Could The Germans Have Successfully Propagated Sealion Without Air Supremacy

[glenn239]

1 hour ago, Andreas said:

1940? As I think was set out quite clearly they didn't get around to clearing the MFPs for production until April 1941. Is time travel now also a requirement to make the Seelöwe case work?

All the best

Andreas

Nobody's talking about MFP's in 1940.

The question was how much faster the Germans could have produced MFP's in 1941 if Barbarossa was off and MFP's had the highest industrial priority.  Rich writes,

NO NO NO, you just don't get it! It's industrial prioritization that matters

Rich has a long habit of burying threads in cascades of interesting but tertiary data and then slipping in bullshit conclusions in the cavalcade.  Here, he's saying that if an MFP program had the highest industrial priority, meaning diverting manpower even from submarine construction, and the supply of all required materials even before needed at the slipway, that this would not translate into faster MFP build times.  Do you agree or disagree with that conclusion?

Edited March 3, 2023 by glenn239

[Andreas]

56 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

Nobody's talking about MFP's in 1940.

Errr, you were. Happy to hear it was a typo or some other explanation as to what you were getting at.

"Do you agree or disagree with that conclusion?"

I consider that any question posited as this one is meaningless, as it is nothing but an academic exercise. Even if the Germans had decided to go for Seelöwe in 1941, they would not have been able, institutionally, to make this kind of absolute allocation/prioritisation decision. The history of the 3rd Reich tells us that much.

All the best

Andreas

[glenn239]

4 hours ago, Andreas said:

Errr, you were. Happy to hear it was a typo or some other explanation as to what you were getting at.

MFP's were originally designed for Sealion in 1940, (ie, industrial priorities established late 1940) but nothing was, (or could be), built until 1941.  

Quote

 

"Do you agree or disagree with that conclusion?"

I consider that any question posited as this one is meaningless, as it is nothing but an academic exercise. Even if the Germans had decided to go for Seelöwe in 1941, they would not have been able, institutionally, to make this kind of absolute allocation/prioritisation decision.

 

A safe answer.  Rich will be most pleased.  For example, after the fall of France and just for a short period of time, U-boats received top industrial priority.   The purpose of doing this was to redouble building tempo of U-boats in anticipation of an expanded U-boat arm for the Atlantic War.  Industrial priorities soon switched again, I think it might have something to do with the fact that you don't take Moscow with a submarine.  MFP's were not as technically complex as U-boats, correct?

 

Quote

 

[RichTO90]

I wonder what part of the first building contract for an MFP was let 5 December 1940 with Werft Gebr. Wieman and Berliner Stahlbau Gmbh this one fails to understand?

Edited March 4, 2023 by RichTO90

[RETAC21]

4 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

I wonder what part of the first building contract for an MFP was let 5 December 1940 with Werft Gebr. Wieman and Berliner Stahlbau Gmbh this one fails to understand?

At this point, I would suggest a technological approach. I asked chatGPT:

Could the Germans have won Operation Sea Lion in 1940?

And it sez:

"Operation Sea Lion was the German plan for the invasion of Britain during World War II, which was developed in 1940. While the Germans were able to achieve a number of impressive military victories in Europe during this period, the success of Operation Sea Lion is widely regarded as unlikely, if not impossible.

There were several factors that would have made the success of Operation Sea Lion difficult for the Germans, including:

The strength of the Royal Navy: The Royal Navy was one of the most powerful naval forces in the world at the time and had a significant advantage over the German Navy in terms of both ships and technology. The Royal Navy would have been able to contest German naval supremacy in the English Channel, making it difficult for the Germans to transport troops and supplies to Britain.

The strength of the Royal Air Force: The Royal Air Force was able to maintain air superiority over the English Channel, making it difficult for the Germans to conduct effective air operations in support of a land invasion. The Royal Air Force would also have been able to strike German naval forces and transport vessels, further complicating the German invasion plan.

The strength of the British Army: The British Army was well-trained and equipped, and would have been able to put up a strong defense against the German invasion forces. Additionally, the British had a significant advantage in terms of defensive fortifications and infrastructure, which would have made it difficult for the Germans to establish a beachhead and advance inland.

Logistics and supply: The German Army was already stretched thin with operations in other parts of Europe, and would have struggled to transport and supply the large number of troops required for a successful invasion of Britain.

