US and NATO. Patrols along the US east coast began in 1969, and eventually reached a level of three submarines constantly on station. West coast patrols began in 1971, and a two submarine patrol was eventually established. Both the Atlantic and Pacific patrols insured missile coverage of US bases in Alaska and Hawaii and coverage or almost all of the continental United States. This threat was enhanced with DELTA, which can launch its missiles from local Soviet Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet waters and hit its US targets. The fact that inch for inch, the Northern Fleet is in perhaps the most heavily defended area on the earth today, makes locating and destroying DELTAs in wartime potentially a very costly endeavor. The benefits of all this to Soviet security are obvious.

This strategic threat is supplemented by Soviet submarine operations in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas.

Atlantic  Ocean  Operations

Excluding SSBN operations, Soviet submarines spent 2600 ship days in the Atlantic Ocean in 1982, for an average daily presence of ten submarines. These figures reflect a critical threat to Allied supply lines across the North Atlantic. We can be sure that these submarines will be governed by a sound naval strategy. The references to the Gorstikov theory presented earlier in this article demonstrate the Admiral’s impressive analysis of German submarine warfare in World Wars I and II. (Interestingly, this point is supported by Sir John Hackett in his book The Third World War: August 1985. Rumor has it that the Hackett team’s assessment was that the Allies would lose World War III. Hackett’s publisher informed him that his conclusion would be psychologically and commercially disastrous. The team then attempted to determine the most likely Dlistake that the Soviets would make if they were to lose the war. They concluded that this error would probably be a failure to follow Gorshkov’ s strategy. Thus, in Hackett’s scenario, Gorshkov has died, his strategy has been ignored, Soviet submarines have not been properly protected, U.S. forces reach Europe, the NATO front is reinforced, the Soviet advance is halted, and the Soviet bloc collapses. Barring such an unlikely spot of good luck, NATO should expect a major disruption of u.s. supply lines should a war occur in Europe.)

West  Africa

In 1982, Soviet attack submarines spent approximately 300 ship days off West Africa, for an average daily presence of almost one submarine. These units augment the surface combatant sea power in the area. In crisis periods similar to the Angolan Civil War, this submarine level would probably increase as the Soviets increase their naval force level.

Caribbean Sea

In 1982, a TANGO attack submarine participated in the twenty-second deployment of combatants to Cuba. This is the latest incident in a Soviet attempt to deploy the widest variety or submarines to the Caribbean. In the past, they have sent NOVEMBERs, ECHOs, FOXTROTs, a TANGO and a GOLF II SSB, a ballistic missile platform which took part in two deployments, in 1972 and 1974.

In conjunction with these operations, the Soviets have demonstrated an interest in Cienfuegos, Cuba, possibly for use as a submarine base. They have assisted in upgrading the facilities , which are now used to support Cuban FOXTROTs. As Soviet interest increases concerning insurgency in Central America, the USSR may decide to establish continuing presence in the region.

The  Mediterranean Sea

The  Soviets     first     standing    submarine  force  on the high seas  was established in the Mediterranean in 1958. Staging from Valona, Albania, the force of approximately twelve submarines operated in the region until 1961, when denial of the Albanian facilities forced an end to this activity.

However,   operations     recommenced in     1964   and continue through today. From 1967 until April 1976, the Soviets. used Alexand~ia to support their Mediterranean Fleet and used El Gabbiri shipyard for submarine repair. Similar repair activity has occurred in Tivat, Yugoslavia since 1975,   and   in   Menzel-Bourguiba, Tunisia  since1978. Syrian  ports  have  also  been  used  since 1967.

In 1982, Soviet submarines spent 2600 days in the Mediterranean, for an average daily presence or seven units. Most of these submarines are FOXTROT and TANGO diesel powered boats, but at least one cruise missile submarine (usually a CHARLIE) and often a VICTOR SSN are deployed. This force poses a potent threat to the u.s. Sixth Fleet, since it exercises regularly in anticarrier warfare and is quite proficient. In crisis periods, such as the October 1973 War, the force will be bolstered, and as the oldest standing Soviet submarine force on the high seas, it is extremely relevant politically. It stands ready to challenge NATO and Israel and to support Soviet policy in the Middle East, and as the events or October 1973 demonstrated, we cannot afford to ignore this threat to our military and political initiatives in the region.

The  Pacific  Ocean

In addition to the Pacific Fleet’s SSBN force, that fleet has an impressive number of attack submarines. The total force or 127 boats is second in size to the 188-boa t Northern Fleet, based on 1981 figures. The Pacific Fleet submarine force is proficient in defense of the homeland operations and exercises regularly. It has the ability to disrupt the sea lanes leading to Japan, Korea, and the People’s Republic of China.

As a result of their support to Vietnam in the Sino-Vietnamese War or 1979, the USSR acquired access to Vietnamese ports. Operating out of Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, the Soviets have a standing submarine force in Southeast Asia. Most of the 2200 ship days that Soviet attack and cruise missile submarines spent on the high seas in the Pacific  in 1982 were spent in or near these Vietnamese porta. This amounts to an average daily presence of over five submarines, including an average or two cruise missile submarines. This amounts to a major threat to the balance or power in the region, Since it means the introduction or significant naval power in an area where the United States has enjoyed naval superiority. It also means that the Soviets can now react much more rapidly to crises in the Indian Ocean, since they can now sortie from Vietnam, whereas before 1979, all reacting naval forces sortied from Vladivostok, which seriously delayed their responses. In light of these factors, it is reasonable to conclude that this Soviet force is a major political and military factor in Southeast Asian affair and will play an even more significant role in coming decades.

The  Indian  Ocean

In 1982, an average of two attack submarines were deployed daily tn the Indian Ocean. This is a moderate presence, which augments the surface forces deployed to the region. Acceas to the facilities at Kahlak Island is adequate to support a larger force, should the Soviets choose to bolster their naval presence.

IMPLICATIONS  FOR THE  WEST

Defense  of  the  Soviet Union is  a consistent theme of Gorshkov’s writings. The Admiral comments repeatedly on U.S. naval power and views NATO as a maritime alliance in which the u.s. Navy is the key force. He is certainly correct in this assessment. The United States is a first rate maritime power, which bas used its naval strength repeatedly tor defense and foreign policy purposes . Furthermore , it the USSR hoped insure its stategic defense and actively support so-called “progressive forces” in the Third World, then it had to find a means of reducing the u.s. naval advantage. It found this means in its submarine program, which has provided both strategic security and a certain tactical advantage.

From the above discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that, guided by the strategy of Sergei Gorshkov, the Soviets have built a potent fleet of ballistic missile, cruise missile and attack submarines. This fleet operates constantly on the high seas and provides the USSR with several advantages.

Concerning strategic security, although the Soviets have not been successful in blunting the u.s. SSBN threat through their antisubmarine warfare program, they have built an impressive SSBN fleet which neutralizes this U.s. advantage. This effort has been so successful that we can no longer employ strategic escalation, as we did in October 1973, to achieve our foreign policy goals. We must realize that IIBintaining this parity is the highest Soviet naval construction priority. It will therefore be very costly and difficult, if not impossible, to regain our previous advantage in the SSBN field. Thus, containing and countering the Soviet SSBN force is a far more realizable goal than attempting to achieve a decisive u.s. superiority in SSBNs.

Cruise missile submarines are a critical threat to u.s. attack aircraft carrier operations. This is most true in the Mediterranean where Soviet SSGNs are targeted against the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Countering this Soviet capability is a continuing problem for the u.s. Navy.

Finally, the Soviet attack submarine is a critical threat to u.s. surface combatants and merchant ships. Whether the Soviets can interdict u.s. convoys to Europe in wartime is hotly disputed and is contingent upon the type of scenario, the length of the war, and other factors. One thing is certain: the Soviet submarine threat is such that the United States is not certain that it can insure SLOC security through the North Atlantic in wartime. The political effect of this predicament on NATO is obvious.

Inversely, while this fleet is impressive, it suffers from some significant weaknesses . or these, systemic liabilities, geography, and susceptibility to U.S. capabilities are the most noteworthy.

Concerning systemic design problems, the Soviets have some serious deficiencies. Noise control has been a chronic problem and Soviet efforts to reduce the noise levels in their submarines have often been unsatisfactory. The result, noisy submarines which are more easily detectable, is a significant weakness. Other design problems include insufficient radiation shielding on some units and reliability. Concerning reliability, the Soviets have a tradition of building systems that are less complex than U.S. naval systems, but systems that are highly reliable. Nonetheless, the Soviets have experienced many submarine mishaps on the high seas, and these must have caused some misgivings concerning system reliability. Among the effects of this possible loss of confidence may be the perceived requirement for submarine access to overseas bases.

Geography is also a significant problem. The exits from the Northern and Baltic Fleet areas are restricted, making submarine detection a problem. To make matters worse, the Hontreux Convention prohibits staging submarines from the Black Sea, so there is no staging area between the Baltic Sea and the Pacific Fleet bases. The Soviets have alleviated this problem by acquiring access to several foreign ports to support their submarine operations. But this has not been an ideal solution, since they have been expelled from several ports, including Valona, Albania in 1961 , Egyptian ports in 1976, and Somali ports in 1977. Host of these expulsions have disrupted Soviet submarine operations, and similar hardships will result if the Soviets are expelled from other ports in the future.

Finally, U.S. ASW systems pose a great problem for the Soviets. SOSUS and other systems afford an impressive detection capability. Moreover, the U.S. Navy is proficient in ASW, which threatens Soviet submarine operations on the high seas in wartime. In short, while the Soviet submarine force is a serious threat, the u.s. Navy has an impressive ASW capability which will combat Soviet submarine warfare operations should war occur. The Soviets, therefore, cannot count on easy success in war either now or in the near future, and this deters more assertive Soviet submarine operations.

Considering both the strengths and liabilities of the Soviet submarine force has been a major preoccupation of the Department of Defense since 1956. While there has been significant success in defining the threat that the Soviets pose, much less attention has been paid to its implications for the West. There is an erroneous distinction which pictures the Soviet submarine as far less politically useful than the Soviet surface combatant. The Soviet submarine, however ; should be viewed as a very important political weapon and one that must be employed in a different way than the surface combatant in order to exert political influence. For example, it is used far less often than the surface   combstant  inthe showy official port visit. Inversely, its patrols and its level or submarine activity in an area have great political content. Who can argue that Soviet submarine operations in the Mediterranean Sea in October 1973 did not threaten u.s. policy objectives through the threat it posed against our Sixth Fleet? Likewise, during the Carter administration, the Soviets dramatically increased the number of submarines deployed to the Atlantic on several occasions when President carter was critical or Soviet human rights abuses. These escalations were so consistent that they had to have been political messages, particularly in light of Carter’s Naval Academy education and his submarine background.

Other examples abound . . .  Vietnam, West Africa, the Norwegian Sea and the Baltic Sea to name a few. They amount to assertive political operations whose political content is too seldom analyzed. Their political results thus include contributing to the dissolution of NATO and a weakening of the far more assertive foreign policy which we pursued twenty years ago. In the future, Soviet submarines might have greater influence on our relationships with Israel, the nations of South Asia, Japan, Korea, the Peoples’ Republic of China, and many other countries.

It is hoped that this article has directed attention to both the military and the political value or the Soviet submarine force and that it will prompt discussion on this subject in future issues of this journal.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1983/the-soviet-submarine-threat

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THROUGH BERING STRAIT IN MID-WINTER

When I took command of the Sargo from Comdr. Dan Brooks, my first big job was to ready Sargo for her Arctic cruise. We had only a few months to install special equipment, test it, and train the crew for the Arctic operations. I’d been aboard Skate with Jim Calvert on her earlier trip to the Pole and had also studied the reports of Nautilus when Bill Anderson took her to the Pole via Bering Strait, so I knew some of the problems involved. But both Nautilus and Skate had made their Arctic cruises in the summer. It was thus imperative to know if our submarines could operate effectively in the strategically useful Arctic Ocean in mid-winter. And it was also imperative to see whether Sargo could be taken to the Pole via Bering Strait under the worst ice conditions.

Nautilus’s course into the polar regions had been through the Bering and Chukchi Seas — the shallow route into the deep North Canadian Basin, some 75 degrees north latitude. But even in the summer her way was blocked repeatedly by deep ice ridges extending as much as 80 feet down from t·he surface. Time after time she had been forced to backtrack and try new routes before she got through. And once, the boat, which measured 50 feet from keel to top of sail passed under an 80-foot deep ridge in 142 feet of water, leaving her only six feet of clearance above and below! Because Nautilus’s sonar couldn’t detect deep ice ridges until they were virtually overhead, Commander Anderson had broken off the mission, Nautilus returned to Pearl Harbor, was refitted with the proper equipment and eventually made a successful transit to the Pole.

Getting Sargo ready, made for the most hectic four months imaginable. Yard workers labored frantically , even on Christmas and New Year’s Day, to finish the job on time. Then immediately after installation was completed, Sargo was off for sea

trials. The inertial navigation system was tested, vertical ascents and descents were practiced, and the new iceberg detector was tried out. This was tested using another submarine in place of the ice ridges the Sargo would face. From these exercises we were able to check out the equipment, learn its range, estimate depths of “ice ridges ” , and familiarize ourselves with appearances of various objects on the scope of the overhead sonar.

We were ready to leave for the north when 1 got a pessimistic letter from an old friend from my days aboard Skate , Walt Witmann, the Navy’s senior ice forecaster. He predicted , after reconnoitering the northland&, that the winter would be a particularly tough one. Bering Strait, the gateway to the Arctic from the Pacific side, might have such deep ice ridges it could be closed to submarine traffic. With that letter in my pocket I slept uneasily the last few nights before we cast off for the north. But I kept the bad news to myself.

One week out of Pearl, Sargo was surfaced. She had made good time underwater past the Aleutian and Pri bilof Islands, and was nearing Saint Matthew Island in the Bering Sea, still some 1, 800 miles from the North Pole. A navigational fix was needed before going under the edge of the ice pack, which was only a few miles north. In fact, I was much aware of ice as Sargo was cautiously surfaced with periscope and antennae retracted into the sail. Such caution moreover paid off. As Sargo broke the surface, chunks of ice bounced off her, making sharp rapping sounds on the hull. Seals cavorted about, and dead ahead was the solid edge of the ice pack. We were at the starting line and now our work had begun.

It was then we contacted the Staten Island, one of the five U.S. icebreakers. She was thirty-one miles to the north. Our orders were to rendezvous with her before we began the long and difficult Arctic exploration.

We closed with the Staten Island after a vertical dive out of the drift ice around us, and tested our iceberg detector and overhead sonar as we went. Close by the icebreaker, we established underwater telephone contact with her, then surfaced nearby. Commodore Robertson, the Royal Canadian Navy’s top Arctic expert, and Staten Island’s skipper, Comdr. Larson, came aboard for a one-day, under-ice demonstration on Sarge. Later, during the night as we cruised close to the Staten Island, the ice thickened directly overhead. Eager to transfer the two officers back to the ice breaker so Sarge could resume her transit through Bering Strait, I found that getting her back up through the heavy polar winter ice cap was no simple problem.

I found very quickly that Sarge couldn’t surface where she hovered, because the ice had made up and shifted directly over her. Carefully, probing was begun upward with the sonar designed to show us the profile of the ice over Sarge. Mostly, heavy ridges of ice were found, crushed downward by pressing — thus extending 15 and 20 feet beneath the ocean surface, but there was enough room to take Sarge to the surface.

Cautiously, Sarge was maneuvered below the center of the icy plain and began a vertical ascent with pumping and flooding of ballast to control her upward rate. (If the overhead ice was hit too hard, serious damage to the sail with its periscopes, masts,  antennae,  and other indispensable equipment might occur. If Sarge didn’t hit hard enough, she wouldn’t break through.)

Sargo bumped the underside of the ice. Nothing happened. She hadn’t broken through. The sonar showed one of the 25-foot deep ridges of ice was closing in on Sarge rapidly. Quickly negative tank was flooded and Sargo dropped to a keel depth of 120 feet.

Again the surface ice was observed from below until a flat spot was found that seemed a likely exit hole. And again tanks were blown cautiously until with an echoing bump Sargo rammed sail-first through the overhead ice. Then there was nothing. Sargo was hung up. I ordered Lt. Fred Stelter to blow the ballast tanks. Almost immediately, with grinding and crunching sounds all around her, Sargo broke the rest of the way through the ice and into the air near the patiently waiting Staten Island.

I  raised the periscope and saw the icebreaker 300 yards on Sargo ‘s starboard beam. The only other thing I could see was solid ice all around. Opening the upper hatch, I went to the bridge and all but stumbled over the cockpit full of thick ice. When the cockpit was cleared it was evident that Sargo had broken through two feet of ice, the thickest any submarine had ever penetrated. On the after deck was an enormous block of ice five feet thick and measuring 15 by 20 feet — a 13-ton ice cube.

After letting the Commodore and the Commander walk over to the Staten Island, Sargo was submerged. Full of confidence, we flooded tanks, dropping vertically toward the bottom, and steered northward. At dawn the next day, Sargo cracked through the ice forty-one miles off Saint Lawrence Island for a final navigational fix before running submerged through the shallow Bering Strait. The day was bright and so clear that the hills of Saint Lawrence Island could be seen. One long last look at the world above the surface was taken. We were not to see the sun again for twelve days after Sargo dropped out of this frozen polynya and headed into the Arctic night.

