US and Western Defense Policy in the Next Four Years

[BansheeOne]

I don't think we need another climate change thread, least of all in Military Current Events. Unless someone wants to discuss militarization of the Arctic prompted by warming trends, water wars, instability through migration caused by droughts and floods etc., in which case you're welcome to open one.

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

[Rick]

5 hours ago, BansheeOne said:

I don't think we need another climate change thread, least of all in Military Current Events. Unless someone wants to discuss militarization of the Arctic prompted by warming trends, water wars, instability through migration caused by droughts and floods etc., in which case you're welcome to open one.

Remember the last time an atomic bomb went off in the Arctic ... 😉

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamera,_the_Giant_Monster

[rmgill]

On 4/10/2022 at 1:16 PM, BansheeOne said:

I don't think we need another climate change thread, least of all in Military Current Events. Unless someone wants to discuss militarization of the Arctic prompted by warming trends, water wars, instability through migration caused by droughts and floods etc., in which case you're welcome to open one.

Generally agree. 

[Angrybk]

Interesting article on the debate in Germany, would welcome thoughts https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/12/world/europe/germany-russia-ukraine-war.html

[Ssnake]

It seems to take a rather benign stance on those who "can't" wrap their heads around a "new situation". I think, culturally Germany has adopted a culture (at many levels) for process optimization based on the unspoken assumption of stable conditions, so the well-meaning explanation is that many are just slow in taking up the newsflashes.

I also think that we have a fair number of Russian sock puppets in our society. I can't come up with an explanation that makes better sense of what I'm seeing. Large parts of the SPD, but not just them, have been subverted or corrupted by Putin's Russia. Schröder, Gabriel, Klingbeil, Weil - the list goes on and on and it's not just the top figures, the rot goes much, much deeper. And these guys will keep doing what they did the past decades - shilling for Putin, delaying anything that goes against Russian interests. I wish I could simply dismiss this as cognitiv dissonance and being slow in understanding the situation. But the situation hasn't changed much, it's just become undeniable. But if they learned anything, they probably bank on being able to simply sit it out.

[BansheeOne]

Quote

A European Bomb

Debate over Nuclear Deterrence Heats Up in the EU

Putin's war has unleashed a debate in Berlin that has been taboo for decades: Does Europe need a share nuclear deterrence of its own?

By René Pfister, Britta Sandberg und Christoph Schult

14.04.2022, 10.59 Uhr

At shortly after 8:30 a.m. on July 12, 2018, Donald Trump asked his National Security Adviser John Bolton: "Do you want to do something historic?" The United States president had just spent the night in the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels and he was now facing a long day of summit meetings. Trump was eager to make waves.

Dinner on the previous evening with heads of state and government from the trans-Atlantic alliance had put him in a bad mood. Once again, most of America’s NATO allies had declined to promise a boost in their defense spending. And on top of that, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was still unwilling to suspend construction on the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline. "We’re out," Trump announced to his distraught advisers, adding: "We’re not going to fight someone they’re paying." The reference was to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the reliance of many European countries on energy imports from Russia.

Bolton, as he describes in his memoirs, began wondering if he would have to resign by the end of the day should Trump carry through with his plan. Together with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, he was able to keep the president from exiting NATO. But if Trump ends up returning to the White House following the 2024 elections, that could very well drive a stake into the heart of the alliance. "In a second term, I think he may well have withdrawn from NATO," Bolton told the Washington Post in early March. "And I think Putin was waiting for that."

A Number of Delusions

The war in Eastern Europe has exposed a number of delusions. The idea that Russian natural gas deliveries couldn’t be used as a political weapon, for example. Or that Putin’s megalomania was just the standard Kremlin huffing and puffing. "Those who deploy violence to shift borders will do so again and again," German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said at the end of March. "And that is why we must together make ourselves strong enough to ensure that that doesn’t happen."

In response to Putin’s aggression, Scholz has said that his government intends to inject 100 billion euros into Germany’s defense, while Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has promised to develop a national security strategy by the end of the year that reflects Germany’s interests. Berlin, astoundingly, has never before had such a strategy.

Already, though, it is becoming apparent just how difficult it might be to come up with a convincing plan for European security. What might happen if the U.S. was to withdraw from NATO and leave Europe alone with a dictator who violates all established norms and doesn’t even stop at slaughtering civilians?

[...]

The Difficult Nuclear Debate in Germany

It is an issue that caused turmoil in the German government once before. In the 1950s, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss discussed the idea of building a European bomb with France and Italy. In November 1957, Strauss even signed a secret deal with his counterparts from Paris and Rome. Their goal was to make Europe independent of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The plan, though, was ultimately torpedoed by Charles de Gaulle, who had taken over power in France in mid-1958 and wanted France to have its own nuclear weapons. The idea of a joint European bomb never again gained traction – much to the frustration of Strauss, who for the rest of his life considered it a mistake for the German military to be dependent on the U.S. when it comes to nuclear weapons.

Strauss, though, became increasingly isolated over the years with his fondness for the bomb. The NATO Dual-Track Decision, with which the Western alliance sought to respond to the Warsaw Pact’s nuclear weapons buildup in Europe, drove hundreds of thousands of protesters onto the streets of Germany and Europe in the 1980s. Resistance within Germany’s center-left Social Democrats to an increase in the number of American Pershing missiles in Europe was so great that it contributed to the collapse of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s government in 1982.

In 2010, then German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle even sought to make Germany a nuclear weapons-free zone and urged the Americans to withdraw their nuclear warheads stationed at the Büchel airbase in western Germany. And until recently, prominent Social Democrats like parliamentary group leader Rolf Mützenich blocked the German military from acquiring new warplanes capable of deploying those nuclear warheads as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement. And now, the EU is supposed to consider a path to becoming a nuclear power?

In the face of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the German government has at least decided to place an order for American F-35 fighters. They have the capability of flying American warheads deep into enemy territory. "NATO’s nuclear deterrence must remain credible," Baerbock said in a speech opening the debate over Germany’s national security strategy. Nevertheless, the government’s deliberations continue to assume that NATO and the U.S. will remain dependable – a rather irresponsible position given developments in the U.S. "It is objectively possible that a U.S. president will rise to power who will once again call NATO and the American nuclear umbrella for Europe into question," says Ekkehard Brose, president of the Federal Academy for Security Policy. "That is something we need to worry about."

Dependence on American nukes could ultimately be more dangerous than dependence on Russian gas. Putin has the fourth largest military in the world, with 900,000 soldiers. Germany’s Bundeswehr, meanwhile, has just 180,000 troops.

The reputation of Russia’s fighting force, to be sure, has suffered mightily due to its inability to even take the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. But the Russian military threat isn’t just rooted in its tanks and artillery, but also in its almost 6,000 nuclear warheads, more than enough to annihilate Europe. The Russian arsenal also includes tactical nuclear weapons which, because of their lower explosive power, are intended for use on the battlefield. They could also be detonated in unpopulated areas to force opponents to capitulate.

