20 Years After 9/11 - Effects, Lessons Learned, Roads Not Taken

[RETAC21]

47 minutes ago, JWB said:

Bribery is not the same thing as policy. What really matters is what happens to cops who take bribes. Too bad D.C. pulled the plug. 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-police/new-commander-takes-on-corruption-mess-in-afghan-police-idUSKCN1T51UC

Well, the policy was to keep the Taliban out of power, create a stable democracy, bring education to the countryside and control the roads, among others. What happened was corruption, corruption, corruption, etc. until the Taliban could just push the rotten building and return to power. So policy was irrelevant to what went on in reality.

[Nobu]

The road not fully taken may have been the law enforcement/mafia approach against the Taliban.

Doing so would have made bringing education to the countryside and nation-building moot, at least. Those aspects fall outside of law enforcement's jurisdiction.

[JWB]

On 9/12/2021 at 12:42 PM, RETAC21 said:

What happened was corruption, corruption, corruption, etc. until the Taliban could just push the rotten building and return to power.

Would ending the corruption have mattered? The real problem was an almost complete failure to do anything about border security. Even if the Kabul government was clean Pakistani Taliban still would have continued infiltration/invasion with maximum effect. The U.S. command tried to do border security for about one week by deploying infantry into those areas but the effort could not be sustained. Taliban casualties soared but so did U.S. casualties. The government of Pak could ignore their losses but D.C. could not and had to pull back. Coalition command should have retasked the drones from the wild goose chase of hunting the Taliban commanders and instead used the drones for border patrol. Problem here was the lack of adequate number armed drones. Another problem was the drones types were not really suited to do that task. At least a decade ago I advocated deploying large numbers of smaller drones armed with machineguns to carry low altitude patrol/hunt/kill sorties.  They could be developed from aircraft like these:

[RETAC21]

3 minutes ago, JWB said:

Would ending the corruption have mattered? The real problem was an almost complete failure to do anything about border security. Even if the Kabul government was clean Pakistani Taliban still would have continued infiltration/invasion with maximum effect. The U.S. command tried to do border security for about one week by deploying infantry into those areas but the effort could not be sustained. Taliban casualties soared but so did U.S. casualties. The government of Pak could ignore their losses but D.C. could not and had to pull back. Coalition command should have retasked the drones from the wild goose chase of hunting the Taliban commanders and instead used the drones for border patrol. Problem here was the lack of adequate number armed drones. Another problem was the drones types were not really suited to do that task. At least a decade ago I advocated deploying large numbers of smaller drones armed with machineguns to carry low altitude patrol/hunt/kill sorties.  They could be developed from aircraft like these:

Just paying the Afghan soldiers and providing for the safety of their families, plus keeping them supplied, would have ensured the regime could go on indefinitely. The Najibullah regime survived the Soviet 1989 withdrawal (which left the Afghan regime in a much worse situation militarily) and it still had the oomph to go on until April 1992, with Soviet aid cut off on Dec 1991.

Should the current "government" still have the support of the US and if the troops had been motivated to fight, there is not reason to assume they would do worse, since the Taliban are no better armed than the Mujaheddin of 1989.

[Ssnake]

6 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

the Taliban are no better armed than the Mujaheddin of 1989.

Now they are.

[Nobu]

 

9 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Just paying the Afghan soldiers and providing for the safety of their families, plus keeping them supplied, would have ensured the regime could go on indefinitely.

It took a generation, but the fear caused by 9/11 eventually dissipated. With it went the regime's reason for existence.

Edited September 15, 2021 by Nobu

[JasonJ]

Just being payed is too easy of a solution. Maybe they weren't getting paid for a reason. Not doing job properly while still demanding pay or spotted using previous payment for Taliban interest.. who knows..

Edited September 15, 2021 by JasonJ

[Stuart Galbraith]

4 hours ago, Nobu said:

 

It took a generation, but the fear caused by 9/11 eventually dissipated. With it went the regime's reason for existence.

I give it 5 years tops before it reemerges again.

[RETAC21]

5 hours ago, JasonJ said:

Just being payed is too easy of a solution. Maybe they weren't getting paid for a reason. Not doing job properly while still demanding pay or spotted using previous payment for Taliban interest.. who knows..

Unfortunately, we know too well: https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/asia/2021/08/16/afghan-armys-collapse-was-years-in-the-making-say-experts/

For example: 

"There were worse problems ahead. Sigar reporting over the decades warned consistently that corruption was deeply rooted, gradually eroding the morale of Afghan soldiers willing to fight, and sapping their combat capability as resources were siphoned off by corrupt commanders tied to political factions.

