The Montreux Convention on the Black Sea Straits

[BansheeOne]

Prompted by both the current reheating of the Ukraine conflict and Erdogan's plans for an alternate canal which would get around the convention's rules, criticism of which just got a couple of retired Turkish admirals arrested:

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MON APR 5, 2021 / 12:48 PM EDT

Turkey detains 10 retired admirals who defended maritime accord

(Reuters) - Turkey detained 10 retired admirals for signing a statement supporting an 85-year-old maritime accord, and President Tayyip Erdogan said on Monday the document went beyond freedom of expression and implied a coup.

The statement, signed by more than a hundred former high-ranking navy personnel, voiced concern that the Montreux Convention could be debated or abandoned after having played an important role in Turkey's security and past neutrality.

Government officials responded by accusing them of conspiring against the constitutional order, and Erdogan said the statement was unacceptable given Turkey's history of military coups.

[...] 

Montreux, signed in 1936, gives Turkey control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits within its borders, and during peacetime guarantees access for civilian vessels. It also limits access of naval warships and governs foreign cargo ships.

The retired admirals defended the accord as strategically important for security, given Erdogan's authority to withdraw from such pacts. Last month, the president suddenly ditched an international accord meant to prevent violence against women.

Prosecutors accuse the admirals of conspiring against state security, news website Haberturk said. State news agency Anadolu said four other suspects were called to report to police within three days as part of the probe.

The statement came as the government moves forward with plans to construct a massive canal connecting the Black Sea north of Istanbul to the Sea of Marmara to the south, parallel to the Bosphorus.

A Turkish official has said Montreux would not cover the canal.

The secularist armed forces were once the dominant force in Turkey but Erdogan and his Islamist-rooted AK Party have eroded their influence since coming to power in 2002.

https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-security-montreux-int-idUSKBN2BS1JN

A brief recap of the essentials:

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[...]

The principal provisions of the Convention ruling the passages of vessels of war are outlined here-below:

· Aircraft carriers whether belonging to riparian states or not, can in no way pass through the Turkish Straits.

· Only submarines belonging to riparian states can pass through the Turkish Straits, for the purpose of rejoining their base in the Black Sea for the first time after their construction or purchase, or for the purpose of repair in dockyards outside the Black Sea.

· The total number and the maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces which may be in course of passage through the Turkish Straits are limited to 9 and 15.000 tons respectively. 

· The maximum aggregate tonnage which non-riparian States may have in the Black Sea is 45.000 tons.

· In this regard, the maximum aggregate tonnage of the vessels of war that one non-riparian State may have in the Black Sea is 30.000 tons.

· Vessels of war belonging to non-riparian states cannot stay more than 21 days in the Black Sea.

· Passages through the Turkish Straits are notified to Turkey through diplomatic channels prior to intended passages. The notification time is 8 days for vessels of war belonging to riparian States, and 15 days for those of non-riparian States.

https://www.mfa.gov.tr/implementation-of-the-montreux-convention.en.mfa

Of note is that the maximum tonnage for all and any single non-local fleet respectively was originally 30,000 and 20,000 tons, but was raised per the convention's provisions to their ultimate limit as tonnage of the local fleets grew. No further increase is possible under those rules, though I guess a way for outsiders (read, NATO) to bypass that would be to reflag warships to riparian members. Obviously those might not have crews with the necessary numbers and training, but I think under international law it suffices if the commanding officer is a member of the flag state's armed forces. Per UNCLOS:

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[...] 

SUBSECTION C. RULES APPLICABLE TO WARSHIPS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT SHIPS OPERATED FOR NON-COMMERCIAL PURPOSES

Article 29

Definition of warships

For the purposes of this Convention, "warship" means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.

[...] 

https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm

Establishing a separate approach would maybe not alter the tonnage and time constraints for outsider presence in the Black Sea, unless you argued that they applied only to vessels which passed through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. It might however give Turkey discretion to allow passage of ships so far prohibited, like aircraft carriers and submarines. There is also the thought that it would lead to a revision of the convention as such. 