"The fact that Putin hasn’t yet played the nuclear card in Ukraine demonstrates the strength of NATO," says Maximilian Terhalle, a visiting professor of political science at King’s College in London. But the Western alliance’s nuclear deterrence is almost entirely dependent on the U.S., which possesses around 5,400 nuclear warheads of varying strength, deliverable in a number of different ways: intercontinental ballistic missiles, stealth bombers and cruise missiles, to name a few.

Can America Be Relied On?

Because the U.S. has recently turned its strategic attention more toward China, Terhalle has been urging for years that Europe establish its own nuclear deterrence. In December 2018, he joined French political adviser François Heisbourg in advocating for France to expand its rather limited nuclear umbrella to protect other European countries that do not possess such weapons. "This commitment could involve the rotational presence of French nuclear-capable combat aircraft on the territory of NATO allies in Europe, including Germany," the two scientists wrote. It was an idea that only really received attention at the time in security policy circles. That, though, has now changed.

[...]

France's Limited Arsenal

Since Brexit, France has been the only nuclear power in the EU. The 26 other member states have pledged to refrain from building the bomb as part of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Beyond that, as part of the deal that paved the way to German reunification in 1990, the so-called Two Plus Four Agreement, Germany committed to neither producing nor possessing weapons of mass destruction. As such, the simplest path toward a European nuclear umbrella would be the expansion of France’s deterrence capability to include the rest of the continent.

There are plenty of hurdles, however, including of a technical nature. France possesses just short of 300 nuclear warheads. In theory, that is sufficient for effective deterrence. Those warheads, though, can essentially only be delivered by four submarines, of which only two are usually available. Security experts have their doubts as to whether such a tiny fleet would be enough to convince Putin that Europe could respond to a nuclear attack with a destructive retaliatory salvo. The U.S., by contrast, possesses 18 nuclear-powered Ohio Class submarines, each of which has the capability of firing off 24 intercontinental ballistic missiles.

[...]

Of course, it would be possible for France to expand and diversify its nuclear force with the help of its European partners. "The problem with a joint nuclear deterrent would not be a technical increase in existing assets," says policy adviser and security expert Heisbourg of the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris. "The problem would be the chain of command – who decides when and with what objective? But that requires a common strategy and policy planning."

A "Wake-Up Call"

And that doesn’t exist. Nuclear weapons are at the core of French sovereignty. The country’s nuclear arsenal was created during the presidency of de Gaulle, who as lieutenant colonel had seen the Nazi Wehrmacht overrun his homeland in the spring of 1940. Nuclear weapons were to ensure that France never had to experience such humiliation again. That’s also why De Gaulle was always against relying on others in defense matters. In 1966, he led France out of the NATO military command structure. It was not until 43 years later, under conservative President Nicolas Sarkozy, that the country returned. To this day, Paris still isn’t part of NATO’s nuclear planning group, which drafts deployment scenarios for nuclear weapons.

This alone shows how complicated it will be to put French nuclear weapons at the service of Europe. Is France really prepared to threaten the use of nuclear weapons in the event of an attack on Poland or Latvia? Or even use them? Similar to the NATO rule, every member of the European Union is theoretically obliged to rush to the aid of another member state if it is attacked. "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power," Article 42 of the Treaty on the European Union states. But while that may sound powerful, it could also mean that help is limited to blankets and bandages.

The French nuclear arsenal reinforces security in Europe by its very existence "and also has a European dimension," President Macron said at a keynote address on security at the École Militaire in Paris in February 2020. Clément Beaune, the secretary of state for European affairs at the French Foreign Ministry, later added that nuclear deterrence could be discussed together with the Germans.

[...]

In Berlin, there is hope that a strategic debate will finally get underway after the presidential election in France. Macron is running a close race, with Marine Le Pen not far behind him. The right-wing populist Le Pen has already announced her intention to leave NATO’s command structure if she wins the election. That doesn’t give Macron much room for flexibility at the moment. It is unlikely that Le Pen will ultimately win, but it is still a possibility. If the president remains in office, "Olaf Scholz will have to sit down with him calmly after the election and explore what is possible," says one political consultant in Berlin.

If France were unwilling to stretch its nuclear umbrella over the entire EU, it is conceivable that a few countries would move forward under enhanced cooperation. It would be anything but an ideal solution. "But we have to start somewhere," the consultant says.

https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/a-european-bomb-debate-over-nuclear-deterrence-heats-up-in-the-eu-a-88ab0869-67c6-4bc9-bdff-75c32340b56c

Edited April 14, 2022 by BansheeOne

[BansheeOne]

Quote

From Peaceniks To Hawks?

Germany's Greens Have Transformed in the Face of Russia's War

The Greens have long been regarded as peace-loving idealists. They are now among the loudest voices calling for heavy weapons to be delivered to Ukraine and have placed considerable pressure on German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to do so. The pacifists of yore have gone quiet and now the talk is of tanks and howitzers.

By Markus Feldenkirchen, Matthias Gebauer, Kevin Hagen, Christoph Hickmann, Dirk Kurbjuweit, Veit Medick, Laura Meyer, Serafin Reiber, Jonas Schaible, Christoph Schult, Marco Schulz, Christian Teevs, Gerald Traufetter und Mascha Wolf

06.05.2022, 12.32 Uhr

Anton Hofreiter had his first experience with the military in 1990, when he had to go in for a pre-enlistment physical. It wasn't a good one.

His left leg is four centimeters longer than his right one, so when he stands with his legs close together, he has to be careful not to fall over. During the physical, the doctor couldn't believe his eyes. His verdict: "unfit." The German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, had no use for Hofreiter. He never saw the military from the inside.

And if he had been deemed fit for service? Hofreiter says he probably would have claimed conscientious objector status.

That was then. Today, he might decide differently. The Green Party parliamentarian and former floor leader, in any case, is currently urging the government more vocally and decisively than most others to supply more weapons to Ukraine, and to begin supplying heavy weapons as well.

Together with parliamentarian Marie Agnes Strack-Zimmermann of the business-friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP), Hofreiter is ratcheting up the pressure on the German chancellor and getting under his skin in the process. Indeed, their efforts likely played no small role last week in Chancellor Olaf Scholz's decision, after significant hesitati on, to supply Ukraine with German Gepard anti-aircraft tanks. It was a major reversal.

"Things are moving in the right direction," Hofreiter said on April 27. He seems quite satisfied, with both himself and the situation. At least as satisfied as it is possible to be when a war is raging a few hundred kilometers to the east.

With his long hair, most Germans had until now viewed 52-year-old Hofreiter as the epitome of the incorrigible hippy. He looks like he jumped right out of one of those 1980s photographs of the first Green Party members of the Bundestag - all men with unshorn locks and plenty of facial hair. Hofreiter, though, wears suits in parliament, and not the wool sweaters that were typical of first-generation Greens. Otherwise, though, he fits in neatly with the cliché of the full-blooded tree-hugger.

