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Could The Germans Have Successfully Propagated Sealion Without Air Supremacy


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The Germans did not have the transport ships, they did not have the landing ships, they did not have the Navy or the Air Force to pull Sea Lion off. This was a waste of resources as the whole Battle of Britain. All the planes and crews lost could have made a difference in Russia (especially the Stukas paid a high price during the BoB) but were wasted in that pointless campaign.

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I'm not really sure at this point which is more lunatic, the German plan or the perennial attempts by inveterate what iffers to "prove" it was just the niftiest, neatest way those cool guys in the black and silver Hugo Boss-designed uniforms could have made the world safe for the Aryan race... :angry:

 

 

 

Germany's military options in 1940 - when it was clear that British weren't caving - weren't exactly whistling zippity do dah out their assholes Chevy Chase style, Rich. Beggars can't be choosers. The problem for Germany was US intervention, the risk of a long war. Sealion was a steaming pile of shit at the operational level, but it could, if they got lucky, have avoided a long war.

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At dawn on 24 September the follow-up echelons of German invasion barges were intercepted still 9 miles short of their beach objectives by a Royal Navy fleet of 17 cruisers and 57 destroyers plus Motor Torpedo Boats. (Tank net is not letting me put quotes around this)

I wonder why it would take them so long? Were they hard to find? Flotte B from Rotterdam, Zeebruge, Ostend, and Dunkirk was 16.5 KM long and 1 KM wide. C from Antwerp, Calais, and Gravelines was another 14 to 15 KM long by 1 KM wide. D from Boulogne was 20 KM long and 2.2 KM wide.

 

 

Coastal defenses would be my guess. The invasion would form up, crawl down the coast, under the umbrella of coastal batteries and defensive minefields and the RN would wait until it had moved some distance beyond these before pouncing.

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I'm not really sure at this point which is more lunatic, the German plan or the perennial attempts by inveterate what iffers to "prove" it was just the niftiest, neatest way those cool guys in the black and silver Hugo Boss-designed uniforms could have made the world safe for the Aryan race... :angry:

 

 

 

Germany's military options in 1940 - when it was clear that British weren't caving - weren't exactly whistling zippity do dah out their assholes Chevy Chase style, Rich. Beggars can't be choosers. The problem for Germany was US intervention, the risk of a long war. Sealion was a steaming pile of shit at the operational level, but it could, if they got lucky, have avoided a long war.

 

Oh, boo-hoo, poor little Nazis. Maybe they should have considered different options on 1 September 1939?

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I'm not really sure at this point which is more lunatic, the German plan or the perennial attempts by inveterate what iffers to "prove" it was just the niftiest, neatest way those cool guys in the black and silver Hugo Boss-designed uniforms could have made the world safe for the Aryan race... :angry:

 

 

 

Germany's military options in 1940 - when it was clear that British weren't caving - weren't exactly whistling zippity do dah out their assholes Chevy Chase style, Rich. Beggars can't be choosers. The problem for Germany was US intervention, the risk of a long war. Sealion was a steaming pile of shit at the operational level, but it could, if they got lucky, have avoided a long war.

 

Oh, boo-hoo, poor little Nazis. Maybe they should have considered different options on 1 September 1939?

 

 

Or have the Organisation Todt build a tunnel below the Channel.

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At dawn on 24 September the follow-up echelons of German invasion barges were intercepted still 9 miles short of their beach objectives by a Royal Navy fleet of 17 cruisers and 57 destroyers plus Motor Torpedo Boats. (Tank net is not letting me put quotes around this)

I wonder why it would take them so long? Were they hard to find? Flotte B from Rotterdam, Zeebruge, Ostend, and Dunkirk was 16.5 KM long and 1 KM wide. C from Antwerp, Calais, and Gravelines was another 14 to 15 KM long by 1 KM wide. D from Boulogne was 20 KM long and 2.2 KM wide.

 

 

Coastal defenses would be my guess. The invasion would form up, crawl down the coast, under the umbrella of coastal batteries and defensive minefields and the RN would wait until it had moved some distance beyond these before pouncing.

