Us Army Restarts Bradley Replacement Effort...

[Dawes]

Looks like the Raytheon/Rheinmetall team may get another go at it (if they so choose):

 

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/02/07/army-wades-back-into-effort-to-replace-bradley-vehicle/

[Stuart Galbraith]

Are they going to restart the Gavin line as well?

[TTK Ciar]

It sounds like they want it to incorporate every possible feature, but be small and light, "be capable of growth without significant weight increases", but also "characteristics would change as the Army learned more down the road".

 

That reads like a textbook example of how to set up a project to fail.

They've combined Second-System Syndrome with a changing specification, both big project antipatterns.

[Dawes]

If I was King Of The World, we'd just buy Ajax or Puma off-the-shelf and be done with it.

[TTK Ciar]

This got me thinking.

If the Army can't competently run a procurement project, they should contract it out to a company which can.

But you shouldn't have the same defense companies which produce your equipment plan and manage procurement, obviously. That's tantamount to letting them write their own checks out of your checkbook and enjoy a monopoly on new contracts forever.

That would suggest a niche for a company which -just- provides management and planning competence, and acts as a middleman between the Army and the manufacturers.

Do such businesses exist?

[Simon Tan]

Again. For the nth time.

[Simon Tan]

No consequence for failure. If a program is unsuccessful or overbudget everyone gets fired and forfeit their pensions AND get blacklisted when joining companies bidding for govt contracts.

[Burncycle360]

It was never about the results, it's about the pork.

[Mighty_Zuk]

This got me thinking.

 

If the Army can't competently run a procurement project, they should contract it out to a company which can.

 

But you shouldn't have the same defense companies which produce your equipment plan and manage procurement, obviously. That's tantamount to letting them write their own checks out of your checkbook and enjoy a monopoly on new contracts forever.

 

That would suggest a niche for a company which -just- provides management and planning competence, and acts as a middleman between the Army and the manufacturers.

 

Do such businesses exist?

Nice but flawed idea. Said company would need the basic info from you, like basic requirements. That's the one thing it cannot do on its own.

If the problem is with requirements, it won't fix anything.

[lastdingo]

This got me thinking.

 

If the Army can't competently run a procurement project, they should contract it out to a company which can.

 

But you shouldn't have the same defense companies which produce your equipment plan and manage procurement, obviously. That's tantamount to letting them write their own checks out of your checkbook and enjoy a monopoly on new contracts forever.

 

That would suggest a niche for a company which -just- provides management and planning competence, and acts as a middleman between the Army and the manufacturers.

 

Do such businesses exist?

Yes, but imagine how Boeing, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, BAE and Ingalls would seek to corrupt it and how much revolving door personnel economics would rule it.

[Mighty_Zuk]

It sounds like they want it to incorporate every possible feature, but be small and light, "be capable of growth without significant weight increases", but also "characteristics would change as the Army learned more down the road".

 

That reads like a textbook example of how to set up a project to fail.

 

They've combined Second-System Syndrome with a changing specification, both big project antipatterns.

The growth capability think seems to suggest a certain desired level of modularity to be able to make some structural changes cheap, or some extra room in general, for example for a larger engine and larger batteries.

And of course, growth in non-kinetic capability.

 

It does not make sense, however, in their protection desires. Do they want an AFV already protected against the reference threats? Or perhaps consider the reference threats as too powerful anyway and go for the shoot first, kill first route?

 

I think they should go 2 routes here, which I've probably already written here.

One is a heavier vehicle with the desired protection with limited airlift capability and produced in greater numbers, and one with reduced squad size (6) and lower protection for quick response and for certain units only, produced in low numbers.

Component commonality via identical electronic suite.

[Burncycle360]

Buy or license produce Namer for use in places that support MBT class weights, and CV90 series for when they cannot.

 

There. Saved the taxpayer hundreds of millions and gave significant improvements in capability

[Mighty_Zuk]

Buy or license produce Namer for use in places that support MBT class weights, and CV90 series for when they cannot.

