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Alternate History- What if Hitler had not invaded Russia, would Germany still control Western Europe today?


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3 hours ago, Rick said:

Curiosity question and I apologize if this has been addressed in earlier comments. Would any significant change in the outcome of Germany vs the Soviets would have occurred if the following three things did occur. I ask this because it seems to me the Germany - Soviet Union war was the most decisive one in the Second World War and I realize virtually everyone on this Grate Site has more knowledge on this than I. 

Germany did not invade the Balkans, North Africa, and Scandinavia and said forces were used against the Soviets?

Germany did not pause -- I think it was in the summer  -- before they resumed their drive toward Moscow? 

Moscow was captured before the winter of 1941?

One last question. Was the Germany Navy in WW2 a waste of men, money, and material?

If the additional manpower is used correctly, it might have made a difference. Not as a fighting force but when used to more quickly repair and improve the resupply lines to the front. Capturing Moscow imho is impossible as the structure of the city would make it impossible to really take control as long the the Red Army is fighting and organized campaign.

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17 hours ago, R011 said:

Having actually moved cargo by hand in Egypt in the summer, I can say that one ton per man per day is about right.  WE could actually do a bit better because we were able to load onto pallets which were moved by forklifts, technology not really in use in Europe at the time and barely being used in America.  

Having also unloaded container cargo material by hand in heavy heat, I would tend to agree with this in general.   That's why for 3,000 tons I assumed 3,000 guys.  Do note that night debarkation has its advantages, assuming the Axis are smart enough to understand the concept of luminescent paint. 

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After that, you need a replacement to continue unloading due to exhaustion.  This was in a garrison with plenty of food and water, much of which including all the water was locally sources.  Supporting us was nearly our own strength in administration and logistics to keep us fed, housed, and paid.  The Axis would save somewhat on that as they could use disposable forced labour that they barely had to feed but would need to guard  - the guards themselves needing support.

Um, no, I'm pretty sure an Axis army of 300,000 fit and healthy young men can find 3,000 of them suitable for this type of work.  

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6 hours ago, Rick said:

Curiosity question and I apologize if this has been addressed in earlier comments. Would any significant change in the outcome of Germany vs the Soviets would have occurred if the following three things did occur. I ask this because it seems to me the Germany - Soviet Union war was the most decisive one in the Second World War and I realize virtually everyone on this Grate Site has more knowledge on this than I. 

Germany did not invade the Balkans, North Africa, and Scandinavia and said forces were used against the Soviets?

By July 1941, there were just 7 German divisions in the Balkans and Greece, 2 in North Africa, and 7 in Norway, so 18 of 209 divisions...8.6% of the total.

So no invasion of the Balkans or German support in North Africa means:

Yugoslavia remains anti-Reich and increases ties with Britain, ditto Greece, which defeats Italy and probably seizes Albania. Crete becomes a giant British base, dominating the eastern Med and threatening the Romanian refineries. Italy also is utterly defeated in North Africa and Tripolitania is seized by the British, relieving any threat to Malta. The likely outcome is the overthrow of the Mussolini government. The actions of the French in North Africa would become interesting.

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Germany did not pause -- I think it was in the summer  -- before they resumed their drive toward Moscow? 

Every such offensive required a logistical pause, which doesn't just mean resupply of consumables. There is this strange predilection by some to view the German campaign in the east in summer 1941 as some sort of nearly bloodless romp for the Wehrmacht. It wasn't. A few examples...

In six days, 20-26 July, AOK 4.'s VII A-K lost 727 KIA, 2867 WIA, and 171 MIA in seizing the Mogiliev bridgehead.

In the 34 days to 26 July, 2. PzGp's 3. Pz-Div lost 2,300 men, 4. Pz-Div 1,300, and 10. Inf-Div (mot) 1,800 men, and its XXXXVI. Pz-K 4,000 casualties.

Overall, the fighting in July cost the Ostheer 158,619, not including forces in Norway and Finland. The Luftwaffe suffered another 4,090 and even the Kriegsmarine 2,351 casualties.