Virtually anything that could be stolen, from fuel to food and soldier’s wages, was up for the taking."

Edited to add: there was nothing new in this, the same dynamics sapped the Communist Afghan Army back in the 80s

Edited September 15, 2021 by RETAC21

[JWB]

22 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Just paying the Afghan soldiers and providing for the safety of their families, plus keeping them supplied, would have ensured the regime could go on indefinitely. The Najibullah regime survived the Soviet 1989 withdrawal (which left the Afghan regime in a much worse situation militarily) and it still had the oomph to go on until April 1992, with Soviet aid cut off on Dec 1991.

Should the current "government" still have the support of the US and if the troops had been motivated to fight, there is not reason to assume they would do worse, since the Taliban are no better armed than the Mujaheddin of 1989.

That doesn't explain why so many Afghan air force pilots deserted.

[RETAC21]

55 minutes ago, JWB said:

That doesn't explain why so many Afghan air force pilots deserted.

They deserted as the whole shebang was coming down, taking their planes with them, the alternative was to lose their lives on the whim of the government leaving them high and dry

I mean, after seeing this in July: https://edition.cnn.com/2021/07/13/asia/afghanistan-taliban-commandos-killed-intl-hnk/index.html

You can't blame them for taking flight in mid-August

https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghan-military-aircraft-land-uzbekistan-move-tajikistan-updated

[RETAC21]

Pertinent, I think:

 

[Nobu]

10 hours ago, JWB said:

That doesn't explain why so many Afghan air force pilots deserted.

Training Afghans up to be pilots was a waste of good mountain infantry. With the number of NATO pilots available, it was also unnecessary.

 

18 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

I give it 5 years tops before it reemerges again.

I hope you are wrong, but I fear you may be right.

[JWB]

23 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

They deserted as the whole shebang was coming down, taking their planes with them, the alternative was to lose their lives on the whim of the government leaving them high and dry

I mean, after seeing this in July: https://edition.cnn.com/2021/07/13/asia/afghanistan-taliban-commandos-killed-intl-hnk/index.html

You can't blame them for taking flight in mid-August

https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghan-military-aircraft-land-uzbekistan-move-tajikistan-updated

Not the same thing. Those commandos who surrendered were surrounded and left with no means of escape. Helicopters cannot be surrounded by enemy infantry. There was nothing preventing the helicopters from going on strafing runs until they were low on fuel before flying to Tajikistan. 

[bd1]

On 9/14/2021 at 8:37 PM, RETAC21 said:

Just paying the Afghan soldiers and providing for the safety of their families, plus keeping them supplied, would have ensured the regime could go on indefinitely. The Najibullah regime survived the Soviet 1989 withdrawal (which left the Afghan regime in a much worse situation militarily) and it still had the oomph to go on until April 1992, with Soviet aid cut off on Dec 1991.

 

i´ve read somewhere that while soviet army left afgh. 1989, the KGB border troops special units stayed there for couple more years

[bojan]

KGB border troops were embassy guards and close protection details for diplomats. That was one of their regular roles actually.

Edited September 16, 2021 by bojan

[RETAC21]

1 hour ago, JWB said:

Not the same thing. Those commandos who surrendered were surrounded and left with no means of escape. Helicopters cannot be surrounded by enemy infantry. There was nothing preventing the helicopters from going on strafing runs until they were low on fuel before flying to Tajikistan. 

You keep making absurd comparisons, the commandos were abndoned by their own chain of command until the ammo ran out and then the Taliban executed them, probably out of spite, but it had the effect of "encourager les autres!", after all, if the elite of the Army is treated as worthless peons, what can the rank and file expect? 

So why would the helicopter pilots or the Tucanos for that matter, risk their lives and the machines (which were tetering on the edge of unserviceabilty due to the pullout of contractors) for a regime that didn't give a shit about them? Remember how the US pulled out Bagram wihtout telling anyone? what kind of support could those pilots expect to have if they were shot down?

This is Afghanistan in 2021, not Japan in 1945, there are no kamikazes.

[EchoFiveMike]

I have no idea why anyone would think that we could ever become proficient at HUMINT, nor why we would ever consider it a primary focus of intelligence.  HUMINT is a function of the exploitation of long term relationships and loyalties, think UK/Germany, Israeli/Arabs, etc.  The US doesn't have that, can't have that really, it's more a mechanism to be used against us than to be used by us. 

