naval warfare 3rd WW, battle for the Arctic (Cold war period)

[Perun]

...

During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy routinely operated north of the Arctic Circle. In the event of war, the Navy would have sent several carrier battle groups into the Norwegian Sea to attack Soviet naval facilities in the Murmansk region.

...

Operating in the Arctic has special challenges for warships and carrier operations in particular. Rough seas make carrier flight decks a particularly tricky—and dangerous—place to operate, and pilots aircraft handlers must deal with ice buildup on aircraft and the flight deck freezing temperatures. Temperatures in the Norwegian Sea are currently in their forties, with morning snow falls and occasional rain. The region is experiencing wind gusts up to 45 knots and waves as high as 22 feet.

...

https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a24071757/us-carrier-arctic-circle/

 

[Perun]

Airports:

[Perun]

[Perun]

Soviet Leningrad Military District's Air Force

76th Tactical Air Army
in January 1, 1988.

http://www.easternorbat.com/assets/images/Soviet_Leningrad_Military_District_map_05.png

Edited June 25, 2022 by Perun

[Perun]

Leningrad Military District
10th Independent Air Defence Army
on January 1, 1988

http://www.easternorbat.com/assets/images/Soviet_10th_OA_PVO_map_88.png

[Perun]

Районы боевого патрулирования ПЛАРБ США на Атлантическом ТВД (US Navy SSBN Atlantic ocean patrol zones)

Edited June 26, 2022 by Perun

[Perun]

Районы боевого патрулирования ПЛАРБ США на Тихоокеанском ТВД (US Navy Pacific ocean SSBN patrol zone)

[Perun]

Районы боевого патрулирования РПЛ СССР на Атлантическом ТВД (Soviet Navy SSBN Atlantic ocean patrol zones)

[Perun]

Районы боевого патрулирования РПЛ СССР на Тихоокеанском ТВД (Soviet Navy Pacific ocean SSBN patrol zone)

[Perun]

[Perun]

US declaratory policy on Soviet SSBN security: 1970 to 1985. Final research memorandum report

ADA175532

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA175532

[Perun]

...

U.S. Navy Attack Submarine Force Mission

The multi-mission nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) will play a critical role in the Navy’s full forward pressure strategy. The Navy must have complete control of undersea areas in which surface forces are operating, and has established a goal of 100 SSNs based on a need to deploy them both simultaneously and sequentially to accomplish the following missions:

* penetrate deeply into hostile seas to conduct sustained independent operations against enemy submarines and surface forces and, with the introduction of cruise missiles, to attack land targets

* protect sea lines of communication

* operate in direct support of carrier battle groups against both submarine and surface threats

* conduct covert special missions such as mining, reconnaissance, and landing of special warfare teams behind enemy lines

Attack submarines must be effective in all ocean areas of the world including restricted waters, under the ice, in the tropics and in both deep and shallow oceans. They also must be capable of changing assignments rapidly without logistical support and be able to reposition quickly.

As of November 1986, the U.S. nuclear attack submarine force consisted of:

* 34 Los Angeles (688) Class

* 39 Sturgeon (637) Class

* 13 Permit (594) Class

* 8 Pre-594 Class

* 2 former SSBNs converted to SSNs

* 96 Total SSNs

It is anticipated that the submarine force will reach 100 SSNs in 1988.

The Los Angeles class submarine was designed in the late 1960s. In the face of the expanding Soviet threat, the Navy is placing high priority on improving the SSN warfighting capability. Improvements to the Los Angeles class submarine include:

* Los Angeles class submarines (beginning with SSN 719) have been modified to include 12 vertical launch tubes which increases tactical cruise missile capacity without reducing the number of other weapons carried.

* The AN/BSY-1 Combat System, which will incorporate new sensor and computer processing capabilities will be installed beginning with SSN 751.

Although extensive improvements are being made to the Los Angeles class submarines, still more improvements will be needed to counter Soviet submarine developments. Improvements in sound quieting, better sensors, added firepower, higher tactical speed and increased operating envelope are required to address the Soviet submarine threat of the 21st century, and cannot be incorporated into the existing hull envelope of the Los Angeles class submarine.