Overall, while it is impossible to say with certainty what would have happened if the Germans had attempted to invade Britain in 1940, it is widely believed that the odds of success were stacked against them. The strength of the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and British Army, combined with logistical and supply challenges, make it unlikely that the Germans could have successfully executed Operation Sea Lion."

Walls of text for the obnoxious poster!  😮 

 

[Andreas]

10 hours ago, glenn239 said:

MFP's were originally designed for Sealion in 1940, (ie, industrial priorities established late 1940) but nothing was, (or could be), built until 1941.  

A safe answer.  Rich will be most pleased.  For example, after the fall of France and just for a short period of time, U-boats received top industrial priority.   The purpose of doing this was to redouble building tempo of U-boats in anticipation of an expanded U-boat arm for the Atlantic War.  Industrial priorities soon switched again, I think it might have something to do with the fact that you don't take Moscow with a submarine.  MFP's were not as technically complex as U-boats, correct?

 

MFPs were clearly not designed for Seelöwe in 1940. How can you prioritise capacity and items in 1940 for a vessel that you haven't even seen a prototype of? Submarines were an existing weapon, so prioritising them is a matter of allocating additional resources to a known task. Which is quite different from simply stashing stuff away on the basis of a drawing, hoping it comes in useful later.

You may sneer at a 'safe' answer, but that doesn't make it wrong? What exactly, for example, does 'top industrial priority' mean? If you look at Table 1 in Salavrakos (2016), U-Boat production increased by 390% YOY, tank production by 111%, SE-fighter production by 53%. So yes they built a lot more U-Boats, but this came at the expense of not building as many surface vessels, so the question then is, what exactly are you willing to trade in for your prioritisation? U-boats (you probably lose 100 boats for 500 MFPs)? Tanks? Planes? All of which would be useful for Seelöwe in 1941 as well. There is no free lunch here. Meanwhile, after you prioritised for MFPs, and wait half a year to see if the design serves, your factories are idle, because all the material is stockpiled somewhere. Not sure if that is a war-winning strategy.

All the best

Andreas

[glenn239]

3 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

At this point, I would suggest a technological approach. I asked chatGPT:

Could the Germans have won Operation Sea Lion in 1940?

 

The answer is probably not.  But Sealion, and not Barbarossa was moving in the correct strategic direction.  This is the concept that dogmatic posters cannot seem to overcome at a basic intellectual level.  Grant lost at Cold Harbor.  Doesn't mean the Union's 1864 strategy in Northern Virginia was the wrong one.  Same idea with Sealion.  

Quote

The strength of the Royal Navy: The Royal Navy was one of the most powerful naval forces in the world at the time and had a significant advantage over the German Navy in terms of both ships and technology. The Royal Navy would have been able to contest German naval supremacy in the English Channel, making it difficult for the Germans to transport troops and supplies to Britain.

The Royal Navy was the single most important element in the defense of the British Isles speaking to the likely failure of Sealion.

Quote

The strength of the Royal Air Force: The Royal Air Force was able to maintain air superiority over the English Channel, making it difficult for the Germans to conduct effective air operations in support of a land invasion. The Royal Air Force would also have been able to strike German naval forces and transport vessels, further complicating the German invasion plan.

British air strength was a lesser factor in the overall equation than the RN.  Of the three 'pillars' of British defense, it was probably the least important.

Quote

The strength of the British Army: The British Army was well-trained and equipped, and would have been able to put up a strong defense against the German invasion forces. Additionally, the British had a significant advantage in terms of defensive fortifications and infrastructure, which would have made it difficult for the Germans to establish a beachhead and advance inland.

The British army was sufficiently prepared that in conjunction with a successful naval defense, it could see off an invasion.  However, if the Germans established a salient, the British army was not well equipped and not well trained to eliminate the beachhead.  That is to say, if the Germans got ashore, the British could hold a perimeter, but would have much more difficultly in throwing the invasion back into the sea.

Quote

Logistics and supply: The German Army was already stretched thin with operations in other parts of Europe, and would have struggled to transport and supply the large number of troops required for a successful invasion of Britain.

Not sure what this pertains to.

Quote

Overall, while it is impossible to say with certainty what would have happened if the Germans had attempted to invade Britain in 1940

I can tell what doesn't happen if the Germans go with Sealion, RETAC21.  Germany doesn't start a land war in Asia.  