 

The assembly areas for the fleets were about five miles from shore, well out of range of any coast artillery batteries, except for the few big guns operational at Boulougne and Griz Nez. Nor were there any "defensive minefields" off the French coast...the Germans were fully occupied in attempting to emplace their over-ambitious minefields blocking access to the Channel.

 

I would guess the reason was actually a misunderstanding of timings in the assumptions of the war game, perhaps thinking the first warning would be when the invasion fleets actually reached the picket lines in the Channel.

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I'm not really sure at this point which is more lunatic, the German plan or the perennial attempts by inveterate what iffers to "prove" it was just the niftiest, neatest way those cool guys in the black and silver Hugo Boss-designed uniforms could have made the world safe for the Aryan race... :angry:

 

 

 

Germany's military options in 1940 - when it was clear that British weren't caving - weren't exactly whistling zippity do dah out their assholes Chevy Chase style, Rich. Beggars can't be choosers. The problem for Germany was US intervention, the risk of a long war. Sealion was a steaming pile of shit at the operational level, but it could, if they got lucky, have avoided a long war.

 

Oh, boo-hoo, poor little Nazis. Maybe they should have considered different options on 1 September 1939?

 

 

Or have the Organisation Todt build a tunnel below the Channel.

 

:D +1

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On the Way How about the role of German army field artillery in the protection of the potential German Invasion fleet as it makes its way to England? Could German 150mm guns like the FH 18 be able to interdict any RN incursion into the English Channel to interfere with the invasion? These guns have a 23K range. Strategically placed batteries on the French side could surely disrupt the RN.

 

 

Rule of thumb might be something like that coastal artillery is ineffective against destroyers and cruisers outside, maybe, 8,000 yards. Against battleships, it' dangerous out to maybe 15 miles. But, even at ranges where coastal artillery is ineffective, the destroyers still have to undertake radical evasive action to avoid salvos, which might decrease their combat efficiency. So, for Sealion, once the invasion fleet passes beyond a certain point, call it 3 miles or whatever, the coastal batteries aren't able to protect it. But, for faster transport, (say steamers), if they have sufficient warning, they would be fast enough to be able to return to the French side to gain cover. On the English side, coastal artillery would be useless until (if or when) shore batteries were established (up to 5.9").

 

At longer ranges at night, one potentially useful application of coastal artillery was to illuminate warship formations with star shells - all air night attack doctrines around this time required star shell illumination for aircraft. I do not know if any planning along those lines was undertaken though, since it would require combined arms doctrine with the LW, and inter-service cooperation wasn't a LW strong suit.

 

Also, the U-boat arm was best part of the Kreigsmarine. The massed employment of U-boats instead of the pathetic 3 U-boats assigned to anti-Dunkirk operations would really make the RN think twice in SeeLowe. I don't see why a blockade of both ends of the English Channel by U-Boats could not inflict heavy losses on the RN entering the Channel to interdict the German invasion fleet. The losses would be RN capital ships too. The RN would not be sending light destroyers and corvettes to interfere with the invasion. The U-Boats do not necessarily have to operate in the Channel itself, but the approaches to the Channel. Given the state and lack of sophistication in the anti-submarine warfare at that time, I can see the German U-Boat fleet having a target rich environment and a happy hunting ground when RN inevitably come to the Channel.

 

 

U-boats weren't generally great at intercepting warships moving fast was the basic problem. But if coordinating with shore based radars that could track RN formations, they might get some dangerous shots in. Nothing that would stop overall momentum of the RN attack though, would be my guess.

 

"Essentially your saying that rather than fight the Battle of Britain to win Sealion, fight Sealion to win the Battle of Britain. "

 

Yes, that is what I am saying.

 

 

The paratrooper arm was a bit "blown" with operations in France and required recooperation. Also, my understanding is that doctrinally it did air assaults in daylight. Neither of these facts work for Channel phase of the Battle of Britain in July 1940. That being said, one possible ahistorical option for the Germans might have been an air assault (Crete style) on Isle of Wight in July 1940. If successful (IOW defenses at this period were weak, but the island was right on top of the RN fleet base at Portsmouth), what develops is a channel battle against the SLOC in which the RAF is increasingly drawn into the fray under conditions favorable to the LW.