German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, also of the Green Party, once said that she comes from "international law." Hofreiter, though, is more of a farm boy from the Bavarian countryside. Until recently, his political focus had largely been on agricultural and transport policy, and he would have loved to have ended up with one of those portfolios in the current government. Having been overlooked with posts were handed out last fall, however, he has taken a greater interest in foreign policy. To put it mildly.

"We are dealing with an imperial, colonial war of aggression," he has said. Or: "If the aggressor wins, wars of conquest will become possible again." At times these days, Hofreiter sounds like the German war historian Carl von Clausewitz.

Such is the situation this spring: Hofreiter, the Ph.D. botanist who can name all the plants and flowers while walking through Berlin's Tiergarten park, is now Hofreiter the weapons expert, who lectures on munitions calibers and crews of infantry fighting vehicles. It's not really the kind of transformation you could have seen coming.

The role his Green Party has played in the current German governing coalition has also been surprising. The coalition is made up of Chancellor Scholz's center-left Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens and the FDP. And the Greens, in particular, have refused to conform to the cliché of what their role should be.

Instead of playing the pacifists and slamming on the brakes when it comes to delivering heavy weaponry to Ukraine, the Greens are the ones who are calling for more, upping the pressure on their partners, particularly the SPD, in the process. Along with Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

The chancellor is now the one who looks hesitant. One reason is the chancellor's rhetoric, which, in contrast to the combative tone coming from the Greens, sounds more like a conscientious objector trying to talk about military matters with an active-duty officer. On the other hand, though, the differences are also substantive.

Economy Minister Robert Habeck of the Greens was the first prominent German politician to call for arms deliveries to Ukraine. He did so last May, long before the Russians launched their invasion, back when he was co-chair of the Green Party. At the time, his own party reined him in and Habeck was forced to backpedal. But now, the party is largely united behind him, and it is Foreign Minister Baerbock who has had to change her tune.

The SPD, on the other hand, continues to equivocate – and the party doesn't seem nearly as united as the Greens. SPD parliamentary group leader Rolf Mützenich and General Secretary Kevin Kühnert were even caught completely off guard by the recent announcement of Germany's decision to send tanks. And it wasn't the first time.

[...]

In the past, the Greens probably wouldn't have accepted someone like Daniel Hecken into their rolls. At the very least, they would have eyed him with suspicion. Hecken, 38, is an officer in the Bundeswehr, Germany's military, and a member of the Green Party. He is open about his profession and has even made it a kind of political project.

Last spring, an organization called BundeswehrGrün was founded to promote exchange between the army and the Green Party. Hecken is one of the organization's two chairs. The association now has just under 60 members, most with some form of ties to the Bundeswehr. "We see ourselves as a bridge for conducting the necessary societal debate about the Bundeswehr, also within the Green Party," says Hecken.

In addition to his position as chair of the association, he is also deputy spokesman for the Federal Working Group on Peace and International Affairs. These committees, or BAGs for short, have an important function for the Greens: They are where the policy building blocks are created that will later become campaign platforms. And at first glance, it may seem rather odd that a soldier holds such an important position in the BAG responsible for addressing peace issues.

Hecken, though, sees no contradiction, and the BAG apparently doesn't either. And that, too, says a lot about the Green Party's more relaxed relationship with all things military.

In general, Hecken says, few in the party have much of a problem with his group. "There has been opposition very occasionally," he says. "But no one has approached us with hostility. Quite the opposite." That, too, is likely something of a change from the past.

Hecken says that criticism of the association, such as it is, has tended to come from the outside, with some telling him that as a soldier he should be conservative. The relationship with the Green Party base, on the other hand, is good, he says, and there has been a great deal of interest in his issues and in the association since the beginning of the Russian invasion. "We see that, because of the war, there has been a change in thinking among many. That was also necessary."

Such a shift, though, doesn't happen overnight, not even under the pressure of an invasion like the one in Ukraine. In addition to the immediate shock of reality, it also takes a lot of preparation, over years. One person who has done this groundwork is Agnieszka Brugger.

The 37-year-old, who is the deputy head of the Greens' parliamentary group, has been in parliament for more than a decade and has been shaping her party's foreign and defense policy for almost as long. She has piercings on her face, her hair is dyed red, she speaks enthusiastically about feminist foreign policy and she belongs to the Green Party's left wing. She knows her way around weapons and is fascinated by technology and naval helicopters. She is the personification of the Greens' reconciliation with the military, if you will.

She is modest and emphasizes that others before her paved the way, such as parliamentarian Winfried Nachtwei, who knew more about the Bundeswehr's Afghanistan mission than almost anyone else. Or Omid Nouripour, the current party leader. But Brugger was instrumental in ensuring that the Greens are now much more widely accepted among the troops, because at some point the soldiers realized that the young member of parliament knew her stuff better than the vast majority of suits who came to visit the military in Afghanistan, in Mali or even in military bases at home.

At first, Brugger explains, she felt alienated. "Hierarchies, uniforms and weapons – they just weren't my world." But she listened, showed interest and gradually eliminated that distance. When she learned that soldiers in Afghanistan had no way of using video telephony, she wrote a resolution for German parliament. When the Armed Forces Association also asked the Green Party to sign messages to servicemen and women at Christmas, she says she passed on the request. At first, some members of the party were skeptical, but now it is normal. For troops in the field, these kinds of letters are an important symbol.

Habeck Supported Weapons Deliveries Early On

In the end, however, when it comes to the big questions, when historic decisions have to be made under the pressure of events, it is no longer specialist politicians who matter, but those at the top, the ones calling the shots.

In the case of the Greens, these are Foreign Minister Baerbock and Economy Minister Habeck, even though they are no longer the party leaders. The two played a decisive role in shaping their party's current position on the issue of arms deliveries, and the party has followed their lead.

[...]

Since then, Scholz has often looked like more of a follower than a leader. He has repeatedly urged caution by, for example, arguing that Vladimir Putin could regard the delivery of heavy weapons as participation in the war. But such arguments aren't getting him anywhere with the Greens.

Under international law, arms deliveries do not constitute participation in a war, Baerbock said last week during a round of questions to the government in parliament. Careful considerations are necessary, she said, but that there was no reason to stir up panic. Since the Russian president doesn't care about international law, she said, it is important how he evaluates certain decisions made by Germany. "As such, what Mr. Putin thinks might be a step is solely at the discretion of this president."

In other words: Of course we are going to deliver – no matter what Putin may threaten us with next time.

[...]