A new design attack submarine is being developed to meet the future threat and prevail in every phase of undersea warfare. This class has been designated the SSN-21 to signify it is being designed to meet the anticipated Soviet submarine threat and high technological demands of the 21st Century.

...

https://theleansubmariner.com/2020/03/29/1987-the-counterpunch-for-a-growing-soviet-threat/

Edited July 2, 2022 by Perun

[Perun]

Nuclear submarines in the Cold War

https://www.e-telescope.gr/en/history/world-history/nuclear-submarines-in-the-cold-war

Edited June 28, 2022 by Perun

[Perun]

[Perun]

50 years ago: The origins of NATO concerns about the threat of Russian strategic nuclear submarines

The Soviet Union developed their Yankee and Delta classes of strategic submarines in response to the George Washington class of US submarines, which were equipped with Polaris missiles. The Yankee class is considered the first true Soviet SSBN, despite the earlier Hotel class. Combined with SS-N-6 missiles, the Yankee SSBNs, which became operational in 1967, had an approximate 2500 km range which allowed them to patrol at great distance from the US coasts in the mid-Atlantic.

A few years later, the arrival of the Delta SSBN equipped with SS-N-8 missiles gave the Soviet Union the potential even to launch attacks on the United States from home waters in the Barents Sea. The Northern Fleet came to define the Barents Sea (and later the Sea of Okhotsk) as closed areas for these SSBNs. These ‘Bastions’ became heavily defended by attack submarines, surface vessels and air power.

The strategic nuclear deterrent submarines and the Bastion Concept came to be recognised as the centrepiece of Russia’s second strike capability. However, it is worth remembering that Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) failed in initial attempts in the 1960s to get the political leadership in NATO to focus on the emerging Soviet naval threat in the High North and North Atlantic and to expand the continental focus of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

SACLANTs concerns about the High North in the 1960s

The Scandinavian Peninsula was important throughout the Cold War. From its earliest years, the transit route of US nuclear-armed strategic bomber fleets passed over the northern parts of Scandinavia toward the central areas of the Soviet Union. In parallel, the Anglo-American carrier fleets operated in the Norwegian Sea for force projection, as well as for air protection for the strategic bombers. In addition, the United States supported a great build-up of Norwegian forces for the same purpose.

This US-led offensive use of the region lasted from the beginning of the Cold War until the early 1960s. By then, the nuclear-armed long-distance strategic missiles had emerged as the main Cold War weapon. The most northern areas became less important for the United States.

However, the strategic importance of the area had been perceived quite differently by the central organisation of NATO and SACEUR. The High North hardly featured at all in NATO strategy. NATO’s concern with the ‘northern flank’ had generally been associated with southern Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea and its approaches. The northern flank was given its headquarters in Oslo in 1951 and the northern command (Allied Forces North or AFNORTH) constituted the northern flank of SACEUR’s sphere of interest. But the prevailing perspective on the region was that of a ‘tactical northern flank’ to the Central Front.
In the early and mid-1960s, the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group argued there were three main rationales describing the strategic purpose of the northern flank (meaning Scandinavia):

 

the barrier it presented to Soviet access to temperate waters;

 

the bases it afforded for counter-offensive (including anti-submarine) operations; and

 

its favourable location for the detection and warning of impending attack.

During the 1960s, SACLANT became increasingly aware of the Soviet naval build-up and sought – initially in vain – to get the NATO top level to focus more on the maritime issue. Two important studies produced by SACLANT in 1965 addressed the increasing Soviet naval threat – ‘Contingency Study for Northern Norway’ and ‘NATO Maritime Strategy’ – but had no immediate impact.

Yet two years later, these studies came to prominence and were acted upon during discussions in 1967 on developing a new and more flexible NATO maritime strategy, based on two concepts, namely standing naval forces and maritime contingency forces.