Slowly, Sargo cruised northward toward Bering Strait, keeping a keel depth of 100 feet. But the sea grew shallower and shallower as Sargo approached the fifty-mile strait that separates the u.s. from the U.s.s.R. By midnight she had crossed      the    25-fathom      curve     and   the    soundings shoaled rapidly up to 126 feet. Sargo was passing under 20-foot ice ridges and avoiding the deeper ones thanks to the effectiveness of the iceberg detecting sonar. Adding to the problems was the scarcity of soundings in this area. As Sargo cautiously cruised along with barely more than 25 feet above and below her. it was a matter of groping her way along to find a way through.

Then the overhead sonar failed. This left us totally blind to what might be above Sargo. The deep icy ridges that so frequently had threatened Sargo. as she wove her way northward toward the shallow Bering Strait, could no longer be detected. The ocean depth was a scarce 126 feet, leaving little leeway, so I gave the order to reverse course. With infinite care, our planesmen and helmsman brought Sargo about without tilting her. Sargo was backtracked for two miles before finding her way around the danger spot. With expert handling. Sargo turned 180 degrees without shifting her angle in relation to the sea bed. The slightest tilt could have resulted in her propellers grinding into the ocean bottom leaving her seriously disabled under the pack ice.

All this time the sonarmen worked feverishly to restore the all important overhead “eyes”. And they were up to the job. With repairs completed, Sargo moved on  threading her way at very slow speed among the treacherous icy ridges above, as if penetrating a minefield. For the next thirteen hours Sargo twisted and turned tortuously in an ordeal of ice. As the ridges got deeper, Sargo eased down to within 20 feet of the bottom. Sargo passed under some ridges as much as 52 feet deep and avoided many deeper ones. At the end of that thirteen-hour trek Sargo was nearing the Bering Strait. I decided to surface — if we could find a spot in this shallow sea.

The depth was 170 feet. I began maneuvering Sargo for a position to make a vertical ascent through a flat spot in the overhead ice. As Sargo moved, she suddenly began losing depth control and started sinking rapidly toward the bottom. Quickly, I ordered the main ballast tanks blown to check Sargo ‘s descent. Then I ordered the vents opened so Sargo wouldn’t bob corklike to the surface with its three-foot-thick ice. But the huge air bubbles which escaped so distorted the pictures of the overhead ice on the sonar that I ordered the boat down again to seek another skylight to burst through. It was two hours before one was found — in a shallow 170 feet. This time Sargo made the vertical ascent smoothly.

Up she went and her sail hit the ice. Just as before, she stuck I Fred Stelter, our diving officer,       ordered  the ballast  tanks blown – but gently. Sargo ‘s sail then broke through three feet of ice. A new record. The hull took an up angle, then a down angle, then an up angle again and the bow crunched through the solid ice. Sargo ‘s stern, however, remained below and she came to rest with a 4 degree up angle.

On the bridge  I found the ice scattered  about in huge chunks. Aft, the ice was even thicker, and it was this heavier ice that prevented Sargo’s stern from coming up. But it was a great relief for us all to be above the ice again, even if briefly. We were only halfway through our shallow transit and the pressure on the entire crew was great.

A radar fix on Cape Prince of Wales,  the westernmost point of mainland Alaska, was acquired. Next morning Sargo made a vertical dive from a standing position in the ice. Fred Stelter expertly dropped her down and leveled her off at 120 feet — but the many hours in the ice had frozen the bow plane controls so they couldn’t be used for the intricate depth control and trimming needed. Even using      the bow planes, it was difficult enough to maneuver and maintain position. Without them it was almost impossible.

A new technique was developed very quickly. . Sargo was cruised at higher speeds than heretofore and a maximum rudder angle of only 3 degrees was used. If a faster turn was required, resort to 5 or even 10-degree rudder might be made to dodge the rock-hard ice ridges overhead. But this meant blowing ballast tanks to keep off the bottom and counterflooding negative tanks to keep from smashing into the ice above. It was nerve wracking.

Once Stelter had Sargo down, she was jockeyed about warily for half an hour before a clear corridor could be found which headed in the general direction desired. Then for the next three hours, the depth continued at around 140 feet. About 20 feet of water between Sargo’s keel and the bottom was kept until suddenly the soundings decreased to 10 feet below her keel. Then, just as suddenly they sloped sharply off to 55 feet before shoaling up quickly again to 40, 30, 20, 10 feet. The bottom was still rising when the diving officer on watch, Lt. Dave Phoenix, ordered the boat up 10 feet — just in time. As he blew the main ballast tanks with the vents open, the boat surged up 10 feet. At the same time the fathometer registered only five feet below Sargo’s keel. We braced ourselves to bounce off the bottom but the soundings went deeper again before Sargo could hit bottom. Many sighs of relief were breathed. The planesmen named the sea mount just crossed, “Tall Gonzales”.

Immediately after the climb over Tall Gonzales, word got to the crew quickly of our narrow escape. After that, virtually everyone huddled around the iceberg detector to watch Sargo being conned around the overhead ice ridges. Alternating at the conn with me were my executive officer, Lt. Comdr. Bill Yates, and my engineering officer, Lt. Comdr. Ned Dietrich. Watching the ice detector reassured all hands as they saw how ice ridges were spotted and a course was plotted with each one.

With the tight squeeze behind, Sargo transited Bering Strait late in the afternoon and by early evening had crossed the Arctic Circle without ceremony. Our objective, the North Pole, was still 1,400 miles off. Sargo ran north all that night, and on the thirteeth day out of Pearl Harbor things went routinely for the first time in a week. As Sargo continued north the water got deeper — 180 feet. Seldom had 30 fathoms looked so invitingly deep to a submariner. With the deeper water and the simple transit, the bow planes were worked – trying to free them from their icy bonds. Frequent manipulation was used to loosen the frost-bound controls. But it wasn’t until later that the bow planes were finally freed.

The next day was the fourteenth out of Pearl and a navigational fix was needed. But at this point, the bow planes still weren’t freed. Without that gear we had to resort to frequent blowing of ballast to make a vertical ascent. The air bubbles unfortunately threw off the sonar so that when Sargo tried to surface through what appeared to be thin ice, she couldn’t poke through. The ice was thicker than the instruments indicated. Sargo was dropped out of that spot, and some hours later, after the bow planes finally were working properly, and after one more unsuccesful attempt to crack through the ice, she surfaced through a skylight only 13 inches thick.

The brief time on the surface allowed a navigational fix, radio reports were made, and two of our divers plunged into the 29-degree water for 22 minutes. It was their first cold water dive. While in the water, they checked the malfunctioning garbage ejector and removed a flattened can that had jammed it closed. Later they made other repairs.

Next day, Sargo resumed her northward course. The bow planes were again frozen but this was of little worry as the 50-fathom curve and then the 100-fathom curve were passed. Speed was increased to 16 knots as Sargo zigzagged her way toward the top of the world.

Shortly, the iceberg detector failed. So on the following day Sargo was surfaced through 7 inches of ice in a 600 by 2,000 yard frozen polynya. Repair of the iceberg detector was then begun. Working in twenty below zero weather, two men at a time worked in half-hour shifts to dismantle the train mechanism and get it below for repairs. The heavy support beam under the detector had to be cut before it could be lowered to the deck below. During this, there was a screeching and groaning of ice as it was being forced up and over the Sargo ‘s main deck. After 40 hours, with the training mechanism finally gotten below, Sargo dove and continued on towards the Pole.

At 0934 on February 9, Sargo passed 350 feet under the North Pole, searching for an opening. A small one was discovered and Sargo smashed through 3 feet of ice and surfaced just 25 yards from the Pole. It was 33 degrees below zero as we raised the Hawaiian State flag alongside Sargo. When Sargo attempted to dive that night she was frozen in solid. It took 30,000 pounds of extra ballast to tear her loose and start her plummeting toward the bottom. But a trim was gotten easily as Sargo circled the earth in seven minutes. That’s real easy when so close to the Pole. Then Sargo headed South — the only possible direction to go.

Enroute South, the ice detector was jury rigged with another sonar, and later Sargo rendezvoused with Ice Island T-3, drifting in the Beaufort Sea and manned by a crew of scientists. After a few tests with the scientists, Sargo headed back for Bering Strait.

Just before entering the Strait, Sargo was surfaced through thick ice and a navigational fix taken. Then Sargo dropped out of the ice into 155 feet of water and cruised at 7 knots into Bering Strait– 24 feet off the bottom. The deep ice ridges began to appear, but evading them was tougher because of the shortened and distorted ranges provided by the jury-rigged detector. Later, when a pair of deep ridges were spotted 500 yards ahead, I ordered a course to take Sargo between them. At 125 yards, the ridge off the port bow looked very deep while the one on the starboard side had disappeared. I altered Sargo’s course 15 degrees to starboard and WHAMl The boat heeled to port as it was shoved down 25 feet, with a 6 degree down bubble. The collision alarm was sounded and conn rang up “‘all stop”. With the depth guage reading 148 feet — almost on the bottom — I ordered “back two thirds” then ordered ballast tanks blown while leaving the vents open. As Sargo came up, “ahead two thirds” on one shaft was rung up and depth control was regained. Sargo was clear of the ridges and all compartments reported “no damage”. It was a close call.

After that, the iceberg scope was left on long scale, and ice ridges were maneuvered around while still 600 yards away. Additonally, Sargo cruised 16 feet off the bottom. But late on the next day, a solid wall of ice was spotted 800 yards ahead. Scanning the huge ice ridge showed no openings, so Sargo was steered parallel to the ice wall for a long period until she was able to skirt around its end — and resume base course.

There was just one trouble spot left — Tall Gonzales. I planned to leave this pinnacle 5 miles off but then the inertial navigational system chose to get out of line a bit. Despite my calculations for set and drift to compensate for the system errors, soundings showed the bottom shoaling up rapidly under Sargo. So I reversed course and headed for deeper water just as the boys put the inertial navigator back on the line . The corrected equipment showed we were clear, and although another field of heavy ridges loomed ahead, Sargo dodged her way through and out into improved ice conditions, where she later surfaced for examination of the damage to the sail. The top of the sail was dished in, one of the scopes couldn’t be raised, and the side of the bridge cockpit was pounded aft and in. We were just plain lucky.

On February 25, Sargo cleared the ice pack after 6,003 miles and 31 days under the ice. At which, one crew member said, “The only ice I want to see for a long time is in a tall glass.”

The success of this risky peacetime mission could only be attributed to the many high skills, courage and well trained reactions of many officers and members of the crew of the Sargo.

John  H.   Nicholson

COMMENT

(Ed. Note: An advance copy of Admiral Nicholson’s article was sent to F.C. Lynch, Jr. for his comments)

Nicholson’s paper on under-ice operations is exceptionally good. How valuable it would have been for us in 1940 if we had something like that to tell us what sort of problems we were going to face, and how one boat was able to handle them.

I have done a lot of thinking as to the proper role of the Submarine League, and in what way it can be of help to those on active duty. I have written many drafts in trying to express my ideas. I am dissatisfied with what I have produced, however I am beginning to get a focus on a solution.

This focus is illustrated by Nicholson’s paper. I suppose it has something to do with tradition- or the problems others have faced, and how they handled those problems. And how, in retrospect, those problems appear to us now and, again in retrospect, how we think those problems should have been handled.

Perhaps the greatest penalty being paid for all the spectacular advances in technology is that the greater the advance the less applicable the past appears. Tradition has gone by the board; it is a brave new world with no emotional linkages to the past.

This is a penalty in that it practically assures that the same mistakes will probably be made all over again. But it is not wholly the fault of the brave new world. What they have been told of the past is mostly in terms of successes; the problems and the failures have not been covered in the history that they know about.

And  then  there  is the problem of knowing how to behave in battle. This is a new kind of history for us, although the English in particular have used it as a training device for centuries. Pride in combat tradition has been an important element in the success of British arms over those centuries.

This is not to say that the British are braver than we, but it is to say that they have far more and better combat role models than we. Our military history tends to glorify rather than critique. We have glorified some submarine skippers in WW II, but they are not role models. What they did and why they did it are not presented in such a manner that a skipper of today can identify with one of them when he is faced with a combat decision.

This is an area in which the  Submarine League could  operate  effectively. It should be the curator of submarine history and traditions. This doesn’t sound very sexy, and I doubt if the interest in it would be very broad. But it is badly needed.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1984/through-bering-strait-in-mid-winter

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1984/Summer/1984-July-OCRw.pdf

[Perun]

STRATEGIC ASW

The recent comments by CNO Admiral Watkins concerning war fighting in the Arctic Ocean are bound to start a spiral of academic and press inquiry into the subject of strategic ASW. (Ed. note: Strategic ASW is, primarily attack submarines versus ballistic missile submarines–SSBNs.) The CNO ‘s comments as noted in the Submarine Review and in Air Force Magazine represent an open and major change in u.s. defense doctrine.

Although Clausewitz and Mahan taught that the enemy military forces were the proper object in war, strategic nuclear forces have often been thought to be exempt from this principle. In the past, the u.s. has also disavowed the development of defensive capabilities which could negate the actions of Soviet strategic forces. Anti-ballistic missile capabilities and civil defense measures have not been pushed. Rather than deterrence by defense, dissuasion through the terror of offense has seemingly been preferred.

Under the concept of allowing one’s own cities and forces to be vulnerable to an opponent’s attack, it was hoped that our opponent would be “educated” to recognize that such policies were logical and less expensive. Each side would then be assured of threatening the “assured destruction” of his opponent. This mutual vulnerability is better known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

Unfortunately, the USSR has taken numerous steps which have led the u.S. to conclude that they do not subscribe to MAD. In fact, the Soviets have evidenced a totally different concept of deterrence. Their view is that defense is both logical and necessary. They have taken efforts to protect their national command center, their military forces, and their civilian population. In short, the Soviet view of deterrence is to have superiority over all possible enemies and the capability to fight a war and limit damage to their homeland should deterrence fail.

The U.S. has belatedly acknowledged that such a defense doctrine is desirable. But the u.s. bas not finalized a strategy or procured the forces necessary to implement a strategic nuclear defense.

Despite the fact that current deterrence strategy for the past two Administrations rejects MAD, there are considerable nUJDbers of the American public, press, academics, and legislators who think that MAD is still u.s. policy–or that it should be.

Those who defend HAD argue that efforts by the u.s. to threaten Soviet strategic nuclear forces is “destabilizing”. This is the fantasy world where a threat to weapons is bad while a threat to unarmed civilians is good.

As is well known, our Navy bas provided a survivable strategic nuclear reserve force–with its SSBNs–which could threaten the “punishment” of Assured Destruction should deterrence and subsequently, strategic defense fail.

U.S. SSBNs have been part of a “countervailing strategy” which uses a triad of forces capable of: providing a secure reserve; prompt and delayed targeting across the full range of enemy strategic targets; flexibility in weapon delivery; and escalation control.

The U.S. is obviously not adding defense to its well thought out strategic offense. Should deterrence fail, our National Co..and Authority will have the option of employing forces both offensively and defensively in order to limit damage to the u.s. and to inhibit further use of strategic weapons. In some circles, this policy is known as deterrence by threatening to deny victory–or deterrence by nuclear war fighting.

Providing the President with an option to defend his nation in strategic nuclear war is not only a good idea but supports the political end to which war is tailored. Taking a page from Clausewitz or Mahan, it might be realized that the u.s. Navy should engage the center of gravity of the Soviet Navy main fleet–of SSBNs–whether it be actively engaged or withheld.

Another area of discussion which will likely grow out of the CNO’s talk is that of sanctuaries or zones where strategic ASW–attack on enemy SSBNs–cannot be practiced. Support for such ideas CBIIle from former President Jimmy Carter. Such ideas however are not in the interest of the u.s. under the present accepted national military doctrine, since they represent a way to return to MAD as a doctrine for deterrence. Furthermore, zones free of ASW limit other missions which might be conducted by forces with a strategic ASW capability. ASW free zones tend to undermine the acquistion of good intelligence from submarines–affecting deterrence.

Strategic ASW using attack submarines is a justifiable mission which is morally defensible. One must assume that it was necessary to take this mission out of the closet in order to support new weapons systems. Now that it is out of the closet, we should prepare ourselves for the inevitable examination from strategic thinkers and a legislature which may not agree with the concept of deterrence through promoting a capability to defend oneself should deterrence fail.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1984/strategic-asw

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1984/Winter/1984-Jan-OCRw.pdf

[Perun]

THE MARGINAL ICE ZONE

Captain LeMarchand’s “Under Ice Operations” in the October, 1985 SUBMARINE REVIEW was rocussed on the problems of warfare under the Arctic polar ice cap. In this environment, a sound velocity profile shows a steady increase with depth, producing in effect a good sound channel with the axis close to the surface. The transmission of sound in such a channel, consequently, is long-range and acoustic scattering is produced only by the irregularities in the lower surface of the ice-covering and particularly from the ice keels which extend downward. He also notes that the ambient noise is low under this ice cover. Overall, then, conditions for long range detections of enemy submarines are generally very good.

But Anthony Wells, in his January, 1986 SUBMARINE REVIEW article sounds a note of caution for u.s. submariners carrying out their ASW mission against Soviet submarines in their Arctic “bastions.” He suggests that u.s. submarines operating within the marginal ice zone (MIZ) where the polar ice is not solidly joined and consists of ice floes — might have a significant ASW problem against well-handled Soviet SSBNs, (in fact against enemy subs in general) which would be “like looking for a needle in a haystack in a hostile environment.”

Why then wouldn’t some Soviet submarines be operated in MIZ bastion areas which favor their survival — rather than under the polar ice cap where sound conditions make their detection by u.s. submarines a lot easier?

The Office of Naval Research has been conducting, since 1979, a series of basic science field investigations (along with other nations in an international program) in the unclassified MIZ, to better understand this environment relative to naval operations within such an area. The area chosen for the investigative MIZEX exercises is shown in Figure 1. and is generally between Svalbard and the east coast of Greenland. The marginal ice zone in this area has a changing geography as the ice edge moves hundreds of kilo-meters north and south on a seasonal cycle.