Within the SPD, annoyance with the course Baerbock has been charting is growing with each passing day. But the SPD is also fully aware that the opposition – especially the CDU/CSU – would immediately exploit any cracks in the governing coalition. Which means the Social Democrats have had to remain cautious and avoid any frontal attacks on leading Greens. Instead, they have focused their displeasure on figures like Hofreiter, who may be a key element in the Green Party's new image, but he plays no role in the government.

Not to mention the fact that he recently attacked Olaf Scholz directly. "The problem is in the Chancellery," Hofreiter said. Taken together, he has become a welcome target for the Social Democrats.

Indeed, members of the party unloaded their anger at a parliamentary group meeting on April 26. Axel Schäfer, the SPD's foreign policy point man in the parliamentary group, specifically mentioned Hofreiter's enthusiastic support for weapons deliveries, according to participants, and said Hofreiter hadn't been able to get over the fact that he hand't received a cabinet appointment. Schäfer claimed that if Hofreiter were part of Scholz's government, he would surely be singing a different tune. "I don't understand why no one in the SPD is making that clear," he said.

Meeting participants say that SPD parliamentary group head Mützenich also went after "those who make new demands in front of the cameras every day despite a lack of expertise" – a comment some felt was directed at Hofreiter. Meanwhile, Ralf Stegner, a left-wing member of the party, has taken the Green Party leadership to task. He said he would like to see Hofreiter contradicted more clearly.

Although Robert Habeck and party co-chair Ricarda Lang and Omid Nouripour have already publicly distanced themselves from Hofreiter, that isn't enough for the Social Democrats. Some believe Hofreiter could ultimately drive a wedge into the coalition, or they are simply trying to protect their chancellor.

One SPD member of parliament recalled how vehemently former parliamentary group leader Andrea Nahles would call internal critics to account. "But the party and parliamentary group leadership of the Greens seem incapable of doing this," the SPD parliamentarian said. "This shows that the Greens still haven't really stepped up to the challenge of being in government."

Such remarks haven't seemed to bother the Greens much. After all, they have other sources of criticism to deal with. When Habeck appeared at an election rally in the city of Bielefeld last week, he found himself speaking against a barrage of catcalls and glare at a rather large banner held up to him. "Greens = Warmongers," it read.

[...]

https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/from-peaceniks-to-hawks-germany-s-greens-have-transformed-in-the-face-of-russia-s-war-a-19bd95f6-fcbc-497d-8ad9-1a767be205f1

The whole is a lot longer than my excerpts above, delving into much history.

[DB]

In some respects, it was ever thus and the Greens are just an example of the latest herd of terrified sheeple. For me, the weird thing is that the herds used to be controlled/exploited by more cunning politicians. Now, the politicians act as though they suffer from the same panicked herd mentality and the control comes from the external influence that lights the blue touchpaper of the scary thing-of-the-week.

[BansheeOne]

I'm putting another "Spiegel" autopsy of Germany's Ukraine support cadaver here for context.

Quote

Olaf Scholz and Ukraine

Why Has Germany Been So Slow to Deliver Weapons?

Half of all Germans – not to mention numerous allied nations – believe the German chancellor could be doing more to help Ukraine. Why has Olaf Scholz's government been so hesitant?

By Melanie Amann, Markus Becker, Markus Feldenkirchen, Florian Gathmann, Matthias Gebauer, Serafin Reiber, Jonas Schaible, Christoph Schult und Severin Weiland

03.06.2022, 18.04 Uhr

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is exasperating. For months, the narrative has been that he would prefer not to deliver any weapons at all to Ukraine, and certainly not any heavy weaponry. The chancellor, according to the scuttlebutt, has had to be forced into every single concession and then he delays the deliveries. On Wednesday, Scholz had to listen in the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, as opposition leader Friedrich Merz of the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) lambasted him as a miserable friend to Ukraine in the face of the Russian invasion. Scholz, Merz said, may even be pursuing a "hidden agenda."

Then, it was Scholz’s turn to speak. Normally, the center-left Social Democrat (SPD) uses the opportunity to read out some prepackaged statement until his audience nods off to sleep. This week, though, he was feisty.

"We are providing comprehensive assistance," the chancellor called out, his voice quaking and a steely look on his face. "That could also be acknowledged." He then went on to list off everything his government had already delivered – a relatively long list, but one primarily made up of light weaponry. He also listed off the heavy weapons that are to follow: 30 Gepard anti-aircraft vehicles, to be sent at some point this summer. Seven Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled howitzers, also to be sent this summer. Those deliveries had already been announced. But Scholz then promised the delivery of a modern anti-aircraft system called IRIS-T SLM, likely to be sent at some point this autumn. Kyiv is also to receive four MARS II multiple-launch rocket systems from the stocks of the Bundeswehr, Germany’s military.

"We are doing what we can," Scholz said. And then, for all those who may not have gotten the message, he added: "Doing what must be done is precisely the path this government is following."

After his speech, Scholz – as he so often does – looked quite pleased with himself. Sitting on the government bench, he exuded a sense of certainty that he had successfully managed to refute all accusations pertaining to weapons deliveries that have been leveled at him in recent weeks. But is the chancellor’s self-satisfaction really rooted in reality?

Thus far, not a single heavy weapon has been delivered directly to Ukraine by Germany. And even if all of the systems that have now been promised do ultimately make their way to the country, the extensive amount of time that Berlin has taken to finally send significant help cannot be recuperated. Every single weapon that reached Ukraine earlier could have turned the tide of war in favor of Kyiv.

Scholz and his government are clearly playing for time. Initially, they didn’t believe that the Ukrainians had a chance against Russia and sent the bare minimum necessary for plausible deniability, starting with 5,000 helmets. Later, it was a mixture of incompetence and a lack of will – and a desire to hide behind its allies. Not to mention the refusal to take international leadership.

[...]

The first act in the German drama surrounding weapons deliveries to Ukraine took the stage immediately after Russia launched its invasion. Despite ample advance warning, Berlin was paralyzed. It took two days before the government began to reconsider the long-standing taboo against delivering weapons to warzones.

And the impulse to do so came from abroad, which has also become a pattern. On the day after the war began, a Friday, Dutch Defense Minister Karin Hildur Ollengren called her German counterpart Christine Lambrecht and informed her that the Netherlands intended to deliver 400 anti-tank weapons to Ukraine. Because those weapons had been produced in Germany, she needed permission from Berlin to do so. It was a call that immediately upped the pressure on Berlin to take action as well.

Leaders in the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry quickly arrived at the conclusion that giving permission to the Netherlands was unavoidable. But it also meant that Germany had to do something. Scholz spent that Saturday meeting with his closest advisers, a day during which the idea for a 100-billion-euro cash injection for the German military took shape. But Scholz also decided to reverse his position on arms exports. The Defense Ministry was ordered to prepare suitable weapons for transport, and military leaders arranged for several hundred anti-tank rocket launchers and Stinger surface-to-air missiles to be trucked across the border into Poland.

