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Could The Germans Have Successfully Propagated Sealion Without Air Supremacy


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2 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

Franco ceasing to be Franco anymore.  Say, now you're onto a possibility. 

Well, Franco would need to have an assurance of Spain suffering no damages from the war, so first UK had to be defeated. So better execute Sealion without active Spanish participation.

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15 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

Which war, the one with Britain by sea or the one with Germany by land?

Seems Hitler preferred to wage war against Russia than against Spain. Weird. Or perhaps conscious of the Napoleonic wars.

Edited by sunday
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17 hours ago, PCallahan said:

We've now seen the idea of a 1941 invasion come up both on these forums and in Forczyk's We March on England.  However, I have not seen any data indicating (without hand-wavium) that German naval and air production by the spring of 1941 would be sufficient to give them a better chance than 8 months earlier; in fact, I have not seen anything to indicate that there was any way it would outpace the new production/training by the UK, on land, air and sea. 

In 1941 the British have specific advantages in the form of the widespread introduction of radar onto its warships, strong aircraft production statistics, warship production and a home army much better equipped and trained than in 1940.   It's also receiving Lend Lease in large quantities, including more aircraft than all of Italy's aircraft production and old destroyers perfectly capable of invasion defense.  These are big advantages.

The German specific advantages are improved KM ship strength and availability and a year to continue improving requisitioned naval equipment.  Against British aircraft production numbers the Germans were reaching peak fighter superiority in the air, (ME-109F, FW190) versus block obsolescence in some of the British fighter production, (Hurricane, Defiant).  There will be better jamming support against British radars, (largely absent in 1940).  The 1941 mining plan will be better.  The Germans could draw on support from other countries.   There would be purpose built amphibious craft in large numbers.

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I know it has been proposed here that Germany could shift production priorities from land forces to air and sea -- but how realistic is that?  Was aircraft factory capacity under-utilized during the winter of 40-41? 

On the question of aircraft production, Rich would know best.  My read of the material is that without Barbarossa and focusing on existing typesw, the Germans could probably have increased on their aircraft production stats for 1941, but not to the level where the British advantage in production and Lend Lease would be nullified  On ship production, the commissioning of new warships and repair of damaged ones might have been sped up.  But the most important factor would be in the construction of specialized amphibious landing ships. 

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I realize that a number of major fleet units were delayed/cancelled at the start of the war, but off hand it is likely that only CV Graf Zeppelin might have been completed (and the less said about that design, the better...)  H-Class BB H & J had begun construction in 1939, but work was halted on the outbreak of war.  Assuming a July 40 restart, they are still multiple years away from service.  On the cruiser front, it would be possible to get Seydlitz into service, in all likelihood, with a July 1940 restart (she was near completion, but obviously fitting out and training a crew would have taken time).  

Everything you say here is true.  Still I think you might not be fully taking into account the magnitude of the shift in the political circumstances from the cancellation of Barbarossa, and the alteration of force structure for Sealion that such a sea change might entail.  The threat was not so much German warship construction as it was leveraging or horse trading for Soviet, Italian, French, Spanish and Swedish warship resources.

In terms of ships like Lutzow (heavy cruiser), Seydlitz, Tirpitz and Graf Zeppelin, the Germans are allied to the Soviet Union.  None of the German ships listed could contribute to Sealion, but some or all of them could be traded to the Soviet Navy in exchange for Soviet warships and other material that could.  The selling price of the Lutzow was 150 million marks - double the cost to build it.  The Soviets were hungry for naval technology in 1940.  

WRT Sweden, you need to keep in mind that if Germany had picked Sealion for 1941, there were  hard political consequences for Scandinavia that would immediately have followed.  Germany had occupied Norway and Denmark, the Soviet Union would have occupied Finland.  Sweden would not have the luxury of remaining neutral and would be forced to join the Axis.

 

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On another note, with regard to Italian MAS boats, it is important to remember that these are not E-Boote, Vospers or PTs -- they are significantly smaller.  The early makes were all around 13-15 tons displacement, while the later were in the 20-25 ton range (compare to 35-40 for other nation's PTs and 95 for early E-Boote)

That's why I said they were transportable by rail.  If  I thought they were 300 tons then I would not think that could be the case.

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19 hours ago, PCallahan said:

We've now seen the idea of a 1941 invasion come up both on these forums and in Forczyk's We March on England.  However, I have not seen any data indicating (without hand-wavium) that German naval and air production by the spring of 1941 would be sufficient to give them a better chance than 8 months earlier; in fact, I have not seen anything to indicate that there was any way it would outpace the new production/training by the UK, on land, air and sea. 