In Captain LeMarchand’s article, the sound velocity profile under the permanent ·ice cover of the Arctic ocean “is essentially all positive.” The sound velocity profiles taken in the Marginal Ice Zone of the area shown above indicate some-what different characteristics — with sound channeling unlikely and anomalies confusing the acoustic sound paths. See Figure 2.

The irregular nature of the sound velocity profiles in the Marginal Ice Zone is perhaps better shown by a plot of the sound velocities taken over a stretch or 45 miles within the area shown in Figure 1. The effect of surface warming or cooling in the ice floe areas produce greatly varying velocities in the first one hundred feet of depth, but below that there is an almost constant velocity. Thus, a submarine hiding near the surface might easily pose a problem “like hunting for a needle in a haystack.” See Figure 3.

The bathythermograph readings taken in the Marginal Ice Zone show considerable variance when taken at relatively close intervals of range or within a few days of each other. See Figure 4. An almost constant reevaluation of sound conditions appears necessary when operating within this area — plus an almost continual changing of submarine trim when moving rapidly through this zone.

It should be recognized that the relatively warm, saline Norwegian-Atlantic branch of the Gulf Stream moving toward the Pole, hugs the Svalbard side of the MIZ, while the far colder, ice-choked and fresher Arctic waters flow southward close to Greenland. This results in a pronounced frontal and current system called the East Greenland Polar Front. The tremendous interchange o~ energy between these cold and warm waters makes the area an extremely dynamic and unstable region characterized by complex oceanographic and atmospheric structures. In addition, fresh water derived from ice-melting creates additional instability due to density differences.

Unlike the low ambient noise enjoyed under the polar ice cap, the ambient noise is far higher in the MIZ. The ice floes become progressively smaller as one nears the edge of the “ice pack.” The first and multi-year ice floes in the inner zone    or  the  MIZ  tend  to  be  a  few      hundred     meters across and 2-5 meters thick. Leads through these floes are choked with pieces or thinner ice, with solar energy melting, for the most part, the first year ice. The ice floes in a transition zone or 5-15 kilometers in width, between the inner and outer zones, are uniformly broken and smaller, with an ice-concentration in this area or 70-90S and with the leads free or brash. The outer zone is a complex region or brash and tiny floes near the extreme edge of the Arctic ice. The ice floes in the MIZ are pushed together and pulled apart by surface winds, they drift into circular patterns where transient ocean eddy currents exist, they expand and contract with varying surface tempera-tures and they grind against each other, all or which results in a considerable production or noise. Also, surface gravity waves can break individual ice floes near the ice edge and ice-ocean eddies at the edge can cause high shear between adjacent bands or ice floes, each or which can radiate a significant amount or noise. It has been determined that ambient noise levels in the 6,000 Hz range can be attributed to thermal stress when ice drifts into warmer water, or from floe- floe crushing. The lower frequency 5 to 100 Hz noise results from ice “quakes” as the ice breaks in response to wind and current stress. Mid-frequency noise, 100 to 4,000 Hz, correlates with atmospheric cooling. In the range or 1,000 Hz, high frequency noise can be related to wind-driven snow impacting upon the ice. In addition, there is more animal life in this MIZ area (whales, seals, etc.), increasing the ambient noise level somewhat. On the plus side, this area is not often contaminated by any ship noise.

During the 1984 MIZEX operation, internal waves were observed in the marginal ice zone which could cause unpredictable fluctuations in a submarine’s trim while it is cruising well below the surface. A sample inner wave had a 20 minute period and a vertical displacement or 10 meters.

The    propagation of  acoustic  signals  through the highly variable oceanographic and ice conditions of the MIZ show a scale of acoustic fluctuation — as measured by the bandwidth-spreading over a range of 100 kilometers — which is much higher than that observed in the central Arctic, or even in the temperate oceans of the world. At the same time, the floe-bumping and shearing noise, the moment and gravity induced noise, and the atmospheric cooling-induced noise all contribute — with great variability — to the ambient noise level in this area of the ocean.

Added to these effects is the considerable variability in the sound velocity profile for any particular, relatively small area of the MIZ. Thus, the predictability of sonar range capability tends to be low and the actual acoustic ranges for detection of enemy submarines are likely to be low as well as extremely variable.

[This  discussion  item is  derived from numerous research reports on the Marginal Ice Zone submitted to the Office of Naval Research.]

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1986/the-marginal-ice-zone

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1986/Summer/1986-July-OCRw.pdf

[Perun]

THE BASTION STRATEGY

I agree with Mr. Breemer in his REVIEW article, July 1985, that in the relevant Soviet literature, there is little direct mention of what in the West we have come to call a “bastion” concept or strategy. As to literature on the “strategic witholding posture” to which the author alludes, it is prolific, giving good reason to infer and deduce such thinking on the part of the Soviets.

In the difference in size between DELTA and TYPHOON, one should keep in mind that the original design of TYPHOON may have called for a 24-tube ship rather than a 20-tube ship.

It is quite true that since the early 1970’s there has occurred a noticeable increase in the per unit size and therefore the endurance of Soviet ships. Newer Soviet submarines taking advantage of this increased size and endurance to be overseas during wartime would still, in Mr. Breemer’s words, have to be “guarded” by forces other than themselves.

In theory. were the Soviets to concentrate their SSBNs in relatively small areas, such as the northern “bastions”, this would ease the Western search and localization problem, though it might or might not ease the detection problem.

Contemporary Soviet military thought does not necessarily hold that any nuclear exchange will be preceded by a period of crisis and increased tension sufficient to constitute reliable warning. Often this is wishful thinking on the parts of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The fact is that the Soviets, more than the West, are constantly augered by a “realistic” perception that war may begin precipitously, without much warning, fed by accidental misinterpretations. The Soviets wish this were not possible because, for them. wars are begun on purpose and by careful calculation. Nevertheless, in recent years, the Soviets show an increasing appreciation for spasmodic war start.

Keeping most of their submarines in and near home ports most of the time is a long-standing Soviet preference owing to a philosophy and a necessity of readiness which is very different from that of the u.s. Navy. It has a lot to do with endemic and systemic limitations on Soviet ~aval readiness, as Mr. Breemer and others have suggested. But, it is also the manifestation of the Soviet understanding of how wars start and of how they can best react to the start of a war in both the very near term and in the longer course of calculated events. The Soviets repeatedly say that it is incorrect and dangerous to impute Western preferences and motives to them.

Moreover, it would not be a good idea to be in the area where any SSBN attempted to launch SLBMs from “inside their home ports.” Additionally, a sizeable depth of water and navigable sea room is required to launch SLBMs -properties usually not found inside home ports.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1987/the-bastion-strategy

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1987/Spring/1987-April-OCRw.pdf

Edited July 18, 2022 by Perun

[Perun]

THE BATTLE FOR POLARIS SURVIVAL

As the POLARIS missile fades into retirement, old timers are apt to reminisce about the early struggles for its birth and the several battles it had to fight as it proved its worth. One such battle never received much publicity. Yet it may have been one of the most crucial in the early survival of that significant contributor to nuclear deterrence.

In 1960 the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was the dominant force in nuclear deterrence and was pushing for the establishment of a Strategic Command that would incorporate all strategic nuclear delivery forces. That would include POLARIS which was about to become operational. This idea was received with little enthusiasm in the Navy, which was not willing to have POLARIS come under the operational command of some other service. General Power was the bead of SAC at the time. He frequently stated that although he had no great personal preference, he felt that since the nuclear war plans of the nation called for SAC to deliver about 90 percent of the megatonnage, it seemed logical that the new Command be headed by an Air Force officer, — the head of SAC. Thi8 really drove naval officers up the wall. President Eisenhower finally resolved the issue by creating the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) reporting directly to the JCS but colocated with SAC and the Staff headquarters in Omaha.

This compromise solution directed the new Staff to coordinate all strategic nuclear weapons targeting for u.s. units and to integrate such planning with that of NATO forces. CINCSAC and the Director of the JSTPS was a dual-hatted Air Force general, with a Vice Admiral as the Deputy Director of the JSTPS to assure the joint nature of the Staff.

The SAC targetting system, adopted immediately, required the development of various probability factors for each type of weapon system — for launch reliability, in-flight reliability, weapon detonation reliability and so on. Two of the most significant factors were weapon accuracy and survivability of the launching platform. All of these factors were combined into a simple mathematical value called damage expectancy (DE) which was computed for every weapon used in the target plan. It was obvious that a submarine system could enjoy a high survivability rating -enabling it to score high mathematically in its contribution to the total deterrent effort. A weapon such as an ICBM with good accuracy but a relatively low probability or survival on its launch pad was not going to score as well as the less accurate POLARIS system that enjoyed a survivability factor or 1.0.

A survivable POLARIS was a threat, not only to the Soviet Union but in some ways to the position enjoyed by several or the weapon3 systems of SAC. General Power now became concerned with the POLARIS ability to perform. In the spring of 1961, the General directed that a war game be conducted by the JSTPS, aided by the SAC starr. The objective or the game was to test the survivability or the POLARIS system. Was the factor or 1.0 really justified?

To conduct the game, a chief umpire and associated supporting players were equipped with a couple or dice and the appropriate probability tables. A scenario was constructed to bring the Red and Blue forces together. Basically, the scenario called for the Blue force or POLARIS subs to be on missile launch stations in the Norwegian Sea, with Red forces deployed as their commander saw fit. Game time was started a few hours before “E” Hour — the time for the launch of all POLARIS missiles. The test was to see if the POLARIS submarines could survive Red search and attack operations — through the launch cycle itself. Any failure to do so would detract from the survivability factor and overall effectiveness of the POLARIS system.

Force composition was interesting. The Blue force consisted solely of three POLARIS submarines with 16 missiles each. The Red force was formidable: nine surface action groups with ASW capability equivalent to u.s. Navy equipment of the time; 1000 trawlers, each with a limited ASW capability allowing short range detection; 50 BADGER-type shore based bombers, 10 of which were loaded with 10 kiloton nuclear depth charges. The pilots of these aircraft were given the high altitude capability of seeing a POLARIS weapon emerge from the ocean surface, at night, from ninety miles away. Further, these pilots were then able to home on the succeeding launch of POLARIS weapons and deliver an attack against the mother submarine, using nuclear depth charges. Additionally, and very significant to the Red force, were 40 diesel and 9 nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). All Red submarines were given sonar capability equivalent to their U.S. counterparts and the Red nuclears had greater speed capability than the POLARIS boats. Neutral forces included 600 merchant ships that were plying the waters of the game area.

Since it was difficult to accept a Red force of such magnitude with virtually equal capabilities, there was considerable discussion as to the validity of the threat being used. However, submarine officers in the game felt confident about the invulnerability of the POLARIS force and acceded to the excessive claims of the SAC intelligence specialists who had constructed the threat. The submariners reasoned that the surface and air threats would not be a factor; that the game would hinge on submarine detections and since the u.s. platforms were much quieter, the likelihood of a Red submarine being in trail, within weapon range at “E” Hour, approached zero. A ground rule was that neither side could shoot bef~re the start of hostilities at “E” Hour.

With the stage set, the game got underway. A period of almost six weeks was necessary to accomplish the few hours of wargame action involved. That action was an interesting experience, highly educational to those who participated and with a rather surprising outcome.

To commence the play, the Red and Blue team members located the units of their forces. The umpire team positioned the neutral force of merchant ships. One might expect that given the size of the Norwegian Sea and only three POLARIS boats to conceal, it would be highly improbable that any of the nine Red team SSNs would be located near a Blue team unit. Yet when Red and Blue team unit positions were compared by the umpires, a Red SSN and Blue POLARIS boat were in the same spot. The luck of the drawl The players of the game, not aware of this, were told by the umpires to move back on their tracks for a number of hours and the game was then commenced with the opposing submarines approaching each other for that chance encounter and tactical interaction which no one on the Blue side had ever expected a submerged dog fight. POLARIS was in trouble!

Both submarines, unaware of each other, approached the same position. They could only deviate by a logical command decision, taken after evaluation of sensor intelligence which was supplied by the umpire team. Their patrol plans would take them through the common point unless tactical circumstances provided cause for a diversion. The capability factors, so readily agreed to before the start of the game, were now in control. Probability of detection, equipment performance, sonar and environmental conditions, and external influences all became subject to the roll of the dice — applying separate chance probabilities to each participant’s perception of the situation. The Red and Blue submarine commanders were controlled in their actions by the information they were provided by the umpire team, who kept track of the movements of all units in a separate war room remote from the impending battle. Both commanders werP being watched very closely for the correctness of their decisions -decisions that might be interpreted as affecting the hazard to POLARIS. The real antagonists were now emerging, SAC versus the Navy, with potentially high political stakes riding on the outcome of a well-crafted wargame.

With the assumed equal sonar capabilities even though Blue was operating more slowly and quieter, both submarines made sound contact on each other at considerable ranges. By the time the opposing skippers had evalutated the meager information they were provided, they were within a few thousand yards of each other. The choice was clear, evade for Blue and trail for the Red. The latter knew that he could affect the strategic balance if he could trail for the few hours until “E” hour and get a kill, whereas the Blue had to evade to be able to return to his routine “alert” status. Although Blue was unaware of an impending “E” hour, he knew that maximum alert time was critical in his patrol. The level of strategic warning as provided from simulated intelligence reports had risen significantly due to increasing international tensions. So he felt a strategic as well as tactical urgency as he started to evade.

Fortunately for the POLARIS skipper, one of the 600 merchant ships (large, fast and noisy) had entered the area on a normal sea-lane track which happened to pass between the now tense submarines. The merchant noise, increasing as it closed range, drowned out the almost silent submarines. Blue, seeing a good thing and not yet willing to test his evasion skills against a potential enemy, left the area, masking his movements under the noisy merchant ship. He stayed with the merchantman for some time, heading in a southwesterly direction, then pulled out to the west to reestablish his alert status. He assumed that the probable nuclear contact had either never made a detection or was helplessly confused by the merchant gambit.

The Red skipper, frustrated by the merchant ship, quickly checked the local area. Unable to regain contact, he then followed the ship’s noises in hot pursuit. He soon realized that he would never detect the Blue leaving the merchant ship’s cover and decided to take the long view by setting up an expanding search which would give a reasonable chance of regaining contact before “E” hour. He first headed south for an hour or so and then west for several hours, assuming correctly that Blue would clear the area to regain alert status. Only the umpires were aware that the latitude line on which Red headed west, was the same line Blue had chosen earlier and where he was now sitting, in a passive alert status.

Blue, on hearing the searching Red closing from the east, decided to move slowly and qu1etly south off the track, far enough to let Red pass clear — a routine patrol evolution. It became apparent, however, that Red was closing faster than expected and Blue, while comfortably off the track, felt it wise to reduce his noise level even further. Accordingly, he shut down his nuclear plant — not a routine patrol maneuver.

Suddenly Red did the unexpected and turned south, on the exact longitude line on which Blue was positioned. Bingo — a POLARIS on battery power, about to be run down by the opposition. The probability that the Red SSN would pick, for both its west and south search legs, the exact latitude and longitude lines on which the POLARIS boat had made his exit from the merchant ship should have been extremely low, but the unexpected happened once again. Red was heading directly for Blue. (Some players on the Blue team cried foul and mild expressions about collusion were heard, but they were ignored by the umpires).

It was only a matter of time until both subs were again in contact with each other. Correct management of the nuclear power plant became a crucial item for Blue, with the procedures for lighting off becoming an issue, challenged at every turn by the umpire team. Thus Blue was constrained to evade on his small capacity battery through the entire time it took to employ “safe” light-off procedures.

Full evasion, with no power for speed, presented a unique challenge to the Blue skipper. Decoys — which helped confirm target presence to Red — were used. Eventually, Red took the bait and followed a noise maker just long enough to open beyond his sonar redetection range before he realized his mistake. Blue had broken sonar contact and was finally “underway on nuclear power.” In time, the independent evasion and search maneuvers of the two submarines resulted in separation beyond that of even chance detection. POLARIS was free once again.

Nothing more significant occurred until “E” hour at which time all three POLARIS subs were on station and commenced firing their missiles. By this time, it was nightfall and the sky was full of Red BADGER aircraft, watching for POLARIS launches. The first launch from one POLARIS was eyeballed by the crew of a high flying BADGER about 90 miles from the launching submarine. Instantly evaluating the sighting, the BADGER turned directly toward the target submarine, descending in a high speed gliding attack, homing in on the periodic launches of the missiles. The Badger arrived in the vicinity of the submarine and dropped one of the ten kiloton nuclear depth charges, just as the twelfth of sixteen missiles was being fired. Then the umpire team became involved in a detailed damage assessment exercise, determining the exact location of the explosion of the depth charge, the exact location of the submarine, and the resulting damage. It was determined that while the submarine was able to survive, it was not possible to launch the last four missiles.

In the initial action of the Strategic Planning Staff in determining acceptable reliability factors for POLARIS, it had been agreed that launch and in flight reliability of missiles was 75 percent, that three fourths of the missiles (12) in each submarine should be successfully launched and reach the target. So it now became necessary for the umpire team in this game to throw the dice and see if the twelve missiles that had been fired were those that would impact on their targets. It was logical to assume that at least one of the twelve that had been launched would fail, thereby reducing the overall effectiveness of the POLARIS system. Just as the probability factors had worked against POLARIS in tbe early part of the game, they worked on the positive side in this monte carlo exercise. In the throw of the dice, all twelve missiles were deemed to be successful and the 75 percent reliability factor was attained. Since there were no detections of the other two Blue submarines, they attained their survivability factor of 1.0 and reliability of 75 percent was assumed.