NATO awakens to the SSBN threat

The strategic submarine build-up is generally accepted as very important for the strategies of the Cold War. However, a review of the NATO archives show that the early developments did not attract much attention within the central leadership of NATO (outside SACLANT). The strategic submarines had been around for a few years but the threat first featured prominently in NATO’s annual intelligence studies in 1967 (the SG/161 series of ‘The Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities’).

The existing strategic submarines were assessed to operate within two or three days steaming of launch areas off the United States. Many of these submarines were also capable of firing their missiles submerged (at least it was tested). However, in addition to the already operational submarines, a new ‘much improved’ SSBN class was expected to come into service by 1968. This correctly correlates to the NATO designated ‘Yankee class’, which by Soviet sources was reported operational by 1967.

Less noisy in the ocean than their predecessors and equipped with missiles of a longer range, the emergence of these submarines was a turning-point for the NATO leadership. It led to a shift in perception where the SSBNs were finally seen to be truly capable of strategic strikes and reckoned by NATO as a significant threat. This was the single most influential explanation why the High North, with the Soviet Northern Fleet, came to the centre of NATO strategy. The region was no longer viewed as just a subordinate theatre as the ‘tactical flank’ of the Central Front but evolved into an independent strategic theatre of operations.

In retrospect it is clear: the threat perceptions voiced over some years by SACLANT about the general and gradual Soviet naval and maritime build-up did not really get the attention of central leadership of NATO in Europe until 1967 – by which time the Soviet submarines had become a strategically important weapon.

...

https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2017/03/24/50-years-ago-the-origins-of-nato-concerns-about-the-threat-of-russian-strategic-nuclear-submarines/index.html

[Perun]

A SILENT BATTLE SURFACES

UNDER THE four oceans and the seven seas, American and Soviet submarines fight a near-war every day of the year. Relentlessly, they search for one another, trailing an adversary when they can and trying to evade one when detected. They make every move of a real war, except shoot.

The submarines operate in what Adm. James D. Watkins, the former Chief of Naval Operations, has called an ''era of violent peace.'' It is an era marked by sharpening debate among naval officers and strategists about the relative importance to the Navy of submarines, surface vessels and air power in a war at sea. Consensus is slowly building among the experts that, against the Soviet Union, the submarine would be the vanguard. At the same time, fueled by political and budgetary concerns, the debate is gaining a wider audience and promises to be a key issue when hearings over the military budget resume in Congress in February.

Should a shooting war erupt, many experts argue, submarines would be the capital ships of the American and Soviet fleets. The battleship dominated naval operations in World War I, and the aircraft carrier brought victory at sea in World War II, but the nuclear-powered submarine would provide the edge in a future conflict.

https://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/07/magazine/a-silent-battle-surfaces.html

[Perun]

During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy planned to slip attack submarines into cold northern waters, where they would hunt down and tail Soviet nuclear ballistic-missile submarines, or “boomers.”

If a shooting war kicked off in Europe, the American boats would sink the Soviet boomers inside their so-called “bastion.” Within minutes, was the plan.

But this anti-bastion plan—a.k.a., “strategic anti-submarine warfare”—was a bad idea 40 years ago and it would be a bad idea today, according to one U.S. Navy veteran and political scientist.

As the American and allied fleets reconsider how to counter an evolving Russian navy, they absolutely must exercise restraint when it comes to threatening Moscow’s boomers, Bradford Dismukes warned in Naval War College Review. “The United States should avoid threatening Russian SSBNs in almost all conceivable circumstances.”

After all, threatening a country’s nuclear deterrent in any context short of civilization-ending warfare likely would trigger civilization-ending warfare. “It can be said without qualification that executing the strategic-ASW mission today would be one of those rare cases in which failure would be far better than success,” Dismukes wrote.

The anti-bastion concept took shape in the early 1970s, with the commissioning of the Soviet navy’s Delta-class boomers with their SS-N-8 nuclear-tipped rockets. The SS-N-8 could strike targets as far away as 5,600 miles, allowing the Deltas to conduct deterrence patrols in the the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean.