Quote

Walls of text for the obnoxious poster!  😮 

But I thought this post was addressed to me. :^)

 

[glenn239]

4 hours ago, Andreas said:

MFPs were clearly not designed for Seelöwe in 1940. How can you prioritise capacity and items in 1940 for a vessel that you haven't even seen a prototype of?

By establishing the scale of the program, the location of the slipways, the organization of the work force, the allocation of the engines, steel, guns, and other materials required, preparing the training programme.  Those sorts of things. 

Quote

Submarines were an existing weapon, so prioritising them is a matter of allocating additional resources to a known task. Which is quite different from simply stashing stuff away on the basis of a drawing, hoping it comes in useful later.

Once the design was ready for production, do you think that MFP production could have been accelerated from the historical case by way of raising the industrial prioritization to the highest level?   That is, MFP's entering service in larger numbers than was the historical case, in 1941.

Quote

You may sneer at a 'safe' answer, but that doesn't make it wrong?

 Rich has an opinion that if Barbarossa is off and the Germans and Italians pour resources into an MFP program, along with top priority on equipment, that this will not budge the needle on MFP production rates.  I'm of the opinion that it sure the fuck would have done exactly that.  You're of the opinion of finding reasons why in 1940 the Germans could not produce MFP's yet....which doesn't really address the case of 1941 MFP production with no Barbarossa.

 

Quote

What exactly, for example, does 'top industrial priority' mean? If you look at Table 1 in Salavrakos (2016), U-Boat production increased by 390% YOY, tank production by 111%, SE-fighter production by 53%.

It means shifting qualified workers from lower priority projects to MFP production.  Shipyards placing orders for steel go to the top of the pile at the steel mill.  Engine production goes to MFP's first.  That sort thing.

Quote

So yes they built a lot more U-Boats, but this came at the expense of not building as many surface vessels, so the question then is, what exactly are you willing to trade in for your prioritisation?

When Barbarossa was ordered, German industry implemented a crash top-priority industrial programme to support it.  If Barbarossa is off, then this does not happen.  The army expansion is low priority, the naval production is high priority.

 

Quote

U-boats (you probably lose 100 boats for 500 MFPs)? Tanks? Planes? All of which would be useful for Seelöwe in 1941 as well. There is no free lunch here.

The German army in 1941 did not require additional industrial production from 1940 in order to invade Britain.  It already had everything it needed.  It was the decision to invade the USSR that put the German army on the backfoot and caused a top-priority industrial program to field more medium tanks and improve infantry division firepower.

Edited March 4, 2023 by glenn239

[RichTO90]

7 hours ago, Andreas said:

MFPs were clearly not designed for Seelöwe in 1940.

It seems the preferred response now is "I reject your reality and substitute my own."

[glenn239]

2 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

It seems the preferred response now is "I reject your reality and substitute my own."

No one is talking of MFP's in 1940.  

[RETAC21]

6 hours ago, glenn239 said:

The answer is probably not.  But Sealion, and not Barbarossa was moving in the correct strategic direction.  This is the concept that dogmatic posters cannot seem to overcome at a basic intellectual level.  Grant lost at Cold Harbor.  Doesn't mean the Union's 1864 strategy in Northern Virginia was the wrong one.  Same idea with Sealion.  

The Royal Navy was the single most important element in the defense of the British Isles speaking to the likely failure of Sealion.

British air strength was a lesser factor in the overall equation than the RN.  Of the three 'pillars' of British defense, it was probably the least important.

The British army was sufficiently prepared that in conjunction with a successful naval defense, it could see off an invasion.  However, if the Germans established a salient, the British army was not well equipped and not well trained to eliminate the beachhead.  That is to say, if the Germans got ashore, the British could hold a perimeter, but would have much more difficultly in throwing the invasion back into the sea.

Not sure what this pertains to.

I can tell what doesn't happen if the Germans go with Sealion, RETAC21.  Germany doesn't start a land war in Asia.  

But I thought this post was addressed to me. :^)

 

Operation Sealion was Germany's plan to invade Great Britain, while Operation Barbarossa was the invasion of the Soviet Union. If Germany had successfully invaded and defeated Britain, it would have removed a major obstacle to German domination of Europe. However, the German navy did not have the resources to launch such an invasion, and the Royal Air Force's superiority made it unlikely that Germany would have been able to maintain a sustained aerial campaign.

On the other hand, the invasion of the Soviet Union was the largest and deadliest military campaign in history, and ultimately played a decisive role in Germany's defeat. However, many historians argue that Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union was a major strategic error, as it greatly stretched German military resources and led to a two-front war that Germany was ill-equipped to fight.