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Revision of Montreux Convention Could Work in Moscow’s Favor

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 22

By: Paul Goble

February 9, 2021 04:38 PM Age: 2 months

The 1936 Montreux Convention governs the passage of ships between the Mediterranean and Black seas via the Turkish Straits, dictates the size of the vessels that can remain there, as well as limits how long they are allowed to stay. Now, 85 years later, this influential treaty is likely to be revised, Moscow military analyst Sergey Marzhetsky says, when Turkey completes its new Istanbul Canal, which will allow ships to bypass the northern element of the Straits—the Bosporus (although not the Dardanelles). But despite the fears of many in Russia, it is highly unlikely there will be any revision in the Convention without Turkey’s approval or that such changes will benefit the West at Russia’s expense. Instead, he argues, Ankara’s own ambitions are such that they may lead to modifications of Montreux that actually advantage the Russian Federation more than Turkey’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The reasons for that, Marzhetsky suggests in two new articles, lie in Turkey’s own longer-term interests and the ways in which these conflict with Western goals (Topcor.ru, January 27, February 8).

[...] 

Two developments have exacerbated Moscow’s concerns about Montreux in recent months, Marzhetsky says. On the one hand, Ankara is seeking to build a canal that would allow ships to transit between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea without passing through part of the Straits. Such a canal could vitiate Montreux, he argues, even though Russian officials have insisted that Montreux’s restrictions would apply to ships using the Istanbul Canal as well. And on the other hand, he points out, Ankara is pursuing a dramatic expansion in its navy. It already has the second-largest army in NATO; and it clearly wants to have a major fleet as well, one with a full-sized aircraft carrier—it is currently constructing a small one. This would allow it to project greater power not only in the Eastern Mediterranean but in the Black Sea as well (Topcor.ru, January 27, February 8).

The Russian ambassador in Ankara has insisted that the Montreux limits will survive the construction of the Istanbul Canal and apply with equal force to ships using that waterway as ones passing through the Bosporus. But the Russian military analyst counters that “this is not entirely so,” because while the appearance of the new canal will not affect the Montreux rules, it will give the Turkish government an opportunity to “raise the question about the review of the provisions of that international legal document” and argue that it no longer “corresponds to contemporary realities.” If Ankara were simply an agent of Washington, as some Russians think, that could lead to a situation in which the United States would be able to put more and larger naval vessels into the Black Sea for longer and longer periods or perhaps without any limitations at all. But Turkey is not a US proxy, Marzhetsky writes; therefore, any revisions Ankara may propose or agree to will work to its benefit and not necessarily for its Western allies.

Ankara sees no advantage to a larger presence in the Black Sea (or the Eastern Mediterranean) of ships from the US, the United Kingdom or France. They would only encumber Turkey’s aspirations to be the dominant player in the region. What this means, the Russian analyst predicts, is that “Turkey will solely seek to exclude from the [Montreux Convention] limits the passage through its Straits of aircraft carriers not carrying nuclear weapons.” That way, Turkey could freely send its aircraft carriers and possibly also submarines into the Black Sea; but the US, the UK and France could not. Thus, Washington, London and Paris would not be beneficiaries from any change, and Moscow would not be a big loser, Marzhetsky says. In fact, it could be a beneficiary because its civilian fleet would be able to make use of the new canal, avoiding the crowded Bosporus route.