Sticking close to home placed the Soviet boomers within range of land-based patrol planes and short-range warships. The ships and planes could protect the boomers, preserving the Soviet Union’s “second-strike” capability—that is, its ability to return fire after an initial salvo of land-based nuclear missiles.

Maintaining a second-strike capability is the key to mutual deterrence, as it means your adversary can’t hope to wipe out your nukes with its own atomic sneak attack. When your enemy has a survivable second-strike force, there’s no way to win a nuclear war. Thus nuclear war becomes less appealing as a policy option.

“The strategic nuclear deterrent submarines and the bastion concept came to be recognized as the centerpiece of Russia’s second-strike capability,” NATO explained in a 2017 historical survey.

But NATO planners worried that the Soviet Union might invade Norway and Sweden in order to safeguard the bastion’s borders. “It is a foregone conclusion that the Soviet Union will try to make the Baltic Sea a mare nostrum,'' Norwegian military analyst Kirsten Amundsen told The New York Times in 1986.

So the alliance planned to attack the bastions. The U.S. Navy upgraded its undersea fleet specifically for the mission and launched development of the catastrophically expensive Seawolf-class submarine specifically for assaults on ice-covered portions of the bastion.

NATO’s efforts undermined mutual nuclear deterrence, Dismukes wrote. “The mortal intercontinental nuclear threat to which successful strategic ASW would subject the nation would be suffered on behalf of no clear or feasible strategic objective.”

Fortunately the Cold War ended before the strategic-ASW notion had its full, destabilizing impact. Thirty years on, however, Russia is modernizing its submarine force amid escalating NATO-Russia tensions. And in response, the U.S. Navy is enhancing, by way of under-ice exercises and new torpedoes, its ability to deploy submarines in far-northern waters.

“Faced with this reality, Russian planners are likely to prove hard to convince that the United States intends to give their SSBNs a wide berth.” And that could provoke the Russians into targeting America’s own boomers, with the predictable escalatory results.

The U.S. Navy and its allies should reconsider their long-held belief that it’s wise to target Russia’s ballistic-missile submarines in Moscow’s near waters, Dismukes advised. “Homespun wisdom long has held that it’s not what you don’t know that gets you into trouble; it’s what you’re surest of.”

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/08/18/hey-us-navymaybe-leave-russias-nuclear-missile-submarines-alone/

[Perun]

Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255891922_Arctic_Marine_Shipping_Assessment_2009_Report

[Perun]

Interesting maps

http://kaldkrig.no/Bilder-web/Angrepsplanene.png

[Perun]

[Perun]

...

Allied reinforcements

The forces on the Soviet side were considered to be far superior to any defense Norway alone would be able to establish. The Norwegian defense concept was therefore based on early Allied aid in the form of both ground forces, aircraft and naval forces. During the Cold War, Norway's defense was strengthened through the pre-storage of large quantities of Allied materiel, the development of NATO infrastructure facilities and the earmarking of Allied forces. At its most extensive in the 1980s, according to Allied plans, over 700 Allied fighter jets, of which 200 operated from aircraft carriers off the coast, could be deployed in the defense of Norway. More than 50,000 Allied soldiers, including 35,000 American and 5,000 Dutch and British Marines, had Norway as a high-priority response option. The most important Allied ground and amphibious forces that were earmarked, or had Norway as a high-priority intervention alternative, were:

- Canadian Air-Sea-Transported Brigade, CAST Brigade, which had Northern Norway as an operational alternative from 1967 to 1988;

- U.S. 9th Infantry division, an American infantry division stationed in Tacoma, Washington on the west coast of the United States and to be transported by keel through the Panama Canal to Europe where it had southern Norway, the Lista area, as one of its response options;

- Norwegian Air Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade, NALMEB, an American naval brigade that from 1982 had its heavy equipment pre-stored in Trøndelag, and which in case of war would be flown in to Trøndelag and then transported up to northern Norway on a keel;

- UK / Nl Amphibious Brigade which from the 1960s had Tromsø as a priority area.