But those hectic days immediately following the Russian invasion would also determine the course that has been interpreted by the rest of the world as timidity. Instead of preparing possible future weapons deliveries, the government apparently relied heavily on an analysis performed by the BND, which held that Ukraine would fall to Russia within days. On the strength of that analysis, the Chancellery concluded that further weapons deliveries made no sense.

Even as the government was drawing that conclusion, however, Berlin was being inundated with all kinds of offers from the arms industry to send weapons. On the Monday after Scholz’s "watershed" speech, the Defense Ministry assembled a group of executives from Germany’s most important arms manufacturers. The mission imparted to them from Vice-Admiral Carsten Stawitzki, head of arms procurement for the German military, was clear: The industry was to immediately report what weapons they could deliver or what Bundeswehr stocks they could quickly replenish following deliveries to the Ukrainian military.

The offers came quickly and in significant numbers, filling up long Excel spreadsheets. Rheinmetall alone offered dozens of products, including heavy weaponry. Marder infantry fighting vehicles, for example, which the German military was slowly phasing out. Rheinmetall had placed dozens of the vehicles in storage, but the German government decided to delay all decisions pertaining to armored vehicles.

Berlin was also offered Gepard armored air-defense vehicles at the time, which had likewise been decommissioned by the Bundeswehr. Producer Krauss-Maffei Wegmann reported that some of them could be quickly overhauled and sent to Ukraine. But the company initially heard nothing in response from the German government. "There was a clear line that we would only be delivering light weapons and no armored vehicles," says one high-ranking official about this period. "That’s why we didn’t immediately process the offers."

The result was the waste of valuable time. "All we would have needed to begin the overhauls was a discrete signal," says one defense industry executive. Instead, he says, officials in most of the ministries involved talked the issue to death.

[...]

Olaf Scholz has never satisfactorily explained his aversion to sending armored vehicles to Ukraine. In mid-May, he at least hinted at his reasoning in a meeting with the Defense Committee in parliament. Germany, he said during the roughly one-hour meeting, will continue its arms deliveries "for as long as it is necessary to support Ukraine in its defensive battle." When it comes to arms deliveries, he said, there are no "eternal principles." Germany continues to coordinate closely with its partners, he said, and to calculate "the risks and the military efficiency" of deliveries – adding that battle tanks remained a no-go. Still, he said, there were no "absolute principles," which is why he preferred to remain vague in his public comments.

The tank embargo has never been discussed at the NATO level, much less decided upon, say people close to the German government, but unofficially, there is complete agreement on the issue between Washington, London and Paris. Furthermore, say sources, Germany could never be the first country to deliver tanks for historical reasons.

At the same time, sources close to the government say there is concern that Ukraine could become overconfident if it experiences a string of battlefield victories and rolls into Russian territory – which would mean that German tanks would once again be inside Russia. It is a concern that highlights a certain distrust in Berlin of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. And that, too, is a reason why the defense industry in Germany has not been authorized to deliver battle tanks.

In Berlin, the joint line that has been established with alliance partners has been interpreted to mean that there is no need yet to prepare armored vehicles for delivery. Which means that if Washington does ultimately decide to send armored vehicles one day, it would still take an additional several months before the German Marders could be overhauled. And responsibility for making such preparations, Berlin believes, lies with the defense companies and not with Berlin.

[...]

Ready in the Autumn?

At the beginning of this week, the debate within the German government again gained momentum. And once again, the impulse didn’t come from the Chancellery. In the secret video conference of Ukraine supporters held the week before last, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin had announced that Washington would soon be delivering medium-range rocket systems to Ukraine, saying the country would otherwise lose its ability to stand up to the advancing Russians. Austin encouraged others to join the effort. Then, last weekend, Washington and the UK government contacted Berlin to ask what Germany had come up with.

Once again, the chancellor was forced to take a position, and again, there was a hectic round of meetings in Berlin. Ultimately, the Scholz administration decided to add four MARS II multiple rocket launcher systems from the Bundeswehr to the U.S. pledge. And suddenly, secrecy was no longer quite as important as it had been. On Wednesday, the news of the MARS II deliveries was leaked to the press. At the same time, Germany’s Federal Security Council authorized the delivery of ultra-modern IRIS-T SLM anti-aircraft systems built by Diehl Defence. It is unclear, though, whether they will have much relevance. Even optimists in the Scholz administration admit that they will likely only be ready for delivery in autumn. Or later.

Even if the new announcements from Berlin managed to finally generate a bit of positive press coverage, there are again plenty of indications that the Germans sat on the fence for quite some time. Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany Andriy Melnyk says that the Ukrainians have been in talks with the Chancellery over the direct delivery of the IRIS-T for three months. Melnyk says that German Economy Minister Robert Habeck was particularly energetic in pushing for a deal between the German arms manufacturer and Ukraine. Other ministries, though, the ambassador said, were more reserved.

Only last Monday, three days before Scholz’s speech, was a deal reached, and Melnyk was discretely notified that the IRIS-T delivery would be given the green light. Insiders say that the export application from Diehl had been sent to the Federal Security Council at the beginning of May. At around that same time, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov sent a letter to his German counterpart Lambrecht urging the rapid delivery of the system.

[...]

The government in Berlin believes that the criticism is completely overwrought. Why hasn’t Germany’s multibillion-euro financial contribution received more recognition? France, say some in the government, is doing less for Ukraine, but is hardly being criticized at all, nor has the country been consumed by a domestic debate on the issue. The Ukrainian ambassador in Paris, say others, is far more reserved than his counterpart in Berlin, who is constantly issuing new demands – and fresh insults – to the German government.

But it is Melnyk, of all people, who has surprisingly thrown his support behind Scholz in recent days. "That is a good decision, a good start," he said this week about the planned deliveries of the air-defense systems. "If things keep going like that and more, heavy weaponry follows, then at some point, we really can say: Well done, Germany!"

Will Melnyk really end up saying such a thing? The experience thus far with the German chancellor would suggest not.

https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/olaf-scholz-and-ukraine-why-has-germany-been-so-slow-to-deliver-weapons-a-7cc8397b-2448-49e6-afa5-00311c8fedce

[glenn239]

. In the secret video conference of Ukraine supporters held the week before last, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin had announced that Washington would soon be delivering medium-range rocket systems to Ukraine, saying the country would otherwise lose its ability to stand up to the advancing Russians. 

 

The formal Russian response to this policy has been made.  If the US delivers these weapons to Ukraine, then key Ukrainian civilian infrastructure targets that hitherto have been spared will be destroyed.  So, if Germany is relucant to go down this path, maybe German leaders are fearing that if millions more Ukrainians pour into the EU as a result of the execution of this threat, that Germany will bear the lion's share of the burden of aiding them?

 

Edited June 5, 2022 by glenn239

[Stuart Galbraith]

This is the same Russia that has been flinging ballistic missiles at Kyiv side the first week of the war. Little late in the day to threaten to start doing what they have already been doing.