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Moscow was captured before the winter of 1941?

Unlikely, but such a capture would have so overextended the German strength available then and cost so many additional casualties that the aftermath would likely have more resembled the winter of 1812/1813 than the winter of 1941/1942.

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One last question. Was the Germany Navy in WW2 a waste of men, money, and material?

No.

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W/o attempting to push Yugoslavia into signing Tripartite pact there would be no pro-Ally coup and pro-German group would remain influential enough that Yugoslavia would remain neutral, but willing to trade with Germany at least until Germany encountered significant difficulties in winter 1941-42.

Which would also coincidence with Peter II being 18 (September 1941) meaning that prince Paul would be far less influential, further weakening pro-German camp.

I doubt that pro-Allied group would go as far as declaring war or even stopping exports to Germany (they did not want to do that in real history after seizing power), but there would be definite degradation of relations.

Edited by bojan
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8 hours ago, Rick said:

Germany did not invade the Balkans, North Africa, and Scandinavia and said forces were used against the Soviets?

 

Invading Scandinavia was essentially a necessary for Germany as otherwise they would have had their most important iron supply cut off. So there is really no way of getting around it, one way or another.

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On 2/20/2021 at 9:36 AM, Stuart Galbraith said:

It was a forgone conclusion as long as the allies didnt do anything stupid. Such as,

Landing in France before 1944.

Invading Yugoslavia.

Invading Spain.

Invading Romania.

Not put 100 percent into replacing allied shipping.

All things which were considered at some point, some more seriously than others :) I don't agree with the notion that Allied victory was predetermined. Obviously they would have needed to work much harder to screw it all up, but it would have been possible.

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5 hours ago, Yama said:

All things which were considered at some point, some more seriously than others :) I don't agree with the notion that Allied victory was predetermined. Obviously they would have needed to work much harder to screw it all up, but it would have been possible.

Nor do I. My problem is that too many "strategies" for German victory are complex, multi-layered tweakings of reality, based upon hindsight, with all potential objections/problems hand waved away, and frequently exhibit little attention to historical facts...when they do not depend on ASB intervention to work.

 

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8 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

By July 1941, there were just 7 German divisions in the Balkans and Greece, 2 in North Africa, and 7 in Norway, so 18 of 209 divisions...8.6% of the total.

So no invasion of the Balkans or German support in North Africa means:

Yugoslavia remains anti-Reich and increases ties with Britain, ditto Greece, which defeats Italy and probably seizes Albania. Crete becomes a giant British base, dominating the eastern Med and threatening the Romanian refineries. Italy also is utterly defeated in North Africa and Tripolitania is seized by the British, relieving any threat to Malta. The likely outcome is the overthrow of the Mussolini government. The actions of the French in North Africa would become interesting.

Every such offensive required a logistical pause, which doesn't just mean resupply of consumables. There is this strange predilection by some to view the German campaign in the east in summer 1941 as some sort of nearly bloodless romp for the Wehrmacht. It wasn't. A few examples...

In six days, 20-26 July, AOK 4.'s VII A-K lost 727 KIA, 2867 WIA, and 171 MIA in seizing the Mogiliev bridgehead.

In the 34 days to 26 July, 2. PzGp's 3. Pz-Div lost 2,300 men, 4. Pz-Div 1,300, and 10. Inf-Div (mot) 1,800 men, and its XXXXVI. Pz-K 4,000 casualties.

Overall, the fighting in July cost the Ostheer 158,619, not including forces in Norway and Finland. The Luftwaffe suffered another 4,090 and even the Kriegsmarine 2,351 casualties.

Unlikely, but such a capture would have so overextended the German strength available then and cost so many additional casualties that the aftermath would likely have more resembled the winter of 1812/1813 than the winter of 1941/1942.

No.

Thank you as always Rich for the -- new to me -- facts. Would you elaborate on your answer on the German Navy?

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4 hours ago, Rick said:

Thank you as always Rich for the -- new to me -- facts. Would you elaborate on your answer on the German Navy?

You're welcome.

