Australia to Get Nuclear Submarines

[Mike1158]

The increase in ship numbers is not coming from jusy Oz but the whole group of nations, UK commitment will be higher too.  Overall the difference may well be enough to deter actual aggression above and beyond posturing and that has to be worth it.

[urbanoid]

I don't think the Australians look at political utility of SSNs at all, maybe except for strengthening ties with US&UK.

It doesn't mean jack shit whether the Chinese believe if the Australians SSNs are there or not. They already know that the American ones are and I don't think it deters them to the point of NOT trying to take Taiwan in the coming decade. Which btw. will be too early for Australian SSNs to see action.

[DB]

A better example than Conqueror was the boat (Dreadnaught, according to a Guardian article) sent to the South Atlantic in, IIRC 1977 - an asset that deterred any attempt to interdict supplies to the FI and to prevent seaborne invasion.

Aus. is an island nation (yeah, bloody big island) and needs to be able to prevent others from interdicting its sea trade. Those SLOCs are long, and for reasons already mentioned, suitable for SSNs not SSKs. Not to mention that the ability to perform high speed transits means you might be able to get by with fewer assets, albeit far more expensive to own.

[Ssnake]

1 hour ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

they can be a bit of a dud,as we found in the Falklands.

Dude, what are you talking about?

A single sub effectively isolated the Falklands, once that its presence was known and it demonstrated that it wasn't there just for show.

I think your metric for success is skewed, and inconsistent. On the one hand you want that the mere threat of a submarine that might be in the theater, with unknown orders, would have had the Argies pack in and go home. That's an unreasonable expectation. Then you complain that the other ships made that expeditious retreat that you wanted before your other sub could sink them too. I say, the subs had a disproportionate effect in the whole conflict. They had to demonstrate deadly intent, yes, but once that was done the whole British task force never again had to worry about a surface engagement and could concentrate on the air threat, and sustaining the land force.

Given that the whole operation could easily have gone either way, it's not unreasonable to say that its chances for failure would have been well above even without the presence of the subs. If that isn't power projection in action, I don't know what is.

[futon]

The new Australian SSNs are like a leapfrog security investment. They come too late for the current situation. There's still going to be a situation that follows the conclusion of the current situation. There's no telling how the current one will conclude. China falls apart or China successfully achieves its stated long term objectives of "national rejuvination". Changes to other countries will happen as well. India in 2050 may very well be a force to be reckon with. Even if Australia-India relations remain cordial, there's still going to be interest to be at some level of power balance. Another possible big future economy (and military tends to follow economy) is Indonesia. Of course, no idea if Australians are actually thinking of this kind of leapfrog security investment. Even with no SSNs in the near or medium term, it still serves other purposes such as providing a medium for AUKUS and/or domestic defense sector jobs. So then for the current situation Australia leaves it to the US and others to continue to fill the sub role while putting the Collins class into a very long career. Although if the US experiences a major retraction along with Japan unable to make up for the retraction and China achieves the term objectives, then the Australian SSNs become pointless, that's the risk with leapfroging. 

[Stuart Galbraith]

1 hour ago, Ssnake said:

Dude, what are you talking about?

A single sub effectively isolated the Falklands, once that its presence was known and it demonstrated that it wasn't there just for show.

I think your metric for success is skewed, and inconsistent. On the one hand you want that the mere threat of a submarine that might be in the theater, with unknown orders, would have had the Argies pack in and go home. That's an unreasonable expectation. Then you complain that the other ships made that expeditious retreat that you wanted before your other sub could sink them too. I say, the subs had a disproportionate effect in the whole conflict. They had to demonstrate deadly intent, yes, but once that was done the whole British task force never again had to worry about a surface engagement and could concentrate on the air threat, and sustaining the land force.

Given that the whole operation could easily have gone either way, it's not unreasonable to say that its chances for failure would have been well above even without the presence of the subs. If that isn't power projection in action, I don't know what is.