I know it has been proposed here that Germany could shift production priorities from land forces to air and sea -- but how realistic is that?  Was aircraft factory capacity under-utilized during the winter of 40-41?

No, it wasn't and the notion that shifting "production priorities" was the solution is simply bullshit hand waving.

For example, as of January 1941 there were five plants producing the Bf 109, 79 of them - Messershmitt Regensberg, Arado Warnemund, Erla Leipzig, Fiessler Kassel, and WNG Vienna. The most productive plant, WNF, completed 21, the least productive, Messerschmitt - go figure, completed 12. In addition, Ago Ochersleben was tooling up to build the Bf 109 and in February completed its first 6.

Production of the aircraft that according to a serial fantasist "the Germans were reaching peak fighter superiority in the air" with, the FW 190, saw zero production. Nil. Zip. Nada. Focke-Wulf Marienberg had completed one in 1939 and two in 1940. The first production types came out of the factory in June 1941 - four of them.

But, yeah, the Germans "shifted priorities". Since the FW 190 would mean ""the Germans were reaching peak fighter superiority in the air" - they believed it too - Fieseler Kassel was ordered to shut down Bf 109 production. After reaching a peak monthly output of 36 in April, it stopped production at the end of June to retool for FW 190 production, which began in May. May 1942. They built one. At least Ago did better when it was selected to convert from Bf 109 to FW 190 production. It stopped the Bf 109 line with 4 in October and 3 in November, and turned out its first FW 190 in October, 2 of them, followed by 17 in November. Arado also did well, ending Bf 109 production in October, 7, and beginning FW 190 production in August, 2.

So lets assume a June 1941 SEELOEWE. Four Fw 190, the first production types, were available. BFD. 284 Bf 109 were produced. BFD. The British, alone, produced 584 fighter aircraft in June 1941. More importantly, they turned out thousands more qualified pilots in 1941 than did the Luftwaffe.

Don't get me started on the asinine "they will ramp up Siebel and MFP" mouthbreathing lunacy. The MFP prototype hit the water in March 1941. The 125th Siebel was completed 9 September 1941.

Franco gave a shit about Spain, not Hitler or Germany. But some man-bunned, guitar strumming shit for brains knows better.

Fucking lunacy.

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Spain has no need to join the war to get an Italian fleet up into the western approaches (note I did not say Channel). 
There's diplomacy at work here too. I would expect London to be more than happy to give Madrid a free pass on breeching neutrality in a case like this than have them join the war on the axis side. 

From the British naval perspective, they have three options:
a/ Contest the passage of the Italian fleet in the Western Med. Pro - choke point effect makes locating the enemy easy. Con - the weight falls on the Med Fleet and whatever reinforcements they scrape up (+Force H etc), which complicates the strategic calculus.

b/ Contest the passage of the Italian fleet in the Bay of Biscay or Western Approaches (between Gib and Cornwall/Brest). Pro  1 - weight falls on the Home Fleet and whatever reinforcements they scrape up (+Force H etc) which simplifies the strategic calculus, plus home ground advantage, land based air etc). Con - Wider field of play and weather makes finding and fixing enemy fleet harder, much less distance/time. 

c/ Not contest the passage of the Italian fleet at all. Pro - allows this hypothetical Sealion scenario a chance to proceed. Con - utterly unrealistic. 

From a British grand strategic/diplomatic perspective they have two options, given there's no way they can stop Spain joining the Axis if that's what Madrid wants to do. 

1/ They can try and fail - worst case result, Spain still becomes an enemy, London takes another very public defeat, no one has anywhere to go.  

2/ Remove the need for Spain to take the action London doesn't want them to take, and probably throw in a few million more in bribes to senior Spanish officials.  From a naval perspective it makes no real difference, the Italian fleet would still be doing the same things at the same times, and short of intercepting them in the Western med there's nothing the British can do, so a diplomatic accommodation costs no one anything, other than London taking a bit of a PR hit which they were going to take anyway. 

I would suggest the best combination of these for the British is options b/ and 2/. 

For Spain the best combination would be a/ and 2/, after all if the RN and RM clash in the Med then the game is decided one way or the other before Spain enters the picture - and any major battle would stop proceedings. Whatever the outcome of such a battle the Italian fleet is going to be in no condition to keep rolling into another major operation without dockyard time to repair damage etc.
Domestically, we know Franco believed the best course was to walk the fine line of neutrality, rather than commit to either side. That doesn't change by much in this scenario, and not enough (I believe) to change things. There is the potential gain of some 'spoils' as a member of the axis if the UK falls, but balanced against that is the certainty of loss if the invasion attempt fails and Spain is now an open target for British action.   