“In other words,” the Russian military analyst contends, “if Turkey does revise Montreux, it will do so to its own benefit” and no one else’s. Those treaty modifications will not be all that welcome in Russia on principle, but the results will certainly not be the tragedy some are suggesting. And that gives Moscow the opportunity to side with Turkey against the West on revising the 1936 convention, something that Turkey will welcome and that will help to further distance Ankara from Western capitals—yet another development Moscow can profit from. If others in Moscow accept this argument, it could mean the Kremlin will now ally itself with Ankara on this issue. Such a move could create new problems and tensions within the transatlantic alliance.

https://jamestown.org/program/revision-of-montreux-convention-could-work-in-moscows-favor/

More on the conflicted Russian stance from the same source:

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Moscow Now Says Montreux Convention Vital to Defense of Yalta-Potsdam World

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 16 Issue: 134

By: Paul Goble

October 1, 2019 04:42 PM Age: 2 years

Moscow has seemingly long wanted to have it both ways (see EDM, April 2, 23) on the Montreux Convention, which governs naval passage through the Turkish Straits (the Bosporus and the Dardanelles). On the one hand, Russia has cast itself as a supporter of this agreement when it works to its advantage but, on the other hand, ignored and worked to undermine it when the accord did not. However, because any high-level discussion of this treaty carries with it the risk of sparking a serious conflict between Moscow and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Russian government typically uses its officials in occupied Crimea to present its constantly evolving positions on the 1936 agreement. These changes reflect Moscow’s desire to keep the West off balance. And the latest such use of a Crimean official came at a September 2019 conference on Black Sea security, held by the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow.

Senator Olga Kovitili, who represents Russian-occupied Crimea in the Russian Federation Council (upper chamber of parliament), told the meeting that “turbulence in present-day political processes, the destruction of the Yalta-Potsdam model of international relations, and the imposition by the United States of the model of ‘unipolar globalization’ ” have come together to make the Black Sea a focal point of international tensions. Consequently, she said, the preservation of the Montreux Convention is essential for the future security of Russia and its neighbors (Blackseafleet-21.com, September 27). Her mention of Yalta and Potsdam underscores that her words reflect not her personal opinion but that of the Kremlin, which has long argued that the world must be governed without any revision of the results of World War II (RT, September 21, 2019; see EDM, February 26, 2015).

[...] 

Last spring, Moscow appeared to have come down on the side of pushing for a revision of Montreux or even scrapping the agreement altogether. Yevgeny Satanovsky, an influential Moscow-based commentator, argued that the Montreux Convention must be scrapped and Russian control over the Straits established so that NATO ships cannot freely enter and exit the Black Sea (Rueconomics.ru, April 20). Additionally, Moscow openly flaunted the agreement’s provisions. The Ukrainian embassy in Washington called attention to one such incident in a Non-Paper that detailed how the Russian Black Sea Fleet sent a submarine through the Turkish Straits to the Mediterranean. Moscow declared that the vessel was in transit to St. Petersburg, where a Russian submarine repair facility is located (Usni.org, March 18). But that claim, the Ukrainian embassy says, was false: in fact, there is “a high probability” that the missile-armed submarine was engaged in a rotation with a Russian submarine belonging to Russia’s Mediterranean naval task force. Such an action, the embassy declare, “constitute[s] a breach” of the Montreux Convention (“Topic: A breach of the Montreux Convention by Russian Federation,” Non-Paper, Embassy of the Republic of Ukraine in Washington, DC, April 17; see EDM, April 23).

Now, just six months later, as Kovitili’s highly publicized statement shows, Moscow has again shifted its position on the convention, possibly convinced that it has more to gain vis-à-vis Ankara and the West by presenting itself as a defender of Montreux than by flouting the agreement’s provisions to show the world that Russia can and will act as it likes. However, this latest shift is unlikely to be the end of the story. Instead, Russia may reverse its position again, making such statements about Montreux an important barometer of its broader assessment of the world and Russia’s place in it.

https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-now-says-montreux-convention-vital-to-defense-of-yalta-potsdam-world/

[Yama]

Erdogan is wrong, the Convention specifically says that 'the Straits' includes Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara.

[BansheeOne]

Yeah, but I think the reasoning is that since the new canal isn't mentioned, the whole thing would have to be renegotiated under Articles 28 and 29 of the convention, at the risk of no follow-on at all. The fear of the admirals seems to be that Erdogan will take the opportunity to denounce it, just like he quit the Istanbul Convention against violence on women immediately prior. 