In any case, it is impossible to say what would have happened if Germany had pursued a different strategy during World War II. Many factors, including military resources, political leadership, and chance, played a role in the outcome of the war.

[RichTO90]

6 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

It seems the preferred response now is "I reject your reality and substitute my own."

So far we've been informed by the same poster that:

"MFP construction had the highest industrial priority in in 1940".

"MFP's were originally designed for Sealion in 1940".

And "No one is talking of MFP's in 1940".

 

[glenn239]

14 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

 

"MFP construction had the highest industrial priority in in 1940".

 

False.   We are discussing what MFP numbers might have looked like in 1941 IF MFP's had the highest industrial priority late in 1940.  "If"

You have continuously made the claim - false in my opinion - that even top industrial priority would not have accelerated the MFP program.  I disagree.  I think the high industrial priority in the wake of the cancellation of Barbarossa translates into large numbers starting mid-1941.

Quote

"MFP's were originally designed for Sealion in 1940".

True.  Read that here,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marinefährprahm

Originally developed for Operation Sea Lion the proposed invasion of England, the first of these ships was commissioned on 16 April 1941,

 

 

Edited March 5, 2023 by glenn239

[glenn239]

18 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Operation Sealion was Germany's plan to invade Great Britain, while Operation Barbarossa was the invasion of the Soviet Union. If Germany had successfully invaded and defeated Britain, it would have removed a major obstacle to German domination of Europe.

Sealion continued the strategic premise of a limited war.  Sealion could hope to keep the USA, USSR, and Japan neutral.  Barbarossa embaced a total war solution, a global conflagration.   Regardless of the outcome, Germany could hope to retain the strategic initiative after a failed Sealion.  Practically independent of the outcome, Barbarossa would rob Germany of the initiative and mire it in an unwinnable war.

Quote

However, the German navy did not have the resources to launch such an invasion, and the Royal Air Force's superiority made it unlikely that Germany would have been able to maintain a sustained aerial campaign.

It was unlikely the Battle of the Somme would cause the surrender of Germany in 1916.  Nonetheless, the British army continued attacking the German army on the Western front, campaign after campaign.  With Sealion, you argue to the effect that Sealion could not achieve its lofty strategic aims.  That is correct, but misses the point from the Somme, which is repetition.  Grant did not win the 1864 campaign in one battle, it was a repetition of the same strategy over and over and over again until the Army of Northern Virginia was pinned and exhausted.

Quote

However, many historians argue that Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union was a major strategic error, as it greatly stretched German military resources and led to a two-front war that Germany was ill-equipped to fight.

There are few cases in modern military history where it can be argued that a more serious and fatal error was made than Barbarossa.  Napoleon's 1812 invasion is one, the decision for Japan to go to war in 1941 is another.

Quote

In any case, it is impossible to say what would have happened if Germany had pursued a different strategy during World War II. Many factors, including military resources, political leadership, and chance, played a role in the outcome of the war.

Correct, but it is sure hell possible to say that if Germany had stuck to Sealion and banished all thoughts of Barbarossa, that Germany's overall strategic prospects would have radically improved over the historical decisions.  This conclusion remains valid in the case of Sealion failing continuously at the operational level.

Edited March 5, 2023 by glenn239

[RichTO90]

Yeah, sure Wikipedia obviously gets that correct. So a vessel was "developed" for Operation Sealion in summer 1940 by initiating development 5 December 1940 and completing and testing a prototype 12 March 1941.

 

[RETAC21]

2 hours ago, glenn239 said:

Sealion continued the strategic premise of a limited war.  Sealion could hope to keep the USA, USSR, and Japan neutral.  Barbarossa embaced a total war solution, a global conflagration.   Regardless of the outcome, Germany could hope to retain the strategic initiative after a failed Sealion.  Practically independent of the outcome, Barbarossa would rob Germany of the initiative and mire it in an unwinnable war.

It was unlikely the Battle of the Somme would cause the surrender of Germany in 1916.  Nonetheless, the British army continued attacking the German army on the Western front, campaign after campaign.  With Sealion, you argue to the effect that Sealion could not achieve its lofty strategic aims.  That is correct, but misses the point from the Somme, which is repetition.  Grant did not win the 1864 campaign in one battle, it was a repetition of the same strategy over and over and over again until the Army of Northern Virginia was pinned and exhausted.