The box score for the exercise was 36 missiles of a possible 48 launched, successfully reaching their assigned targets. This maintained the 75 percent reliability factor established in development and operations tests conducted at Cape Canaveral. Survivability of 1.0 was maintained, the misfires being the result of missile launch and in flight reliability, not submarine vulnerability. In short, POLARIS had survived the “search and destroy” efforts of a rather impressive enemy force. The Blue team had won, but not without a lot of frustration and unusual tactical actions — not to mention some luck, both good and bad, which one will always encounter in combat.

At the conclusion of the exercise, briefing material was prepared and the umpire group presented the results of the war game to General Power. He listened intently. Upon hearing the conclusion, he commented calmly that the game had merely showed the results that could be obtained from one set of circumstances; that nothing conclusive about POLARIS survivability could be determined from that particular exercise.

An early battle won, POLARIS continued enjoying a survivability factor of 1.0 — a significant achievement for ballistic missile submarines and seems to come. that has destined to persisted for over 25 years continue for many more years.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1986/the-battle-for-polaris-survival

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1986/Spring/1986-April-OCRw.pdf

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POLARIS SURVIVAL: HOW TO WIN THE BATTLE

Miller, Neeb, Lee and Fullinwider, in their SUBMARINE REVIEW article, “The Battle for Polaris Survival,” describe a wargame conducted to assess the survivability of POLARIS. In 1961, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) questioned the survivability factor of 1.0 attributed to the POLARIS system. Three blue force POLARIS missile submarines were opposed by a formidable red force of nine surface a<:t:! (If! &roups (SAGs) , 1,  000 trawlers, 50 BADGER aircraft, 40 diesel submarines and nine SSNs. In the game the three SSBNs had to transit undetected to their launch points while opposing forces attempted to detect end maintain contact until launch time. To win, the three POLARIS submarines had to launch all of their missiles before the opposing forces attacked and destroyed them.

It is our contention that this question could have been better and mor·e llf·•rf!uasively investigated with some simple analysis. When POLARIS “won” by achieving a survivability of 1.0 (36 Missiles launched), the general officer convening the game proclaimed the results inconclusive.

Considering some of the extraordinary circumstances of play, it is small wonder. For instance, the authors describe how it was necessary at one point for 12 missiles, each with a 25% probability c;f failure, to be launched successfully. Dice and probability tables were used, and there were no failures. The probability of that occurring is 0.032. Other approaches might have been taken, and in view of the criticality of POLARIS, should have been. We will outline one.

We tried out a simple uodel and conducted an analysis that would have provided the JSTPS with the advantages of clear cut cause-and-effect relationships, increased flexibility, and variance of parameters to test the sensitivity of results — with an answer provided in a shorter amount of time.

Our analysis was performed using the identical forces, strategic setting and tactical characteristics that were described in the SUBMARINE REVIEW’s article. The analysis assumed, as did Jerry Miller’s wargaDJe, that all events occurred in the Norwegian Sea. Because it was not clear from his article whether the surface forces were in active or passive search, two cases ~ere investigated and probability of survival of the SSBN was calculated for each case.

The first used a passive area search model with the searcher’s sweep width reduced, to account for counterdetection and evasion by the SSBN. SAG and trawler detection ranges were 10,000 and 2,000 yards respectively.

In the second case, labeled the “ping and listen” scenario, an active sonar capability was given to the SAGa and trawlers. Both utilized an intermitt.ent active search at tactically advantageous intervals. If an SSBN was wi tl•j n detection range (10,000 or 2,000 yards), the SSBN was detected.

In both cases red submarine force detection  range was a function of SSBN speed and is represented in the graph in figure 1.

Specifically, the SSBN was much detectable at higher speeds. So, if it speeded up to evade red surface searchers it became more vulnerable to red submarines. In all cases the overall survival probability of of POLARIS was virtually 1.0.

In the case of a Soviet BADGER being within the distance to abort a missile launch by the SSBN, since detection is considered to be virtually certain, the relevant question becomes “how soon can an armed BADGE~ get to the launching submarine?”

It seemed that compared to the war game described in the SUBMARINE REVIEW, our analysis was more straightforward, unambiguous, and compelling. By varying the POLARIS op area and the assumed capabilities of the searchers, absurdly pessimistic (long range) detection capabilities could be tried and the POLARIS fiur·vhability still be shown to be very high. Warsaming is too time consuming to permit many variations and with a fixed scenario does not allow this freedom. We also varied the time to Ehour (missile launch tiuJe) and SSBN speed.

In one case, model results showed that the SSBN would not be detected by the trawlers and was vulnerable to SAG detection if it’s at very slow ‘-speeds. Additionally, we were able to see how fast the probability of SSBN survjval decreased, as the tire to E-hour increased.

For the “Ping and Listen” scenario, results in~icated overall lower probabilities of SSBN survival than the passive model. As before, we were able to see how much more susceptible the SSBN was to Red Force detection &8 time to E-hour increased.

The versatility or flexibility of our approach showed up again wld J e analyzing the question of how long it would take an armed BADGER to attack a launching submarine. Analysis showed that the expected number of missiles launched by an SSBN before the nearest BADGER could get there was 15 — all but one missile. This was ivuependent of tile. aircraft’s ability to localize ~rtd conduct an attack with sou1e unnamed weapon -probably a nuclear depth bomb.

The second advantage to our analysis was the short time involved. The SUBMARINE REVIEW article stated that it took six weeks to play the game and derive the results. Our three man team, on the other hand, took one week for research, model generation, and analysis. In six weeks the wargame undertook one case. In 1/6th the time every question thought to be inter·esting was explored in our analysis.

Our findings could have been expanded by incorporating other variables, as specified by the JSTPS staff into the analysis. It is clear that we could supply more quality infornation to the decision-maker to answer the question of survivability of POLARIS. The ability to vary rararueters, time involved and flexibility all illustrate this point.

This is not an argument against all war gaming. Sometimes human decision-making ~o dominates the analysis that players (of the r·ight professional background} are mandatory. It js &h!ays wise, given the tiu•e, to check anall’sis “‘·ith several games. t-!or·eover, tt’le ar·t of cco.ming has progressed since the 1960’s.

Still. the game described in the SUBMARINE REVIEW shows that in striving for “realism” and the ~human element” you can create more doubt than conviction. more confusion than clarity. and more astonishment thc•n confidence.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1987/polaris-survival-how-to-win-the-battle

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1987/Winter/1987-Jan-OCRw.pdf

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POLARIS SURVIVAL AND TRIDENT RELIABILITY

In the January 1987 issue of SUBMARINE REVIEW, Lieutenants Breux, Horn and Foster made some interesting comments on a POLARIS survivability war game, played in SAC Headquarters in 1961, almost 27 years ago. Four of us who participated in that game had described it in an earlier issue of the REVIEW. I was delighted to see some younger officers respond to the description of an interesting game wherein the POLARIS system was under a “real world” attack by some leaders in the Strategic Air Command. Although I am at that wonderful age where the more I know the less I understand, I strongly suspect that the Lieutenants were giving me the needle, inferring that those of us involved in the 1961 Game were naive, amateurish in our knowledge of analysis, and of the wrong “professional background.” And they may be right in their views. A few more comments might be of interest and maybe even valuable to the Lieutenants.

The analysis of the 1961 Game, probably conducted by the Lieutenants somewhere in the vicinity of a good computer installation, was very interesting and representative of the considerable improvements that have been made in the war gaming process in the last 27 years. In 1961, although digital computers were beginning to make in-roads in the war gaming function, their use was extremely limited. Although the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was a leader in computer usage at the time, capabilities of the degree necessary to play a series of war games envisioned by the Lieutenants did not exist. We played a hand game — laborious and time consuming — and we examined only one set of conditions. The Game never should have been attempted in the first place — but the issue was real. POLARIS was a considerable threat to the manned bomber and ICBM for many reasons and its credibility had a tremendous impact on the budgets of the individual services as well as on the effectiveness of the deterrent posture in the world. So we were ordered by the authorities in power to “play a game” — and we did so, without benefit of much more than some good maps, a few adding machines, a book of probability tables, plus the talent available in the Joint Strategic Planning Staff and SAC Headquarters. We succeeded in fending off a direct attack on POLARIS. Had we had the analysis and war gaming capabilities available today, we could have undoubtedly come to better and more positive conclusions in a more definitive manner — in far less time. But the end result would have been the same the survival of POLARIS — a reinforcement of its credibility as a dominant deterrent force. So much for the past.

Today, it seems that TRIDENT is under attack in a somewhat different manner than POLARIS in 1961 — and from different antagonists. There are wishful anti-submarine warfare theorists who claim the seas will be transparent in ten or fifteen years, thereby casting doubt on the survivability of TRIDENT. And there are others who would welcome a flaw in the reliability of TRIDENT — for a variety of reasons. The more successful the system, the more it will contribute to deterrence — and thereby as an incidental result, receive a larger share of the available deterrence defense dollars.

Some of the more sensible opposition to TRIDENT comes from those who are genuinely concerned about the dangers of nuclear war, started by mistake or contrivance. They don’t like the idea that the actual launch of the missiles in a TRIDENT submarine is under the direct control of military personnel on board. They want positive control of all nuclear weapons in the bands of civil authority. They invent scenarios wherein the skipper of a TRIDENT submarine blows up the world of his own volition or with the contrivance of his crew. They don’t understand the term “special trust and confidence” and they don’t give it much credibility. In some extreme cases, they even cast aspersions on the sanity of people who would serve with such weapons systems in the first place. (Naval aviators often have the same feelings about the submarine service). They want all missiles in all Navy units, particularly those in the TRIDENT, to be equipped with the Permissive Action Link — the PAL — with the control vested in the hands of civil authority. And they have mounted an organized effort to bring about such a condition.

For example, the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard held a conference on the subject in February 1986. A draft version of the minutes of that meeting can leave no doubt as to the seriousness of the action that is being mounted to place further constraints on the TRIDENT system. The impact of the installation of PALs in TRIDENT could stand some good analysis. If such installation decreases the reliability factor of the system considerably, the emphasis on its role in deterrence will be decreased accordingly, which many of us believe would not be in the best interests of peace — or the Navy’s role in the events of the future.

Possibly for their next exercise in war gaming analysis, the Lieutenants could put together a model that explores the impact of Permissive Action Link on TRIDENT effectiveness. In 1961 the survivability of POLARIS was a key issue. In 1991 it can well be the reliability of TRIDENT, in addition to the survivability of the launch platform itself. Some bright young Lieutenants may have to fight that battle and now may be a good time to get ready.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1987/polaris-survival-and-trident-reliability

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1987/Spring/1987-April-OCRw.pdf

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THE SHALLOW  WATER CHALLENGE REVISITED

Background

We   should  be  nurturing  an  ongoing  capability to operate attack SSNs in shallow water. During World War II the Japanese spent a lot of transit time hugging coastlines, ometimes  behind minefields. Today the Soviets can be expected to do the same thing along the Northern Sea Route, which is entirely made up of coastal shallows. The Northern Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk (both ice covered part of the year) are identified as SSBN operating areas in the 1987 edition of S9viet Military Power (GPO). Both seas have shallows that could be used to advantage by Soviet SSBNs.

The Maritime Strategy moreover specifies that during Phase II of a crisis (seizing the initiative): “We will wage an aggressive campaign against all Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines.”

World  War  II Experience

One of the most dramatic submarine attacks in history was carried out by HMS TRENCHANT on 8 June 1945 . The Japanese cruiser ASHIGARA was intercepted and sunk at the northern end of Bangka Strait between Bangka and Sumatra during an attempted transit from Jakarta to Singapore. Hazlet , the skipper, positioned TRENCHANT in shallow water inside an Allied minefield in northern Bangka Strait. ASHIGARA came by on course 340° T, 17 knots, hugsing the Sumatra coast. TRENCHANT on course 280 T fired a spread of eight steam torpedoes, track angle 120°, firing range 4700 yards, and five torpedoes were seen to hit. Patrol report comments reflect AHSHIGARA’s dilemma:

“The target had made a navigational alteration of about twenty degrees to starboard, with the coast of Sumatra to port. At this point the stern wave of the enemy increased and I am of the opinion that he increased to full speed to avoid the torpedoes. He could not alter away as he would have run ashore and an alteration towards was the wrong avoiding action.”

It is obvious that the Japanese never expected a submarine to threaten from the confines of shallow water within a strait.

Can we expect to carry out such an attack with our SSNs?

During a 1944 patrol in the Kara Sea, U-957 took part in an attack that underscored the problems of fighting in ice-covered waters. On 18 September 1944, a convoy was intercepted on the Northern Sea Route near the western end of Proliv Vilkitskogo — the strait connecting the Kara and Laptev seas, located between the Siberian Mainland and Severnaya Zemlya. Schaar, the skipper of U-957, pressed home his attack amidst patches of drift ice. The attack periscope was peened over by an ice floe, hence tracking involved sonar bearings part  of  the  time. Using  the secondary aircraft              periscope, an attack position was reached. One torpedo fired at a merchantman exploded prematurely, probably due to a collision with ice. As escorts started to harass the u-boat, the second periscope was bent over during evasive maneuvers . U-957 retreated westward, went deep and blind. Schaar periodically trimmed down aft and probed the surface for ice with the bow. Eventually, U-957 returned to base with buckled bow torpedo tube shutters added to her list of casualties.

The Soviets  probably  never  expected to be attacked by a submarine in ice-floe waters. From the German point of view, the susceptibility of weapons to ice floes came to the forefront during this patrol.

Recent  Trends  in Submarine Displacement

It would seem that the Maritime Strategy and development of SSNs are out or step when it comes to opposing Soviet submarines in shallow waters or ice-covered shelves . Bigger and bigger submarines seemingly make shallow water cps less feasible. The latest point on a nearly linear (with time) plot or ever-increasing submerged displacement of SSNs is summarized in Table 1.

The Weapon  Problem

Lack  of  maneuverability  in close  quarters, inherent  in  large submarines, is a  serious problem. But of equal seriousness is the kind of weapon for use in a shallow water environment. History and today’s technology would show that a quiet, wakeless, “cool” torpedo is indicated. Others have recommended RPVs. In retrospect, during tlorld War II, we had a good idea — with the Mk 27 submarine-launched mine. This weapon had an 877 pound charge that could be delivered 4500 yards away at 10.5 knots . Upon reaching the preset range, it bottomed.

Attacking an SSBN lying doggo on the sea floor or resting against the ice canopy in shallow water is a tough challenge. A quiet, “smart” wire-guided weapon of some kind should be developed on a high priority basis.

The Delivery Vehicle

The STURGEON-class SSN is probably as close to an all-purpose submarine as we can get. It can operate in any environment in the World Ocean . The later LOS ANGELES-class should be able to do almost as well.

We must exercise foresight with regard to the real problems attendant to employment of attack submarines  in other  than deep waters. The  shallow water  problem will  not  go  away.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1988/the-shallow-water-challenge-revisited

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1988/Summer/1988-July-OCRw.pdf

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A SUBMARINE DESIGN FOR ALL SEASONS?

U.S. submarine warfare, as pictured today can be readily and simplistically described. Our submarines will respond to the Maritime Strategy by conducting independent forward barrier operations or go into Soviet bastions to rapidly attrite enemy submarines including strategic ones and thereby critically reduce the enemy’s high seas threat to u.s. battle groups and merchant convoys carrying vital support to overseas U.S. forces –while also reducing the enemy’s strategic submarine threat. At the same time, our submarines would provide a screening function for surface battle groups, and our ballistic missile submarines would ensure their survival by laying doggo in the vast reaches of the world’s oceans.

Simple? — very — and readily played in wargames and trained for in peacetime, with u.s. submarines specifically and well designed for such operations.

Despite our best planning, submarine warfare is unlikely to follow exactly this pattern if history is to be reckoned with. First, today’s war of attrition against enemy submarines has to be quickly accomplished to be consistent with the u.s. Maritime Strategy. Yet, decisiveness by our submarines in World War II. in their primary mission of destroying Japanese merchant shipping, was gained only after long, drawn-out operations.

Second, U.S. submarines before World War II trained for and were played in exercises as “fleet” pickets. Yet when WW II started, u.s. submarines were used in other roles different from their planned primary mission — that of attriting the Japanese merchant fleet.

Third, although submarine commands in the past (particularly the German and Japanese) seemingly recognized the best way to use their submarines in war, when war actually started a higher command overrode the submarine command which had been responsible to meet war requirements and called for some missions which were different than those planned for, or higher commands changed the way planned-for missions were to be carried out. The Japanese high command, for example, called for a different use of their submarines — responsive to fleet requirements than the submarine commanders had contemplated.

Fourth, the u.s. submarine mission of today is focussed on the Atlantic and the Pacific. They are of equal importance, but the submarine operations in the Pacific proved in WW II to be quite different than those in the Atlantic. With the Arctic and Indian Oceans now also important theaters of submarine warfare, the concept of a quick U.S. attrition of enemy submarines is being considered on a worldwide basis.

Fifth, attriting the enemy’s strategic nuclear submarines is necessarily a political decision and will not always follow military planning. In the past, International Law for wartime military operations and Rules of Engagement for peacetime restriction of military action have been subject to civilian interpretation and change. At the start of WW II, the shift to unrestricted submarine warfare — away from International Law’s clearly defined requirement to warn an enemy merchant ship before submarine attack, and to render assistance to survivors after attack — illustrates the difficulty of submarine planning for conflict.

Sixth, today’s expectation that there will be several days of strategic warning before the onset of a big war should be temporized by the total surprise of Pearl Harbor and the Soviet emphasis on a surprise “first salvo” to initiate a war at sea.