Back then, we had a fleet of 14 conventional submarines (There was something like 13 Oberons, but I think we may still have had a porpoise or two still on the books), as well as some 8 SSN's, 5 Swiftsures, Valiant, Warspite and Dreadnought (She was probably out of commision by then perhaps).  The Argentinians must have understood their capablities. They knew back them, perhaps still, we were the best in the world at it, because of Perisher. Im sure some Argentinians went on that course as well.

Ultimately, how successful were all those submarines  in preventing the Falklands being invaded? Yes, they were mostly all oriented towards the Soviet threat. And yet, you would have figured the Argentinian navy might have gulped and pointed out that if it came to a fight, they were utterly shagged. But not a bit of it, because it wasnt the Argentinian navy that made the decision to go to war.

Yes, at least in part that was due to some dubious political decisions on our part that sent them message we were not serious about the Falklands. I will say, if we had a full size aircraft carrier, lets say we had retained HMS Eagle, or even rebuilt HMS Ark Royal from the keel up, and had exercised in the South Atlantic from time to time, they would not have thought about it at all. Instead we relied on an unarmed Arctic patrol vessel for power projection, and we were rather surprised when we removed it they interpreted it as a go to invade signal.

Its worth reflecting on what happened in 1977, when the Argentinians occupied Thule. We send a 'task force' south, including HMS Dreadnought, two fairly anemic frigates and two RFA's. But there was insufficent power projection to convince the Argentinians to leave, we didnt want to force the issue, and they remained there till 1982. Imagine if we had sent HMS Fearless and HMS Tiger as well, and I rather doubt the issue would have remained in doubt, whether they fired or not.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Journeyman

HMS Dreadnought was more powerful than Fearless and Tiger, certainly against maritime targets. But who rates a platform they cannot see?

SSN's are militarily the most useful of maritime platforms at sea denial. But if you want to send a message, if you want your enemy to understand that they will inevitably lose control of the sea, they are really not in the same league at demonstrating intent as a surface vessel, particularly an  aircraft carrier, no matter how much the latter may be limited.

At least, before a war starts anyway.

I would have presumed Australia would rather have a platform that tries to deter war, rather than be supremely efficient at fighting one after it commences. Or perhaps its an area where their politicians havent seriously thought about it other than having a deniable presence, which to me misses the point of being present in the conflict area at all.

I might add, Im still glad they have made the choice they have. Im not entirely convinced the reasoning is consistent with the threat they want to address, but thats Ok. It annoyed Macron,keeps British workers occupied, and helps closen ties between Britain and Australia. Win win all round really.

 

 

 

Edited October 27, 2022 by Stuart Galbraith

[Ssnake]

I find it really odd to pin the outbreak of the Falklands war on the lack of the submarines' ability to generate images for the press. By that argument, there's a whole bunch of regional wars that weren't stopped even though US carriers were fully occupied with photo production.

You can produce images when a submarine lifts anchor, especially if you send it out "on a special patrol", in proper timing with a developing crisis, and announce (or don't) it's intended theater of operation. You can have embedded journos/social media stars to emphasize their capabilities:

 

[RETAC21]

44 minutes ago, Ssnake said:

Dude, what are you talking about?

A single sub effectively isolated the Falklands, once that its presence was known and it demonstrated that it wasn't there just for show.

I think your metric for success is skewed, and inconsistent. On the one hand you want that the mere threat of a submarine that might be in the theater, with unknown orders, would have had the Argies pack in and go home. That's an unreasonable expectation. Then you complain that the other ships made that expeditious retreat that you wanted before your other sub could sink them too. I say, the subs had a disproportionate effect in the whole conflict. They had to demonstrate deadly intent, yes, but once that was done the whole British task force never again had to worry about a surface engagement and could concentrate on the air threat, and sustaining the land force.

Given that the whole operation could easily have gone either way, it's not unreasonable to say that its chances for failure would have been well above even without the presence of the subs. If that isn't power projection in action, I don't know what is.

