How Many Battleships Were Sunk Outside Of Harbour Strictly By Carrier Based Aircraft In Wwii?

[Yama]

He had no CAP even in good weather though.

Apparently Glorious didn't even have a man in the crows nest...

There were aircraft in 10-minute readiness, but in reality they could not be launched in 10 minutes and by the time they were ready, Glorious was hit on the flight deck.

[KV7]

 

He had no CAP even in good weather though.

Apparently Glorious didn't even have a man in the crows nest...

There were aircraft in 10-minute readiness, but in reality they could not be launched in 10 minutes and by the time they were ready, Glorious was hit on the flight deck.

 

Even after spotting the German ships he also failed to increase speed or bearing. But the biggest blunder seems to be the (if true) reason for the journey - to head back to Scapa Flow to engage in some vendetta against the air officers.

[Yama]

Reportedly there are some things about the sinking still kept in archives, under 100-year lockdown. Whole episode appears so bizarre one can't really even call it incompetence.

[KV7]

Yes some interesting discussion here:

https://www.hmsglorious.com/

[Stuart Galbraith]

That was seriously bloody interesting, thank you very much for that.

[Rick]

Great topic; the answer is "Damn few." Interestingly, it is the topic of an article just published in the J of Military History by a Navy War College Prof:

 

Aircraft Carriers versus Battleships in War and Myth:

Demythologizing Carrier Air Dominance at Sea



James R. FitzSimonds

Abstract

Since the end of World War II, the aircraft carrier has been commonly

portrayed as the ultimate element of sea power. This notion of carrier

supremacy is based largely on the prevalent belief that carrier-based

aircraft were so lethal during the Second World War that they rendered

surface combatants, most notably battleships, powerless against air

strikes. Yet a close reading of the history of combat at sea during

World War II fails to support this contention. The battleship proved the

most resilient surface ship and remained the ultimate determinant of

sea control. The idea that the aircraft carrier supplanted the battleship

as the dominant naval platform is a myth.

....

Ian Toll, in his best seller Pacific Crucible, offered a similar assessment: “the battleships were . . . incapable of defending themselves against air attack,” and the damage inflicted on the U.S. battle line at Pearl Harbor “forced the American naval high command to acknowledge the ascendency of aviation.” John Keegan deemed the aircraft carrier “the supreme instrument of command of the sea.” To Barrett Tillman, the U.S. Essex-class carrier of World War II amounted to “the most nearly perfect instrument of sea power.” These assertions sum up the near-universal assessment of war at sea during the Second World War: the aircraft carrier had replaced the battleship as the dominant maritime platform, and was the critical element in the Allied victory at sea. Yet examination of the historical record suggests that this conclusion is more myth than reality. Carrier aircraft demonstrated a limited ability to seriously damage or sink battleships, or other surface combatants at sea and, most critically, even massive numbers of carrier aircraft were unable to prevent battleship-led forces from accomplishing their combat missions. In reality, the battleship proved to be the most resilient surface ship against air and other attacks, and remained the ultimate determinant of sea control throughout the war. Moreover, American naval leaders at the time were not surprised by the limitations of carrier air power, and consistently employed the battleship in its traditional, prewar role. The prevalent belief that the aircraft carrier supplanted the battleship as the dominant naval platform despite opposition by an ignorant mass of hidebound pedants and Luddites is a military revolution that did not occur.

....

Yet after three days of near-continuous daylight carrier air strikes numbering over 1,300 sorties on virtually the entire Japanese fleet, U.S. carrier aircraft were able to sink or put out of action only ten Japanese combatants: four aircraft carriers, one battleship (albeit the super battleship Musashi), four cruisers, and one destroyer. Five of those ships, including the four carriers, were intended as sacrificial decoys. Of the remaining five vessels, only two—Musashi and one heavy cruiser—were put out of action or sunk by U.S. aircraft en route to Leyte. Had the United States relied purely on carrier air power to defend the amphibious landing, the Japanese force that arrived off Leyte to attack the U.S. beachhead could have included as many as eight battleships, fifteen cruisers, and twenty-nine destroyers.