'Shane's Home brewed moonshine' AKA Perfidious Albion Strikes Again

Factoids 
Taranto - Gib 1200nm, 3 days 10 hours
Gib - Ferrol 600nm, 1 day 17 hours 
(Tranto - Ferrol  1850nm, 5 days 3 hours)
Ferrol - Brest 350nm, 23 hours
All at 15knots as a representative fleet speed of the time. 

Lets assume the London hears of this (the Italian Fleet being committed to the Channel as part of an invasion attempt), before the force sails. How long before I don't know, lets say soon enough to spoil any surprise, but not early enough to re-arrange the RN's global dispositions around meeting them. 


Diplomatic actions

The subject is discreetly broached with Spain, it may come from the Spanish first, perhaps a little shadow boxing around around the subject, whatever. London offers 2/ and hints at a/, but with no promises on a/ after all war is war and 'shit happens.' 
Secret Anglo-Spanish agreement - London's first public response to news of the Italian fleet sailing will be in part to recognise Spain as subject to 'force majeure' and not hold it responsible for any breeches of its neutrality by Axis forces.  Spain promises to obstruct any Axis move on Gib to the best of her ability, likewise prevent the use of Cadiz by any but damaged ships, and to keep London informed of events. This last is bit is diplomatic Kabuki, the British don't expect the Spanish to actually do it, but are curious about what the Spanish don't/won't tell them as an indication of 'wind direction', and the Spanish in turn expect the British spies to learn it all anyway so its no real consequences, and they are both about right.

Naval Campaign

Phase 1
The RN concentrate Force H on Gib, submarine forces on Malta, and the Med Fleet in Alexandria prior to the Italian departure. The Med Fleet is held on short orders to sail, steam kept up etc, with the story being they don't want to risk hanging around in Malta and hope to get enough warning of the Italian movements to sortie from Alex in time to make the transit across.  

Phase 2
+/- the Italian sortie, as fate dictates the news gets out.
The RN execute stage 1 of their plan; a/ all subs not already on patrol sortie to areas across the expected Italian route, b/ the Med fleet sail from Alex with a dash but slow down once at sea. c/ RN fast mine layers get in a quick lay or two across expected Italian routes, d/ Allied shipping is directed out of the Biscay/Western Approaches area.
The RM make their transit across to Gib as per their planning, and bump into as many RM subs and mines as may be. 

Phase 3 (D+2 ish)
Force H and any ships left in Gib sail  - West. Other than mines, subs, shore batteries and perhaps an air strike from Ark Royal the British do not contest the passage of Gib, just as they have only sought to harass the Italian transit from Taranto.

Phase 4 (D+3.10)
The magic fog descends across the Straights of Gibraltar, both sides flail away at mirages in the mist to no end little expenditure of ammo. With little additional damage, the lack of enough oil to fuel the whole fleet oil at Cadiz (Spain keeping its end of the deal with London), the Italian fleet steams on North to Coruna/Ferrol, shadowed but not engaged aircraft from Ark Royal and Force H. 

Phase 5 (D+5)
The Italian fleet drop anchor in the Spanish ports, probably undamaged ships in Ferrol and those needing a little dockyard love in Coruna, but however. All the crews break out the grappa and wind down a little from the most stressful week of their lives, in preparation for an even grater effort over the next few days, as the fleet needs to be resupplied and patched up for the next phase up to Brest. 

Phase 5b
At about 22:30, the a wave of Swordfish announced the start of Operation Judgement with a curtain of flares. Over the proceeding hours the RN's combined carrier force proceeds to entertain all and sundry with a succession of air strikes. Defended only by their own guns, and those limited in there firing arcs by friendly ships and neutral Spanish homes the Italian Fleet takes heavy losses from the RN's bombers. By dawn everyone is rather sick of the RN's continuing presence over head, it had kept the Spanish awake and the Italians dealing with 250lb bombs, which short of a direct hit were not very damaging, but equally impossible to ignore. 

With the dawn came the Skua squadrons with 500lb SAP bombs and rather more discrimination than their nocturnal brethren had been capable of. Concentrating on those cruisers and battleships not carrying obvious damage, and then working backwards down the list, the Skua and then Swordfish kept returning until the RN carriers ran out of ordnance and aircraft. 