The Kriegsmarine was in theory a viable threat - as a raiding or guerre de course navy - so was not a "waste of men, money, and material". Much of it was built and trained prewar, long before the scope of the war or its course could be anticipated. Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht made the right decision to cancel much of the construction program almost immediately, restricting itself to completing vessels pretty much well on the way to completion...at a point where for many of them scrapping would have been as expensive in a sense as completing them would be. The problem for the large surface ships is that the way they expected they would operate - on extended cruises to destroy commerce, while running away from opposition - simply didn't work as well in WW2 as it did in the Great War. The Panzerschiffe were simply not as economical as the Emden or Seeadler and weren't much more successful, while the means of countering them got better and better as radar and sea and land-based air narrowed the envelope they could survive in.

It could be argued that the large building program for the U-Boot was a waste, except they again could not know it before they tried it. Again, the problem was the Allied countermeasures were too good and its shipping building capacity far outstripped the German ability to field large numbers of U-Boot and effective crew. Plus the supposed success of the arm early on during the first "Lucky Time" and then the second off the American coast seduced the Germans into believing that if they just were able to turn the corner they would win...except the corner kept getting further and further away. 

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3 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

You're welcome.

The Kriegsmarine was in theory a viable threat - as a raiding or guerre de course navy - so was not a "waste of men, money, and material". Much of it was built and trained prewar, long before the scope of the war or its course could be anticipated. Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht made the right decision to cancel much of the construction program almost immediately, restricting itself to completing vessels pretty much well on the way to completion...at a point where for many of them scrapping would have been as expensive in a sense as completing them would be. The problem for the large surface ships is that the way they expected they would operate - on extended cruises to destroy commerce, while running away from opposition - simply didn't work as well in WW2 as it did in the Great War. The Panzerschiffe were simply not as economical as the Emden or Seeadler and weren't much more successful, while the means of countering them got better and better as radar and sea and land-based air narrowed the envelope they could survive in.

I fully agree on your second point, but this first one, I believe, assumes an strategic foresight that wasn't there in the case of the navy. The Deutschlands could be said to be the only ships built for commerce raiding, although not by choice, but under the pressure of the Versailles clauses.

After that the navy went for big ships that would be too expensive to be built in numbers, too prestigious to risk and too few in number against its projected enemies (a mistake repeated by the Soviet Navy in the 80s), where commerce raiding was a use that was incidental rather than a design feature, let me explain:

- The Schanhorst: an improved Deutschland, built to counter the French Dunkerques that sacrificed range for firepower and protection, on the idea that they could protect German trade from the French battlecruisers. Due to their origins, the proved to be the more suitable ships for commerce raiding

- The light cruisers: These were a waste of resources, the best that can be said of them was that they served as training ships, but they were built with a re-run of Jutland as their rationale, and that didn't make sense for WW2 Germany, as there was no battlefleet to protect from destroyers or scout ahead, and they were too weak to risk in raiding against RN or French cruisers

- The Hipper class: As useless as they were pretty, thanks to the risky decisions regarding their machinery, the KM wasn't too sure what to do with them either, and the last 2 were to have a 15cm battery that would have made them more useful in the Artic, but that's would only be obvious at a point in the war in which the whole surface fleet would be thought as less than useful (1942-43)

- The Bismarcks: These were really useful as a fleet in being and as a menace to British or French trading routes, but they consumed so many resources there would never be enough of them

- The destroyers: another area where the Germans thought they were going to fight WW1, so they over armed them, at the price of seakeeping, when going for a smaller, standard design would likely pay off in bigger numbers, which were going to be needed in any war.

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Dilemma of Kriegsmarine was well recognized by KM itself and fiercely debated even before the war. With little in way of legacy fleet and distant third in priority between services, facing overwhelming superiority from most likely opponents, there were just no clear good answers. Should they build pure commerce raiding fleet, or a fleet which maybe could take on France, or start building 'second to none' major power fleet which could take on Royal Navy? In the end, sort of compromise was reached where little bit of everything was done. Now, in hindsight - and this has been particularly popular with amateur what-ifers - submarines seem like an blatant choice. But it was not so obvious then. U-Boats had been defeated in WW1 by convoy system and increasing aerial threat, and since then, ASDIC was invented. Most extreme positions thought that ASDIC would make submarines almost obsolete. Also, cold hard fact is that generalized surface warfare ships are needed to some degree anyway, regardless of whether your main aim is at Mahanist fleet action or jeune école commerce raiding or just completely static Baltic-style coastal defence.