....

During the war, only five of the capital ships in the belligerent fleets were sunk at sea by aircraft alone under combat conditions. Three of the five—the Royal Navy’s battleship Prince of Wales and battle cruiser Repulse, and the Italian battleship Roma—were sunk by land-based aircraft. The only two capital ships sunk by carrier-based aircraft alone during the course of the war were the Japanese battleship Musashi (sunk 24 October 1944 at Leyte Gulf) and her sister ship Yamato (sunk 7 April 1945 in the East China Sea). Musashi succumbed to carrier air only after five full hours of strikes by well over 100 aircraft, withstanding as many as nineteen torpedo hits, seventeen bomb hits, and eighteen bomb near-hits before going down. The carrier air attacks on Yamato were no less massive; some 280 sorties against Yamato and her escorts inflicted as many as thirteen torpedo and eight bomb hits on the big ship. One might also credit to carrier air the Japanese battleship Hiei, which went down after being struck by as many as six air torpedoes in attacks by more than 60 U.S. aircraft flying over a ten-hour period from both carriers and Guadalcanal in November 1942. Hiei was already unmaneuverable and engulfed in flames from massive U.S. cruiser gunfire impacts, however, when the first air attacks rolled in. The follow-on air strikes were essentially a coup de grace for a doomed vessel.

....

Battleships were particularly tough platforms to sink by any means, and especially with aircraft, but carrier air torpedoes and bombs were not remarkably more successful against cruisers or other combatants during the war. Smaller vessels had limited deck armor, lacked significant torpedo protection, and had far less AAA than capital ships; but their speed and maneuverability made them challenging targets to hit with aircraft-delivered ordnance. Of Japan’s eighteen heavy cruisers, only four were sunk by carrier air at sea under combat conditions. Two of these were the result of secondary explosions from highly volatile, oxygenfueled Long Lance torpedoes that were mounted on deck without any armor protection, and failed to be jettisoned prior to the attacks. U.S. carriers accounted for six of Japan’s twenty-five light cruisers sunk at sea. On the Allied side, no U.S. heavy or light cruisers were lost to Japanese carrier air during the war, while only two British cruisers were sunk by carrier air attack. Because they were so small and nimble, destroyers underway proved difficult to hit with air-delivered bombs or torpedoes. An illustrative example was the futile effort by dive bombers from two U.S. carriers to hit the Japanese destroyer Tanikaze at the Battle of Midway. SBD Dauntless aircraft from carriers Enterprise and Hornet conducted some fifty attacks on the lone Japanese vessel, achieving not a single hit.13 Of the 127 Japanese destroyers lost in the war, 27 were claimed by carrier air (21 percent). Of the 77 U.S. destroyers sunk in the war, only 4 were killed by carrier air (5 percent). While carriers had limited success in killing gunships during the war, their minimal protection, exposed ordnance on deck, and vast quantities highly flammable aviation fuel made them lethal to each other. Carrier air strikes accounted for eleven (of nineteen) Japanese carriers and three (of eleven) U.S. carriers sunk during the war.

 

[Journal of Military History (July 2020), pp. 843-865]

Disagree with the author. Let's take this point to point:

"... In reality, the battleship proved to be the most resilient surface ship against air and other attacks,..." I do agree with this statement as it was the nature of the battleship's design.

" ...and remained the ultimate determinant of sea control throughout the war." He is wrong. Let's take a few examples in the Pacific.

1. Battle of Midway, after the sinking of the the I.J.N. carriers, the I.J.N. battleships retreated in the face of depleted U.S.N. airplanes on the two remaining carriers. The U.S.N. did not even bring their battleships into the conflict.

2. The I.J.N. raids in the Indian Ocean. No R.N. battleships risked a confrontation with I.J.N. carriers.

3.. Guadalcanal, where both naval forces were about equal. The Japanese never risked their battleships in daylight to U.S. airpower. Nor in any of the naval battles in this campaign did the I.J.N. send battleships to engage U.S.N. carriers. Nor did the U.S.