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[...] 

Article 28.

The present Convention shall remain in force for twenty years from the date of its entry into force.

The principle of freedom of transit and navigation affirmed in Article I of the present Convention shall however continue without limit of time.

If, two years prior to the expiry of the said period of twenty years, no High Contracting Party shall have given notice of denunciation to the French Government the present Convention shall continue in force until two years after such notice shall have been given. Any such notice shall be communicated by the French Government to the High Contracting Parties.

In the event of the present Convention being denounced in accordance with the provisions of the present Article, the High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference for the purpose of concluding a new Convention.

Article 29.

At the expiry of each period of five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention each of the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to initiate a proposal for amending one or more of the provisions of the present Convention.

To be valid, any request for revision formulated by one of the High Contracting Parties must be supported, in the case of modifications to Articles 14 or 18, by one other High Contracting Party, and, in the case of modifications to any other Article, by two other High Contracting Parties.

Any request for revision thus supported must be notified to all the High Contracting Parties three months prior to the expiry of the current period of five years. This notification shall contain details of the proposed amendments and the reasons which have given rise to them.

Should it be found impossible to reach an agreement on these proposals through the diplomatic channel, the High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference to be summoned for this purpose.

Such a conference may only take decisions by a unanimous vote, except as regards cases of revision involving Articles 14 and 18, for which a majority of three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties shall be sufficient.

The said majority shall include three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties which are Black Sea Powers, including Turkey.

[...] 

https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Montreux_Convention

[Stuart Galbraith]

If aircraft carriers are not allowed, how did Kuznetsov and Varyag transit it?

[TrustMe]

It's not a Carrier it's a Large Aircraft Carrying Cruiser 😃

[BansheeOne]

Yeah, that's this nice squishy loophole in Annex II of the convention:

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(2) Aircraft-Carriers are surface vessels of war, whatever their displacement, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea. The fitting of a landing on or flying off deck on any vessel of war, provided such vessel has not been designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea, shall not cause any vessel so fitted to be classified in the category of aircraft-carriers.

 

[RETAC21]

7 minutes ago, BansheeOne said:

Yeah, that's this nice squishy loophole in Annex II of the convention:

 

well, treaties are only something more than words in a paper if someone is willing to enforce them...

[Josh]

What I don't understand is why bypassing or removing the Treaty is of any advantage to Turkey? Why would they want other powers like the US, UK, and Russia to have a larger presence or freedom of movement in the Black Sea? How is their navy in anyway seriously constrained by it?

[TrustMe]

Why would they want other powers like the US, UK, and Russia to have a larger presence or freedom of movement in the Black Sea?

I can answer this question. Basically the Black sea is controlled by Russia (and the USSR before it). They consider it there turf, and have plenty of SSK's and land based aircraft (including bombers) to destroy any NATO ship that step's foot in it. 

 

[Yama]

2 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

If aircraft carriers are not allowed, how did Kuznetsov and Varyag transit it?

It's a bit more complicated than that. The Convention permits Black Sea powers to transit capital ships and light warships through the Straits, but makes no mention of aircraft carriers, which are explicitly defined as 'not capital ships'. Non-Black Sea powers are limited by strict tonnage limits which for practical purposes excludes sending aircraft carriers through (in theory however a small carrier could be sent in accordance of the Convention).

None of the Black Sea powers had any kind of aircraft carriers at the time of Convention, nor were planning to build them, so this was probably just an oversight. The wording was literally copypasted from London Naval Treaty.