There are few cases in modern military history where it can be argued that a more serious and fatal error was made than Barbarossa.  Napoleon's 1812 invasion is one, the decision for Japan to go to war in 1941 is another.

Correct, but it is sure hell possible to say that if Germany had stuck to Sealion and banished all thoughts of Barbarossa, that Germany's overall strategic prospects would have radically improved over the historical decisions.  This conclusion remains valid in the case of Sealion failing continuously at the operational level.

It is difficult to say with certainty how Germany's strategic prospects would have been affected if they had launched Operation Sealion instead of Barbarossa. 

If Germany had successfully invaded Britain, it would have secured a key strategic position in the Atlantic and weakened the Allied war effort. However, invading Britain was a difficult task, and it is unclear whether Germany had the resources and capability to pull it off. Additionally, even if Germany had been successful in invading Britain, it is unlikely that it would have been enough to win the war, as the Soviet Union and the United States were still powerful adversaries.

On the other hand, the decision to launch Operation Barbarossa was a major strategic mistake for Germany, as it led to a long and costly war on two fronts, which ultimately led to Germany's defeat. If Germany had focused its resources on consolidating its gains in Europe and building a strong defensive posture, it may have been able to hold out longer and negotiate a more favorable peace settlement.

In conclusion, while it is impossible to know for sure how history would have unfolded if Germany had launched Operation Sealion instead of Barbarossa, it is unlikely that the invasion of Britain alone would have been enough to secure Germany's victory in World War II.

[RichTO90]

Quote

For example, after the fall of France and just for a short period of time, U-boats received top industrial priority.   The purpose of doing this was to redouble building tempo of U-boats in anticipation of an expanded U-boat arm for the Atlantic War.  Industrial priorities soon switched again, I think it might have something to do with the fact that you don't take Moscow with a submarine.

Sigh...no, just no. Yet another rejection of reality.

Upon the declaration of war, the U-Boot Rüstungsprogramm expanded from contracts for 25 seagoing boats in 1938 under the so-called Z-Plan to 32 seagoing boats per month when Hitler cancelled the Z-Plan. Total contracts in 1939 were for 383 seagoing boats.

However, that did not translate into "top industrial priority" (whatever the fuck that is). During the first twelve months of the war, an average of just 1.75 seagoing boats joined the fleet per month.

So, yes, under the "top industrial priority" of Rüstungsprogramm B, which was instituted "after the fall of France" for the "short period of time" of 28 August 1940-23 June 1941 (I wonder what a "long period of time" is?) U-Boot production "more than tripled" (according to Tooze p. 435), which actually translates into an increase of 6.25 boats joining the fleet per month on average during the second 12 months of the war - so 3.57 times.

Of course in 1940 only 129 seagoing U-Boot were actually contracted for, which was in fact a reduction of the construction tempo.  It was in 1941 that another 276 were contracted for...the actual prioritization of total U-Boot construction was under the Göring-Rüstungsprogramm not under Rüstungsprogramm B. From 23 June 1941 to the introduction of the Iwan-Rüstungsprogramm in May 1942 after the failure of BARBAROSSA. That was the program that emphasized "industrial priority" primarily for the Luftwaffe and secondarily for the Kriegsmarine - U-Boot and MFP.

Rüstungsprogramm B prioritized arming and equipping the 50 percent expansion of the Heer, from 120 to 180 divisions, for BARBAROSSA. It also failed miserably at it.

Yes, "industrial priorities soon switched again", basically following the German accounting year (1 April-31 March). Go figure.

So no, you "don't take Moscow with a submarine" but you also don't rewrite history to suit your warped notion of reality. Go peddle your bullshit on some Alt-History site where they don't know that you're a habitual bullshitter.

[PCallahan]

One of the things to consider in a 1941 Sealion scenario (assuming September 1941) launch, is that the Germans would be engaged in a race to build an invasion fleet( posited here as being composed primarily of MFPs) against the UK's construction of warships.  This is not a race that the Germans were going to be able to win in 1941.  

Essentially, it doesn't really matter if you can actually make 300 or more MFPs by September 1941 -- they will increase the German's ability to successfully prosecute an invasion far less than the historical UK shipbuilding program increases its ability to defend against it.  Consider that while the Germans would (with some sort of industrial focus) produce a significant number of MFPs (while sharply limiting U-Boat production, apparently), along with a small handful of destroyers and a larger number of minesweepers and S-Boot, just looking at select light craft, the UK would have commissioned perhaps 130 more Flower class and 200+ Fairmiles.  