4. Samar Island in 1944. Four I.J.N. battleships -- including Yamato -- along with several cruisers failed to destroy a small U.S.N. escort carrier task force and left the scene. IMO, this was the largest (psychological) victory of carrier aircraft vs battleships. After three years of naval warfare the I.J.N. knew that battleships cannot control the seas when opposed by aircraft carriers. This mental defeat by the escort carriers on Admiral Kurita was the accumulation of this naval fact.

5. Yamato and Mushasi; still sunk by carrier aircraft no matte how long or how many it took. The I.J.N. did not even come close to approaching the U.S. fleet much less control the seas.

 

"...carrier air torpedoes and bombs were not remarkably more successful against cruisers or other combatants during the war."

Again, let's take the Pacific adventure. Once carriers were sunk, these supporting ships fled from the opposition's carriers. Hard to be a target when fleeing out of range. Remarkable effectiveness or not, aircraft carriers sank several cruisers and destroyers and not the other way around.

 

"Moreover, American naval leaders at the time were not surprised by the limitations of carrier air power," Which were professor? The only limit on carriers vs battleships was daylight. And both sides knew this and acted on it.

 

and consistently employed the battleship in its traditional, prewar role. Which was what professor? Sea Control? Not in daylight with carriers around. 1941-1945 proved this was the age of carrier aviation and the demise of big guns and thick armor.

 

"...the battleship as the dominant naval platform despite opposition by an ignorant mass of hidebound pedants and Luddites is a military revolution that did not occur." Let's be kind to the professor and just say he is wrong. As wrong as wrong can be.

[Nobu]

Respectfully disagree with Fitzsimonds regarding battleships remaining as the ultimate determinant of sea control. That would be determined by the presence of enemy fast carriers in strength.

 

Sea control implies some ability to dictate terms of battle. The number of fast carriers sunk by battleship pursuit and gunfire in WW2 is a question to consider in determining whether battleships were able to do so against fast carrier forces of equal tonnage.

 

Edited to add: fascinating stuff re: HMS Glorious

Edited August 19, 2020 by Nobu

[bojan]

... Petropavlovsk

Petropavlovsk/Marat was "sunk" at the port. Here is after-action photo:

​

 

As you can see she stayed above sea level, and it was soon repaired enough to serve as a floating battery (Fired 1971 x 12" shells after "sinking"). Full repair by using bow of Poltava/Frunze was considered, but it was rejected due the her obsoleteness.

[Yama]

Yes some interesting discussion here:

 

https://www.hmsglorious.com/

Awesome, I haven't seen that before. Yes it does sound plausible and not too conspiracy-theorist. 'Operation Paul' is exactly what Winston would get excited for. For him, 'neutral' was just alternative spelling of 'enemy'.

 

Some more points to add:

'Operation Juno' was actually a plan to attack Allied ships at Harstad. However Germans got an air recon report which suggested Harstad was nearly empty. So on his own initiative, Marschall took his ships to offensive sweep on open ocean. I wonder if this was one thing which threw off the British intelligence. Not sure how good information Bletchley Park had provided?

 

Cajus Bekker provided a report of battle from German perspective. German radio intel was expecting the Brits to immediately signal a sighting report and possibly help request and Germans were ready to jam it. But Glorious did not transmit anything until she was already seriously damaged, and even that was just a sighting report of two battlecruisers (later changed to two pocket battleships (?)). Destroyers did not transmit anything. This greatly puzzled the Germans.

 

It appeared to also puzzle the Admiralty who tried to look into that in their official inquiry. As all commanding officers on the British side were dead, nothing came to light explaining this weird behaviour.

 

Obvious conclusion is that Glorious and her group were under very strict orders of radio silence. My theory was that Glorious was carrying something very valuable, like Devonshire was just a bit north of her which also maintained radio silence (in fact, lookout in Devonshire saw the smoke on the horizon). But the idea that Glorious was preparing for a very secret mission seems much more compelling.