Edited by glenn239
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Rule of thumb might be something like that coastal artillery is ineffective against destroyers and cruisers outside, maybe, 8,000 yards. Against battleships, it' dangerous out to maybe 15 miles. But, even at ranges where coastal artillery is ineffective, the destroyers still have to undertake radical evasive action to avoid salvos, which might decrease their combat efficiency. So, for Sealion, once the invasion fleet passes beyond a certain point, call it 3 miles or whatever, the coastal batteries aren't able to protect it. But, for faster transport, (say steamers), if they have sufficient warning, they would be fast enough to be able to return to the French side to gain cover. On the English side, coastal artillery would be useless until (if or when) shore batteries were established (up to 5.9").

The professional's whose business was firing the 155mm GPF at ships judged that against destroyers the probability to hit from point blank to 5,000 yards decreased from 100 to 35 percent, from 5,000 to 10,000 yards decreased from 35 to 10 percent, from 10,000 to 15,000 yards from 10 to 3 percent. To its maximum effective range of 17,500 yards the chance decreased from 3 to nil percent.

 

The "steamers" were an integral part of the landing plan...no steamers, then no second echelon until at least S+2. So unsupported infantry with some mortars and light mountain guns.

 

 

At longer ranges at night, one potentially useful application of coastal artillery was to illuminate warship formations with star shells - all air night attack doctrines around this time required star shell illumination for aircraft. I do not know if any planning along those lines was undertaken though, since it would require combined arms doctrine with the LW, and inter-service cooperation wasn't a LW strong suit.

Sigh...remember the conversation about illum rounds? BTW, with regards to "strarshells" I forgot to mention the most important aspect of using them, aside from firing them over something within the range of the gun in question, which is that you need to have a "starshell", i.e., illumination round, for the piece in question.

Now most of the German Küsten-Artillerie at this time were either 10cm FK18 Heeres-Artillerie Abteilungen impressed into the role or captured French 155mm GPF. The 10cm gun did not have an illum round in its inventory that I am aware of and AFAIK the French gun did not either (I know the American version, the 155mm Gun M1917 did not). The German Heer depended on the 10.5cm leFH for artillery illumination, the 15cm sFH 18 did not have them and neither I believe did the few 15cm sFK. In terms of the KM, the 8.8cm TbsK and UbTs had an illum round as did some of the 15cm SK. I know that by 1944 the Heeres and KM Küsten-Artillerie did have a few 15cm sFH deployed with batteries as illuminating guns, so I suspect they adapted the 15cm lg UbTs KL/45 illum round for firing from the howitzer, but that was four years later and a howitzer with much less range than the gun.

 

 

U-boats weren't generally great at intercepting warships moving fast was the basic problem. But if coordinating with shore based radars that could track RN formations, they might get some dangerous shots in. Nothing that would stop overall momentum of the RN attack though, would be my guess

 

Great, nifty idea indeed, worthy of any good war gamer...except the Germans never managed to achieve such a degree of inter-service cooperation.

 

 

The paratrooper arm was a bit "blown" with operations in France and required recooperation. Also, my understanding is that doctrinally it did air assaults in daylight. Neither of these facts work for Channel phase of the Battle of Britain in July 1940. That being said, one possible ahistorical option for the Germans might have been an air assault (Crete style) on Isle of Wight in July 1940. If successful (IOW defenses at this period were weak, but the island was right on top of the RN fleet base at Portsmouth), what develops is a channel battle against the SLOC in which the RAF is increasingly drawn into the fray under conditions favorable to the LW.

 

Yeah, let's move the counters over here... :D

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Rich The professional's whose business was firing the 155mm GPF at ships judged that against destroyers the probability to hit from point blank to 5,000 yards decreased from 100 to 35 percent, from 5,000 to 10,000 yards decreased from 35 to 10 percent, from 10,000 to 15,000 yards from 10 to 3 percent. To its maximum effective range of 17,500 yards the chance decreased from 3 to nil percent.

 

 

A 3% hit rate on salvo chasing destroyers at 15,000 yards seems a tad bit optimistic, to say the least.

 

The "steamers" were an integral part of the landing plan...no steamers, then no second echelon until at least S+2. So unsupported infantry with some mortars and light mountain guns.