[DB]

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/rearming-british-army

[lucklucky]

https://alert5.com/2022/06/05/super-hornet-refuels-spanish-av-8b-and-italian-f-35b-for-the-first-time/

 

Super Hornet refuels Spanish AV-8B and Italian F-35B for the first time

[lucklucky]

Quote

 

“The interaction of today is a great opportunity to strengthen our cooperation and partnership,” SNMG2 Italian Navy Rear Admiral Mauro Panebianco said.

“We share many of the core values of your Navy – that is why our cooperation is mutually beneficial. Japan is one of a number of countries beyond the Euro-Atlantic area with which NATO is developing relations.” 

 

The Italian Navy’s Carlo Bergamini-class frigate ITS Margottini and the Turkish Navy’s Barbaros-class frigate TCG Salihreis, both assigned to Standing NATO Maritime Group Two, met with the JS Kashima and JS Shimakaze, during their transit in the Mediterranean Sea while conducting the 66th edition of the Overseas Training Cruise.

The vessels Kashima and Shimakaze departed Japan on 24 April.

The newly commissioned Japanese officers interacted with the NATO units and conducted training activities, including a maneuvering exercise. A personnel exchange allowed NATO crew members to embark on the Japanese ships and vice versa. 

 

[lucklucky]

Quote

 

The Biden Administration’s State Department is soon going to announce the establishment of a “Special Representative for Racial Equity and Justice” on June 17th, a leaked email reveals.

According to the Daily Caller, the position was first announced in April by the State Department’s own “Equity Action Plan. But the newly-obtained email reveals more details about the power that the position will have, including “institutionaliz[ing] an enterprise-wide approach to integrating racial and ethnic equity.” The email also declares that “advancing equity, addressing systemic racism, and strengthening democracy worldwide” will be considered “national security imperatives and core tenets of President Biden’s foreign policy.”

 

https://amgreatness.com/2022/06/09/state-department-to-announce-global-racial-equity-chief-leaked-email-shows/

[BansheeOne]

German Social Democratic Party co-head Lars-Klingbeil who has been noted for his pro-military stance around these boards earlier held a pretty remarkable keynote speech at the SPD-affiliated Friedrich Ebert Foundation this week. Naturally it proved immediately controversial with the party's left wing. I'm not so sure about some of his expressions like "military power is a legitimate means of politics". I know what he means, but I suspect Putin would agree with the words, too. Improved Google translation.

Quote

Speech by Lars Klingbeil, FES Tiergarten Conference 2022

"Change of times - the beginning of a new era"

Address,

a famous definition of crisis goes back to the Italian writer and intellectual Antonio Gramsci. In a crisis, he says, the old is not anymore, but the new has not yet begun.

Today we live in a time of diverse crises: war, climate, pandemic, inflation, social division. Every crisis in itself is an enormous challenge for our society. But the crises occur together. They are related, they are reinforcing each other.

These crises pose very fundamental questions. My aspiration is that we provide answers to these questions. That we shape the future. And that we do it together.

Sometimes history is written, and it is only many years later that you know what kind of times of epochal upheaval those were. But there are also moments when you are clear at first glance: This moment is historic. This moment changes the course of history. This moment has a direct, immediate and lasting impact on our life.

--

When I was 11 years old, the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War was over. That was such one moment. The idea of communism was dead, there was only one way into the future: liberal democracy. The system antagonism seemed resolved. I never understood the insane idea of suppressing freedom behind walls. But that this attempt existed has formed me.

When I was in New York for an internship at the age of 23, I had to witness the 9/11 attacks in this great city up close. The attacks have in many ways changed my view of the world, they politicized me, shaped my relationship with the Bundeswehr and intensified my interest in security policy.

And now: February 24, 2022. The start of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. A turning point for the European peace order. A "change of times". We are faced with a huge design task. The old is no longer, the new has not yet begun.

--

Today I am no longer 11 or 23 years old. Today I am 44 years old. as As party chairman of the SPD, I bear responsibility.

On the morning of February 24 I did not have comprehensive answers to this change of times. Noone had. But I was fully aware that that moment changed everything. And that it is the great task of my generation to draw the right conclusions from the change of times.

The change of times will demand a lot from us. It marks a turning point. The upheavals will effect our coexistence and the political agenda for the next 20 years.

--

Russian President Vladimir Putin started this war. He bears the responsibility for the brutal murders, for the suffering of the Ukrainians. It is his attack on the sovereignty of a European country.

We are not to blame for Putin's war, but we must ask ourselves critically what could have done differently before February 24 . Above all, we must ask ourselves what we can now do better in the future. And then we must do it, too.

[...]

I've been on the road a lot in the past few days and months. In the last week I was in Brussels, Stockholm, Bommersvik, Lisbon and Madrid. I have had intense conversations about the change of times. I've had representatives of other countries here in Berlin for the past few weeks, have discussed with think tanks and journalists throughout Europe.

I've been trying to focus my thoughts for the last few days and to write them down. My thoughts and theses have culminated in this speech. I raise no claim that they are complete. I invite you to disagree, to discuss, to think further. I want debate.

[...]

I am firmly convinced that our social model of a democratic and free society is the best. But only because I see it that way, because we see it that way, it doesn't mean that it is seen that way all over the world.

The West has felt too sure that the future only knows this one end. A war between states in Europe seemed unimaginable. Our peace order was based for many decades based on the belief in the immovability of borders, in national sovereignty, all cast in treaties and international law.

We have made ourselves comfortable in this world. If it jerked here and there, we were convinced that everything would fall into place again in the end. Because we believed that in the end our political model would prevail. That rule-based order would prevail.

We failed to recognize that things had long since developed differently. The signals from Russia we should have seen differently. At the latest with the illegal annexation of Crimea.

Russia became more and more authoritarian and is now a dictatorship. China also has one entirely different vision than ours. And the truth is that many countries in the Global South are disappointed by the promises of liberal democracies.

--

So far, the big global players have secured global political influence through pressure and allegiance. The world will organize itself differently in the future, of that I am firmly convinced.

In the future, the world will no longer be organized on different poles, but on centers which wield power in different ways. Not allegiance, pressure and oppression are critical for attribution, but beliefs and interests. These centers of power are attractive, they create bonds, dependencies and cooperations. These centers are dynamic, joining them is out of one's own Interest. Power is exercised differently today.

This world order has great advantages for states that are not yet a strong center, but possess large economic and political potential, because they are no longer have to assign themselves to a block. They can choose on which topics they want to work with whom. The world order is becoming more flexible and dynamic. Negotiations between states will become even more important, but just as resilient and trusting Relationships.

--

China is proceeding very strategically in expanding its influence and binding states to itself. Above all, China uses its economic power and invests strategically, for example in the New Silk Road.

Russia, too, has cultivated relations with ascending states for years, and bound them to it through that.