Phase 5c
Diplomatic protests at this gross violation of Spanish neutrality and sovereignty are met with raised eyebrow in London, after all  'They started it old boy, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander is it not?"

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14 hours ago, glenn239 said:

Because the Channel is sufficiently narrow, sufficiently coastal, that traditional comparisons of blue water naval strength do not trump littoral naval tactics.

Tell me then please, explain the Spanish Armada, twice. Or the long blockade of France during the Napoleonic war. Or the impassability of it to anything but submarines in WW1. Once again Glenn, you erect these goalposts as suits your argument, rather than any actual reference to naval history of Britain.

Invading Britain via Barge is a very old idea. Im sure there were other people whom envisaged it, but the first one to demonstrate it as a viable concept that im aware of was Erskine Childers in his first rate thriller 'The Riddle of the Sands'. Childers supposedly (or at least claimed in a later edition) caused much soul searching in the Admiralty who figured that his concept, an invasion of Southern England via barge, was just about possible, so set about building naval bases in the North of England, to keep the fleet away from a surprise attack. Imperial Germany, for that and many other reasons, never got close to dominating the Channel in WW1 to start an invasion, despite in naval forces being far stronger than they ever later became in WW2. And now we are just going to wave hands, assert the channel is too narrow, and assert the Germans could transition to England without obeying all the established rules of Naval Warfare?

You bring some some interesting discussions Glenn, Id be the first to admit that, but this is cracked. No, this is Siebel Ferry cracked, lets not hold back here.

Edited by Stuart Galbraith
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18 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Tell me then please, explain the Spanish Armada, twice. Or the long blockade of France during the Napoleonic war. Or the impassability of it to anything but submarines in WW1. Once again Glenn, you erect these goalposts as suits your argument, rather than any actual reference to naval history of Britain.

 

Or more pertinent to WW2, this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Channel_Dash

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5 hours ago, Argus said:

Spain has no need to join the war to get an Italian fleet up into the western approaches (note I did not say Channel). 

Snipped a bit for brevity, there are some legal issues with that plan

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague13.asp

"Art. 5.
Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries, and in particular to erect wireless telegraphy stations or any apparatus for the purpose of communicating with the belligerent forces on land or sea.

Art. 6.
The supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power to a belligerent Power, of war-ships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever, is forbidden.

...

Art. 8.
A neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which that Government is at peace. It is also bound to display the same vigilance to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, which had been adapted entirely or partly within the said jurisdiction for use in war."

So, basing or refueling Italian ships would be a breach of Spanish neutrality and could cause a British response, most notably in occupying the Canaries (which Franco knew where practically defenceless as he had been the military governor there in 1936), Spanish Sahara (worthless at the time) and Spanish Guinea, all in exchange for nothing.

Spanish neutrality was always tilted to the stronger side, becoming a "passive cobeligerent" when France fell, which meant turning a blind eye to German breaches and selling them materials as well as allowing to Abwehr to operate in Spanish territory. Of course, in 1941,  Spain sent forces to Russia until 1943, when the shifting tide meant that neutrality was again in, and then tilted towards the allies.

In practical terms, there was nothing the Axis powers could provide Franco that would offset the expected losses to allied naval superiority both in terms of territory and shipping, as well as access to food sources, which were critical, so there was never a realistic chance of Spain joining the Axis, except for a very narrow window between the fall of France and the Battle of Britain when it seemed the British were about to reach a negotiated peace and then, of course, the Germans weren't interested in sharing the spoils.

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44 minutes ago, RETAC21 said:

Or more pertinent to WW2, this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Channel_Dash

Not the Royal Navy's finest hour, but yes, it does rightly illustrate very large warships have more than enough room to manoeuvre in 20 miles of water. Indeed looking at the maritime traffic the channel houses today, there is clearly more than enough room to swing a battleship.

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4 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Not the Royal Navy's finest hour, but yes, it does rightly illustrate very large warships have more than enough room to manoeuvre in 20 miles of water. Indeed looking at the maritime traffic the channel houses today, there is clearly more than enough room to swing a battleship.

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I think the obvious point that Glenn in his lunacy is overlooking is that even if the Germans achieved enough superiority to close the Calais area to the Royal Navy and the RAF, enabling the crossing of the canal, the front and the beaches over which the invasion would have to go would be so narrow as to be easily defensible by the British Army.

Of note, the German Army realised this and wanted a broad front, which of course, was unsupportable by the available naval and air forces.