 

There. Saved the taxpayer hundreds of millions and gave significant improvements in capability

CV90 is an ageing design, that if upgraded too much will no longer be able to leverage parts commonality and accumulated combat data.

 

I would advise the US to make a decision between Namer and Lynx, and supplement them with GD's 6-man, less protected prototype.

 

In such competitions, buying the Namer, or recently the calls to buy Eitan, are not very realistic. There is not one private company behind these vehicles that can act as a supplier. It has to be via a G2G route and then select a company to be prime contractor, which would then still be problematic in coordination of development between users.

So I think that either way, the Lynx is the top contender here.

[Stuart Galbraith]

I think they may as well max out the production on the 30mm stryker. Its cheap, mobile, NBC sealed, and fulfills the role. It cannot beyond them to put a launcher for Javelin on it.

 

Does the US really need a vehicle that can take on T15 or Kurganets? Not really, the Abrams and Dismounts im sure are more than capable of doing that.

[bojan]

It is no about taking on T15, it is a fact US army needs tracked IFV, period and wheeled one can not fulfill that niche.

[Stuart Galbraith]

I remember there being a discussion on here many years ago about whether IFV's were a good idea, being vulnerable to all antitank weapons and being unable to carry even a full infantry section. If you want a tank, buy a tank. If you want to carry infantry, build an APC and max out the protection systems if you must.

 

There are undoubtedly many limitations with wheeled APC's. But when Russias operate BTR's in some of the worse terrain on the planet to operate wheeled vehicles, maybe the problem is less the wheels than the vehicles we are building.

Edited February 10, 2020 by Stuart Galbraith

[Burncycle360]

 

Buy or license produce Namer for use in places that support MBT class weights, and CV90 series for when they cannot.

 

There. Saved the taxpayer hundreds of millions and gave significant improvements in capability

 

CV90 is an ageing design, that if upgraded too much will no longer be able to leverage parts commonality and accumulated combat data.

 

I would advise the US to make a decision between Namer and Lynx, and supplement them with GD's 6-man, less protected prototype.

 

 

Emphasis mine, and disagree wholeheartedly. The US has shown that it is incapable of running even a basic procurement program without gold plating it, and until they can demonstrate competence should go on training wheels. Any fawning eyes glancing at the latest and greatest new designs needs to have their peepee slapped and told "no", then dealt with swiftly and ruthlessly. Known, proven, working, and reliable options exist that are not just better than our current system but significantly so.

 

[Mighty_Zuk]

Lynx is, in itself new, but uses components that can hardly be described as "gold plated". Its niche is a cost effective vehicle with a new and modular approach to take on as many desired additions as possible.

[lastdingo]

I remember there being a discussion on here many years ago about whether IFV's were a good idea, being vulnerable to all antitank weapons and being unable to carry even a full infantry section. If you want a tank, buy a tank. If you want to carry infantry, build an APC and max out the protection systems if you must.

 

A case can be made against the IFV.

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-1.html

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-2.html

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2014/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-3.html

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2014/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-4.html

 

It's interesting that the IFV doesn't bring much of anything to the table that an APC or MBT wouldn't have as well - except the autocannon.

Yet at the same time, the addition of autocannons to a MBT's armament was repeatedly and consistently considered a failure because a MBT can make do with main gun and coax machinegun and doesn't need a coax autocannon.

Edited February 10, 2020 by lastdingo

[Burncycle360]

Lynx is, in itself new, but uses components that can hardly be described as "gold plated". Its niche is a cost effective vehicle with a new and modular approach to take on as many desired additions as possible.

 

Aren't they all

Edited February 10, 2020 by Burncycle360

[Burncycle360]

 

I remember there being a discussion on here many years ago about whether IFV's were a good idea, being vulnerable to all antitank weapons and being unable to carry even a full infantry section. If you want a tank, buy a tank. If you want to carry infantry, build an APC and max out the protection systems if you must.

 

A case can be made against the IFV.