In addition to the ground forces, at most up to 19 fighter squadrons were earmarked for action in Norway and a large number of military airports were built to be able to receive all the aircraft, from Rygge, Torp and Gardermoen in the south, Kjevik, Lista, Sola and Flesland. in the west, Ørland and Værnes in Trøndelag and Bodø, Evenes, Andøya, Bardufoss and Banak in northern Norway. Towards the end of the Cold War, there were also concrete plans to establish a military air base in Brønnøysund. The most important aircraft reinforcements were American fighter aircraft, which from 1974 had pre-stored equipment at a number of airports in southern and northern Norway in accordance with the so-called COB agreement. At most, in 1986, the COB program in Norway consisted of 170 fighter aircraft at nine airports. From 1978, NATO's airborne control and alert system, AWACS, Ørlandet had its main airport as an advanced support point. NATO had no earmarked maritime reinforcements. But the Atlantic Command's, SACLANT's, navy operated in the sea areas off the Norwegian coast. It included both aircraft carriers that were relevant for deployment in the Norwegian Sea and American and British amphibious forces that could be deployed in Norway. If three American aircraft carriers operated off the coast of northern Norway, it could help double the number of fighter jets and triple the number of fighter bombers available in the area. In order to support the Atlantic Fleet's operations in Norwegian and adjacent waters, the Invictus agreement with the USA to establish advance stocks in Norway was entered into as early as 1960. The agreement includes a large fuel depot in Namsen in Trøndelag as well as logistics support for maritime aircraft on Værnes, Ørlandet, Bodø and Andøya. In addition, there were two mobile hospitals each with a capacity for 500 patients stored in Trøndelag and in Ofoten. The fear of limited attacks at short notice meant that NATO established forces with rapid reaction capability that could be deployed quickly on NATO flanks in Norway or in Turkey in the event of a minor local crisis. Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force, AMF, in Norway often called "NATO Fire Brigade", was established in 1960, with a ground element, AMF (L) and an air element AMF (A). The force, corresponding to a brigade, had no great combat capability in itself, but was to be a symbol of the member states' ability and willingness to stand together in crisis and war. When working in Norway, AMF (L) would consist of branches from the USA, Great Britain, Canada, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg, and from the end of the 1970s also from Germany.

In 1967, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, STANAVFORLANT, was established for the same purpose, as a standing force of six to eight frigates from NATO member countries with shores to the Atlantic. Norway participated with one frigate each year from 1968. In 1973, NATO also established a standing mine response force of minesweepers and minesweepers, for operations in the English Channel, the North Sea and in Danish waters, where Norway participated at irregular intervals with one minesweeper or minesweeper. As a consequence of Norway's nuclear and base policy, Allied exercises became a particularly important contribution to making NATO's security guarantee credible. The Northern Command at Kolsås and the two PSCs COMNON and COMSONOR prepared operational plans that regulated the efforts of Allied forces side by side with the Norwegians. The plans were practiced regularly in major NATO exercises and earmarked Allied forces conducted routine training in Norway. When the exercise and training activities were at their peak in the 1980s, Allied military presence in Norway in one year could reach around 30,000 soldiers and flight crews, many hundreds of military aircraft and dozens of military vessels. In order to control Allied training and exercise activities, the Norwegian authorities introduced restrictions on the number of Allied soldiers and aircraft that could be on Norwegian soil at any given time, and a ban on units and units that would normally be equipped with nuclear weapons or were certified for use. of such weapons.

...

https://snl.no/Norges_forsvar_fra_1945_til_1991

Original text on norwegian, translated on english by online translater.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Might be your cup of tea, interview with a crewman on an EP-3 Aires recce aircraft.

https://www.buzzsprout.com/167223?client_source=large_player&iframe=true&referrer=https://www.buzzsprout.com/167223.js?player=large#

[Perun]

Nice find mate

[Stuart Galbraith]

NP.

If you have a search on there, there is an interview with a guy who served on a Soviet warship on the Baltic and the Med in the 1980's, was also quite interesting.

[Perun]

STRATEGIC  ASW

“Strategic  ASW”  as   presently used implies anti-submarine warfare against strategic submarines — i.e. ballistic missile submarines, both nuclear (SSBNs) and conventional (SSBs). If, however, the word “strategic” is used in the dictionary sense, then “strategic ASW” more correctly means the way to combat the entire enemy submarine threat.