In practice, big problem for Kriegsmarine was that the fleet was very heterogenic. There were ships which were good at commerce raiding but bad as general purpose fleet units. There were ships which were vice versa, and some which were in-between. There were ships which could do coast defence but nothing else. And then there were ships which were just good at nothing, like Type 1935/37 torpedo boats. It was hard to put together properly functional task forces which led to many failures particularly in North Atlantic and Arctic convoy battles.

In technical sense, German shipdesign suffered from 'underdog syndrome', a phenomenon not unique for them but particularly strongly manifested there. Basically, we have less resources so our ships (tank, aircraft) must be better and smarter. This led to attempts to produce very ambitious and powerful vessels which often ended up overloaded, unseaworthy, expensive, technically unreliable or combination thereof.

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17 minutes ago, Yama said:

Dilemma of Kriegsmarine was well recognized by KM itself and fiercely debated even before the war. With little in way of legacy fleet and distant third in priority between services, facing overwhelming superiority from most likely opponents, there were just no clear good answers. Should they build pure commerce raiding fleet, or a fleet which maybe could take on France, or start building 'second to none' major power fleet which could take on Royal Navy? In the end, sort of compromise was reached where little bit of everything was done. Now, in hindsight - and this has been particularly popular with amateur what-ifers - submarines seem like an blatant choice. But it was not so obvious then. U-Boats had been defeated in WW1 by convoy system and increasing aerial threat, and since then, ASDIC was invented. Most extreme positions thought that ASDIC would make submarines almost obsolete. Also, cold hard fact is that generalized surface warfare ships are needed to some degree anyway, regardless of whether your main aim is at Mahanist fleet action or jeune école commerce raiding or just completely static Baltic-style coastal defence.

In practice, big problem for Kriegsmarine was that the fleet was very heterogenic. There were ships which were good at commerce raiding but bad as general purpose fleet units. There were ships which were vice versa, and some which were in-between. There were ships which could do coast defence but nothing else. And then there were ships which were just good at nothing, like Type 1935/37 torpedo boats. It was hard to put together properly functional task forces which led to many failures particularly in North Atlantic and Arctic convoy battles.

In technical sense, German shipdesign suffered from 'underdog syndrome', a phenomenon not unique for them but particularly strongly manifested there. Basically, we have less resources so our ships (tank, aircraft) must be better and smarter. This led to attempts to produce very ambitious and powerful vessels which often ended up overloaded, unseaworthy, expensive, technically unreliable or combination thereof.

I disagree on the U boats being the solution, the convoy system was still the solution to the submarine problem. Good results were achieved due to the scarcity of ocean going escorts, which couldn't be predicted as U boat numbers were boosted by the fall of France and Norway before increased production kicked in. Also the boats that would be built with the situation as it was in 1939 would be Type IXs which would consume more resources (human and material) anyway, so it would be a false dichotomy. 

Obivously with a ton of hindsight, it would make more sense to approach the problem like the Chinese do, build a few prototypes of a restricted number of classes and once problems are ironed out, go for mass production.

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13 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

Nor do I. My problem is that too many "strategies" for German victory are complex, multi-layered tweakings of reality, based upon hindsight, with all potential objections/problems hand waved away, and frequently exhibit little attention to historical facts...when they do not depend on ASB intervention to work.

 

"Don't start a land war in Asia".

 

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5 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

I fully agree on your second point, but this first one, I believe, assumes an strategic foresight that wasn't there in the case of the navy. The Deutschlands could be said to be the only ships built for commerce raiding, although not by choice, but under the pressure of the Versailles clauses.