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1 hour ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Tell me then please, explain the Spanish Armada, twice. Or the long blockade of France during the Napoleonic war. Or the impassability of it to anything but submarines in WW1. Once again Glenn, you erect these goalposts as suits your argument, rather than any actual reference to naval history of Britain.

What about Glorious Dutch Invasion of 1688? :P

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1 hour ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Tell me then please, explain the Spanish Armada, twice. Or the long blockade of France during the Napoleonic war. Or the impassability of it to anything but submarines in WW1. Once again Glenn, you erect these goalposts as suits your argument, rather than any actual reference to naval history of Britain.

 

Well, going back a little further than some novelist....  My understanding is that as far back as 1539 Henry VIII had constructed the Downs fortifications - Castles Deal, Sandown and Walmer, when combined with Henry's navy, and land forces to deal with any possible invasions....

It isn't as if Britain was not aware of possible invasion, but had about 400 years to prepare for it, more if you take the inclusion of the Dover forts into consideration. 

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27 minutes ago, Yama said:

What about Glorious Dutch Invasion of 1688? :P

The Oranges were invited.....

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1 hour ago, Yama said:

What about Glorious Dutch Invasion of 1688? :P

As Doug said, if they had an invitation, they werent crashing the party. :D

41 minutes ago, DougRichards said:

Well, going back a little further than some novelist....  My understanding is that as far back as 1539 Henry VIII had constructed the Downs fortifications - Castles Deal, Sandown and Walmer, when combined with Henry's navy, and land forces to deal with any possible invasions....

It isn't as if Britain was not aware of possible invasion, but had about 400 years to prepare for it, more if you take the inclusion of the Dover forts into consideration. 

Not just some novelist... a first rate novelist that would probably have gone onto much greater things, if he hadnt been executed for fighting on behalf of the Irish Free State, against the Irish free state.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erskine_Childers_(author)

Yes, there were defences erected along the south coast by HenryVIII, and in fact at least some of them still survive in the portsmouth area. But Glenn insists on restricting himself to motorised or semi motorised vessels, and much of the arguments still ring true. There is a lot of seawater, plenty of room to manoeuvre, if you dont find yourself boxed up in Southampton Harbour  anyway.

You are right about having 400 years to prepare. In 1804, Britain built the worlds first antitank ditch, predating the tank by just over 110 years. :D

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Military_Canal

Edited by Stuart Galbraith
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On 1/17/2022 at 6:47 AM, PCallahan said:

We've now seen the idea of a 1941 invasion come up both on these forums and in Forczyk's We March on England.  However, I have not seen any data indicating (without hand-wavium) that German naval and air production by the spring of 1941 would be sufficient to give them a better chance than 8 months earlier; in fact, I have not seen anything to indicate that there was any way it would outpace the new production/training by the UK, on land, air and sea.

The benefit that Germany might have in 1941, would be not having all those ships under repair, after Norway.

In the fall of 1940, Germany would have zero battleships, zero heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and less then 10 destroyers available vs. Britain. So in essence a surface fleet, that was at best comparable to that of Sweden. In 1941 they would at least have some battleships and some heavy cruisers. And they would have some landing crafts.

In 1940 no german ship available would have more that 50mm of armour anywhere except for the conning tower, so even light british cruisers wouldn't have much use of AP-shells.

The problem for Germany in 1941, would be that the Royal Navy would still be wastly superior (but not to the extent it was in 1940) that the RAF would now be numerically superior from the start (british aircraft production was 50% greater then the german production in 1940 and 100% in 1941) and that the British Army would be far better prepared.

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With the buding dumb relations between Germany and Japan, if Germany had the foresight to plan with Japan, then they could have requested equipment assistance for such an amphibious assualt. That is the Daihatsu vessel. Japan was able to make many of these. Japan could have provided Germany with 1,000 of these if given a headsup. 333 for transport; 111 for troop transport about 50 soldiers each so thats about 5,555 soldiers strong(essentially a division worth of men plus attachments), 111 for trucks, artillary, anti-tank guns or even any AFVs under 15 tons, and the remaining 111 for supplies. The next group of 333 vessels for mounting a single long lance torpedo to slow down opposition approaches as the launch together like salvo. And the remaining 333 for serving as radio/suicidal/slave labour for controlled decoys and faint landings. The remaining one would be kept at German R&D so they can learn from these wonder weopon of a transport. 