There were 3, actually, plus a conventional one. HMS Spartan*, which was the first to go South (March 30th), HMS Splendid, which arrived mid-April, and HMS Conqueror. HMS Onyx was the conventional boat. After sinking Belgrano, UK SSNs were dedicated to collect intelligence on Argentine aircraft movements and to stalk the ARA in the hopes they would leave territorial waters (which they didn't, but that doesn't mean they were tied up in port).

* the press mixed Spartan and Superb's deployments.

[Stuart Galbraith]

1 hour ago, Ssnake said:

I find it really odd to pin the outbreak of the Falklands war on the lack of the submarines' ability to generate images for the press. By that argument, there's a whole bunch of regional wars that weren't stopped even though US carriers were fully occupied with photo production.

You can produce images when a submarine lifts anchor, especially if you send it out "on a special patrol", in proper timing with a developing crisis, and announce (or don't) it's intended theater of operation. You can have embedded journos/social media stars to emphasize their capabilities:

 

I'm saying that it, along with everything else, it clearly did not deter. Try as I might, I can't imagine CV01 surrounded by Type 82 Destroyers would not have made a decisive difference, as probably would the USS Nimitz with a deck full of Tomcats and Intruders for that matter. 

Here is an example. Did you read of the 1972 invasion of Belize by Guatamala? No. Because dear old Ark Royal thrashed her boilers out to get down there and put a Buccaneer in the air over the airport, so everyone could see it. The crisis refused immediately. 10 years later when the Falklands crisis was kicking off, the first question the PM asked  was where Ark Royal was. In a scrapyard was the reply.

It's a similar problem with SSBNs. No doubt the are far more secure and effective than the V force. Yet for all that, Soviet pilots were still asking to be given guided tours of Vulcan in the early 1980s. Wouldn't you prefer to see Tornado? No thanks, it cannot reach my country was the reply...

Speaking as someone who saw a bomb wing of B52s take off, I can see what they meant. Manned bombers exude raw power in a way SSBNs never shall. And that in large part is probably why Australia hung into the F111 for so long too.

 

 

[Stuart Galbraith]

1 hour ago, RETAC21 said:

There were 3, actually, plus a conventional one. HMS Spartan*, which was the first to go South (March 30th), HMS Splendid, which arrived mid-April, and HMS Conqueror. HMS Onyx was the conventional boat. After sinking Belgrano, UK SSNs were dedicated to collect intelligence on Argentine aircraft movements and to stalk the ARA in the hopes they would leave territorial waters (which they didn't, but that doesn't mean they were tied up in port).

* the press mixed Spartan and Superb's deployments.

Onyx was the one that grounded in a reef and damaged her torpedo tubes iirc?

There was reportedly one  Soviet boat on the scene too. There was a claim in Ian Ballantines book it deliberately broached to convince the Argentinians  there was a British boat on scene, but I've no idea of his source for that. Amusing if true of course..

[Josh]

15 hours ago, Angrybk said:

It's still just weird to me what the Aussies are expecting to do with nuc boats that would justify the cost. Nuc boats can't really do power projection (which the Aussies don't care much about anyway), and the only conventional war possibility Australia has is vs. China, in which case Australia's job, given geography and the size of its population, should be to make itself an extremely well-defended base for activities by its allies. 

The RAN seems to have a more wide ranging goal for its boat fleet. If they are just supposed to defend Australia, then I'd argue they don't need submarines of any kind.

[RETAC21]

26 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Onyx was the one that grounded in a reef and damaged her torpedo tubes iirc?

There was reportedly one  Soviet boat on the scene too. There was a claim in Ian Ballantines book it deliberately broached to convince the Argentinians  there was a British boat on scene, but I've no idea of his source for that. Amusing if true of course..

Yes to the first. The second one is a rumor. There was "something" out there, and it was attacked several times but it wasn't Argentinian... so most likely, it was a whale.

Recommended reading (and not by me, but by a Spanish Navy officer specialising in ASW): https://www.amazon.com/Find-Him-Bring-Back-Anti-Submarine/dp/1913336395

"Although the undersea battlefield was thus actually empty of Argentine submarines, elements of the Royal Navy’s task force continued detecting and tracking multiple sonar contacts over the following days and weeks. Indeed, they ultimately fired no fewer than 31 torpedoes, 49 depth-charges and 21 mortar salvoes at these."