Oh, I understand and agree completely. The problem was the split personality developed and the institutional prejudices developed. In essence, the KM was a service searching for a strategy during its prewar existence. Even the decision to finally just maintain Tirpitz and Scharnhorst as the "fleet in being" was taken late.

The twins and Hippers were developed in 1933, just as Hitler was taking control, but not funded until 1935, Bismarck and Tirpitz two years later as essentially "prestige" projects. Hitler liked them, powerful first-world European nations had powerful ships. Ditto the destroyers...they were the most powerful destroyers in the world...when they worked. At least they woke early to the limitations of the lightcruisers, especially given the large number of excellent British light cruisers they would face, but why they didn't have the same epiphany WRT to the destroyers, heavy cruisers, battleships, and carriers is a mystery. Because the real problems came when they built neato ships without a strategic vision as to what they could do with them. It was the pre-Great War dilemma all over again...how they ever imagined they could out-build the surface fleet of a likely combination of Great Britain and France (with the US sitting in the wings) is beyond me. Fo some bizarre reason they tried to rebuild the Hochseeflotte, even though that strategy had proven to be a non-starter.

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4 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

I disagree on the U boats being the solution,

Yep. The problem for the Germans was that the actual strategic solution for the KM was not to go to war in the first place. The Z-Plan wasn't a solution either, since it was a building plan without a strategic center.

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18 minutes ago, RichTO90 said:

The problem for the Germans was that the actual strategic solution for the KM was not to go to war in the first place. The Z-Plan wasn't a solution either, since it was a building plan without a strategic center.

Navies do not have the option to sit out wars that their leaders start though.

The German navy's pre-war mission was focused on the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and a dabble of commerce raiding or perhaps if the British somehow remained out of it, sparring with the French.  In this period the German navy hit above its weight, in particular by capturing Norway.  As it became clear in the summer of 1940 that Great Britain was not going to throw in the towel, the role of the German fleet suddenly expanded into more of a WW1 style total war scenario.  This was something beyond the pre-war force structure or mission scope of the navy.

Even worse for the German navy, between July and December 1940 Hitler rejected a naval strategy and turned east.  The opportunity presented by the fall of France to recalibrate the German navy towards a strategic mission was cut off at the knees by this decision, and it reverted to its 1939-1940 localized role with surface forces, leaving the submarines to provide the bulk of the total war mission.  By turning east, the possibility of combined armed tactics was eliminated.  The submarines operating on their own in the Atlantic were insufficient, they required support.  In this manner, the same gross error of WW1 was repeated in WW2; the submarines fought almost alone, without adequate combined arms support from the other services.

Whatever prospects the Axis navies had for a strategic mission in 1940 were ruined by the decision for Barbarossa.

Edited by glenn239
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16 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

Navies do not have the option to sit out wars that their leaders start though.

No screaming eagle shit dude. Go back to playing your guitar, its a more useful waste of time.

 

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The German navy's pre-war mission was focused on the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and a dabble of commerce raiding or perhaps if the British somehow remained out of it, sparring with the French.  In this period the German navy hit above its weight, in particular by capturing Norway. 

Nothing like confusing prewar with wartime events in an effort to make a point that was already made.

 

 

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1 hour ago, RichTO90 said:

For some bizarre reason they tried to rebuild the Hochseeflotte, even though that strategy had proven to be a non-starter.

Z-plan was derived because Empires needed a strong Navy and Third Reich wanted an Empire, including colonies. Pre-Z-plan building was, as glenn noted, directed against France, not because it was a likely scenario but because there the surface fleet would not be so ridiculously overmatched so it would seem irrelevant and thus could justify itself. In actual war, Germans were (until Norway) actually astonished that their losses had been so low against combined might of Anglo-French navies.

Another factor often forgotten is Soviet naval ambitions, which Germany could not completely ignore. I do not know to which extent rest of the world was aware of Stalin's truly lunatic naval building plan, but they were not completely in the dark.

Edited by Yama
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On 2/11/2021 at 5:45 PM, glenn239 said:

glenn-added POD - Franco caves in to Hitler. – No, that’s wrong.  I said that it didn't matter whether Franco caved to Hitler or not.  Spain falls in 1940 either way.  You know how it didn’t matter whether Denmark fought like tigers or rolled over in a day, either way they were getting occupied?  Same idea.