You think we didn't do it well for the last 50+ yrs, we know this and yet we still don't do it well simply do to lack of effort?  HUMINT is something that we can take based on situational conditions, like with Mexican gangs, we're not going to get shit from Pastuns 8000 miles away.  Here SIGINT should have delivered 95+%.  Particularly with the Paki infiltrations  It emits, you kill it.  Problem largely solved.  S/F....Ken M 

[Stuart Galbraith]

Actually the US used to do it very well, in the early 1980's before Aldrich Aimes rolled them all up. Or the early 1960's before James Jesus Angleton fucked it all up with the wilderness of mirrors. The problem is not your skill at recruiting useful sources, you are great at that, when left alone to do it. The historic problem is paying your public servants enough that they dont feel the need to sell to the highest bidder.

The CIA feels comfortable with sigint. Its not messy, you are guaranteed a particularly output for a financial input. It keeps shareholders in rocket and satellite producers happy. Nobody gets arrested and tortured on camera. But in a society that is feudal, that doesnt rely on technology to the degree we do, its often useless. Hence the reason why drone strikes seem to so often fail.

But the US doesnt need to rely on its own HUMINT sources, it can rely on that of its allies whom seemingly are much better at it because, being poor, they cant rely on the technical top end. The problem is there that the past few years where the US has been blowing its trumpet that it doesnt need any allies, probably has not greased the rails for getting better intelligence cooperation. The debacle of the widthdrawal from Kabul still less so.

Doesnt it make anyone stop to think why Guantanamo remained open for so long? It wasnt because they were scared of terrorists. Its because it was   their number 1 intelligence source on who was who in Al Qaeda. Who do they have now, now that that is largely closed, and the prison camps in Afghanistan have been overrun?

[RETAC21]

8 hours ago, EchoFiveMike said:

I have no idea why anyone would think that we could ever become proficient at HUMINT, nor why we would ever consider it a primary focus of intelligence.  HUMINT is a function of the exploitation of long term relationships and loyalties, think UK/Germany, Israeli/Arabs, etc.  The US doesn't have that, can't have that really, it's more a mechanism to be used against us than to be used by us. 

You think we didn't do it well for the last 50+ yrs, we know this and yet we still don't do it well simply do to lack of effort?  HUMINT is something that we can take based on situational conditions, like with Mexican gangs, we're not going to get shit from Pastuns 8000 miles away.  Here SIGINT should have delivered 95+%.  Particularly with the Paki infiltrations  It emits, you kill it.  Problem largely solved.  S/F....Ken M 

While I agree with HUMINT not being the primary focus, it's not particularly difficult to obtain it in feudal conditions like those of Afghanistan, as each clan seeks to screw its neighbours. But HUMINT is hard because it requires analysis of the motivations of the source, while SIGINT is easy in the sense that this analysis can be left to computers.

[JWB]

22 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

So why would the helicopter pilots or the Tucanos for that matter, risk their lives and the machines (which were tetering on the edge of unserviceabilty due to the pullout of contractors) for a regime.................

Not for a regime. For a country. Otherwise it is cowardice

[RETAC21]

48 minutes ago, JWB said:

Not for a regime. For a country. Otherwise it is cowardice

Afghanistan is no country, see the lecture I posted above. It's a bunch of tribes under a common banner.

[Angrybk]

11 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

While I agree with HUMINT not being the primary focus, it's not particularly difficult to obtain it in feudal conditions like those of Afghanistan, as each clan seeks to screw its neighbours. But HUMINT is hard because it requires analysis of the motivations of the source, while SIGINT is easy in the sense that this analysis can be left to computers.

Brits (for example) were amazing at humint when running their empire with vastly greater effective distances, no tech advantages we have, etc. just because we suck at it doesn’t mean it’s impossible. It needs people who stay in the AO for a very long time and have some degree of autonomy. 

[Nobu]

13 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

But the US doesnt need to rely on its own HUMINT sources, it can rely on that of its allies whom seemingly are much better at it because, being poor, they cant rely on the technical top end.

I would have enjoyed seeing the Mossad operating in full retaliatory mode against the Taliban, AQ, and bin Laden's clan, with its political and operating cover guaranteed by Washington.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Joo's in Afghanistan I think would not have gone down well. But yes, we could do with some Mossad creativity.

Drone strike the other day, Pentagon admitted it didnt have any people on the ground. So I guess we can see the future of over the horizon antiterrorist strikes right from the start.