 

 

Probably better to receive the material on the beach late than never would be my observation.

 

Sigh...remember the conversation about illum rounds? BTW, with regards to "strarshells" I forgot to mention the most important aspect of using them, aside from firing them over something within the range of the gun in question, which is that you need to have a "starshell", i.e., illumination round, for the piece in question.

​

 

5.9” guns were earmarked for coastal batteries. Here,

 

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNGER_59-60_skc25.php

 

28,000 yard maximum range at 40 degrees elevation, illumination round listed.

 

Now most of the German Küsten-Artillerie at this time were…

 

 

…irrelevant to the discussion. If the proposed tactic had been established between the navy and the air force, the coastal artillery batteries would have to employ 5.9” pieces of a type that could do the job.

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"Essentially your saying that rather than fight the Battle of Britain to win Sealion, fight Sealion to win the Battle of Britain. "

 

Yes, that is what I am saying. Also, the U-boat arm was best part of the Kreigsmarine. The massed employment of U-boats instead of the pathetic 3 U-boats assigned to anti-Dunkirk operations would really make the RN think twice in SeeLowe. I don't see why a blockade of both ends of the English Channel by U-Boats could not inflict heavy losses on the RN entering the Channel to interdict the German invasion fleet. The losses would be RN capital ships too. The RN would not be sending light destroyers and corvettes to interfere with the invasion. The U-Boats do not necessarily have to operate in the Channel itself, but the approaches to the Channel. Given the state and lack of sophistication in the anti-submarine warfare at that time, I can see the German U-Boat fleet having a target rich environment and a happy hunting ground when RN inevitably come to the Channel.

 

Because they didn't have the U-Boot to do it with? Most of the U-Boot tasked for Sealion were the Ducks, Typ-II U-Boote, which had proven so woefully vulnerable and inadequate in Norway. The Typ-IX were completely unsuited and there were few operational Typ-VII and most were either on patrol, returning from patrol, or preparing for a new patrol.

 

BTW, it wasn't the "state and lack of sophistication in the anti-submarine warfare" that caused the British trouble...it was the needle-in-a-haystack problem of tracking U-Boot in the Atlantic...concentrating the U-Boot in the narrow and shallow waters of the Channel approaches was like herding cattle into the slaughter pen.

 

And I am sure that the Brits were willing to take the losses, after all, what is a fleet with no free home nation for it to serve?

 

Exactly. If we had lost the war, we would only have been handing it over to the Germans, or watching the Americans sinking it at anchor.

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I'm not really sure at this point which is more lunatic, the German plan or the perennial attempts by inveterate what iffers to "prove" it was just the niftiest, neatest way those cool guys in the black and silver Hugo Boss-designed uniforms could have made the world safe for the Aryan race... :angry:

 

 

 

Germany's military options in 1940 - when it was clear that British weren't caving - weren't exactly whistling zippity do dah out their assholes Chevy Chase style, Rich. Beggars can't be choosers. The problem for Germany was US intervention, the risk of a long war. Sealion was a steaming pile of shit at the operational level, but it could, if they got lucky, have avoided a long war.

 

Oh, boo-hoo, poor little Nazis. Maybe they should have considered different options on 1 September 1939?

 

 

Or have the Organisation Todt build a tunnel below the Channel.

 

 

They could have used an iron mole like the one Doug McClure and Peter Cushing used to get the centre of the Earth.

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U-boats weren't generally great at intercepting warships moving fast was the basic problem. But if coordinating with shore based radars that could track RN formations, they might get some dangerous shots in. Nothing that would stop overall momentum of the RN attack though, would be my guess

 

Great, nifty idea indeed, worthy of any good war gamer...except the Germans never managed to achieve such a degree of inter-service cooperation.

 

 

Also the yet unsolved problem of communicating with a submerged submarine in order to get the tracking information to them.

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I'm not really sure at this point which is more lunatic, the German plan or the perennial attempts by inveterate what iffers to "prove" it was just the niftiest, neatest way those cool guys in the black and silver Hugo Boss-designed uniforms could have made the world safe for the Aryan race... :angry:

 

 

 

Germany's military options in 1940 - when it was clear that British weren't caving - weren't exactly whistling zippity do dah out their assholes Chevy Chase style, Rich. Beggars can't be choosers. The problem for Germany was US intervention, the risk of a long war. Sealion was a steaming pile of shit at the operational level, but it could, if they got lucky, have avoided a long war.