I don't see the point of invading either Spain or Turkey in this setup. As has been noted, those are not the easiest countries to invade. Yes they did not have similar capability to resist militarily as Soviet Union and undoubtely could have been conquered. But they would not have been easy campaigns. Whole point of not invading USSR in this scenario is to avoid quagmires, not create new ones.

Thing with 'neutral' contries in WW2 was that they became less neutral when the outcome began to look clearer and they began to be geographically surrounded by winning side. Turkey - generally a friendly country to Germany - declared war on them after it became obvious that Germany would lose. They did not actually lift a finger to actually fight in that war, but it's the thought that counts. Here, we would have opposite effect, neutrals becoming more aligned with whom they view as eventual victors of the war, Germany. Why ruin that progress with threats of military force and invasion? You don't need to take Gibraltar to win in Egypt. Nor you need to outflank Suez via Turkey and Levant. If Alexandria is taken, then rest of the Allied position in Eastern Mediterranean falls like house of cards. Fleet would have to evacuate and Cyprus would be probably lost. At that point, joining or supporting the Axis would suddenly look much more attractive for Turkey. Once Eastern Mediterranean is secured, Axis can then isolate or reduce Gibraltar at their leisure. In that situation I might be even tempted to pretty much ignore Gibraltar and concentrate on raiding campaign on Indian Ocean.

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Not that they could have taken Alexandria, but the eastern Med falls, and then what?  An advance through the desert across Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Iraq and Iran?  As for raiding the IO from Egypt, the RN still has bases in the area rom which it could easily block and exit from the Red Sea, and the Axis Navies do not have an overabundance of fuel oil even without BARBAROSSA. 

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On 2/26/2021 at 4:57 AM, Rick said:

Curiosity question and I apologize if this has been addressed in earlier comments. Would any significant change in the outcome of Germany vs the Soviets would have occurred if the following three things did occur. 

Germany did not invade the Balkans, North Africa, and Scandinavia and said forces were used against the Soviets?

Ref. North Africa alone, I remember reading an assessment that the German supply effort expended just to operate the DAK in North Africa would have represented a significant proportion of the German supply effort expended on the army group level for Barbarossa.

The effect of a stronger invasion of Russia in the form of the divisions of the DAK and additional supply infrastructure would probably not have resulted in a significant change in the Russo-German War, but would not have been welcomed by Russia on first contact with the Wehrmacht in 1941 either.

 

3 hours ago, Yama said:

You don't need to take Gibraltar to win in Egypt. Nor you need to outflank Suez via Turkey and Levant. If Alexandria is taken, then rest of the Allied position in Eastern Mediterranean falls like house of cards. Fleet would have to evacuate and Cyprus would be probably lost. At that point, joining or supporting the Axis would suddenly look much more attractive for Turkey.

That's fair regarding the potential ramifications of a capture of Alexandria by the Axis, but the Alamein bottleneck appears almost impregnable, particularly if the British do not wait for it to be threatened before fortifying the heck out of it and making it so.

The heartburn Hitler would have felt over the prospect of going to war against Germany's Great War ally Turkey would have been real, and may only have been matched by his disappointment in its unwillingness to consider aligning with him. 

The calculation on whether to invade Turkey would have to be a cold one, as it would not be an easy campaign, involve risk, and could fail.

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On 2/27/2021 at 12:07 PM, RichTO90 said:

No screaming eagle shit dude. Go back to playing your guitar, its a more useful waste of time.

You'd written,

The problem for the Germans was that the actual strategic solution for the KM was not to go to war in the first place. 

Um, no.  The strategic imperative for the KM was to avoid war with the United States while achieving something approaching an alliance with the Soviet Union.  Within that framework, a German naval war against Britain could succeed.  So the problem for Raeder was not so much whether Germany went to war in 1939, but that the strategic ambitions of Hitler were not likely to realize either strategic pillar that Raeder required.  And so, you get what we got - Germany generally on the offensive in the sea war up until 1941, then almost immediately reduced to ineffectiveness as a surface combat force in the Atlantic or elsewhere as the SU and USA enter the war.