Basically, the Germans didn't just have to produce an effective amphibious fleet, they had to be able to protect them against a radically expanding Royal Navy (which was effectively several years ahead than Germany on its building surge).  If you start to get into 1942 (with the UK and US really hitting their building stride), then things get really, really grim for the Germans, irregardless of what they build.

[Andreas]

Quite. You also need to build the planes to gain air superiority over the Channel. You need to build the tanks to replace your obsolete tank fleet of early Panzer III with 37mm guns. You need to build the surface vessels to protect the MFPs - and the only reason the Germans did get to prioritise U-Boats was because they throttled back surface vessel construction. There just wasn't a magical mountain of steel and materials, it was always a question of robbing Peter to pay Paul.

All the best

Andreas

[Stuart Galbraith]

It was quite interesting to learn quite how badly off the Luftwaffe was for fighter Geshwader, even before the Battle of France, not helped by Goerings fixation with the sub par Me110. And in fact that they were still using Me109E's as late as 1942 shows how crap their production rates were. It has been suggested by James Holland in his book on the Battle of Britain, that the Luftwaffe never even really recovered from the Battle of France, let alone the Battle of Britain, where the British at the end of the Battle had replaced every aircraft lost, and had actually advanced numbers on what they had.

 

16 minutes ago, Andreas said:

Quite. You also need to build the planes to gain air superiority over the Channel. You need to build the tanks to replace your obsolete tank fleet of early Panzer III with 37mm guns. You need to build the surface vessels to protect the MFPs - and the only reason the Germans did get to prioritise U-Boats was because they throttled back surface vessel construction. There just wasn't a magical mountain of steel and materials, it was always a question of robbing Peter to pay Paul.

All the best

Andreas

Industrially the Reich, the way it was structured, was backward, and they didnt really start sorting that out till fairly late in the day. Like 1944.

 

[Andreas]

2 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

IIndustrially the Reich, the way it was structured, was backward, and they didnt really start sorting that out till fairly late in the day. Like 1944.

 

It was an industrial oligarchy underneath the nasty dictatorship. Pretty much like Russia now, and with similar results on the battlefield.

All the best

Andreas

[Stuart Galbraith]

Yes, a totally valid comparison. How fortunate we are that the Russian Army isnt a patch on the Wehrmacht.

[RichTO90]

Just a short note on "prioritization". From initiation of contract to the first test of a pilot was 97 days for the MFP.

It took 56 days for the first American-built LCT 5 to get from keel laying to commissioning. That was with a completed design, based on the extensive British experience with the LCT 1-3 and was essentially a slightly modified British LCT 4.

Given that the British TLC 1 took about five months from concept to launch and commissioning, I would say the Germans did pretty well, whether or not the design had "priority". Of course, the execution of the building program was the usual German manufacturing twaddle but that is a different subject.

[seahawk]

20 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

It was quite interesting to learn quite how badly off the Luftwaffe was for fighter Geshwader, even before the Battle of France, not helped by Goerings fixation with the sub par Me110. And in fact that they were still using Me109E's as late as 1942 shows how crap their production rates were. It has been suggested by James Holland in his book on the Battle of Britain, that the Luftwaffe never even really recovered from the Battle of France, let alone the Battle of Britain, where the British at the end of the Battle had replaced every aircraft lost, and had actually advanced numbers on what they had.

 

Industrially the Reich, the way it was structured, was backward, and they didnt really start sorting that out till fairly late in the day. Like 1944.

 

Where is the industrial capacity to come from? By 1933 the whole Luftwaffe was made up by 3 „Reklamestaffeln“. The whole aircraft industry (civil included) employed a meagre 4000 workers. If you see from where they started, the output was not too bad.

 

[Stuart Galbraith]

Well if they had a better head of the Luftwaffe, they would probably have seen the Me110 wasnt worth the resources, and they could probably have built maybe 2 Me109's for ever Me110? Granted the former didnt have the range, but they only needed air superiority over the SE of England, which it had enough range for.

Yes, they did very well, other than the ambition to want to be masters of the world. For defensive purposes, what they had was adequate. To take on the entire planet, one has to point out they didnt have the cloth for the coat. But then I think we knew that.