“Strategic” as used in classic terminology pertains to the word strategy and “strategy” is the art of directing the military movements and operations of a campaign — in this case, an anti-Submarine campaign. And for this campaign, a strategic ASW plan should be required to bring an enemy’s submarines under control. In the case of the Soviet Navy this would mean a Plan to decimate a submarine force or almost 400 submarines.

Is the proper use of the term “strategic ASW” which would include ~ enemy submarines, not just  ballistic  missile ones — important?

Yes,   it  probably  is, because  it  makes  evident a need to have a comprehensive plan for significantly reducing the Soviet submarine threat, and it focuses attention on the requirement to do this in a time-urgent fashion in accordance with “The Maritime Strategy” recently outlined by Admiral Watkins. the former Chief of Naval Operations. What is called for by Admiral Watkins is a quick destruction of the Soviet submarine force in order to permit u.s. surface battle groups to operate close to Soviet land objectives so they can, by projection of power from the seas, create a decisive effect on the conduct of a big war with the Soviets. To carry out such offensive operations calls for the operating areas or the u.s. carrier forces to be swept relatively free of opposing enemy submarines.

To  do  this quickly  and  efficiently  requires  a well-laid Plan. It is not enough to have a plan for air ASW, a plan for surface ASW and a separate plan for submarine ASW. Without a coordinated single integrated ASW plan, the ultimate goals called for by Admiral Watkins are not likely to be achieved — in a major war at sea. Reasonably, the developers of such a single Plan should be the Submarine Force since submarines have to make the major contribution in achieving a quick decimation or    enemy    submarines   at the initiation   or  a conflict with the Soviets. Surface and air ASW are not likely to be effective as rapid means for bringing the enemy submarine threat under control —  except  where their efforts are  closely coordinated with the submarine effort. Undeniably, surface and air ASW are effective means or destroying submarines — but basically, only in a drawn-out attrition manner. Quick attrition or neutralizing or enemy submarines is required. This takes a submariner-generated Plan.

If the  Soviets  choose not  to  send  their submarines to sea at the initiation or hostilities, or if a significant portion or their sub force has been based overseas, or if their bastions are not used for the protection or their submarines, or if it is evident that a Soviet “first salvo” strategy is likely to be employed — then a “strategic ASW Plan” becomes a requirement to adapt to such options and still rapidly bring the Soviet submarine threat under control.

The u.s. Submarine Force might prefer to limit its responsibility for controlling the enemy submarine threat to only a lone-wolf type or submerged  effort  against  deployed enemy .submarines.   But  this  effort  in  itself will  not  do the  job  called  for.    u.s.  submarines  in a  sound, “Strategic   ASW  Plan”  will  have  to:   be  sure   that enemy   surveillance   and  communication   satellites are   destroyed   if   air   and   surface   ASW   is   to function efficiently in coordination with submarine activity; be capable or destroying enemy submarines in port areas or shallow waters; have the proper guidance capability on their cruise missiles for destroying submarine facilities ashore; be able to mine submarine base areas to prevent submarines from getting to sea; be capable or interdicting submarine support activities including their support ships; ensure the necessary intelligence on enemy submarines, wherever; even, possibly, shoot down threatening enemy aircraft which could affect the rapid destruction of the enemy submarine force; and coordinate the Allied ASW effort with that of the United States.

Are these submarine activities at the start of a war unreasonable? . .  . . Or essential to an ASW Plan to do the job called for in “The Maritime Strategy?”

Why should so vital an issue as the development of a strategic plan to counter the Soviet submarine threat be in question? The answer seems fairly straight-forward. In an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, the u.s. might not have sufficient resources or time to adequately contain the Soviet submarine threat on the tactical level by means of forward U.S. submarine operations, as well as carrier battle group outer inner zone  ASW operations.

