Marines To Shut Down All Tank Units

[jstar]

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/03/23/marines-shut-down-all-tank-units-cut-infantry-battalions-major-overhaul.html

[Ken Estes]

I smell the USN, plus the usual ignorance of current leadership on the value of tanks when fighting in the heavyweight leagues, let alone the opposition faced 1990-present.

[Rich]

So no tanks, reduced bridging capability, and a massive reduction in artillery. I can't see a problem there, can you?

[bojan]

So glorified light infantry, playing second fiddle to the various SForces?

[GregShaw]

Looks like a typical attempt to re-org to fight the last war, badly.

[Rich]

Well, since Trump is best buds with Putin and Kim and will never send forces to the Middle East or Afghanistan again and has no concerns about mainland China, then there's no problem...right?

[shep854]

My impression is a swing away from extended ground campaigns to more of a heavy raiding force, to establish temporary sites for support and cover of USN ships in the area, as well as sea denial to the opposition. Do the Marines need MBTs and their heavy log tail for such missions?

[JasonJ]

ISTR that marines really shouldn't have made the push deep into Iraq, because of riding AAV7s rather than proper IFVs wasn't so good.

[Burncycle360]

Frankly I'd reestablish the USMC as our primary expeditionary to deal with global hotspots (incl. increase in funding), cut the army to a primarily reserve force, shift foreign policy away from occupations and nationbuilding and find something better to spend the hundred billion dollars saved on.

[Rick]

I spent two years of my young life as a Marine infantry corpsman. IIRC, in time of war, there were to be one "Doc" per infantry squad of 13 men. Casualties were expected.

Edited March 24, 2020 by Rick

[shep854]

Frankly I'd reestablish the USMC as our primary expeditionary to deal with global hotspots (incl. increase in funding), cut the army to a primarily reserve force, shift foreign policy away from occupations and nationbuilding and find something better to spend the hundred billion dollars saved on.

Back to the 1930s??

[Rich]

 

Frankly I'd reestablish the USMC as our primary expeditionary to deal with global hotspots (incl. increase in funding), cut the army to a primarily reserve force, shift foreign policy away from occupations and nationbuilding and find something better to spend the hundred billion dollars saved on.

Back to the 1930s??

 

Pretty close. The U.S. Army has c. 28 maneuver brigades now, versus about the same in 1939. The difference is the number of flag-officer headquarters that have proliferated at an extraordinary rate over the last 75 years.

[shep854]

 

 

Frankly I'd reestablish the USMC as our primary expeditionary to deal with global hotspots (incl. increase in funding), cut the army to a primarily reserve force, shift foreign policy away from occupations and nationbuilding and find something better to spend the hundred billion dollars saved on.

Back to the 1930s??

 

Pretty close. The U.S. Army has c. 28 maneuver brigades now, versus about the same in 1939. The difference is the number of flag-officer headquarters that have proliferated at an extraordinary rate over the last 75 years.

 

Gotta be ready for sudden wartime expansion; majors to major generals is a bit haphazard...

[R011]

Ike was an LTC in 1941 and an LTG in 1942.

[Rick]

On a related subject https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/03/24/toilets-navys-newest-carriers-clog-frequently-fixing-them-costs-400k-flush.html

[Rich]

Ike was an LTC in 1941 and an LTG in 1942.

He was actually eighteen years in grade as a major, RA from 1918 to 1936, when he was promoted to lt.col., RA. However, he was promoted to col., AUS and accepted on 18 March 1941, then to brig.gen., AUS accepted 5 October 1941, then maj.gen., AUS accepted 27 March 1942. then lt.gen., AUS 7 July 1942, and then finally gen., AUS 11 February 1943. Interestingly, he was promoted brig.gen. and maj.gen., RA (the highest RA rank at the time) concurrently on 30 August 1943. Then on 20 December 1944 he was promoted to General of the Army, RA.

 

So technically he went from 0-5 to O-11 between the declaration of limited emergency in September 1939 to 20 December 1944, just over five years. Not too bad.

 

Of course, he was also very highly thought of by his peers, by his training.(he was the Honors Graduate at the C. and G.S. School in 1926, and by his previous experience rising meteorically through the ranks. Remember, when the U.S. entered the Great War he was a 1st lt., RA, but accepted a commission as a lt.col., USA on 20 October 1918, so O-2 to O-5 in just over a year.

 

Anyway, at one time I went through and compared the wartime flag officer ranks actually held to the current Congressional authorizations. It was pretty revealing. I'll see if I can track down where I filed it.

[Mighty_Zuk]

I was at first baffled by the idea of removing the tanks entirely, but if the army gets an expanded landing capability, and the marines get the MPF, or a lighter version of it, plus turreted ACVs, then I can support this idea.

 

Any near peer adversary can easily block the landing of an MEU, even if it's a really heavy one, so perhaps it's time to shift the missions of the marines. Instead of engaging in heavily contested environment, they can be deployed in many different spots to create temporary landing strips, logistical sites, and occasionally be deployed on special missions like seizing ports.

 

Basically, the army engages the enemy army with all its assets, and the marines create as many contested points as possible to harass an enemy.

 

In the context of China it could be, for example, seizure of the islands and denying the whole area with anti-ship cruise missiles and local air defenses.

[shep854]

Once I got over the shock of the Corps apparently self-castrating and read through the various articles, I pretty much came to the same conclusion as MightyZuk,

 

The title of that article about clogged heads is really misleading. Its $400K per system flush, not each head flush

[Rich]

Okay, I haven't been able to track down the study I did, but these statistics might suffice.

 

As of the end of the war in August 1945, there were just over 2,000 general and flag officers in the U.S. military, out of a total establishment of 12 million, including 1.1 million officers. So generals made up about 1.8% of all officers and about 0.017% of all personnel.