Submarine policy and planning, then, are developed to produce submarines of the highest achievable quality in certain vital characteristics, keeping in mind other capabilities whose quality may necessarily be limited both by funding and by the optimizing of the special qualities particularly desired. This makes good sense based upon the past.

For example, the “fleet submarine” designed just before WW II was optimized for: extremely long surfaced range– about 16,000 miles (with converted ballast tanks); long endurance at sea-over 60 days; a great load of weapons — up to 26 torpedoes; high speed on the surface — about 21 knots; high stability surfaced and submerged; very good survivability against the types of weapons visualized at that time; and very good maintainability of machinery while at sea. As a consequence of emphasizing these characteristics over others, the fleet boat was able to adapt extremely well to the changed nature of the warfare environment in which they actually operated and not inflexible to changed missions.

Similarly, today, the optimized characteristics of u.s. nuclear submarines are responsive to the possibility that our submarines will be employed in ways other than currently envisioned. To minimize too wide a variance, our submarines are being designed for: great quietness even at relatively high speeds; extremely long detection and tracking capability on enemy ships; unlimited range; high mobility and great endurance totally submerged; high operating reliability; very good under-ice capability; and a very large load of offensive weapons.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1988/a-submarine-design-for-all-seasons

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1988/1988-April-OCRw.pdf

Edited July 18, 2022 by Perun

[Perun]

AIR RAID -PETROPAVLOVSK THE DRILL THAT BECAME A STRATEGY

Captain James Matthew Patton. USN (ret.), served 1956-1986. Commanded USS VOLADOR (SS-490) and Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego. Earned Ph.D. in International law at the Fletcher School of law and Diplomacy 1972 and served on the State Department Policy Planning Staff 1974-1977. Selected by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward as Head of the War Plans Branch at CINCPACFLT Headquarters 1977-1980 and subsequently served as Executive Director of the CNO Executive Panel 1980-1981.

Makalapa Crater on Oahu, Hawaii, Headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Fleet-1976, about half way between the Cuban Missile Crisis and the fall of the Berlin Wall: midnight in the long dark night of the Cold War.

The headquarters on the crater’s edge had been emplaced to organize, equip and train the fleet that, through a combination of sea battles, amphibious assaults, unrestricted submarine warfare and, finally, sea-based air strikes powerfully enabled the defeat of the Japanese Empire in World War II. The same headquarters had directed the fleet and its Marine Corps component through the wars in Korea and Vietnam. In terms of sheer warfighting command activity, perhaps no American military headquarters could match Makalapa for similar intensity over such a long duration.

Now, in 1976, a new fleet Commander-in-Chief might hardly recognize this headquarters. By 1976, the inevitable effects of a U.S. defense strategy that was NATO-centric and, insofar as the U.S. Navy was concerned, entirely oriented on the security of the lines of communication across the Atlantic Ocean, had drained the fleet headquarters of its aggressive spirit-and had drained the Pacific Fleet of its warfighting muscle. The great fuel tanks buried under Red Hill were nearly empty and the vast magazine at Lualualei contained ordnance more appropriate to the battles of World War II than combat with a modem enemy.

The Pacific Fleet itself reflected the national fixation with defending Western Europe at the expense of other places. The main striking force of the fleet, the carriers, were fewer in number than those in the Atlantic Fleet and, in disregard for the much greater sea distances in the Asia-Pacific theater, all but one were fossil-fueled. Two carriers, MIDWAY and CORAL SEA, could not support the most modem Navy fighter aircraft, the F-14. Likewise, the distribution of surface combatants and submarines favored the Atlantic Fleet by at least a 3:2 advantage.

Perhaps the most debilitating effect on the Pacific Fleet was the war plan that it was bound to implement in the event of hostilities with the Soviet Union. OPLAN 5000 mandated that the main body of the fleet would fight in the Atlantic and, in some circumstances, movement to that ocean would begin even before the actual commencement of hostilities. This strategic deployment of nearly half of the Navy was called The Swing Strategy.

Strategies and war plans have consequences. Implementation of the Swing Strategy would obviously leave the Asia-Pacific theater uncontested and cede the initiative throughout the theater to the Soviet Union. Who could deny that Japan might be intimidated into at least a neutral stance or that China might reevaluate its bellicose front with the Soviet Union-a front that tied down enough Soviet forces which, if rapidly redeployed to Europe, could certainly overwhelm NATO and might bring on the use of tactical nuclear weapons? Absent at least a spirited defense, the Aleutian chain could provide a ready access for the Soviets to Alaska, Canada and the western United States.

Strategies and war plans also have champions and the Swing Strategy enjoyed almost a generational respectability. NATO and the Atlantic Fleet confidently expected that early losses in the Battle for the Atlantic would be replaced by units of the Pacific Fleet. Any argument that the revered strategy might be flawed would need powerful evidence that the Pacific Fleet could be put to better use.

How best to use the Pacific Fleet against the Soviet Union? How to remain in the Pacific and deny the Soviets a windfall initiative? How to plan combat exchanges with the Soviets that would be advantageous to the United States? In short, how, when and where to fight and how to make that fighting worthwhile? These questions perplexed the fleet’s new Commander-in-Chief in 1976, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward.

Being a combat-tested naval aviator in the Korean War and having commanded the U.S. SEVENTH FLEET, Admiral Hayward elected to begin his search for answers by assigning to his headquarters staff the requirement for preparing a detailed plan for striking the major Soviet base at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula with conventional weapons. He reasoned that, by focusing his staff on that single mission, he would uncover the deficiencies in his fleet’s warfighting capability. Armed with that knowledge, he could better weigh the fleet’s contribution to a war with the Soviet Union in any theater. If the staffs ability to plan battles had not atrophied he would learn whether his fleet could provide a sensible and viable alternative to swinging into the Atlantic.

No staff can plan without certain basic guidance. Admiral Hayward emulated his World War II predecessor, Admiral Chester Nimitz, by reinvoking the latter’s rule of Calculated Risk-and going beyond that to establish the analytical metric of acceptable alteration. Admirals Nimitz and his CNO senior, Admiral Ernest King, had accepted certain losses in aircraft and ships in four decisive sea battles of 1942, buying with those losses the destruction of the core of the Japanese Imperial Fleet and opening the way for the later assaults on Japan itself. Admiral Hayward reasoned that achieving the strategic goal of denying the initiative in the Asia-Pacific theater to the Soviets and, thereby, influencing decisions in Tokyo and Beijing-and, perhaps in Moscow itself-woutd be worth the same level of attrition endured by the Pacific Fleet’s World War II commander.

The decisions that would be taken in Asia-Pacific capitols at the outset of hostilities would probably not be long in the making and, therefore, any offensive action by the Pacific Fleet must occur promptly after the initiation of combat anywhere between the U.S./NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact. Admiral Hayward’s tasking for the headquarters staff became known as The Prompt Offensive Action Plan. As the planning progressed it became clear that the actual Time Over Target (TOT) depended on many factors, each of which illuminated strengths and weaknesses in the Pacific Fleet’s combat capabilities.

Once given the target, the approximate time frame, and the acceptable level of losses, the staff could determine the appropriate size of the strike: sufficient strength to saturate the enemy’s defenses while doing significant damage to the target. The damage inflicted should preclude near-term use of the harbor and support facilities at Petropavlovsk as well as the nearby forward operating base for Soviet Naval Air at Yelizovo. Damage to ships and aircraft at those sites would be considered a bonus. The enemy’s defenses, provided by Naval Intelligence, and the target-rich environment indicated that the strike must be made simultaneously by four carriers and their battle groups. The organization of the Pacific Fleet was, therefore, modified and schedules were adjusted over time so as to make that amount of combat power available within a short assembly period. Moreover, the fleet’s command and control scheme needed to change to accommodate the operation of a multi-carrier strike force. At-sea exercises that tested these adjustments and changes were instituted.

Beyond the enemy’s defenses in the immediate area of the target, the staff also had to consider the threat to the strike force from enemy submarines and long range bomber and missile-firing aircraft. In the mid-1970’s, the number and types of Soviet surface combatants outside the Sea of Japan represented no threat to the strike force. Careful analyses were done to balance the distance that the carriers would stand off from the target against the distance over which the enemy could accumulate sufficient forces to penetrate the layered defenses around the carriers. Clearly, the closer the carriers could approach the target the greater would be the damage that they could inflict (the main variables being bomb loads, tanking requirements and the number of sorties). Conversely, the closer to the target the greater the density of enemy submarines and aircraft (and the not-inconsequential quality and quantity of enemy reconnaissance).

There is a significant difference in the way that submarines and long-range aircraft are used in the defense of a site. Submarines move slowly relative to aircraft but they have endurance measured in weeks and months. Only submarines that have been deployed well forward before the approach of a strike force will be in positions to attack that force. Submarines, particularly Soviet Pacific Fleet submarines circa the mid-1970’s, could not reposition rapidly without being detected easily. Given the Order of Battle of the submarine portion of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, deductions were made for operational availabilities and Base Loss Factors and probable densities of patrol stations were calculated at various distances from Petropavlovsk. It would be the business of U. S. submarines to validate the locations of these stations and to concentrate prophylactic anti-submarine warfare along the approach paths of the carriers.

Long-range aircraft, such as the bombers and missile-firing planes of Soviet Naval Air, could respond rapidly and over significant distances to cues provided by reconnaissance assets. However, once launched, the endurance of these aircraft eroded swiftly so Soviet doctrine held them on the ground until the location of targets such as the U. S. strike force was known with certainty. These aircraft were not used for search and the use of their radars made them vulnerable to attacks from F-14’s equipped with PHOENIX missiles. Denying Soviet reconnaissance information about the presence in the Northwest Pacific, much less the locations of the carriers demanded a multi-layered cover and deception plan.

Finally, the withdrawal of the strike force was planned to take advantage of the U.S. facilities in the Aleutians. Prior to the Prompt Offensive Action Plan, the defense of those facilities had been delegated to organizations like the Alaska National Guard-with a mobilization and deployment schedule measured in months Reassignment of elements of the Marine Corps component of the Pacific Fleet remedied this situation.

All of the labors of the headquarters staff in response to Admiral Hayward’s tasking might have been consigned to the might have been being if Senator Sam Nunn had not been searching for a U.S. national strategy that would minimize the chances that conventional weakness would encourage Soviet aggression that might degenerate into war and the likely use of at least tactical nuclear weapons. The Senator visited CINCPACFL T headquarters and Admiral Hayward exposed him to the Prompt Offensive Action Plan by then, known to the staff as SEASTRIKE. On his return to Washington DC, the Senator encouraged Harold Brown, the SECDEF and Graham Claytor, the SECNAV, to listen to the plan. Surprisingly, they endorsed it and set in motion the termination of the Swing Strategy. Just as Admiral Hayward had planned, SEASTRIKE revealed the need for many improvements to the Pacific Fleet’s combat capabilities. Over time, and particularly after Admiral Hayward became the CNO, these improvements were made.

When the Reagan Administration arrived the Prompt Offensive Action Plan fit its agenda for obtaining peace through strength and the basic precepts of the plan were adapted for execution in the Atlantic as well as the Pacific. It was a short reach from that point to characterize the prompt and universal offensive employment of the U.S. Navy as a Maritime Strategy.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/2013/air-raid-petropavlovsk-the-drill-that-became-a-strategy

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/2013-Spring-OCRw.pdf

[Perun]

SUBMARINES AND ASW

The Naval Institute Proceedings or October 1987 is devoted to Submarines and ASW. It has articles by six nuclear submariners along with articles by non-submariners on submarine matters. Reviewing all or the pertinent articles and excerpting observations from them appears to be informative to the SUBMARINE REVIEW’s readership which rarely  sees  public  expressions  from the nuclear submarine community. Also, certain interesting generalizations are made about this collection of writings on submarines. (Note: the Editor does not confirm the validity or the quoted statements nor does he necessarily feel that the generalizations which fall out would be a consensus of today’s submarine force.)

Submarine Warfare  and Strategy

LCDB M. N. Pocalyko, USN, in his Sinking Soyiet SSQNs declares that: “tactical nuclear war at sea may exist marginally but is highly implausible” — and, “the Soviets would not choose a naval tactical nuclear response to our strategic ASW” — “Soviet SSBNs must be sunk by conventional means” — and, “Soviet SSBNs are our leverage for ending the war.” “SSNs operate alone and indeed must operate alone.”

LT D. I. Nylen, USN, in his Melee Warfare says that the “high-kill criteria for success of the Maritime Strategy may be out of reach for our SSNs in the future,” and “The engagement rate will not be high,” — “The conclusion that must be drawn is that the current high-cost U.S. SSN seems destined to lose its preeminence as an ASW platform in the future.”

LT W. F.   Hoeft, USN, in his Topfish; Tactics Firat writes: “effectiveness of the u.s. sub force was baaed on hypothetical one-on-one engage-ments between each force’s most capable submarine.

CDR  D. W.  Hearding,  USN, in A Call  to  Combined Arms noted that: “As a result of the erosion of the U.S. technology edge, the mammoth size of the Soviet submarine force has become a more important determinant in the outcome of future submarine war,”– and, “U.S. sub attacks against Soviet submarines operating in consort with other forces will undoubtedly increase u.s. submarine losses.”

VADH Bruce DeMars. USN, in an Interview says: “We will have to stop regarding the submarine strictly as an ASW weapon.”– and, “Don’t ever take your eyes off the fact that submarine warfare is stealth warfare.” As for the Soviet bastion concept. “I think it is clearly their current concept because of implications of our Maritime Strategy.”

Submarine  Tactics

LCDR Pocalyko says, “nuclear war is a Soviet option only of last desperate resort.”

LT Nylen feels that  in  a melee  “the engagement now seems somewhat even.” “Depth capability, where the Soviets again exceed the U.S., aids a submarine in avoiding the vertical width of the torpedo’s acoustic cone.” — “Speed, in which the Soviets excel, also helps a submarine evade the homing torpedo.” — “The submarine can be an effective ASUW platform, but its vulnerability once detected — may preclude this from becoming an important mission.”

CDR  K. J.  Reardon,     USN,  in his  Ensuring  the Undersea Adyantase says: “The top 3 characteristics of an SSN are quieting, quieting and quieting.” Also, “The SSN-21 will provide a revolutionary breakthrough in underwater stealth.”

LT Hoeft notes that “the tremendous routine workload submariners face on sea duty diverts their attention away from their individual tactical proficiency.”

LT T. J. Belke, USN, in Pushing the Limit notes that, “The submariner who thinks the primary advantages of stealth and concealment are invio-late courts disaster,” — and that “we promote blind faith in our cloak of invisibility.” Also, “Even shots that miss yield dividends because they put your opponent off balance and on the defensive.”

C.T. Urban in his Bringing Tactics to the Surface says: “Attack submarine wardrooms consider themselves tactical experts . . . . .  However, the allotted time within the larger scheme of things relegate tactical training to more of a hobby.” “Today there may be too much misplaced trust and dependence on combat system and weapon capabilities.”

VADM DeMars  says, “We  have  the  potential to perform antiair warfare to a certain degree and help the battle group with our ability to launch antiair missiles from covert positions.”

Weapons

LT Nylen writes: “the Soviet’s sonar system would certainly pick up the noisy Mk-48 torpedo within seconds of its launch.”

CDR Reardon says, “Unfortunately, U.S. torpedo developments have not kept pace, while, “The Navy currently has no anti-torpedo defense system.”

VADM DeMars notes that, “rather than making our heavyweight torpedo warhead better, we are making our lightweight torpedo better.” — “A new torpedo program? Eventually — but I don’t have the money right now.” — As for whether our torpe-does can defeat the threat, “Obviously I think so or we’d be working hard to change the heavyweight torpedoes.”

Personnel

LT Hoeft notes: “The submarine force is losing far too many good officers who expected to contribute to a cause but found themselves jerked around — and overworked by contused and competing priorities.”. . . . “The Engineers Exam ensures that uniformly competent officers are supervising the propulsion plants of nuclear submarines — no equivalent challenge exists for individuals to prove their tactical competence.” — and, “Although an attitude of invincible arrogance pervades the submarine community, few submariners have the first hand knowledge to justify such an attitude.” . . .  “Officers find themselves pursuing ‘urgent’ tasks that have no apparent relationship to ship safety or wartime readiness, and they become disillusioned.”

LT Belke says that “Some nuclear-trained officers without SSN experience are eventually assigned as executive and commanding officers with as few as 5 OOD watches under their belt.” . . . “Since GSOs have stood the lion’s share of OOD watches in SSBNs for two decades . . . .  there are . . . .  a number of nuclear trained officers with dangerously little shiphandling experience and only a shallow knowledge of their boat’s capabilities.”

C. D. Urban feels that, “Unless retention improves drastically there will never be enough second-tour officers to have significant impact on working conditions.”

CDR Hearding points out that “The current level of experience and expertise in combined arms ASW operations is low.”

Generalizations

There seems to be scant belief within the submarine community that tactical nuclear weapons will see any use. Therefore, there is little regard for how they might change submarine strategy and tactics.

All present weapons. including those air-delivered, are felt to be “lethal” against Soviet submarines despite their widely spaced double hulls.

All submarine writers appear to take it for granted that the u.s. still holds the initiative against the Soviet  submarine force. The corollary to this is that the u.s. SSN is the best submarine in the world today. VADM DeMars confirms this, saying: “I think we probably dwell too much on R&D and modernization . . . . It is the area that I put the least percentage of my money into.”

“Avoid detection” — a dictum of the submarine force — is apparently a paradox. The articles show that for SSBNs this is absolutely correct; for SSNs it might seriously reduce their usefulness in combined operations. Specifically, LT Nylen says: “U.S. submarine groups would force individual subs to give up covertness.”