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-1.html

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-2.html

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2014/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-3.html

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2014/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-4.html

 

It's interesting that the IFV doesn't bring much of anything to the table that an APC or MBT wouldn't have as well - except the autocannon.

Yet at the same time, the addition of autocannons to a MBT's armament was repeatedly and consistently considered a failure because a MBT can make do with main gun and coax machinegun and doesn't need a coax autocannon.

 

 

 

Classically I haven't been a particular fan of the concept, mostly because I feel they traditionally sacrifice too much in regards to dismounts in order to gain the additional firepower, and whenever the question comes up the very first thing that the brass are okay with is "one less dismount" up to and including basically going "eh, we'll redesign the squad to make it work". The rising popularity of shock mitigating seating has exacerbated this, but on the other hand improvements in unmanned turrets with little to no roof penetration have ameliorated it. So the net result is more interior volume... yet often no more dismounts!

 

[lastdingo]

The Puma is now at about € 10 million apiece and in need of expensive upgrades once it comes off the assembly line.

This is for 6 or 7 dismounts (depends on whether you count the commander, who could dismount to lead the dismounted Panzergrenadiere).

 

We cannot afford enough infantry (I don't care whether Panzergrenadiere are considered infantry or not - the dismounts fight with infantry weapons on foot) this way.

A mix with a lower cost APC is in order, but our GTK Boxer 'let's wish everything and put it together as a giant APC' monstrosity has a horrible price per dismount seat as well.

 

I stick with what I wrote years ago: We should have 50+ ton duel vehicles with much firepower and protection and track mobility (could be MBT), a similarly mobile and protected HAPC in small numbers (as battle taxi only, not with allocated dismounts) and a large quantity of relatively cheap protected wheeled vehicles based on the automotive parts of an in-service standardised truck family. The latter is needed for many support troops just as much as for infantry, for it would have to protect against harassing fires by arty and small arms.

 

I changed my opinion only in regard to one thing.

The micro UAVs of the 2000's seemed like irrelevant toys when I wrote the first three blog posts of the series. Nowadays they ARE toys that we gift to ten year olds and the cameras in our mobile phones put to shame 1990's military daylight sensors of all kinds.

The age of cooperative yet autonomous combat drones is coming like the 1900's announced the age of air power.

The time window for traditional AFVs is closing soon. We don't need to develop a tank with the 2040's in mind. AFVs will belong onto a 2040's battlefield like cuirassier horse cavalry belonged on a 1940 battlefield. So either we hurry up with the 2030's in mind (at most) or we should just declare the legacy vehicles the last generation of traditional AFVs.

[Ssnake]

...unless we develop drone defense (which we must, in any case). You can have large drones, or swarm drones in larger numbers. The former are a case for classic air defense. The latter will need autonomous counter-drones with proximity sensor and a sufficiently large self-destruct charge. Maybe this requires entire truckloads of counter-drones but it's not as if they are impossible to defend against, we just don't have suitable tools in our arsenals yet. But we will.

[Mighty_Zuk]

 

 

Lynx is, in itself new, but uses components that can hardly be described as "gold plated". Its niche is a cost effective vehicle with a new and modular approach to take on as many desired additions as possible.

Aren't they all

I understand you're joking, but no, and far from it.

There are quite a few IFVs on the market that absolutely try to maximize some aspect.

 

The Namer and T-15, for example. They're built with protection as a top priority, and the top limiting factor is weight, not cost. Built for the mid-60 and mid-50 ton ranges respectively.

 

The Puma needs to meet serious protection demands within even more limiting weight requirements, so it has so use all the latest and greatest to shave off as much weight as possible. Even going down in hull height from 95 percentile to 75.

 

The Lynx is in a category of vehicles NOT designed for the requirements of any specific customer, so in its current configuration it is cheaper and more exportable, and the modifications it will need to meet customer demands, are going to be substantially cheaper in most cases.

For some, import of the above mentioned tanks is not even feasible in any way.

[Simon Tan]

Better to have a lightly armed APC and a sister Infantry Support Vehicle in each platoon on the same chassis.