So alternatives to the Western development model have grown. Russia and China have for many years also courted democratic states such as South Africa, India or Brazil, given them a voice at the international level via the BRICS initiative, for example. They have seen the interests of these countries and met their governments with respect. That has built trust.

We are currently seeing the effects when many states oppose our path of sanctions against Russia. Voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations shows that half of the world's population does not support our policies. That has to make us think. It shouldn't affect the substance and severity of our decisions, but our activities in other regions of the world.

[...]

We must never again become so dependent as was the case with Russia in terms of energy policy. Europe must expand its strategic autonomy. Critical goods and critical infrastructure must be produced and promoted here in Europe. With regard to China, this means, for example, that we reduce dependencies in the areas of medicine or technology. That doesn't mean we won't trade with countries like China anymore, as some are demanding - but it means we set ourselves up strategically smart and resilient.

--

We now have a few years of ambiguity and uncertainty ahead of us as far as the future world order is concerned. In the years to come there will be a competition for relationships, dependencies, bonds, cooperation and emanation. We have to set up for this competition.

I am convinced that no country can master the challenges of the globalized world alone. Therefore, as described at the beginning, strong centers are needed that work into one direction. The European Union is such a centre, but additionally needs to develop geopolitical significance.

It remains enormously important that we as the West stand together closely: a strong Europe as a core, but in close alliance with the US, the UK, Australia, Japan and others. There must be no doubts here. We have to do our homework in Europe for that. Our aspiration must be that we are the most attractive center.

--

A lot depends upon Germany. Germany must have the aspiration to be a lead power.

After almost 80 years of reticence, Germany now has a new role in the international coordinate system. Germany has in recent decades earned a high level of trust. But with this trust, expectations go along. That's exactly what we've experienced in the discussions of the past weeks. Germany is more and more in the spotlight. We should meet these expectations.

Incidentally, leadership does not mean to act straddle-legged or rude. Also, hopefully in international politics – just like in domestic politics – smartleadership cultures will prevail. Incidentally, this also includes the idea of a feminist foreign policy. Leadership means being aware of your role. To not duck away, to gather others. To never act arrogant, but thoughtful, confident and consistent. A collaborative leadership style is a smart leadership style. Also respectful, even if you have a different opinion.

It must always be clear what our motivation is. We make foreign policy so people can live in security, peace and prosperity. US President Biden speaks of "Foreign Policy for the Middle Class". I find this approach exactly right. Foreign policy engagement is never an end in itself, it always has an impact on how we live together locally.

We are currently witnessing what enormous cost an unstable international order, war and broken supply chains have for life here. In the end, international conflicts are also an enormous explosive force for our democracy and cohesion of our society. This is precisely why foreign policy engagement is so important. Inside and outside grow together.

Yes, this new role as a lead power will require Germany to make tough decisions – financially, also politically. We have to change structures, also negotiate new budgets. I think we need a completely different security policy debate in Germany. And also new and more places where this debate is held.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz and the federal government in recent weeks had to reconsider and change some basic principles of German foreign policy. Sometimes very far-reaching. We stand in solidarity with Ukraine. We deliver weapons, including heavy artillery. We impose tough sanctions which Russia will feel for decades. And we exert hard political pressure together with ours partners in the USA and Europe. It is right that we are taking these steps. That too has to do with our new role that we have as Germany.

--

We have all followed the security policy mainstream in recent years to neglect national and alliance defense. I recently had a visit from my social democratic colleagues from Lithuania. They told me of their fear that Putin will attack their country, too. My first reflex was to say, "Hogwash, Putin won't do that". But then I realized that it was precisely this reflex that was and is the mistake.

In mid-February, more than 2,000 security experts came together at the Munich Security Conference. Very few assumed that Putin will attack Ukraine. A few days later, Putin launched his attack. I'm bothered to this day that none of us did seen that coming.

Therefore, we have to think in scenarios and also prepare for these scenarios. If we hear from the Baltic States or Poland that they are afraid to be the next target of Russia, then we must take it seriously.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz has repeatedly made it clear that we will defend every centimeter of NATO territory. I applaud his decision to send more German troops on the eastern flank of NATO and to intensify the protection of our Eastern European partners. For that, too, better equipment for the Bundeswehr is urgently needed.

We made mistakes in dealing with our Eastern and Central European partners. It is therefore personally important to me that we intensify the dialogue with them and move Europe forward together. I will also do that in talks next week in Lithuania and Poland.

--

I think we need a different social approach to the Bundeswehr.

It's good that we've got the 100 billion euro special funds for the Bundeswehr on the way. This allows us to close capability gaps and put national and alliance defense back into focus. This also underscores our promise of protection to our own citizens and to ours allies.

Our army was reduced further and further, bases were closed, conscription abolished. The Bundeswehr moved further and further back in public debate. Often it was only seen when there were scandals. You almost had the impression some thought that the less Bundeswehr there is, the smaller is the probability of war. The opposite is the case.

I've been experiencing this contradiction first hand for a long time. As a soldier's son, as someone who has his home in Munster, the largest army base, as someone who knows what it is means losing an acquaintance on the Afghanistan mission, as someone who was a member of the Defense Committee for 12 years. If you campaigned for the Bundeswehr in society, one was often viewed critically.

I wish that we as a society would develop a new normal with the Bundeswehr. That we develop a matter of course to pay respect to those who render their service to our country, who are willing to go to extremes if Parliament so decides. I wish we we talk about peace and security and include thinking about the Bundeswehr as amatter of fact. Talking about war doesn't lead to war. Closing your eyes to reality leads to war.

For me, peace policy also means military force as a legitimate means of politics. Incidentally, this is also provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. It is always the ultimate means, but it must also be clear that it is a means. We see that especially in Ukraine.

--

I suspect some are alarmed now. The chairman of the SPD talks about leadership power, about the Bundeswehr, about military force. I can imagine how some debates will go now. But I have the aspiration that we are realistic. Even Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt knew that the foundations for a powerful peace policy were military strength and capability. At that time, the defense budget was more than three percent of our economic power.

The hand we stretch out must be strong. Brandt and Schmidt understood that you can only stand up for peace and human rights out of your own strength. We should not curtail debates.

[...]

Chancellor Olaf Scholz has been to the Balkans in recent weeks and promised Macedonia and Albania to start accession negotiations to the European Union soon. And on his trip to Kyiv, too, he brought along in common with other heads of government an important message: you, Ukraine, belong to Europe. You fight for European values. With you, Europe is stronger. Moldova needs a candidate status, too.

I find these signals extremely important. The change of times is an epochal upheaval. The European peace and security order is currently rearranging. That states orientate towards European Union and want to belong to us shows which attractiveness we already have as a centre. But then this attractiveness also goes with political responsibility.

This also includes enlargement policy. As a geopolitical player, Europe needs to get more weight. After the end of the Cold War, the EU has already shown that it is able to act geopolitically and strategically. It was a political goal to give the former states of the Eastern Bloc a quick prospect of accession to the EU.