[Markus Becker]

 

 

He had no CAP even in good weather though.

Apparently Glorious didn't even have a man in the crows nest...

There were aircraft in 10-minute readiness, but in reality they could not be launched in 10 minutes and by the time they were ready, Glorious was hit on the flight deck.

 

Even after spotting the German ships he also failed to increase speed or bearing. But the biggest blunder seems to be the (if true) reason for the journey - to head back to Scapa Flow to engage in some vendetta against the air officers.

 

 

Not all of the boilers were lit. This carrier was steaming like it was 1938!

 

PS: Wasn't Devonshire the ship that evacuated the Norwegian government and royal family?

Edited August 19, 2020 by Markus Becker

[Rick]

 

... Petropavlovsk

Petropavlovsk/Marat was "sunk" at the port. Here is after-action photo:

​

 

As you can see she stayed above sea level, and it was soon repaired enough to serve as a floating battery (Fired 1971 x 12" shells after "sinking"). Full repair by using bow of Poltava/Frunze was considered, but it was rejected due the her obsoleteness.

 

Great photo and information. Thanks as always bojan.

[KV7]

 

 

 

He had no CAP even in good weather though.

Apparently Glorious didn't even have a man in the crows nest...

There were aircraft in 10-minute readiness, but in reality they could not be launched in 10 minutes and by the time they were ready, Glorious was hit on the flight deck.

 

Even after spotting the German ships he also failed to increase speed or bearing. But the biggest blunder seems to be the (if true) reason for the journey - to head back to Scapa Flow to engage in some vendetta against the air officers.

 

 

Not all of the boilers were lit. This carrier was steaming like it was 1938!

 

PS: Wasn't Devonshire the ship that evacuated the Norwegian government and royal family?

 

It is discussed in the website I linked. Devonshire was carrying the King and it's orders to proceed under silence and caution is why it didn't go to aid Glorious.

 

Edited August 20, 2020 by KV7

[Yama]

...allegedly. Officially, they received a garbled message they could not read...

[DougRichards]

I fear that I have opened a can or worms here. Could the Glorious been able to defend herself even with a CAP and just a few Stringbags? I do not think so,

 

If she was in company with heavier units then the German light battleships may have not put themselves at risk, as at the time the KM was not strong with heavy units.

 

Of course this is an interesting situation.

[Markus Becker]

I fear that I have opened a can or worms here. Could the Glorious been able to defend herself even with a CAP and just a few Stringbags? I do not think so,

 

I absolutely do. A CAP would have spotted the German ships much earlier giving Glorious plenty of time to evade. Swordfish would have slowed the persuers down by forcing them to make evasive maneuvers.

[KV7]

Duplicate post deleted.

Edited August 20, 2020 by KV7

[KV7]

I think Devonshire going to aid likely would have ended with it also being sunk.

The critical error was Glorious leaving the convoy, when it had basically been reduced to a freight carrier and so could not do much to defend itself. If we believe the story this was a result of Churchill's hairbrained mining plot which no one really had the ability to stop.

If one wanted to carry out the plot, it still would have been possible for Ark Royal and Glorios to fly CAP, which should have given an alert and at the laest allowed glorious to break towards the convoy and allow time for the convey assets to engage the 2 battlecruisers.

Edited August 20, 2020 by KV7

[TheSilentType]

 

The reason I asked is because I keep hearing how the introduction of the CV doomed the Battleship, yet it really seems it was not the CV but land based aircraft that made them vulnerable. The main advantage of CV appears to be the ability to launch surprise attacks on enemy harbours. But that advantage would be lost if the enemy had operating radars and alert warning system (cough* looking at you Pearl Harbour cough*) Plus as AA suites and shipborne radars improved, Japanese CV became limited in the damage they could inflict on non-CV ships as the cost in aircraft would soon deplete their air wings.