 

Oh, boo-hoo, poor little Nazis. Maybe they should have considered different options on 1 September 1939?

 

 

Or have the Organisation Todt build a tunnel below the Channel.

 

 

They could have used an iron mole like the one Doug McClure and Peter Cushing used to get the centre of the Earth.

 

 

A gem, but British, the Nazis wouldn't have them.

 

I kinda like this goof: The guards in front of the White House are dressed in British police uniforms.

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I'm not really sure at this point which is more lunatic, the German plan or the perennial attempts by inveterate what iffers to "prove" it was just the niftiest, neatest way those cool guys in the black and silver Hugo Boss-designed uniforms could have made the world safe for the Aryan race... :angry:

 

 

 

Germany's military options in 1940 - when it was clear that British weren't caving - weren't exactly whistling zippity do dah out their assholes Chevy Chase style, Rich. Beggars can't be choosers. The problem for Germany was US intervention, the risk of a long war. Sealion was a steaming pile of shit at the operational level, but it could, if they got lucky, have avoided a long war.

 

Oh, boo-hoo, poor little Nazis. Maybe they should have considered different options on 1 September 1939?

 

 

Or have the Organisation Todt build a tunnel below the Channel.

 

 

They could have used an iron mole like the one Doug McClure and Peter Cushing used to get the centre of the Earth.

 

 

A gem, but British, the Nazis wouldn't have them.

 

I kinda like this goof: The guards in front of the White House are dressed in British police uniforms.

 

 

:) :) :)

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Although the effectiveness of allied ASW weapons and techniques did vastly improve through the war, the depth of the English Channel, or lack thereof, made attacking a submerged submarine essentially a two dimensional problem. That drastically increased the effectiveness of conventional depth charges vs u-boats.

Think about the seabed echo problem for a minute.

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Although the effectiveness of allied ASW weapons and techniques did vastly improve through the war, the depth of the English Channel, or lack thereof, made attacking a submerged submarine essentially a two dimensional problem. That drastically increased the effectiveness of conventional depth charges vs u-boats.

Think about the seabed echo problem for a minute.

 

 

Think about the effectiveness of U boats in the channel in 1944

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Although the effectiveness of allied ASW weapons and techniques did vastly improve through the war, the depth of the English Channel, or lack thereof, made attacking a submerged submarine essentially a two dimensional problem. That drastically increased the effectiveness of conventional depth charges vs u-boats.

Think about the seabed echo problem for a minute.

 

 

Most successful attacks in the early period seem to have been the initial ones where the ship had a visual sighting (or later radar contact or HF/DF bearing) to race toward and the surfaced sub rapidly dived. ASDIC did not turn out to be the universal panacea expected. At least that's what I'm getting from Blair.

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Except they had no Marinefahrepraehme and few Pionier-Landungs-Boote. None of the later were intended for Sealion.

Weren't original barges proposed for landing tanks the base of MFPs?

 

MFP's were used in invasion of Hogland much later tho ^_^ That invasion didn't go too well either.

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Given the potential for its defeat, Sealion sounds like something the British should have both welcomed and invited, similar to how the Normans invited English troops off their hill at Hastings.

 

Poison gas use by the British against it, on the other hand, sounds like something that could possibly backfire on them.

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Perhaps Sealion would have been something like Julius Caesar's first invasion? To test the waters so to speak, and to come back later when the affairs in the east were settled? Sealion would have also been the German equivalent of the Dieppe operation, providing lessons for a future attempt.

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A 3% hit rate on salvo chasing destroyers at 15,000 yards seems a tad bit optimistic, to say the least.

 

Ya think?

 

 

Probably better to receive the material on the beach late than never would be my observation.

 

The "material"? The second echelon on the steamers included the third infantry regiment, most of the division artillery, essentially all division services...and most of the ammunition and rations.

 

 

5.9” guns were earmarked for coastal batteries. Here,

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNGER_59-60_skc25.php

28,000 yard maximum range at 40 degrees elevation, illumination round listed.