Tactics are much discussed but there is little definition of what  they are. Certainly, there is little recognition of how submarine weapons are being used and how they affect tactics.

How the Soviets might destroy or counter our submarine weapons before their arrival on target seems to be lacking.

There is a general recognition that all enemy submarines may be quieter than in the past — at least at low speeds . VADM DeMars recognized that, “Designing a submarine to be quiet at slow speeds is relatively easy nowadays.”

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1988/submarines-and-asw

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1988/Winter/1988-Jan-OCRw.pdf

[Perun]

STRATEGIC THOUGHIT FOR SUBMARINES

The Navy’s Maritime Strategy, published during the mid 1980’s, tasked the U.S. Navy to use an early, forceful, global, forward deployment of maritime power both to deter war with the Soviet Union and to achieve U.S. war aims should deterrence fail. Secretary of the Navy Lehman proposed that a 600 ship Navy was required to fulfill the Navy’s mission as prescribed in the Maritime Strategy. With this well defined strategic mission, the Navy was highly successful in obtaining funding from Congress to purchase ships, planes and submarines. The threat of a global war with the Soviet Union has diminished, and the funding for a 600 ship Navy has deteriorated. Thus, the Navy has abandoned the Maritime Strategy of the Reagan era and a new naval strategy must be defined.

A shift in strategic planning focus from a global war to a low intensity conflict has occurred within the Navy. Along with this shift in naval strategy, the strategic missions of the U.S. submarine force have also changed. This essay addresses some of these changes and raises some questions about the use of submarines in the future.

The U.S. ballistic missile submarine’s (SSBNs) mission in the Maritime Strategy was to conduct strategic deterrent patrols while remaining undetected and, in the event of a global nuclear war, accurately launch its nuclear missiles. While the Soviet Union retains the ability to launch a nuclear strike at the United States, the role of the SSBNs must remain the same. The ‘IRIDENT class submarines are capable of performing this mission for the foreseeable future. While the TRIDENTs major defense lies in its ability to remain quiet and undetected, it must retain its ability for self defense if it is detected and attacked. Officers serving on these SSBNs must continuously enhance their tactical capabilities to effectively fight any opponent.

U.S. fast attack classes of submarines (SSNs), under the Maritime Strategy, were tasked with the mission of destroying the Soviet submarine fleet, including both SSNs and SSBNs, in Soviet home waters. The main reason behind destroying the Soviet SSNs was to protect the U.S. sea lines of communication (SLOCs) across the Atlantic. The Soviets still possess more submarines than the United States and they are continuing to build more. The United States must retain the ability to effectively combat the Soviet submarine force in case of a resurgent Soviet intention to globally employ its submarine fleet The Navy is currently projecting a 25% reduction in the SSN force to about 80 submarines by 1995. The ability to perform an offensive campaign to destroy the Soviet submarines will be hindered and if cuts in funding continue this ability will be lost Some say that a defensive strategy would protect our SLOCs and that fewer submarines would subsequently be needed. It appears that as the number of U.S. SSNs decrease the Navy must adopt a defensive maritime strategy to protect its SLOCs. But, as the number of U.S. SSNs decreases, the ability to keep the Soviet SSNs in their own waters, away from our SLOCs, declines. The Navy must maintain a powerful SSN force not only to protect our SLOCs, but also to deter the Soviet SSNs from leaving their home waters. The likelihood of a global war is minimal, but it is wise to keep enough SSNs on hand to deter the Soviets from any malicious activities.

The Navy must decide on the strategy of the ’90s with regard to the mission of the U.S. SSN force. With a well defined mission, the Navy can direct its funding and training programs to better meet the requirements of the mission. The U.S. SSN force is presently capable of fulfilling numerous missions including anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, intelligence gathering, convoy escort, carrier task force escort, cruise missile launching, harbor penetration, mine placement and more. The U.S. SSN force will continue to be capable of performing these missions, but without a well defined strategic mission it may be hindered in its ability to carry out some of them due to Jack of training or Jack of funding in particular areas. A well defined mission can assist in the proper allocation of funds and training in the areas needed to carry out that mission.

The emphasis in maritime strategy has shifted toward a low intensity conflict in a local area of the world with a minimum likelihood of an open ocean fleet battle. With this in mind, there are still many questions that must be answered. What will the mission of submarines be in the next conflict? How many and of which type of submarines does the U.S. need to fulfill this mission? Should the U.S. build smaller, cheaper diesel submarines? Should the U.S. sonarmen and sonar systems be geared toward the detection of quiet diesel submarines or nuclear submarines? What should submarine commanders emphasize in their training programs? There are many more questions which need to be answered to effectively plan the submarine strategy of the future.

The next submarine engagement could very well occur in shallow waters close to enemy land. There are many countries throughout the world which possess capable navies, some of which contain SSNs. The threat of modem diesel submarines, which many of these countries possess, is lethal. I propose that U.S. SSN training programs should concentrate on seeking out and destroying these navies in a shallow water environment U.S. SSNs must be able to enter enemy waters, perhaps penetrating through minefields, then detect and destroy the enemy Navy without being counter-detected along the way. It is clear that the U.S. must maintain the technological advantage in sound silencing and underwater acoustics over all potential enemies because the dominant advantage of a submarine is in its stealth. Without proper funding from Congress, the technological advantage will deteriorate and the submarine will become a less potent weapon.

For most officers aboard submarines, the responsibility for strategic thought belongs to the Admirals in Washington, D.C., but it is these officers aboard present submarines who have the frrst hand knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of their own submarine. These are the men who should be thinking about how the U.S. can best use submarines in future conflicts. The wardrooms aboard U.S. submarines should allocate time on a regular basis to discuss the strategic use of submarines in future conflicts and answer the questions raised here.

With the current projected cuts in funding for all branches of the military, the Submarine Force must have a well defmcd strategy so that it may receive its fair share of the funding. It is up to the officers who wear dolphins to establish this submarine strategy so that the U.S. submarine force may remain the most lethal weapon in the U.S. military.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1991/strategic-thoughit-for-submarines

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1991/Summer/1991-July-OCRw.pdf

[Perun]

DEFENSIVE ANTI-AIR WARFARE FOR SSNs

Background

In the broader concept of general war with the Warsaw Pact  and  the  execution  of the  Maritime  Strategy  in  the  Soviet littoral, some U.S. nuclear attack submarine (SSN) losses to air ASW were operationally accepted as a minor portion of total losses. This rationale wilt no longer survive a prudent examination of post-Cold War submarine employment.

If a major conflict had occurred between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, U.S. SSNs would have deployed en masse to the littoral waters of the Soviet Union (Barents Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, etc.) where an extremely target rich environment of Soviet submarine and surface units would have existed. The high rate of engagement with these units most likely would have resulted in a very rapid virtual destruction of the Soviet Navy. In spite of the large technological advantage held by U.S. SSNs, it was to be expected that this engagement would have involved significant U. S. losses, considered acceptable at the time, princi-pally due to reactive counterfire from attacked Soviet submarines and defensive anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mining. The percentage of these total losses caused by air ASW was rightfully considered too small to warrant the development of air defense capabilities for SSNs, particularly since any such devices would likely impact the number of offensive weapons carried and/or the employment of limited weapon launchers-capabilities badly needed in the expected target and engagement-rich environment.

U.S. Submarine Employment Within The New World Order
With the need now to deter regional war on a global basis rather than deterring global war on a regional basis, and to do so with fewer military assets, an evolving theory of The Great Black Fleet defines a key role for U.S. SSNs. As the only naval platform that by itself represents a survivable military capability across a broad spectrum (including reconnaissance, surveillance, strike, mining, injection of special warfare forces, ASW, anti-surface ship, etc.), and also unique in being invulnerable to threats of attack by highly proliferated chemical or biological weapons, the SSN is particularly appropriate for being the first warship on the scene as the far more powerful but less plentiful Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) transit to the crisis. It is not at all beyond the scope of imagination, particularly given the emphasis onjointness, that a scenario could exist where a distant on-station SSN, targeting through organic ELINT and COMINT capabilities, calls in a B2 air strike from Omaha, NE, to establish air superiority through destruction of early warning and C-cubed nodes for an approaching CVBGs strike aircraft to whom it passes post-strike bomb damage assessment.

Nuclear powered warships also have the enviable characteristic of being basically no more expensive to operate than they are to own. and for many reasons, an operating tempo of about 50 percent has evolved as a near optimum level for highest material and operational readiness, and for best crew morale. Typically. half the time a unit is at sea, it is at sea in relatively short local operations for training. For any given total force level. therefore. about 25 percent are forward deployed-typically for a period of about 90 days. For a force level of 60 SSNs, this equates to 15 units. If indeed the task is to deter regional conflict on a global basis with CONUS-based forces, and if this amorphous constella-tion of units were to move somewhat homogeneously throughout the world’s oceans, than statistically. an SSN would probably be within 1000 miles (2 days steaming) of any shoreline point, and many units could pile ·an within a few more days if needed. Analogous to antibodies distributed throughout a bloodstream. these quick reaction forces could watch, tag and commence a limited engagement of infections while full immune systems defenses are alerted, mustered and deployed. While so employed, individual SSNs would be in a familiar situation not unlike that expected and trained for. had the Maritime Strategy been execut-ed-alone, in potentially hostile waters, with no air cover.

However. with the collapse of the Soviet Union as a credible threat and employment of U.S. naval forces in such Desert Storm-like scenarios. the similarity of the employment algorithm stops there. It is unlikely that the target rich environments of the Soviet Bastions will exist, the far greater need to communicate with and to National Command Authorities (NCA) and other forces will impact the SSNs primary defensive suite-covertness. and it is clear that the only domestically acceptable loss rate for major naval vessels in such engagements is zero. In this light, even a small probability that an adversary’s fixed or rotary wing aircraft could attack or even detect an SSN unopposed is unacceptable. If submariners have no good response to the what if of airborne detection in the shallow waters expected of regional conflict scenarios, then the only acceptable alternative is that they not be so employed-a justified but unfortunate conclusion for such an intrinsically capable platform.

The Air-Delivered WeaJPOn Threat to On-Station SSNs
If a need exists for a submarine based air defense system, then it must be effective, reliable, and as inexpensive as possible. To be effective, the submarine must have the capability to launch such a device upon warning of an actual or imminent attack. Such warning must come from detection of either the air ASW platform before an attack (preferably) or its weapon following such an attack. To initiate an attack, the air ASW platform must detect and localize the submarine.

There are only a few submarine detection phenomenologies available to aircraft, all of which can be categorized as either passive or active in nature (either involve release of energy to the environment or not):

Passive Means                                                                                                                                        Active Means

Acoustics                                                                                                                                                     Acoustics

Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD)                                                                                         Radar

Electrooptical (i.e., forward looking IR – FLIR)                                                                     Electrooptical (i.e. , laser)

Visual

It is demonstratable that a properly operated SSN is generally assured of being alerted to and of having enough time to deploy a defensive device, before any of these detection methods result in a weapon being delivered from the detecting platform.

First, it is important to realize the significant tactical difference between detecting a submarine within some large volume of uncertainty involving tens or evens hundreds of square miles and then localizing that position to meet the attack criteria of + / -500 yards or so required to release a modem homing weapon. It is also important to note and accept the fact that very real tactical and equipment limitations preclude the aircraft, fixed or rotary winged, from releasing that weapon (essentially on top of the SSN), from an altitude of more than several hundred feet.

In addition, it is stipulated that any viable submarine launched air defense device will have the ability to be launched within a minute or less, and throughout an operating envelope of several hundreds of feet through likely on-station speeds, and would be autonomous after launch to permit full evasive action by the SSN. In short, if an SSN can be shown to have a reasonable probability of sensing an imminent attack some few minutes in advance, permitting the launch and deployment of a defensive weapon that would effectively mine the airspace several thousand feet above and several thousand yards around his targeted position. then it would have the general ability to preclude the consummation of that attack. If the unlikely event occurs where detection of the ASW weapon itself is the first indication of attack, than the release of a defensive anti-air warfare (AAW) weapon as an integral part of evasion tactics has significant value-added to the survivability of the SSN by largely precluding subsequent reattacks.

Since stealth itself is the submarine’s primary defensive suite, it is logical that it will employ every means to detect any active emission that represents a potential threat to this vital characteris-tic. Since basic laws of physics dictate that a given emission will be more detectable following one way transmission losses (from emitter to target) than following two way losses (from emitter to target and back to a receiver co-located with the emitter), then a generally true statement is that such active emissions will provide the submarine enough time to evade prior to detection, or if received signal strength indicates that detection is likely, to deploy a defensive weapon and commence evasion well in advance of any attack. Even the theoretical capability of employing high pow-ered, blue-green lasers to see several hundred feet below the surface (from directly above) is relatively easy for the submarine to technically counter through use of topside mounted broadband blue-green sensors.

As for passive sensors, the relatively short ranged MAD systems require that the searching platforms be at altitudes low enough that significant amounts of acoustic energy will be coupled to the water to permit passive acoustic alertment of the submarine at slant ranges of several thousands of yards. Particularly in the case of fixed wing aircraft, such initial detection does not general-ly result in an immediate release of a weapon, but rather a circling return to that spot (consuming many minutes) for a release at the next subsequent detection.

Although many submariners can claim they heard sonobuoys hit the water, this is not a reliable means of alertment. However, to have an accurate enough knowledge of these buoys positions to support weapon release, they too have to be released from an altitude low enough to result in a high probability that the submarine will key to the presence of the releasing platform. In addition, passive buoys often don’t provide sufficient positional granularity to meet attack criteria, and contact by these devices is generally followed up by a MAD pattern, the release of an active buoy or, for a rotary-winged aircraft, a cable suspended dipping active sonar from a hovering condition-all of which the submarine will react to before attack criteria can be satisfied by the aircraft.

Visual observation of a submarine at periscope depth is always a possibility, and probably still accounts for many if not most initial submarine detections. For no other reason than relative physical size of the target (periscopes and masts) and the seeker (the aircraft), a significant visual cross-section advantage lies with the properly operated submarine, and the aircraft that spots a submarine has most likely been under observation itself for some time. If the hazard of the aircraft’s presence turns into a threat of attack by a turn towards, then the submarine will react according-ly. At night, against a FLIR equipped aircraft, the visual cross-section advantage is largely nullified through a normal periscope. More and more, however, submarines are adapting technology to obtain an integral periscope IR capability themselves, if anything, providing an even greater advantage of relative detection of the hot aircraft engine exhaust over the near ambient temperature peri-scope. Many previous submarine defensive AA W schemes involved mast mounted weapons to be employed in such a scenario, but this approach fails to satisfy the need for rapid release from a broader range of operational depths and speeds.

In all, a modem submarine can reasonably be expected to detect the presence of an ASW aircraft in advance of that platform being positioned to actually drop a weapon. Equipped with an appropriate autonomous defensive AAW weapon, the submarine could effectively prevent that platform from safely achieving the low altitude on-top status required for release of its ASW weapon.

Operational Employment of An SSN Air-Defense Weapon Many scenarios could be constructed to highlight the employ-ment of a defensive AA W system by an SSN. For the sake of brevity, however, the entire set of such scenarios can be summarized by consideration of a few first principles:

The SSN would employ in either a deliberate or a reactive sense:

Examples of deliberate use:

Mining vicinity where SSN will surface to disembark special forces

Mining a datum generated by launch of offensive weapons such as Tomahawks or torpedoes

Mine near-water airbases’ end-of-runway to engage low level departing or arriving aircraft

Dispersed mining of larger areas where opposing air ASW forces are likely to conduct general searches to discourage same

Examples of reactive use:

Upon receipt of off-board real time intel message that ASW aircraft or helo alerted and enroute

Upon visually spotting or ESM intercept alert of ASW aircraft or helo coming in

Upon acoustic detection of low pass by ASW aircraft or helo

Part of tactical evasion guidance if active sono-buoy lights off (prevent a first attack)

Part of tactical evasion guidance if air delivered torpedo lights (prevents a second attack).

Characteristics of An SSN Air-Defense Weapon

To complement and summarize the preceding discussions, any device considered for the SSN defensive ASW requirement should adequately address the following concerns:

Cost . A  principal  concern,  and  to  reduce  or  eliminate developmental expenses, maximum use of existing developments should be stressed by employing commercial off-the-shelf(COTS) and government off-the-shelf (GOTS) technologies .

Autonomous operation. Since it is operationally unsatisfactory to be required to target, release or guide any weapon from a vulnerable position (i.e., periscope depth), any considered device must be autonomous in nature, and upon release form a reasonable operational envelope (depths to 300 feet and speeds through 15 knots) be capable of independently detecting, classifying and engaging specified targets of interest.

Information or control links to the releasing platform are not desirable for a number of reasons including cost, post launch constraints on the releasing platform, and salvo size.

Passive operation. Since the device must be able to be employed in a prophylactic manner (i.e., to establish an air defense umbrella just prior to deployment of special forces or a Tomahawk launch), any search, acquisition or tracking phenomenologies employed must be passive in nature.

Low observables. To preclude the device itself from either initiating or confiming a detection event, it must have credible prefiring counter detection envelopes which lie significantly within its capability to detect, classify and engage any threat.

Target selectivity. Since operations could involve areas where non-valid targets exist, the device’s imbedded acquisition, targeting, and weapon release logic must include provisions for selectivity of engagement.

Self-sanitization. Provisions (i.e, scuttling by means such as dissolvable salt plugs) must be included which limit the time duration of the threat established by the device. Such provisions shall also destroy or otherwise render inoperable any contained armament. A broad time to scuttle selection is not required, and all expected employments could be met through the selection of either a short (30 minutes or so), or long (2 hours or so) option.