Counting only battleships that were sunk(and not repaired) or finally sunk by airplanes, carrier aircraft sank two battleships on the high seas; the Yamato and Mushasi. Carrier aircraft sank six battleships in port (Conte Di Cavour, Arizona, Oklahoma, Haruna, Ise, and Hyuga) for a total of eight battleships sank by carrier aircraft.

 

Land based aircraft sank six battleships (and one battlecruiser) with three (plus battlecruiser Renown) being on the ocean: Prince of Wales, Roma, and Hiei. Petropavlovsk, Gneisenau, and Tirpitz were sunk in harbor. I do not include the Greek "battleships" Kilkis and Lemnol as they were not used as battleships in WW2. Same with the U.S.N. Utah.

 

Surface action (gunfire and/or ship torpedoes) sank four battleships: Scharnhorst, Bismark, Fuso, and Yamashiro.

 

Three battleships was lost to submarines -- Barham and Kongo on the high seas and Royal Oak in port, and one to an accident -- Mutsu. For the reverse, battleships sank two aircraft carriers on the high seas, Glorious and Gambier Bay and none in port.

 

In regards to aircraft carriers operating against alert harbors, the U.S.N. did this through out 1944-45 vs the I.J.N. Of course we know why they were able to do this though. As others have stated, the increased ability for carrier aircraft to search for and find battleships and to sink them at a range several times that of a battleship's guns led to the demise of the battleship vs the carrier.

 

You should add Kirishima to your list of battleships sunk by surface action.

 

Hiei was a complicated case. She was disabled by surface gunfire, further damaged by land-based planes and then scuttled by her own side. Hard to say who gets credit for that.

[TheSilentType]

 

 

 

 

Roma and Tirpitz for land based. Musashi and Yamato for Carrier air.

 

Im struggling ot think of any others.

If you're having Tirpitz on that list, you really should add Gneisenau too.

Hmm, she was not really a Battleship was she? I thought she was classed as a Battlecruiser. And she was in a harbour. Not deprecating it of course.

 

I suppose we can count a fair few others if we can count the Bikini Atoll test....

The Germans rated the Twins as battleships. The RN called them battle cruisers as they were fast and smaller than contemporary battleships. By the 1930s there was no real difference between a fully-armoured battle cruiser and a fast battleship.

 

By definition "...fully armoured..." in your context would be a battleship, not a battle cruiser. "Fully armored" is the amount of armor a said Navy believes will keep out -- as much as possible -- an opposing Navy's battleship's main gunfire for the time period said battleships are designed. To be sure, this distinction can be somewhat blurred; the Royal Navy considered Hood a battlecruiser while the Japanese Navy considered the modernized Kongo class as battleships.

The armor of the Hiei -- a modernized Kongo class, and the Hood, both failed against true battleship main guns. Albeit Hiei was surprised at basically point-blank range.

 

Hiei was crippled by gunfire from cruisers, she never faced an enemy battleship. It was Kirishima that was sunk by battleship main guns.

[glenn239]

I fear that I have opened a can or worms here. Could the Glorious been able to defend herself even with a CAP and just a few Stringbags? I do not think so,

 

 

 

A Swordfish or two on ASW patrol might have spotted the approaching danger.

[Rick]

 

 

The reason I asked is because I keep hearing how the introduction of the CV doomed the Battleship, yet it really seems it was not the CV but land based aircraft that made them vulnerable. The main advantage of CV appears to be the ability to launch surprise attacks on enemy harbours. But that advantage would be lost if the enemy had operating radars and alert warning system (cough* looking at you Pearl Harbour cough*) Plus as AA suites and shipborne radars improved, Japanese CV became limited in the damage they could inflict on non-CV ships as the cost in aircraft would soon deplete their air wings.

Counting only battleships that were sunk(and not repaired) or finally sunk by airplanes, carrier aircraft sank two battleships on the high seas; the Yamato and Mushasi. Carrier aircraft sank six battleships in port (Conte Di Cavour, Arizona, Oklahoma, Haruna, Ise, and Hyuga) for a total of eight battleships sank by carrier aircraft.