 

Edited October 27, 2022 by RETAC21

[urbanoid]

15 minutes ago, Josh said:

The RAN seems to have a more wide ranging goal for its boat fleet. If they are just supposed to defend Australia, then I'd argue they don't need submarines of any kind.

Why?

[Josh]

7 minutes ago, urbanoid said:

Why?

A coastal D/E boat seems like an incredibly inefficient way to defend that much coastline compared to aircraft or even surface ships. Its an expensive asset with a slow <8knt rate of advance that has to cover thousands of miles of coastline even if we're just talking approaches from one particular threat axis. RANs boats are two few in number to cover all that ground and too slow to quickly reposition. But they are not intended to defend the coastline; they are power projection assets. They are rather unique D/Es in their range and rate of advance.

Edited October 27, 2022 by Josh

[urbanoid]

1 minute ago, Josh said:

A coastal D/E boat seems like an incredibly inefficient way to defend that much coastline compared to aircraft or even surface ships. Its an expensive movement with <8knt rate of advance that has to cover thousands of miles of coastline even if we're just talking approaches from one particular direction. RANs boats are two few in number to be relevant in that context because they are not intended to defend the coastline; they are rather unique D/Es in their range and rate of advance.

I'd say their specifications make them useful for both roles, it would be even more true for SSNs. It's not like the direction from which the enemy fleet is coming will be a secret, some big eyes from the skies are going to observe them too. 

It's not unusual for both the presumed aggressor and the presumed defender to invest in submarines, they're versatile beasts.

[Stuart Galbraith]

23 minutes ago, RETAC21 said:

Yes to the first. The second one is a rumor. There was "something" out there, and it was attacked several times but it wasn't Argentinian... so most likely, it was a whale.

Recommended reading (and not by me, but by a Spanish Navy officer specialising in ASW): https://www.amazon.com/Find-Him-Bring-Back-Anti-Submarine/dp/1913336395

"Although the undersea battlefield was thus actually empty of Argentine submarines, elements of the Royal Navy’s task force continued detecting and tracking multiple sonar contacts over the following days and weeks. Indeed, they ultimately fired no fewer than 31 torpedoes, 49 depth-charges and 21 mortar salvoes at these."

 

Yes, id read that elsewhere somewhere. Everything was assumed to be a submarine and they went a little nuts. Ironically when a real submarine approached the screen and fired a torpedo at a frigate, they seem to have missed it.

Thanks for the recommendation, I'll look into that.

[Stuart Galbraith]

I suppose there is one area Aussie submarines would be incredibly useful for 5 eyes. Sigint. Although you could probably do a lot of that with a  spy trawler.

[TrustMe]

About 5??? years ago the Argies were again making statements about taking over the Falklands and we sent a nuke sub down there. Then the Argie President then demanded to know were the nuke sub was, we declined to tell them, and the Argies stopped talking about the Falklands.

That's the power of a single SSN.

Edited October 27, 2022 by TrustMe

[kokovi]

On 10/26/2022 at 2:34 AM, Argus said:

Not to get back on topic or anything,  but I learned a few things about our Submarine history the other week.
1/ apparently this is not the first time the RAN have been in line for nukes. When we bought the O-Boats, the plan was for 4 as that was the minimum number to provide fleet ASW training and a submarine crew pool large enough to support 2x SSN's 'of the Dreadnought type' so presumably Valliant's. The program was killed on purely financial grounds (Vietnam I'm guessing) and another 2x Oberon's ordered instead.     