Detection/engagement envelopes. Subject devices should be capable of detecting and classifying appropriate threats at slant ranges of at least 8000 yards, and of engaging such threats to ranges of at least 5000 yards and to altitudes of at least 4000 The device should have intrinsic physical capability limitations which would allow safe overflight by friendly or innocent parties at reasonable altitudes.

Platform capability. Subject devices should be compatible with planned characteristics of SEAWOLF and CENTURION SSNs, and should be back fittable, at reasonable ~st through either internal or external launching means, to Los Angeles and Sturgeon Class SSNs. Compatibility with some existing or planned countermeasure launchers is particularly desirable. Possible SSBN employment is a separate issue with a potentially different set of require-ments and considerations, and although likely, is not addressed at this time.

Conclusion

The U.S. SSN represents a far too cost effective and effective component of a post-Cold War National Strategy to allow artificial constraints on its employment due to the lack of a response to a definable, albeit, an unlikely threat to its survival. The synergistic melding of existing sensor, weapon and countermeasure technologies should provide an affordable and effective solution to this problem.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1994/defensive-anti-air-warfare-for-ssns

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1994/Winter/1994-Jan-OCRw.pdf

Edited July 18, 2022 by Perun

[Perun]

COMMENT ON DEFENSIVE ANTI-AIR WARFARE FOR SSNs

In his January 1994 SUBMARINE REVIEW article Defensive Anti-Air Warfare for SSNs, Jim Patton provides an elegant description of how technology could be applied to solve the airborne threat  to  attack     If  the  Navy  had  ever actually had to execute the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, with its emphasis on attacking submarines within protected bastions, such  an  AAW  capability  might have been extremely  valuable. Soviet protection of ballistic missile submarines in home waters relied, in part, on air cover; while Soviet airborne ASW was not a huge threat to attack submarines, there is no inherent reason for that limitation to be permanent.  In the forward ASW world of the

Maritime Strategy, an SSN AAW capability made sense. Unfortunately, given the end of the Cold War, the proposal is a technology cure for which there is no longer any known disease. If ,From the Sea really does represent the future, it is difficult to see a need for such a system. This is not because there is no role for submarines in littoral warfare. On the contrary, the CSIS study, Anack Submarines in the Posr-Cold War Era, summarized in the same issue of THE SUBMARINE REVIEW, clearly documents that the stealthiness and multi-mission flexibility of nuclear attack submarines ensures them an important role in a defense planning environment characterized by uncertainty and built around regional conflict.

That role is, however, unlikely to expose submarines to airborne ASW attack. In littoral wnrrare, the first and most important characteristic or attack submarines is stealth. Whether conducting covert intelligence gathering, covert strike, or covert insertion of special warfare forces, the submarine must remain undetected. If a situation arises where AAW defense comes into play, the submarine has already failed. Fortunately, prospective targets for littoral warfare are not likely to be able to detect a submarine that wants to remain undetected. While Tomahawk launches could, in theory, provide a datum, such launches normally take place well off shore and thus offer limited opportunities for detection.

Even after overt hostilities begin, there should be little need for submarine-based AAW. It is virtually certain that the United States will have control of the littoral air space in such operations, precluding effective airborne ASW directed against U.S. subma-rines. In short, either submarines will remain covert and undetect-ed or the United States will have control of the air. As a result, it seems doubtful that SSN AAW will be crucial for executing the missions envisioned by … From the Sea. At a time of drastic reductions in submarine force levels and of serious debate about the future of attack submarines, adding nice-to-have features such as SSN AA W is simply not warranted.

The fact that there is no current need for submarine-based AAW does not, however, mean that there never will be. The new post-SEAWOLF attack submarine will still be in service 40 years hence. Who knows what our defense needs will be in 2035? Forty years ago the Korean war had just ended. Defense planning was dominated by fears of a confrontation with international communism leading to a global nuclear war in which nuclear weapons would be used more or less like any other weapon. Ahead lay insurgency, counterinsurgency, the concepts of nuclear deterrence, the strategic Triad, the loss of energy independence and consequent importance of Middle East oil, the information processing revolution, the nuclear submarine, and a host of other factors-some foreseen, some not-that have shaped today’s defense environment. Given this history, only a fool would claim to be certain of future defense needs.

The best course would appear to be to design the new, 21st century attack submarine to make future backfits and updates of the weapons system as easy and cheap as possible. Such an approach would be analogous to that used with the design of the SPRUANCE destroyer, where the basic hull and propulsion plant has been continually adapted to new weapons. While we may not be able to afford the full modular approach suggested by Bill Houley in his October 1993 Proceedine;s article, 2015, such a modular design should be our goal .

Adapting submarine design to emerging requirements is nothing new, of course. Neither a requirement for Arctic operations nor vertical launch of cruise missiles figured in the initial LOS ANGELES design. What is important, however, is to recognize that, at the same time basic hull designs must endure longer and longer, world conditions are changing more and more rapidly and unpredictably. Design flexibility to adapt to future requirements including as-yet undefined requirements for AAW -should be an integral part of future submarine construction.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1994/comment-on-defensive-anti-air-warfare-for-ssns

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1994/Summer/1994-July-OCRw.pdf

[Perun]

WHAT MIGHT BE OBSERVED IN PICTURES OF SURFACED SOVIET SUBMARINES

The AKULA; It is seemingly the same as the ALFA only the AKULA appears to be twice as large in displaceme~t. Its sleek, low-slung sail, well ~aired to the main deck and without sail planes, promises a high degree of hydrodynamic stability in high speed radical maneuvers. This sailcon~iguration should reduce generated vortices which would normally increase boundary layer separation — producing destabilizing forces and increasing drag (causing loss o~ depth, snap roll, settling by the stern and loss o~ speed). A similar sail design is observable on an earlierproduced ALFA submarine, reported to have made 43+ knots in high speed maneuvers. Its pod on the stern cannot logically be considered to be a towed array system. Its shape is consistent with a Soviet MHO propulsor while the whiteness of its sur~ace after underway operations would indicate a use o~ cryogenics inside the pod. The raised longitudinal pipings on either extreme side of the 1 ~ain deck are evidently not safety tracks (the~, would only hazard a man trying to so use them). Rather they seem to be raised piping to pour 101 ~ pressure air laterally across the main deck i 0 order to decrease the turbulence drag (on the ver y well designed low drag hull) and possibly form a bubble shield against a surface warship’s small _ warhead weapons — like hedgehogs which attac ;k vertically downward. The arrangements o~ limbe ar holes suggest the use o~ syntactic ~oam and ha· rd tanks between outer and inner hulls, except whe re gear between the hulls should be responsive to changes in sea pressure with changes in dept .b~ The white painted door edges near the bow wol tld indicate that the space inside the door is u: sed ~or some manned underwater activity. Like salv: age fittings, a man returning to a submerged submar 1ne would have to know where the doors open — in order to stay clear of them during their opening.The AKULA rides so high in its pictures that over 35~ reserve buoyancy apparently exists.

The OSCAR: Its faired, low-slung long sail (without sailplanes) indicates a good hydrodynamic stability in high speed maneuvers. The plimsoll marks on the after part of the sail suggest an expected use of the OSCAR in an exposed-sail type of operation. Acting as an AEGIS ship for surface forces? Or an anti-air picket? A peeled-off tile shows a thickness consistent with the rubber-like tile acting as a compliant coating — in addition to the tile’s acting as an anechoic surface over the submarine’s outer hull. The tiles are reportedly of four inches or more in thickness and are seemingly attached to the hull with what seem to be piping for fluid transfer? The huge hatch, on a raised deck just aft of the sail, seems to represent a stowage area below the main deck for something big like amphibious gear, boats, small submersibles, or 28 cells for vertically-launched anti-air missiles. (The hatch seems too big for housing just communications buoys.) The handrail at the base of the sail, compared to the raised longitudinal piping on the main deck, illustrates the fallacy in ascribing a safety track function to the piping. The lack of limber holes suggests that most of the spaces between the outer and inner hulls is filled with syntactic foam or its equivalent, and that void spaces are flooded through doors in the bow. The widely separated positions of the masts in the sail indicate a reduction in their mutual interference and reinforcing signatures — reducing their detectability from mainly airborne sensors. Do they indicate a secondary control center? And possibly non-penetrating masts? The gear on the top of the rudder is evidently for a towed array. The OSCAR’s surfaced aspect suggests over 35~ reserve buoyancy.

The TYPHOON: The bow planes are longitudinally striated and  the tips have holes like an air craft’s wing to minimize vortex formation at the tip — thus reducing boundary layer separation. The four holes down the stern of the conning tower below the sail appear to be vortex controllers. The conning tower — a CIC-type structure? indicates a function for the TYPHOON which would be more than its strategic use of nuclear ballistic missiles would require. The two vertical slots at the after part of the sail appear to be suction holes to reduce vortex formation off the sail. The two large hatches aft of the sail and on the main deck are about 6 meters by 4 meters in size and have white painted batch edges for submerged use by humans — similar to submerged use of salvage fittings. The volume suggested below the main deck is inconsistent with communication buoys and is more likely used for manned small submersibles, etc. The excessive size of the TYPHOON suggests functions which are not being credited to this 40,000 ton submarine — beyond the strategic nuclear function. (Its dimensions indicate this displacement, not the 25,000 tons credited to it.) This huge submarine is possibly the “battleship” of the Soviet Fleet — a submarine which can operate world-wide and which can threaten carrier battle groups in war, whether conventional or nuclear. The fins sticking up on either side of the hull, just forward of the rudder appear to be means for vortex control, to increase the efficiency of the propulsion system. The two scoop-like protuberancies which seemingly would increase the drag of this submarine only slightly and may possibly be used to gobble up vortices produced by the sail and increase propulsion efficiency. Note that they face the hatches — like the DELTA IVa, only the DELTA IV have these protuberancies forward of the hatches. Thus they may be used to observe (by TV?) submerged activity. The TYPHOON has no limber holes, (perhaps there are limber holes with covers?) despite the probability that there is a great amount of space between the outer and inner hulls (up to 4 meters by estimates). And, the surfaced aspect of the TYPHOON indicates considerable reserve buoyancy — over 40~ of displacement. The staggered small holes down the after part of the main deck appear to be so spaced as to reduce lateral formation of vortices which would reduce propulsion efficiency and increase drag.

The ALFA: The bow planes in the bow are unusually low — probably for increased control or stability in high speed operations.

The SIERRA: The white coating observed on the top of the pod on the stern would indicate the use of cryogenics inside of the pod. The considerable number of limber holes indicate a use of this submarine involving a good deal of surfacing and submerging during a war patrol. Their activity is probably different than a VICTOR III’s. since the VICTOR III has virtually no limber holes. while still being credited with attack submarine functions.

The VICIOR III: The coke bottle shape of the outer hull indicates a very good laminar flow. A difference in the color of the paint on the outer hull indicates some sort of polymer stain for changing boundary layer flow conditions.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1988/what-might-be-observed-in-pictures-of-surfaced-soviet-submarines

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1988/1988-April-OCRw.pdf

[Perun]

SOVIET VIEWS OF THE U.S. SUBMARINE ROLE IN CARRIER GROUPS

Occasionally, to stimulate the thinking of their officers, the Soviet Defense Press publishes open literature and official reviews of selected Western systems and tactics. A recent publication titled “Winged Rockets in Naval Combat” described Soviet perceptions of modem winged rockets technology, tactics, ship’s defense against winged rockets, and the Soviet conclusions, in four sections. The third section contained a chapter “Ship Defenses Organization”, describing the U.S. fleet AAW and ASW organization improvements between 1975 and 1985.

Apparently, the integration of LOS ANGELES class submarines with the surface fleet impressed them. They compared the 1975 “weak” organization of the U.S. carrier groups, and the 1985 improved organization in Figure 1. The Soviet description of these organizations follows. In this translation and review, “let the Soviets speak for themselves,” with the reviewer’s comments in brackets to clarify Soviet jargon and context.

Against a severe threat of long-range winged missiles, they (the U.S.) placed at great ranges from the aviation-carriers early detection special ‘dangerous’ (armed or supported by armed platforms) anti-submarine defenses and long-range radar detection — warning aircraft, and ships with powerful sonar and radars. Some gain in effectiveness was expected with the addition of surface based aircraft, particularly with long-range warning and control aircraft systems — AWACS — used as patrol aviation, and substantial oceanic and continental systems of air and antisubmarine defense.

In the thinking of foreign specialists, air and antisubmarine defenses of aviation carrier multipurpose groups had to be organized in four zones: self defense, near, middle, and far. The zone of self defense (at distances 3 to 6 km from the defended central objects –carriers) used surface to air missile complexes, artillery or guns, and ship based radio-electronic combat equipment.

Escort ships and helicopters acted in the near zone to 37 km. Inside the escorts, the central ships formed a circular screen at distances of 7 to 9 km from the carrier, where they could about equally well detect distant torpedo firing submarines, bombers, and low flying antiship missiles. Helicopters were stationed ahead on the course of the carrier at 18 to 28 km. In the middle zone (to 140 km), the fighters, anti-submarine aircraft and anti-submarine shock group ships were stationed. In the far zone (to 330 km), the antisubmarine defense was guaranteed by ship groups of radiolocation {radar-ESM) cruisers, aircraft patrols of long-range aircraft and fighter patrols.

In the improved organization of defense against anti-ship missiles and their platforms (Figure 1, 1985), the far zone of anti-submarine defenses extended to more than 460 km. The far zone was larger because multi-mission submarines (independently and cooperating with surface ships) could launch attacks at very large distances from the center of the battle order.

Even if there was a reliable zone of defense {experience in the second world and local wars showed exceptions to the complexity of the improved organization) self defense by the ships was still valuable. {Comment: Na”ow waters such as fiords, straits, or the Baltic may lack room for the full deployment of the 1985 style organization’s near, middle and far zones.]

Reviewer’s comments: The Soviet depiction of a submarine detection satellite was puzzling, since the satellite class was not identified by the Soviets. Clearly the 1985 USN battle groups with the LOS ANGELES class submarines was seen as an improvement by the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

A Soviet officer’s training teaches the importance of weapons deployed in depth (both vertically and horizontally), with dense cover on the main axes. The USN fleet organization of 1985 gave deep active protection supported by sensors found in space and down to the seabed.

From discussions in other Soviet publications, Soviet planners want to kill the USN submarines, carriers and other cruise missile platforms before the U.S. missiles are launched. Soviet staff planning doctrine for attack on a defended, distributed complex requires avoiding the strong points by maneuver, and penetration along weaker axes. The strong points of Figure 1 are the LOS ANGELES class submarines and the F-14, TOMCATs, working with the E-2C, HAWKEYE. A Soviet fondness for maneuver tactics would suggest preferential attack against the ORION P-3s, and LAMPs helicopters as the keys for the Soviet submarines to penetrate to weapon-launch range. Soviet radio-electronic combat doctrine to degrade target data collection and delay data transfer would call for attack on the SOSUS and satellite systems links to the USN battle control center.

As a humorous aside, when the Soviet text and figures were directly translated, they were still nearly unreadable, with 32 acronyms of their own plus the acronyms SOSUS, A WACS and other U.S. nomenclature. The burden of Soviet and U.S. acronyms in the official ponderous prose was too much even for them in this book. As an aid to the readers, they put two pages of Soviet acronyms in the front of the book. The readers were left to struggle with the USN acronyms and nomenclature.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1990/soviet-views-of-the-u-s-submarine-role-in-carrier-groups

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1990/1990-July-OCRw.pdf

[Perun]

THE BATTLEGROUP COMMANDER’S MOST UNUSED ASSET: THE SUBMARINE

An award-winning essay from the Naval Submarine League sponsored contest at the Submarine Officer Advanced Course at the USN Submarine School.

Naval Expeditionary Forces – Shaped for Joint Operations Operating Forward From the Sea – Tailored for National Needs

“The Navy will be part of a sea-air-land team trained to respond immediately to the Unified Commanders as they execute national policy.” “Naval Forces will concentrate on littoral warfare and maneuver from the sea.” These are quotes from the Secretary of the Navy’s white paper … From the Sea of 1992 defining new roles for the nation’s Navy in the maritime strategy . … From the Sea directs the Navy commander to shift his warfighting philosophy from open ocean, blue water naval strategy to those strategies best suited for close-in coastal operations. Littoral operations would include shallow-water operations with congested airspace within the enemy’s own territory. With military emergencies such as Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti, it is evident that this policy is in effect. However, examining the tactics used by today’s battle-group commanders, evidently they still do not understand the versatility of all assets at their ready. Specifically, it appears that battlegroup commanders do not understand the multi-mission capability of a submarine. This results in failure to use the submarine to its maximum effectiveness.

The end of the Soviet Empire has resulted in a chaotic perspective of the enemy leaving an unclear picture of the true world threat. It has become more difficult to figure out who is the enemy, obtain intelligence or even just detect their motive. The world is much less a kinder and gentler place than it once was.

From the Navy’s perspective, we must be ready to carry the fight to the enemy from the sea. Proliferation of arms by small countries has become relatively easy. Of particular threat to the U.S. naval force is the diesel submarine. For a naval force to adequately achieve battlespace dominance, it must be able to counter the threat from air, land and sea. What better way to dominate the sea than by using a sensor and weapon system that operates within the same plane as the threat? The submarine operates in concert with the ocean to counter the enemy maritime threat from beneath the ocean surface.