 

Land based aircraft sank six battleships (and one battlecruiser) with three (plus battlecruiser Renown) being on the ocean: Prince of Wales, Roma, and Hiei. Petropavlovsk, Gneisenau, and Tirpitz were sunk in harbor. I do not include the Greek "battleships" Kilkis and Lemnol as they were not used as battleships in WW2. Same with the U.S.N. Utah.

 

Surface action (gunfire and/or ship torpedoes) sank four battleships: Scharnhorst, Bismark, Fuso, and Yamashiro.

 

Three battleships was lost to submarines -- Barham and Kongo on the high seas and Royal Oak in port, and one to an accident -- Mutsu. For the reverse, battleships sank two aircraft carriers on the high seas, Glorious and Gambier Bay and none in port.

 

In regards to aircraft carriers operating against alert harbors, the U.S.N. did this through out 1944-45 vs the I.J.N. Of course we know why they were able to do this though. As others have stated, the increased ability for carrier aircraft to search for and find battleships and to sink them at a range several times that of a battleship's guns led to the demise of the battleship vs the carrier.

 

You should add Kirishima to your list of battleships sunk by surface action.

 

Hiei was a complicated case. She was disabled by surface gunfire, further damaged by land-based planes and then scuttled by her own side. Hard to say who gets credit for that.

 

Your right on the Kirishima, good catch. Thanks for the correction.

Edited August 20, 2020 by Rick

[EchoFiveMike]

Also add Bretagne. S/F...Ken M

[Rick]

Also add Bretagne. S/F...Ken M

Add Jean Bart. My error, thanks for catching it. Totally forgot the French Navy.

[shep854]

According to pearlharbor.org, California* and West Virginia** were listed as sunk, even though they were refloated.

*"After three days of flooding, the California settled into the mud with only her superstructure remaining above the surface. She was later re-floated and dry-docked at Pearl Harbor for repairs."

**"USS West Virginia (BB-48) was sunk by six torpedoes and two bombs during the attack on Pearl Harbor, but in May 1942, was salvaged from the seabed by draining the water from the hull."

Edited August 20, 2020 by shep854

[Ken Estes]

Lots of skepticism toward the NWC guys article. However, too many of us are playing fast and loose with the OP. Colin is questioning the supposed superiority of carrier aviation to battleships of the line, and specifically not when caught in harbor, but rather in an open seaway.

 

Counting only battleships that were sunk(and not repaired) or finally sunk by airplanes, carrier aircraft sank two battleships on the high seas; the Yamato and Musashi. Carrier aircraft sank six battleships in port (Conte Di Cavour, Arizona, Oklahoma, Haruna, Ise, and Hyuga) for a total of eight battleships sank by carrier aircraft.

 

 

Is an example of ducking the OP. The only BB destroyed in port by carrier air was Arizona. Oklahoma was righted and salvaged but too late for use in WWII. She sank in 1947 while under tow to a west coast scrapyard whereas it presumably could have been repaired and restored to service. None of the BBs badly damaged at PH were repaired there because the limited yard was needed for operational ship upkeep.

C. d. Cavour was not sunk, but grounded [as was Nevada at PH], raised and brought into port for repair, when the clock ran out on her with the armistice. Italy lacked resources to make her a priority to repair. The final sinking came when in German hands with an air raid [land based, I'd wager].

 

The three IJN BBs 'sunk' in the Inland Sea were caught in harbor, out of fuel, immobile, lacked complete crews and defenses. They could have been refloated but not after Japan's unconditional surrender.

Here were Hyuga, Haruna and Ise: not much worse than Nevada at PH:

 

https://youtu.be/670WR7NgKpw

 

https://youtu.be/O6RAfIwsnR8

 

https://youtu.be/5znKeTCI28w

 

 

The French BB Jean Bart was not sunk, but remained at Casablanca for the rest of the war because of lack of repair facilities. Still damaged, she did preliminary sea trials on 15 Sept 1944, but did not enter a shipyard [Cherbourg] until 29 August 1945.