[BansheeOne]

Damn, you're right; I never noted. Submarines are expressively mentioned, but aircraft carriers only show up as a definition in the annex, without specific mention in the actual articles. Those only state that ships shall not make use of aircraft they carry while in transit. Essentially the convention says "you can send both light and capital vessels through, but aircraft carriers are a separate category and fall under neither of the above. I think the "whatever their displacement" description even rules out the smallest carriers. The point that they just copied in the definitions of the 1936 London Naval Treaty would also explain the redundant definition for the purposes of the convention that capital ships are those either above 10,000 tons or with guns of more than eight inch, or not more than 8,000 tons and guns with more than that caliber. That might be relevant for the classes of light and heavy cruisers under the London Treaty, but not here.

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[...]

SECTION II. VESSELS OF WAR.

Article 8.

For the purposes of the present Convention, the definitions of vessels of war and of their specification together with those relating to the calculation of tonnage shall be as set forth in Annex II to the present Convention.

Article 9.

[Naval auxiliary vessels]

Article 10.

In time of peace, light surface vessels, minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, and whatever their flag, shall enjoy freedom of transit through the Straits without any taxes or charges whatever, provided that such transit is begun during daylight and subject to the conditions laid down in Article 13 and the Articles following thereafter.

Vessels of war other than those which fall within the categories specified in the preceding paragraph shall only enjoy a right of transit under the special conditions provided by Articles 11 and 12.

Article 11.

Black Sea Powers may send through the Straits capital ships of a tonnage greater than that laid down in the first paragraph of Article 14, on condition that these vessels pass through the Straits singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers.

Article 12.

[Submarines]

Article 13.

[Notification]

Article 14.

The maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces which may be in course of transit through the Straits shall not exceed 15,000 tons, except in the cases provided for in Article 11 and in Annex III to the present Convention.

The forces specified in the preceding paragraph shall not, however, comprise more than nine vessels.

Vessels whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, paying visits to a port in the Straits, in accordance with the provisions of Article 17, shall not be included in this tonnage.

Neither shall vessels of war which have suffered damage during their passage through the Straits be included in this tonnage; such vessels, while undergoing repair, shall be subject to any special provisions relating to security laid down by Turkey.

Article 15.

Vessels of war in transit through the Straits shall in no circumstances make use of any aircraft which they may be carrying.

[...]

ANNEX II.

A. STANDARD DISPLACEMENT.

[...]

B. CATEGORIES.

(1) Capital Ships are surface vessels of war belonging to one of the two following sub-categories:

(a) Surface vessels of war, other than aircraft-carriers, auxiliary vessels, or capital ships of sub-category (b), the standard displacement of which exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) or which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.);

(b) Surface vessels of war, other than aircraft-carriers, the standard displacement of which does not esceed 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons) and which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.).

(2) Aircraft-Carriers are surface vessels of war, whatever their displacement, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea. The fitting of a landing on or flying off deck on any vessel of war, provided such vessel has not been designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea, shall not cause any vessel so fitted to be classified in the category of aircraft-carriers.

The wording of the present Annex is taken from the London Naval Treaty of March 25th, 1936.

The category of aircraft-carriers is divided into two sub-categories as follows:

(a) Vessels fitted with a flight deck, from which aircraft can take off, or on which aircraft can land from the air;

(b) Vessels not fitted with a flight deck as described in (a) above.

[...]

 

[wilhelm]

13 hours ago, Yama said:

It's a bit more complicated than that. The Convention permits Black Sea powers to transit capital ships and light warships through the Straits, but makes no mention of aircraft carriers, which are explicitly defined as 'not capital ships'. Non-Black Sea powers are limited by strict tonnage limits which for practical purposes excludes sending aircraft carriers through (in theory however a small carrier could be sent in accordance of the Convention).

None of the Black Sea powers had any kind of aircraft carriers at the time of Convention, nor were planning to build them, so this was probably just an oversight. The wording was literally copypasted from London Naval Treaty.

Hmm... so technically, the many opinions expressed that the Soviets, as a Black Sea power, could not send carriers through were incorrect?