Well, it may sound obvious that a submarine would be the best weapon to use against a submerged threat, but it has been my observation of real world operations, exercises and wargames that the use of a submarine is often considered a burden to surface ASW forces. The potential for BLUE on BLUE engagement restrains the surface forces in an ASW attack. If a friendly submarine is operating in the same Joint Tactical Action area, friendly surface forces must positively identify the location of the submarine before executing an attack. Submarines are difficult to communicate with and are even more difficult to locate. The hesitation to attack results in the lack of desire to work in tandem with a submarine.

counter the threat from air, land and sea. What better way to dominate the sea than by using a sensor and weapon system that operates within the same plane as the threat? The submarine operates in concert with the ocean to counter the enemy maritime threat from beneath the ocean surface. Well, it may sound obvious that a submarine would be the best weapon to use against a submerged threat, but it has been my observation of real world operations, exercises and wargames that the use of a submarine is often considered a burden to surface ASW forces. The potential for BLUE on BLUE engagement restrains the surface forces in an ASW attack. If a friendly submarine is operating in the same Joint Tactical Action area, friendly surface forces must positively identify the location of the submarine before executing an attack. Submarines are difficult to communicate with and are even more difficult to locate. The hesitation to attack results in the lack of desire to work in tandem with a submarine. To illustrate, I provide the following example from a recent wargame matching students from Submarine Officer’s Advanced Course (SOAC) with their surface community counterparts, Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) in Newport, Rhode Island. Both groups of students are experienced specialists in their own community. In brief, the scenario was: A Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) to evacuate approximately 2000 BLUE citizens from the BLUE embassy in country GREEN. Country GREEN is a small country situated on a coast adjacent to country ORANGE. Hostilities are escalating between GREEN and ORANGE and BLUE forces aligned with GREEN. We are the BLUE force and our assignment is to plan the rescue mission. ORANGE forces have a strong naval threat relative to the rest of the region consisting of an aircraft carrier, several small combatant ships and five diesel submarines. BLUE forces consist of an aircraft carrier and support ships, an amphibious ready group for the evacuation and two submarines.

The submarine officers were not able to attend the planning phase of the operation. Thus, the mission was planned solely by the SWOS students. This opportunity allowed me to examine the inherent difference in paradigms between surface and submarine doctrine. As expected, the SWOS students planned the mission well within their familiar frame of reference. In doing so, they failed to fully achieve the goal of the exercise which was to maximize the use of available forces to efficiently conduct the NEO. Specifically, the operation was conducted almost completely with surface and tactical air forces. Apparently no regard was given to the fact that there were five rogue enemy submarines that had not been located at the start of the problem. My prediction was that it would have been simple for one or two of the enemy submarines to lie in wait on the track of the surface forces. The way the game played out is really unimportant to this discussion (the surface guys got lucky).

The friendly submarines were remotely placed and virtually rendered ineffective. Both of the assigned SSNs were vertical launch (VLS) missile shooters. One unit was assigned marker operations to follow the ORANGE aircraft carrier. The second SSN’s role was ASW, to hunt for ORANGE diesel submarines-good in theory but the SSN was placed astern of the aircraft carrier and amphibious ready group rending the BLUE submarine ineffective. The amphibious ready group and aircraft carrier were placed at extreme risk entering a war zone with five unlocated enemy submarines. The only real means of detecting them was behind the battlegroup.

Now, had the SOAC students been included in the plan to counter the tactical maritime threat (the diesel submarines and surface forces in the area), the following methods and missions of the SSN may have been implemented: Insert the SSNs weeks in advance to monitor GREEN and ORANGE military activity in an interdiction and warning (l&W) mission. Insert a SEAL or Marine reconnaissance team early to provide on-site advanced intelligence for the amphibious landing. As D-day approaches, the SSNs should begin an ASW sweep down the corridor the amphibious ready group intends to sail, thus clearing any enemy submarine threats from the area. As the amphibious ready group enters the theater to conduct its NEO, the SSN has covertly created a safe path. The SSN can continue guarding the BLUE surface force’s flank in concert with other BLUE surface and air ASW forces. Should ORANGE force threats become apparent, the SSN can be readily tasked to counter the threat. In parallel with this guard mission, the VLS equipped SSN can plan a TLAM strike provided by the National Command Authority if consistent with the mission. Finally, as the amphibious ready group and the aircraft carrier groups depart the area, the SSN could clear ahead of the battlegroup any submarine threats that position to intercept.

The paragraphs above are not meant to criticize surface warfare tactics. They are to illustrate the inherent differences in the tactical planning conducted by surface warfare planners and submarine tacticians. As stated in … From the Sea, the primary goal in theater is “ultimate battlespace dominance”. The stealth and covertness of the submarine act as a force multiplier to allow it to change missions rapidly. I submit that in the wargame scenario, it was amateurs planning the mission. Again I state, the wargame exercise illustrates the differences between the paradigms of the Surface Force and the Submarine Force. Submariners would do no better if we were attempting to plan the tactical air strategy. I introduce the synergistic approach. Neither the surface forces nor the submarine forces are independently qualified to plan a mission such as this. Current battlegroup operations do divide the warfare commanders up to micro-manage their assets. My observation is that no one has adequately used experts from all forces to truly plan an operation to achieve its maximum effectiveness.

When questioning the SWOS students about why they did not make better use of the assigned subs, interesting misconceptions were noted. One response highlighted was “although submarines are multi-mission, they can only conduct one mission at a time”. True statement. However, the submarine can change roles and missions as fast as you can say “Dudley Mush Morton”. As illustrated above, a submarine can move from one mission to the next in a matter of hours and can perform functions of multiple missions simultaneously. A second reason stated for not using submarines was that it was too difficult to communicate with the submarines. Water space management issues become too difficult to resolve in a hot war situation. This just takes training. Just because it is difficult does not mean it cannot be accomplished. During my tour in the Operations Department at COMSUBLANT, I witnessed the growing pains of battlegroup operations by participating in several fleet exercises in which tactical command of the two to three submarines was shifted to the battlegroup commander. No doubt communications with the submarines were difficult, but the lesson learned was that you had to plan. The concept of submarine broadcast delivery time seemed somewhat of an enigma to surface forces for a long time. The SSN does not need to communicate with multiple warfare commanders at any given time. The SSN is an extended weapon and sensor system and needs only to report to the ASW commander.

Clearly the threats encountered in the above scenario are very real today. These threats are often considered as two-dimensional. By two-dimensional, I mean that the surface force has two primary missions: the short term, tactical mission-to protect the aircraft carrier, and the long term mission of logistics-sustaining operations over long periods. The submarine brings the third dimension to the table: the maritime mission-guarding against the threats in the ocean. The ASW maritime threat develops much slower than the tactical air picture. An ASW threat may take several days to manifest itself and several more days to exterminate. To adequately plan for such a threat, the battlegroup commander must surround himself with type commander level submarine experts. These are experts in maritime tactics that can most effectively advise the battlegroup commander on the best method of countering the threat at sea approaching the littoral waters.

Not all the faults lie with battlegroup commanders. Submariners are not as proactive as they could be in helping the battle-group commander solve his problem. Submariners are raised to be independent tactical thinkers of the Cold War doctrine and of their World War II predecessors. During my shore tour at COMSUBLANT, I noted reluctance to provide a submarine asset under the tactical command of the battlegroup. The reluctance stemmed from concerns for waterspace management (preventing BLUE on BLUE engagement) and from prevention of mutual interference (preventing BLUE bumping BLUE) standpoint. The submarine operations specialists felt that the battlegroup qualifications were not up to the task. Vice Admiral Emery bad the vision to see how the Submarine Force must assert itself and be involved in the littoral environment or be left behind. Therefore, this was a paradigm we had to change. It is much easier to stand back and criticize rather than take the proactive approach to work with the battlegroup commander. For us as submariners, providing our tactical expertise to the battlegroup commander will greatly enhance the ability to achieve that synergistic relationship resulting in more effective mission employment.

To conclude, battlegroup operations in littoral waters are tough. I think there are two fundamental ways to reduce the difficulty. First, warfare commanders and battlegroup commanders must realize and truly understand the robust multi-mission capability of the submarine. This can be best done through instruction at the communitys’ department head school. Both SWOS and SOAC provide direct input to the fleet. What I take with me to my next ship is considered the most modern and advanced guidance. Secondly, the battlegroup commander must surround himself with submariners during the tactical planning phase of a mission. The submariner looks at the problem from a third dimension. The ASW threat is more real to the submariner and he has trained his whole professional life to counter this threat. Let him aid in the planning.

As well evidenced in recent years, the small littoral conflict will not go away soon. Keys to success are to understand the forces available, tailor those forces to anticipate the threat and support the national needs.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1995/the-battlegroup-conunanders-most-unused-asset-the-submarine

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/1995-Oct-OCRw.pdf

 

[Perun]

THE SOVIET SUBMARINE FORCE: GLASNOST’S REVELATIONS

Glasnost is providing Soviet and Western readers with interesting glimpses inside the Soviet Navy. Captain H. J. Manthorpe provided a fascinating review of Soviet coverage of the MIKE sinking (‘The Soviet View,” U.S. Naval Institute ProceedinK5. August, September, November 1989) using Soviet media reports to examine the accident. While the Soviet willingness to discuss the tragedy in detail was unusual, it was not an isolated case of glasnost exposing problems within the Soviet Navy. Military problems that were not previously disclosed or discussed, have become subjects for open debate in the Soviet press. An observer can find many examples of problems in submarine units among the complaints being aired. Some interesting insights can thus be gathered from articles concerning the Soviet Navy’s most formidable arm, the submarine force. This essay reviews recent Soviet media stories concerning the Soviet Navy. It focuses on the submarine force, and discusses the significance of problems revealed in such stories.

PROBLEM AREAS
Training is a recurring topic of complaints appearing in the Soviet media, with many aspects being criticized. The highest levels of fleet leadership acknowledge the deficiencies. The Northern Fleet Commander, Admiral Gromov, and his deputies are personally overseeing training in their fleet. In the fleet’s submarine force, the Deputy Fleet Commander for Training has been assigned the task of teaching tactics and torpedo attack procedures to submarine commanding officers!

Oversimplification of multi-unit exercises has been cited as another submarine training problem. One senior officer emphasized that the goal of multi-unit training was not to gain operational proficiency, but to avoid the unpleasant consequences of an unsatisfactory evaluation. This was accomplished by giving submarine captains “the places and courses in such a way that they can probably be met.” Critics claim that such artificialities lead to inaccurate indicators of force capability.

At the unit level, the Soviet Navy seems to organize its shipboard training on a standardized plan, but there is talk of granting a measure of independence to individual ships. Despite attempts to liberalize, one naval officer stated that “combat training still is closer in nature to a production cycle than a training cycle.” Although his comments were directed at the Navy in general, the Soviet’s centralized methods of control and execution imply the existence of such a situation in the submarine force as well.

At the individual submariner’s level, there are significant problems. Soviet submarine crews are often prevented from attending planned training programs due to additional duty requirements levied upon them from higher commands. Many submarine crew members are diverted from training to stand guard duty, garrison patrol, or other projects requiring manpower that is in short supply. At one base last year, “hundreds of man-days were spent on economic projects.” As a consequence, the level of training of Soviet submariners is probably not what their plans project. Other articles point out instances of submarine crews standing watch with insufficient training.

A related issue receiving attention in the Soviet media is the demonstrated inadequate level of initiative of officers in leadership positions — particularly commanding officers. One observer noted that a common trait of Soviet naval commanders is their tendency toward cautious action which stifles initiative. He stated that although opportunities exist for ship’s captains to be innovative, “inventing, creating, (or) testing something of one’s own becomes very difficult, since one risks being put off the plan, and this is a mortal sin.” As a result, many commanders eschew departure from “the plan.”

Some articles blame the lack of Soviet officer initiative on the near-continuous presence of senior riders aboard submarines. A submarine unit’s deputy commander, Captain 1st Rank Shvechkov, told the Soviet military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda that regulations require a senior commander to be aboard “whenever a submarine puts to sea for combat training.” For example, a Baltic Fleet submarine that lost its commanding officer overboard while leaving port was reported to be carrying the submarine unit commander, the superior formation commander and his staff. Critics claim that senior riders often interfere with the operational control of the ship. The Baltic Fleet’s deputy chief navigator, Captain 1st Rank D. Shtefanov, cited “a blurring of responsibility while senior commanders are present” as the cause, last year, of a disproportionately high number of navigational violations among vessels carrying senior officers. The presence of senior riders apparently causes a dilution of the commanding officer’s authority and an avoidance of responsibility. As one officer explained, “they say there is a senior commander aboard, and he will be held responsible.”

The MIKE-class submarine, KOMSOMOLETS, on its first operational cruise, carried a senior rider on its final voyage. The Chief of the Submarine Political Department, Captain 1st Rank T. A Burkulakov, was the senior officer on board.

Another highly-publicized incident provides another data point: The Soviet diesel submarine that grounded off Sweden’s Karlskrona naval base in late 1981, WHISKEY-137, carried an officer senior to the submarine’s captain. That officer told a Swedish naval officer who boarded the submarine that the senior officer was in charge after the grounding. While WHISKEY-137’s captain would only admit that his Kaliningrad-based boat was on a “mission,” and that they had grounded due to a navigational error.

A potentially serious problem area was recently revealed in the Soviet press. It is the apparently poor material condition of many Soviet submarines. The recent primary coolant leak aboard an ECHO-class nuclear submarine, requiring it to be towed home, emphasizes the rapidly approaching age limit of some portion of the Soviet submarine fleel The incident was followed by the Soviet announcement that they would retire their first-generation nuclear submarines ahead of schedule. Moreover, boats deemed suitable for repair, rather than retirement, are experiencing problems as to repair facility availability. One SSBN was recently moved from its garrison to a repair base, only to be told that there was no space available. Notably, Soviet submarine personnel do not exhibit confidence in their boat’s nuclear safety. The ECHO’s accident caused considerable concern among inhabitants of the submarine’s garrison, prompting rumors and questions about radioactive contamination which resulted in at least 86 personnel reporting to the garrison’s clinic– concerned about contamination. Officers of the SSBN’s crew expressed concern that, •we have been living for almost a month on a ship with an atomic power generator, even though at the base it is not recommended that long periods of time be spent on it. ”

An area receiving much attention recently is equipment deficiencies. Emergency equipment deficiencies were highlighted by the April 1989 MIKE sinking. Several deficiencies that were brought to light are worth noting. MIKE’s life rafts failed to function properly and problems developed with emergency breathing systems — apparently costing many sailors their lives. One officer questioned why the amount of emergency equipment listed on the ship’s emergency bill was insufficient for all hands. Yet, they are certainly not strangers to submarine accidents. Counting MIKE, they lost four nuclear submarines: a NOVEMBER in April 1970, a C~LIE I in 1983, and a YANKEE in October 1986, and also lost the conventional GOLF in 1968. Additionally, several Soviet nuclear submarines have been so severely damaged in accidents that they have been scrapped rather than repaired.

Articles have also criticized equipment provided to the Soviet submarine force for routine duties. Critics have attacked not only its quality and availability, but its usefulness and safety in the submarine environment. A recent example is foul-weather gear for submarine bridge watchstanders when running on the surface – an understandable concern for crews operating at high latitudes. The only protection afforded these exposed men, beyond layered clothing, is an insulated suit meant for the Army’s chemical service. It is described as woefulJy inadequate for sea service and is so bulky that it is impossible to wear a life jacket over it and pass through the bridge access hatch, on some classes of Soviet submarines. The men consequently do not wear life jackets and take the risk of being swept overboard in protective gear offering no buoyancy. This was the case in the Baltic incident involving the loss of a submarine’s captain. Soviet submariners complain that their allies in the East German submarine force wear “orange~colored, impermeable, insulated coveralls, which inflate when a sailor enters the water” while they have no equivalent. Soviet Vice Admiral Igor Ryabinin commented as follows: More than thirty years of my life is linked with submarine sailing ….. But I have yet to see any significant improvement in the clothing wom for standing watch topside. Topside clothing is not the only submarine hazard criticized in recent Soviet articles. According to Soviet accounts, they wear overalls that are probably similar in design to those worn by American submariners. However, an officer writes that ” … the overalls of … submariners … in a fire … go up like gunpowder.” This can cause disastrous consequences during damage control efforts.

CONCLUSION:
The implications of the revelations concerning submarines presented in the Soviet media are: Submarine crews are poorly trained. Men are diverted to other duties, and conduct training exercises under oversimplified conditions. Sizable gaps exist between the proficiency levels projected by plans and the actual proficiency aboard individual submarines.

Excessive oversight of commanding officers by senior commanders stifles the degree of initiative that some Soviet writers credit to submarine captains. The presence on board of senior officers may lower the sense of responsibility among submarine captains and even the perceived authority of the captain in the eyes of the crew. This has potentially disastrous consequences. In today’s fast-paced underseas world, waiting for the approval of a senior commander and losing the crews’ respect may be the factors that allows an opponent to win. Moreover, the oversight of the Northern Fleet leaders does not speak highly of the tactical ability of Soviet submarine commanders.

Material condition of submarines is low with those in poor repair likely to be incapable of executing wartime missions. A lack of adequate repair facilities exacerbates this problem.

Finally, the Soviets may not be learning from past accidents. Damage control efforts during the MIKE incident may have been heroic, but reports reveal serious deficiencies in damage control gear and emergency equipment.

Not only is emergency and damage control equipment inadequate, but basic equipment such as foul-weather gear and work uniforms pose hazards to Soviet submariners. Poor equipment quality seems to be the fleet norm, rather than the exception.

In summary, the Soviet submarine fleet is experiencing many material, training and organizational problems. Recognition of these problems in the Soviet press will likely be followed by attempted solutions.

It is easy to sit back, observe the Soviet problems that glasnost is revealing, and assure ourselves that our forces are adequate to defeat the Soviet submarine fleet. However, we must not let revelations of Soviet problems lull us into a sense of complacency.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1990/the-soviet-submarine-force-glasnosts-revelations

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1990/Spring/1990-April-OCRw.pdf