2/ The real problem with the French SSK program - it wasn't really the French or how the thing was being managed or such. Rather it came down to the latest generation of remote sensing camera's IR resolution. I'm told that SSK's are fine in busy waters where there's a lot of other traffic to hide amongst. however out in the open ocean, there's enough contrast for the satellites to track individual diesel exhaust plumes (presuming the engines are large enough). So a hotspot out in the oggin without an AIS squawk or radar return pretty much screams 'SSK hiding here.' So not terrible news for 90% of the worlds SSK operators who run their subs as coastal boats or as prestige assets. But the RAN's peculiarity is running SSK's as long range deep water boats. So the Attack Class had become operationally obsolete before they reached the production gate. 
Which sort of explains why they seemed so happy to exchange a bird in the hand for a pile of fuzzy handwavium with AUKUS and a decade's delay. It looks like the choice wasn't really between the French subs and 'something better,' rather between nothing at all and something nuclear powered in the future.  

As the diesel exhaust can be placed somewhere below the waterline - you do not really require a mast for it - where the gases can be dissipated in the water, that reasoning is not the best.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Or it may well be they were never serious about retaking it at all. 

[TrustMe]

6 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Or it may well be they were never serious about retaking it at all. 

The local president was only doing it to bump up nationalistic feelings as their economy was going south *pun intended*  Basically the same as in 1982.

Edited October 27, 2022 by TrustMe

[Josh]

2 minutes ago, kokovi said:

As the diesel exhaust can be placed somewhere below the waterline - you do not really require a mast for it - where the gases can be dissipated in the water, that reasoning is not the best.

I thought placing the exhaust below the water is normal practice? This suppresses the radar and IR signature of the exhaust mast (tough presumably the gas is still hot). I believe typically only the intake mast actually broaches the surface. There are enough references to a "hydrocarbon sensor" that I think it is a separate technique, if not separate sensor, from standard IR.

Google "p8 poseidon hydrocarbon sensor" or "MQ-4C Triton hydrocarbon sensor"

[kokovi]

1 minute ago, Josh said:

I thought placing the exhaust below the water is normal practice? This suppresses the radar and IR signature of the exhaust mast (tough presumably the gas is still hot). I believe typically only the intake mast actually broaches the surface. There are enough references to a "hydrocarbon sensor" that I think it is a separate technique, if not separate sensor, from standard IR.

Google "p8 poseidon hydrocarbon sensor" or "MQ-4C Triton hydrocarbon sensor"

Yes, and for such sensors to be useful, the platform needs to be relatively nearby in the general vicinity of the sub.

[Argus]

On the power projection side, while the Falkland's is one example, there's another more recent and closer to home. The Indonesians sailed a naval 'Task Force' during the East Timor crisis. A USN 688 did a porpoise off their bows a few hours out of port, and the Indonesians took the hint, turned around and sailed right home - incidentally the politics of the whole thing caused the Army factor to lose a lot of influence and in some respects was key point in Indonesia's development as law based democratic state. 

Anyone who can't see the utility of both SSK's and SSN's to the RAN probably needs to look at a map or three, and perhaps spend a little time thinking about the tales they tell. For example an SSK can do very good work in the the waters to our near north, speed is much less of an issue if geography dictates the routes of advance. In waters further north, yes the USN has SSK's but the USN has many demands on its assets and the RAN subs mean more hulls on station and in the pool to absorb attrition, more is very much more. 

Otherwise Australia has one of the largest zones of concern, both official and unofficial on the planet. Just our SAR zone is about 10% of the earth's surface. Like our defence and so on, there's two ways to look at this. Either its poor little Australia, too big a job, too small a country, why bother. Or that we have half the population of the UK with a GDP per Capita about 20% higher; so we are not a 'small' country any more, and not only can but should start to make an effort to actually hold our end up properly. This last view is a hard sell with most of my countrymen, who just aren't used to thinking of us as actually having some real weight, but hay got to start somewhere.  How does this relate to SSN's - what other assets do we have that can do 30 knots (or whatever) from Fiji to the Kerguelen's, or pop up off Mombassa on Thursday if required?  

 

[Argus]

9 hours ago, kokovi said:

As the diesel exhaust can be placed somewhere below the waterline - you do not really require a mast for it - where the gases can be dissipated in the water, that reasoning is not the best.

The exhaust is IR supressed, that the point - or to be super clear, the ability to detect IR from space  is now getting higher than the ability to hide under certain conditions, and those conditions have operational relevance for the RAN.