This actually makes perfect sense. The Soviets laid down the 80 000t Ulyanovsk carrier in Nikolayev in the Black Sea, to follow on the Kuznetsov class. I had always suspected that the way the treaty was presented in some quarters could thus not be correct.

Thanks for the interesting info.

 

Edited April 10, 2021 by wilhelm

[Stuart Galbraith]

14 hours ago, Yama said:

It's a bit more complicated than that. The Convention permits Black Sea powers to transit capital ships and light warships through the Straits, but makes no mention of aircraft carriers, which are explicitly defined as 'not capital ships'. Non-Black Sea powers are limited by strict tonnage limits which for practical purposes excludes sending aircraft carriers through (in theory however a small carrier could be sent in accordance of the Convention).

None of the Black Sea powers had any kind of aircraft carriers at the time of Convention, nor were planning to build them, so this was probably just an oversight. The wording was literally copypasted from London Naval Treaty.

Thanks for that. So a Nimitz class carrier could not transit the straits, but say, and Invincible class Carrier might?

[BansheeOne]

38 minutes ago, wilhelm said:

Hmm... so technically, the many opinions expressed that the Soviets, as a Black Sea power, could not send carriers through were incorrect?

This actually makes perfect sense. The Soviets laid down the 80 000t Ulyanovsk carrier in Nikolayev in the Black Sea, to follow on the Kuznetsov class. I had always suspected that the way the treaty was presented in some quarters could thus not be correct.

Thanks for the interesting info.

I initially took it that way too, and puzzled whether the "aircraft carriers can pass in no way" was just a bold Turkish statement on their foreign ministry's website I linked to in the original post. However, upon closer reading it appears the trap is indeed that the articles mention both light and capital vessels as having transit rights, but the annex defines aircraft carriers as something that isn't either; ergo, since they are not stated to have a right to passage, they have none.

Per Russian Wiki, even the Ulyanovsk was officially termed a "nuclear-powered heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser", and of course would have carried a substantial missile armament including SS-N-19. Of course the fiction was wearing very thin at that point because by all appearance, she was clearly "designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea", what with a full flight deck operating supersonic fighters. In fact it would have been interesting to see how Turkey and the other signatories to the convention would have handled it, though I suspect it would have been allowed in the mutual interest of not rocking the boat (ha) too much. At least at a quick search I don't find any indication the West was working itself up to indignation over the further bending of rules.

Also thought of the Invincibles. The design was of course initially termed a "through-deck cruiser" with a Sea Dart launcher forward, for different political reasons. But their standard displacement was already 16,000 tons, so in excess of the 15,000-ton limit for non-local fleets which didn't apply to locals like the USSR. The earlier design steps from the 60s that were about 60-90 percent of the eventual size would have fit, but been very marginal for Harrier use; the iteration with a full displacement of 12,500 tons (so probably about 10,000 standard) would have been similar to the Italian helicopter cruiser Vittorio Veneto with a flight deck aft carrying six Sea King, the subsequent one of 17,500 tons (maybe 14,000 standard) was the first with a through-deck for nine helicopters.

Even the penultimate design of 19,000 tons full gained another 800 tons to lengthen the flight deck and improve Harrier performance after it was decided to put those on. However, Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi with barely over 10,000 tons standard and her armament including Otomat anti-ship missiles and ASW torpedo tubes would have fit, and could even have taken one or two escorts along; she was also termed an aircraft carrying cruiser and did in fact not operate Harriers before the 1937 law giving the Italian Air Force sole control of fixed-wing aircraft was changed in 1989, but her flight deck was actually a bit longer than the Invincibles' (173 vs. 168 meters). I'm not aware of her ever visiting the Black Sea though.

[wilhelm]

I thought so too, being aware of the missile armament and designation of the Kuznetsov class. However, the Ulyanovsk was really very near to the Nimitz class in terms of size and aircraft capacity.