 

 

The battleship remained a tough nut to crack. They were required to escort the fleet carriers because the CVs remained too fragile to risk in surface combat. The USN continued to operate its BBs under prewar doctrine. Once the new and reconstructed BBs became available, with enough oilers for the fleet, it was always envisioned that commanders opposed by the IJN battle line would form their own battle line under Admirals Lee [fast BB, TF34 for example] or Oldendorf [the OBB supporting amphibious landings, TG 77.2 at Surigao Str].

 

Postwar, the surviving navies of USA, UK and FR all sought to keep their fast battleships as necessary escorts, until the dearth of funding made it impossible. The USN did not scrap its best ships of the OBB force until 1957 [Colorado] and 1959 [Tennessee class, rest of Colorados]

 

I think FitzSimmonds had it right, and he concluded:

 

 

Ultimate victory for the Allies in the Pacific in World War II depended on

their superior ability to both impose and break sea blockades, and to conduct

successful amphibious landings while preventing enemy assaults from the sea. The

key to success was always sea control. Japanese reticence to persist with operations

in the absence of air striking power certainly facilitated their defeat, but the ultimate

attainment of sea control always rested on a dominant surface fleet centered on the

largest numbers of superior battleships, not the carrier forces. The fact that the U.S.

and Japanese battle lines never met in a major engagement is irrelevant.

From early 1943 until the end of the war, U.S. naval commanders confronted the

Japanese with a superior battleship-led battle line that served to deter any major fleet

engagement. Vincent O’Hara was on the mark in his observation that the Pacific War

was not a carrier war at all, seconding Admiral Thomas Kinkaid’s conclusion that U.S.

naval operations in the Pacific were “conducted generally along the lines visualized

before the war.” Far from believing battleships obsolete, the United States continued

to construct battleships and battle cruisers throughout the war, assuming that they

would be needed to replace combat losses. In the event, no U.S. battleships were

sunk and only three were seriously damaged after Pearl Harbor, while the precipitous

end of the Pacific War eliminated the need for a continued fleet buildup.

One final argument, at least chronologically, made against the continued relevance

of the battleship was its postwar absence from the arsenals of the world’s fleets. The

battleship did disappear from the U.S. fleet in the postwar years, not because of any

threat from carrier-borne aircraft, but for lack of a foreign battle fleet to fight, at

first, and eventually to the development and fielding of guided anti-ship weapons

that could overwhelm active defenses and defeat the strongest armor, thus putting all

surface ships—including aircraft carriers—at increasing risk. Battleships were still the

most survivable vessels at sea, but proved too expensive to operate relative to smaller

combatants to justify their continued service in the postwar years.

With the demise of the battleship as a useful platform, the U.S. Navy needed

a new type of capital ship to serve as a tangible symbol of global U.S. maritime

power. The aircraft carrier was deemed a sufficiently impressive vessel to perform

in that role. The carrier eventually carved out useful support missions in postwar

maritime operations, and has continued to serve as the icon of sea power. But the

aircraft carrier has never offered the ability to establish and sustain sea control

against a competent adversary armed with the latest anti-ship weaponry.

Ibid., 863.

 

 

 

The U.S. Navy today faces critical near-term decisions regarding its future force

structure and operational concepts to deal with major challenges at sea. Having

defined sea control as the carrier-centric battle group for the past seventy-five

years, the U.S. Navy’s general response to growing anti-ship threats since World

War II has been to devote an increasing proportion of fleet assets to defend that

widely acclaimed “capital ship,” arguably at the expense of fielding truly effective

and survivable offensive power. A more accurate understanding of sea control

during World War II and beyond, and of how attractive myths can displace sober

analysis, might help to better inform decisions regarding future force acquisition

and operational concepts within the U.S. Navy.

 

Ibid., 865

 

Edited August 21, 2020 by Ken Estes