I want the EU to push the next accession negotiations with political pressure. That doesn't mean any discount for the accession candidates, that doesn't mean fast tracks. The Copenhagen Criteria apply. But that means we won't let accession processes bog down in the mills of Brussels bureaucracy, rather than actively promote them as a geopolitical project.

Of course when we talk about enlargement, we also have to speak about reforms on the inside. This is the only way for the EU to become receptive. I agreed there with my interlocutors in Europe, too.

Even with more members, the European Union must be able to act quickly. We must therefore abolish the unanimity principle, for example in foreign policy or in financial and fiscal policy. This makes the EU more quick-witted, quicker to act and more democratic.

And there will be no compromises on the rule of law and democracy. Therefore we need to introduc a new mechanism to defend the Copenhagen Criteria effectively even after an admission.

--

I thought for a long time while working on this speech about what new ideas for Europe I wanted to bring up. But then I realized that there is no shortage of ideas. It's actually all on the table. Many ambitious Ideas have been mooted over the last few years and then pushed back and forth in the hallways of bureaucracy until they eventually petered out. So it isn't necessarily about new ideas, but about politicizing the future of Europe again.

For example, I am firmly convinced that now is the moment to finally promote a European defense and security policy. 27 countries which each maintain their own procurement system, have their own defense companies, individually negotiate with these defense companies. I can no longer explain to anyone why we not finally bundle that in Europe.

I know the arguments, but we should finally get down to business now. In the end the goal should be that we pool resources effectively and create a strong European pillar within NATO. In the future, the European states in NATO should be able to to defend European territory together. That's not a policy against that transatlantic alliance, but a policy that strengthens the alliance.

[...]

https://augengeradeaus.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Klingbeil_FES_Zeitenwende_21jun2022.pdf

[lucklucky]

New EU envoy to China backs Taiwan 'reunification'

Quote

Jorge Toledo Albiñana said the EU supports the 'peaceful reunification' of the two nations and that there should be 'one China'

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/07/20/eu-divided-taiwan-new-ambassador-voices-support-reunification/#comment

[sunday]

4 hours ago, lucklucky said:

New EU envoy to China backs Taiwan 'reunification'

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/07/20/eu-divided-taiwan-new-ambassador-voices-support-reunification/#comment

First Borrell, now this one... Spanish Socialists are quite special when choosing diplomatic personnel.

[Stuart Galbraith]

https://uk.yahoo.com/news/18-republicans-including-mtg-matt-103055954.html

18 Republicans — including MTG, Matt Gaetz, and Lauren Boebert — voted against Sweden and Finland joining NATO

• Eighteen Republican lawmakers in a Monday vote opposed Finland and Sweden joining NATO.

• The vote passed easily, but "nay" voters included several far-right GOP members.

• The House vote was symbolic; the US portion of the approval process takes place in the Senate.

Eighteen Republican lawmakers voted against the US allowing Finland and Sweden to join NATO.

Among the dissenters in the Monday vote were some of the party's furthest-right members, including Reps. Marjorie Taylor Greene of Georgia, Matt Gaetz of Florida, and Lauren Boebert of Colorado.

The vote was a symbolic one to express support from the House for the applications — the formal process by which the US can ratify new NATO members takes place in the Senate.

The House bill passed easily with 394 votes, leaving the 18 Republicans in a small minority even among their own party.

Here is the full list:

• Andy Biggs (AZ)

• Dan Bishop (NC)

• Lauren Boebert (CO)

• Madison Cawthorn (NC)

• Ben Cline (VA)

• Michael Cloud (TX)

• Warren Davidson (OH)

• Matt Gaetz (FL)

• Bob Good (VA)

• Marjorie Taylor Greene (GA)

• H. Morgan Griffith (VA)

• Thomas Massie (KY)

• Tom McClintock (CA)

• Mary E. Miller (IL)

• Ralph Norman (SC)

• Matthew M. Rosendale Sr. (MT)

• Chip Roy (TX)

• Jefferson Van Drew (NJ)

Nineteen US lawmakers — 17 Republicans and two Democrats — didn't vote.

 

'Europe must defend itself. But no, we wont let it  defend itself'. Uhuh.

[Josh]

4 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

https://uk.yahoo.com/news/18-republicans-including-mtg-matt-103055954.html

18 Republicans — including MTG, Matt Gaetz, and Lauren Boebert — voted against Sweden and Finland joining NATO

• Eighteen Republican lawmakers in a Monday vote opposed Finland and Sweden joining NATO.

• The vote passed easily, but "nay" voters included several far-right GOP members.

• The House vote was symbolic; the US portion of the approval process takes place in the Senate.

Eighteen Republican lawmakers voted against the US allowing Finland and Sweden to join NATO.

Among the dissenters in the Monday vote were some of the party's furthest-right members, including Reps. Marjorie Taylor Greene of Georgia, Matt Gaetz of Florida, and Lauren Boebert of Colorado.

The vote was a symbolic one to express support from the House for the applications — the formal process by which the US can ratify new NATO members takes place in the Senate.

The House bill passed easily with 394 votes, leaving the 18 Republicans in a small minority even among their own party.

Here is the full list:

• Andy Biggs (AZ)

• Dan Bishop (NC)

• Lauren Boebert (CO)

• Madison Cawthorn (NC)

• Ben Cline (VA)

• Michael Cloud (TX)

• Warren Davidson (OH)

• Matt Gaetz (FL)

• Bob Good (VA)

• Marjorie Taylor Greene (GA)

• H. Morgan Griffith (VA)

• Thomas Massie (KY)

• Tom McClintock (CA)

• Mary E. Miller (IL)

• Ralph Norman (SC)

• Matthew M. Rosendale Sr. (MT)

• Chip Roy (TX)

• Jefferson Van Drew (NJ)

Nineteen US lawmakers — 17 Republicans and two Democrats — didn't vote.

 

'Europe must defend itself. But no, we wont let it  defend itself'. Uhuh.

Because the GOP loves free-dumb!

[JWB]

Massie said on Twitter on Monday following the vote that “America can’t afford to subsidize socialist Europe’s defense, nor should we. Tonight, I voted against the House Resolution urging NATO’s expansion into Sweden and Finland.”

Roy made a similar argument in a statement explaining his vote, pointing to the fact that only a small number of member countries are meeting their defense spending obligations.

 

[Stuart Galbraith]

So they are excluding 2 nations that meet the 2 GDP target, because some other NATO nations are not meeting the target?

I've seen ballast that was smarter.

[JWB]

 

1 hour ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

So they are excluding 2 nations that meet the 2 GDP target, because some other NATO nations are not meeting the target?

I've seen ballast that was smarter.

That list of politicians you posted above have made careers of taking the piss.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Undoubtedly. But what happens when one of them makes it to President?