It beggars belief they would construct Ulyanovsk just to remain in what was, in global terms, a pond. So the glaring anomaly of the situation always intrigued me...something Yama has shed light on.

Of course, this has interesting ramifications to the Zaliv shipyard.

[Yama]

On 4/10/2021 at 2:25 PM, BansheeOne said:

I initially took it that way too, and puzzled whether the "aircraft carriers can pass in no way" was just a bold Turkish statement on their foreign ministry's website I linked to in the original post. However, upon closer reading it appears the trap is indeed that the articles mention both light and capital vessels as having transit rights, but the annex defines aircraft carriers as something that isn't either; ergo, since they are not stated to have a right to passage, they have none.

This is the Turkish interpretation. However there is also another school of thought based on legalistic principle "If something is not explicitly forbidden, it is allowed". Nowhere does Convention explicitly forbid carriers passing through, either. Since it has never gone to court, it is impossible to say which view would prevail.

Any way, Moskvas and Kievs were very much just huge cruisers with some aircraft capability tacked on. So from POV of Longon 1936 and Convention, they were really 'capital ships'. With Kuznetsov and Ulyanovsk, they're clearly getting more into 'bona fide aircraft carrier' territory. However, the Soviets don't seem to have been too worried about Turkey suddenly barring their passage. Probably because Turkey had already allowed Kievs through, they must have felt pretty secure that any international court would rule in their favour. They could have easily built the carriers in Baltic yards, where the Kirovs were built, if it really came down to that.

Any way, I am certain that the whole aircraft carrier issue in Convention was just an oversight which nobody thought at the time, rather than some brilliant foresight to stop passages of aircraft carriers. If the aircraft carriers would become an issue, the Convention would be amended or renegotiated, simple as that. I don't think anyone thought it would remain in force in original form decade after decade.

[RETAC21]

On 4/10/2021 at 2:27 PM, wilhelm said:

I thought so too, being aware of the missile armament and designation of the Kuznetsov class. However, the Ulyanovsk was really very near to the Nimitz class in terms of size and aircraft capacity.

It beggars belief they would construct Ulyanovsk just to remain in what was, in global terms, a pond. So the glaring anomaly of the situation always intrigued me...something Yama has shed light on.

Of course, this has interesting ramifications to the Zaliv shipyard.

The designations weren't put in place to please the Turks, but to get around the mental blocks in the Party leadership that equalled "aircraft carrier" to "Capitalist nuclear mobile silo", which may be a bias inherited from Stalin (who loved cruisers no matter how big) and Khruschev (who dislikesd all big ships anyway and just wanted missiles). The Kievs were, to a large measure, a product of such irrationality, having missiles and an air group composed of attack aircraft, trusting their SAMs and cannon to do air defence.

[Josh]

The Yaks were very marginal in the attack and the Kievs still had a large battery of SSMs on the bow as the primary offensive weapon. I think the class could be best described as 'learning how to crawl before you run'. The Yaks were only good for point defense against unarmed MPAs; they wouldn't even have detected opponent USN or land based fighters before being shot down. An F-8 would have done circles around them.

Edited April 12, 2021 by Josh

[Yama]

Yak-38 was primarily meant for strike & recon with secondary role in air defence, including chasing off or shooting down enemy AWACS aircraft (!). Think of it like equivalent of the original Etendard but with vertical takeoff. Its warload was light but it could carry AS-7 missiles.

As RETAC21 said, the thought process which resulted to these ships was long and tortuous (not completely unlike one behind RN 'through deck cruisers'). Basically, Moskvas were designed as pure ASW cruisers: then Yak-36 was presented and some within the Navy began to see it as an opening for aircraft carriers which they had long argued for. Soviet Navy did do studies and proposals for CTOL carriers but they went nowhere at the time. So the follow-up class had little something to please everyone, resulting to a large and expensive ship which could perform at every role but wasn't particularly great at any of them.

Marvellous footage of Kievs and Yak-38 operations. Those vertical takeoffs are a doozy!