 

As of 2018, there were 920-921 active duty GFO's and about 377 reserve component GFO's for a total of 1,297, out of an active military establishment of 1,317,325, including 230,708 officers. So GFO's made up about 4% of all officers and about 0.07% of all personnel.

 

Even more interesting is the growth of three and four star positions.

 

In 1965, there were 36 4-stars and 119 3-stars out of 1,284 GFO's.

 

In 2018, there were 40 4-stars and 147 3-stars out of 921 GFO's.

 

So while the total number of GFO's shrank, the number of high-ranking GFO's increased.

 

At the end of 1944, there were 12 4-star GFO's.

[Ken Estes]

Do not mistake a MEU for a full combat organization. It simply fits the shipping the USN allows for peacetime show of force [sic!] in the Med, P Gulf, Far East etc. It has five days of munitions, 15 days of general supply carried on board its shipping.

 

Forced entry requires at least a brigade [MEB], and it carries 15 days of munitions, 30 of supplies. Next is the full-up MEF [Div+Aircraft Wing] and its 30 days of all supplies (another 30 days must be carried in commercial follow-on shipping). Joint doctrine provides that the Army COSCOM takes responsibility for common logistics from D+60 onwardin any theater.

 

Looks like the US Pacific Command and CINCPACFLT are light readers of the WWII Pacific Campaign. It was an Aero-naval campaign, with emphasis on the 'Aero'. The South China Sea fortified islands are simple bowling pins for a serious military organization to handle. The IJN thought they were 'unsinkable aircraft carriers' but in the end they served as mere targets for systematic destruction. As in 1944-45, they can be bypassed and left for diminution by air power left in range from real bases.

 

The Maritime Prepositioning Force MEB has never been amphibious capable. Proposals for so using it remain in vapors. Its ground composition remains as an equivalent Army mech brigade.

 

Strategic problems for the US/Allies abound, depending very much on the strategic objectives of a WESPAC campaign, about which we will have little info on in TankNet. For example, Must ROK be defended at all costs?Taiwan? Guam? Is it with nucs? If not what are the constraints? One cud go on n on!

 

One of my lieutenants who was PM Tanks in the USMC as a colonel, stated this today:

 

This will cause the Marine Corps to become irrelevant to any CINC that needs heavy or medium forces in a theater of operations. Poorly thought out, border line stupid decision. Does not surprise me considering the current environment in the Corps. All we are is a light infantry force with little or no ability to survive or sustain itself for anything longer than 20 days. Bottom-line – if we get into a serious shooting war USMC units will get their ass kicked

 

 

Edited March 25, 2020 by Ken Estes

[Ken Estes]

p.s. - I like to remember that Napoleon was a general at 25 and Emperor of the French at 35. That's a career climber!

Edited March 25, 2020 by Ken Estes

[Ken Estes]

This space for rent.

Edited March 25, 2020 by Ken Estes

[Rick]

This space for rent.

Just arrived, approximately 232 M1 tanks for sale or lease.

POC -- K. Estes,

Grate Site Way, suite M48

,Kitsap Militia 1802

[Rich]

 

This space for rent.

Just arrived, approximately 232 M1 tanks for sale or lease.

POC -- K. Estes,

Grate Site Way, suite M48

,Kitsap Militia 1802

 

Nope, he's on the wrong side of the water for the Kitsap Militia...of which I may be the only member now? I think Ken is either a member of the Angle Lake Fencibles or possibly the Seatac Airdales?

[JasonJ]

Do not mistake a MEU for a full combat organization. It simply fits the shipping the USN allows for peacetime show of force [sic!] in the Med, P Gulf, Far East etc. It has five days of munitions, 15 days of general supply carried on board its shipping.

 

Forced entry requires at least a brigade [MEB], and it carries 15 days of munitions, 30 of supplies. Next is the full-up MEF [Div+Aircraft Wing] and its 30 days of all supplies (another 30 days must be carried in commercial follow-on shipping). Joint doctrine provides that the Army COSCOM takes responsibility for common logistics from D+60 onwardin any theater.

 

Looks like the US Pacific Command and CINCPACFLT are light readers of the WWII Pacific Campaign. It was an Aero-naval campaign, with emphasis on the 'Aero'. The South China Sea fortified islands are simple bowling pins for a serious military organization to handle. The IJN thought they were 'unsinkable aircraft carriers' but in the end they served as mere targets for systematic destruction. As in 1944-45, they can be bypassed and left for diminution by air power left in range from real bases.

 

The Maritime Prepositioning Force MEB has never been amphibious capable. Proposals for so using it remain in vapors. Its ground composition remains as an equivalent Army mech brigade.

 

Strategic problems for the US/Allies abound, depending very much on the strategic objectives of a WESPAC campaign, about which we will have little info on in TankNet. For example, Must ROK be defended at all costs?Taiwan? Guam? Is it with nucs? If not what are the constraints? One cud go on n on!

 

One of my lieutenants who was PM Tanks in the USMC as a colonel, stated this today:

 

 

 

This will cause the Marine Corps to become irrelevant to any CINC that needs heavy or medium forces in a theater of operations. Poorly thought out, border line stupid decision. Does not surprise me considering the current environment in the Corps. All we are is a light infantry force with little or no ability to survive or sustain itself for anything longer than 20 days. Bottom-line if we get into a serious shooting war USMC units will get their ass kicked

Further along the Pacific War analogy, there was value of M4s during the island hoping campaign. Cutting the M1s out would be like cutting the M4s out. Relying on just AAV7s or whatever future amphib that gets deployed would be like doing all the pushing with only LVTs. Saipan and Peleliu without M4A2s? Would need to request the UK to send over some Churchills.

Edited March 26, 2020 by JasonJ