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41 minutes ago, futon said:

With the buding dumb relations between Germany and Japan, if Germany had the foresight to plan with Japan, then they could have requested equipment assistance for such an amphibious assualt. That is the Daihatsu vessel. Japan was able to make many of these. Japan could have provided Germany with 1,000 of these if given a headsup. 333 for transport; 111 for troop transport about 50 soldiers each so thats about 5,555 soldiers strong(essentially a division worth of men plus attachments), 111 for trucks, artillary, anti-tank guns or even any AFVs under 15 tons, and the remaining 111 for supplies. The next group of 333 vessels for mounting a single long lance torpedo to slow down opposition approaches as the launch together like salvo. And the remaining 333 for serving as radio/suicidal/slave labour for controlled decoys and faint landings. The remaining one would be kept at German R&D so they can learn from these wonder weopon of a transport. 

The only issue, is that Japan didn't have any to spare, they couldn't get them to France and a reinforced division was not 5555 men, but rather 15'000 to 20'000. And a Daihatsu couldn't carry a 15 ton tank. Furthermore it lacked the range necessary for Operation Sealion. 6th, 9th and 16th army, all had as much as 150km to their beeches and the Daihatsus had a nominal range of 185km, so best case scenario, Daihatsus would get the first wave to the beech, and if that first wave didn't secure intacs ports with the weapons and ammo that they carried on their persons, there would be no second wave.

 

It is not a coincidence, that the landing crafts that Germany developed for operation Sealion, had 4-15 times the range of the Daihatsu and could carry 5 to 15 times as much cargo.

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2 hours ago, Olof Larsson said:

It is not a coincidence, that the landing crafts that Germany developed for operation Sealion,...

Was it? The development contract for the MFP was issued to Werft Gebr. Wieman and Berliner Stahlbau Gmbh on 5 December 1940. A bit late for the party.

I suspect it was developed because it was a useful item of kit in the Baltic and along the Atlantic and North Sea coast.

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8 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Tell me then please, explain the Spanish Armada, twice. Or the long blockade of France during the Napoleonic war.

Sailboats and - I think in the case of the French plan - wasn't it going to be row boats on a becalmed day?

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Or the impassability of it to anything but submarines in WW1. 

France never fell in WW1 and the German army was never in a position in that war where it had no opponents.  From August 1914 all the way to the 100 Days, the German army was simply never in a position to occupy the ports in the Channel, nor the surplus forces to take a crack at an invasion.  

 

Edited by glenn239
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7 hours ago, DougRichards said:

The Oranges were invited.....

Well, they were 'invited' in very much the same fashion Finnish proletariat 'invited' Stalin to send Red Army to help people's revolution in 1939...

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15 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

For example, as of January 1941 there were five plants producing the Bf 109, 79 of them - Messershmitt Regensberg, Arado Warnemund, Erla Leipzig, Fiessler Kassel, and WNG Vienna. The most productive plant, WNF, completed 21, the least productive, Messerschmitt - go figure, completed 12. In addition, Ago Ochersleben was tooling up to build the Bf 109 and in February completed its first 6.

On the British side, the Spitfire was slightly inferior to the ME-109F.  The Hurricane was approaching obsolescence.  Production figures I see online for the year 1941 are - 

ME-109 - 2764

FW190 - 228

Spitfire - 2518 

Hurricane - 3167

Defiant - 452

 

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Don't get me started on the asinine "they will ramp up Siebel and MFP" mouthbreathing lunacy. The MFP prototype hit the water in March 1941. The 125th Siebel was completed 9 September 1941.

To put a number on it, I think with a high priority program they'd have been north of 500 and south of 1,000 Siebels and MFP's available by the end of September 1941.  

 

 

Edited by glenn239
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9 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

You bring some some interesting discussions Glenn, Id be the first to admit that, but this is cracked. No, this is Siebel Ferry cracked, lets not hold back here.

You think Rich is reacting very strongly to the topic of Siebel and MFP mass production figures because he thinks large numbers of them wouldn't matter?  

Custom built beach to beach kit was a game changer.  They could be loaded on a beach, (circumventing embarkation port capacity problems).  They could offload tanks and other heavy equipment on a beach, (circumventing the requirement to capture ports for this purpose).  They could be armed for naval and air combat, (reducing the requirement for naval escort).  They were capable of 8-10kt, (allowing for two trips per day per vessel at peak sortie rates).

There's a reason why Rich is very much not willing to go beyond 125 Siebel ferries for 1941, Stuart.  Do the math.  If 500 Siebels and MFP's could deliver 100 troops each, and could make 2 trips across the Channel in 24 hours, that's 100,000 troops per day.

Edited by glenn239
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