The Soviets have enjoyed a numerical superiority in total number of submarines for several  decades. In  the  past,most western  naval analysts generally  agreed that the West’s qualitative advantages in anti-submarine technologies would be adequate to off-set the Soviet’s quantitative edge. With the introduction of seven new Soviet submarine classes in the last five years, these views are changing.

The  latest  Soviet  submarines  present  U.S. ASW forces with some grave problems. Since the introduction of the Victor III-Class SSN, the Soviets have steadily reduced the technological gap with their American counterparts especially in the area of acoustic silencing.

The Soviet’s narrowing of the submarine technology gap is the result of a combination of uniquely-Soviet innovations  (titanium  hull construction,  liquid-metal reactors,more efficient bulls,             etc.)and acquired western technologies (acoustic silencing, computerized sonar systems, etc.). The end result is that the Soviet submarine force seriously threatens the superiority of the United States’ primary ASW sensor  —  its fixed-array,   long-range  passive acoustic sonar system known as SOSUS. Also, the vulnerablilty of the SOSUS system to overt or covert attacks makes possible a wartime shift in the advantage held by the u.s. in controlling the oceans depths.

Since  the  United  States mightlack  sufficient forces and resources (attack submarines, torpedoes, sonobuoys, etc.) to deal with the Soviet submarine threat on a continuum of tactical warfare scenarios, what are the available options? The optimal solution appears to be the establish-ment of a comprehensive strategic ASW policy involving the overal Plan.

The first, and foremost. requirement of an effective u.s. strategic ASW policy is the ability to obtain and maintain intelligence on the posture of the Soviets’ submarine and supporting forces. With a declining effectiveness of SOSUS, the u.s. would need to evaluate the expanded use of shorter-range acoustic sensors. Additionally, the u.s. might be wise to take a page from the Soviets and broaden its exploration of the use of non-acoustic ASW sensors, (e.g. space-based synthetic aperture radar, etc.).

Secondly, the Soviets best-case surge capability, outside Soviet waters, should see a large portion of its SSBNs and SSNs moving quickly to sea at the initiation of a conflict. Thus, it would be vital to initiate attacks on Soviet submarine bases and support facilities prior to the large-scale deployment of their submarines. When this fact is coupled with the Soviet strategy of using defended ocean bastions, a “strategic” ASW operation becomes potentially more valuable. Combined overt (aircraft) and covert (submarine) mining operations of enemy ports and choke points, aircraft strikes, and cruise missile attacks, may significantly  reduce the  effective  Soviet submarine  threat. When one  expands  the  targeting list to include   Soviet   C3I   networks,  ocean surveillance and communication systems, and supporting forces, the capability of deployed Soviet submarines should also suffer markedly.

It is important to note that regardless of the amount of “strategic warning” the U.S. and her Allies might have, the lack of a strategic ASW contingency plan in being would likely present the West from containing the Soviet submarine threat. Additionally, to count on having adequate warning prior to the initiation of a conflict, as the solution to the problem, runs contrary to the history of modern warfare.

The    priority  of strategic ASW activities reflects  an emphasis on  immediate, near-term goals.            However,     some  might  argue  that  strategic ASW    should  be  geared toward longer-range implications.This could  result  in a complete reversal of mission priority. But regardless of mission priority, the all-inclusive definition of strategic ASW would involve more than tactical ASW operations against enemy SSBNs.

So if a strategic plan is necessary to “quickly” counter the Soviet submarine threat, are any of the existing ASW plans sufficiently comprehensive to do the job? It may be useful to engage in an open discussion and debate on the potential value of a United States strategic ASW policy, spearheaded by the submarine community.

In    sum,      the  Soviet  submarine  fleet    —  with its numerical superiority and approaching qualitative parity with their western counterparts is such a threat to the naval objectives of the West, that the United States Navy can no longer expect to adequately contain the Soviet submarine threat on the tactical level. A strategic ASW plan is indicated, along with a broad based discussion to gain valuable insight into the best approach to meet this critical national problem.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1986/strategic-asw-2

And pdf

https://s36124.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/1986/Summer/1986-July-OCRw.pdf

Edited July 17, 2022 by Perun