 

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Nothing like confusing prewar with wartime events in an effort to make a point that was already made.

With a question such as, 'was the German navy a waste of resources?', the answer needs to clarify between the local operational theatre of German navy, (Baltic, North Sea, Norwegian Sea, Barents Sea) and the distant theatres, (Atlantic and beyond).  Because in the local mission, the German navy in WW2 succeeded beyond expectations.  It was in the distant theatres that its surface forces operations were sporadic, haphazard, and generally ineffective.

Edited by glenn239
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On 2/27/2021 at 2:54 PM, Yama said:

I don't see the point of invading either Spain or Turkey in this setup. As has been noted, those are not the easiest countries to invade. Yes they did not have similar capability to resist militarily as Soviet Union and undoubtely could have been conquered. But they would not have been easy campaigns. Whole point of not invading USSR in this scenario is to avoid quagmires, not create new ones.

The specific strategic objective to invading Turkey for the Axis in WW2 was to set the table for the partition of the British Empire.  That is to say, if the partition of Turkey drew the USSR into alliance with Germany and Italy to the purpose of destroying the British Empire, then even a quagmire in Turkey was justifiable.  But, if the invasion of Turkey did the opposite and antagonized the USSR, then for the Axis Powers, it would be counter productive.  

The specific objective to invading Spain was to secure the Mediterranean as an Axis lake while achieving the union of the Axis fleets for war in the Atlantic.   With Spain in Axis hands elements of the Italian fleet could enter the Atlantic, or go to France to threaten Sealion.  The German fleet could enter the Med, or conduct an Atlantic war with bases that were not so easy for the RAF to bomb.  Once Gibraltar falls, Torch is impossible and the first Anglo-American campaign is presumably either into Iberia, or far down the Atlantic coast of North Africa.  Neither possibility threatens Italy.

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Thing with 'neutral' contries in WW2 was that they became less neutral when the outcome began to look clearer and they began to be geographically surrounded by winning side. Turkey - generally a friendly country to Germany - declared war on them after it became obvious that Germany would lose. They did not actually lift a finger to actually fight in that war, but it's the thought that counts. Here, we would have opposite effect, neutrals becoming more aligned with whom they view as eventual victors of the war, Germany. Why ruin that progress with threats of military force and invasion? 

Because the Axis needed to barter with something in order to get Stalin to do what they wanted.  In the Roman Empire, eventually much of its expansion was gutting foreign territories to sustain Roman opulence with slaves and stolen goods and markets.  With Germany in WW2, the cheapest currency it could barter with the Soviets with was 3rd party territory.  How many million tons of oil and grain shipped to Germany and Italy was it worth to Stalin for Turkey to be a communist country with Soviet forces based on its territory for "security" purposes?  Million tons to be sure, but how many million tons exactly?  The USA Lend Lease was about 18 million tons to the USSR.  If the Axis could throw Turkey under the bus for even half that amount, that would be a huge boost the Axis war economy.

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You don't need to take Gibraltar to win in Egypt. Nor you need to outflank Suez via Turkey and Levant. If Alexandria is taken, then rest of the Allied position in Eastern Mediterranean falls like house of cards. Fleet would have to evacuate and Cyprus would be probably lost. At that point, joining or supporting the Axis would suddenly look much more attractive for Turkey. Once Eastern Mediterranean is secured, Axis can then isolate or reduce Gibraltar at their leisure. In that situation I might be even tempted to pretty much ignore Gibraltar and concentrate on raiding campaign on Indian Ocean.

All true, but the Axis could not cut British sea lines of communication to the Empire by leaving Gibraltar in British hands, and it gets tougher to see  how the Allies win the war in the Med if they can't even enter it because Gibraltar is in Axis hands.  IMO Italy is only made secure from Anglo-American counterattack by taking (and holding) Gibraltar.

Edited by glenn239
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