 

Yeah, the problem with that is that it was never provided with coastal mounting. The ones that were...

 

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNGER_59-55_skc28.phpin Kusten Marine Pivot Lafette C/36 and Kusten Dreiheitslafette LM-43 was mounted for coastal defense...in September 1942 after such a mounting was developed. Maybe this?

 

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNGER_59-48_skc36.phpexcept it was not extensively used in coastal defense until much later in the war, because it was the main armament of the destroyers being built. How about...

 

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNGER_59-40_skc96.phplong in the tooth, but yes it was used early in in coastal batteries, along with the not so quite long in the tooth http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNGER_59-45_skc16.php except that most of them were already emplaced...defending the German coastline and the decision to begin shifting them and emplacing them in Holland, Belgium, and France apparently wasn't made until sometime between late June and 15 July at the Berghof when it was decided to move the super heavy (21cm, 24cm, 28cm, and 38cm) batteries there, which was estimated to take three months.

 

Anyway, the L/45 coastal mounting had a range of 16,000 meters firing SAP/HE and 10,600 meters firing illum (unless they utilized the more modern production rounds). The L/40 was about 14,300 meters.

 

So what were actually available? Hmm, I think I posted this for you before, maybe it'll take this time.

 

According to Assmann's postwar analysis by 31 August the Heer had set up 35 heavy and medium batteries, plus seven batteries of captured guns. I suspect that some of the Heer heavy batteries would also include captured guns, since only the 10cm K18 and 15cm K39 were readily available and there were only 15 of the latter. Note that none of the Heer 10cm K18 or 15cm K39 were mounted on coast defense carriages, were not intended for coastal defense, and did not have any of the specialized range-finding, computing, and predicting gear required to do the job. I can account for about 27 of those medium batteries, probably including most of the captured guns:

 

24 August 1940 - 3./Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 367...Namsos Norway.

1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 570...three batteries of 10cm guns at Villerville, Benerville, and Houlgate

15 October 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 778...two batteries of 10.5cm guns at Le Havre

24 October 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 738...three batteries, probably all 15.5cm guns at Fort Mahon and Le Touquet

18 November 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 769...probably three batteries

23 November 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 770...three batteries of 10.5cm guns at Cayeux and Le Tréport

23 November 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 789...probably three batteries

27 December 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 823 (mot)...three batteries of 15.5cm guns at Nieuport, La Panne, and Fort Mardik

27 December 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 826...three batteries of 15.5cm guns at Nieuport, La Panne, and Midelkerke

27 December 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 827...three batteries

 

The heavy Heer batteries included eight railway batteries, the last two of which were at Cherbourg:

 

2 28cm K5 (3 guns each)

1 28ck K12 (1 gun)

2 28cm Kurze Bruno (4 guns each)

1 28cm Schwere Bruno (2 guns)

1 28cm Lange Bruno (3 guns)

1 24cm Theodor (3 guns)

1 24cm Theodor Bruno (2 guns)

 

Of those, the first two batteries had such a dispersion and slow rate of fire as to be useless against naval targets. The other Heer heavy guns were:

 

6 24cm K3 guns

6 24cm Czech guns

10 21 cm K39 guns

 

Then there were the heavy Kriegsmarine batteries:

 

Grosser Kurfuerst with 4 28cm guns was operational at the beginning of August

Friedrich August with 3 30.5 cm guns, Prinz Heinrich with 2 28cm guns, and Oldenburg with 2 24cm guns were operational by mid-August

Siegfried (later Todt) with 2 38cm guns was operational by mid-September.

 

Anyway, this mass of some 57 heavy guns fired a grand total of 1,880 rounds in 1940 and managed to damage seven British merchant ships.

 

 

 

…irrelevant to the discussion. If the proposed tactic had been established between the navy and the air force, the coastal artillery batteries would have to employ 5.9” pieces of a type that could do the job.

 

Except that such a "proposed tactic" never was "established between the navy and air force". Nor could they "employ 5.9" pieces of a type that could do the job" unless they actually had such pieces.

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Although the effectiveness of allied ASW weapons and techniques did vastly improve through the war, the depth of the English Channel, or lack thereof, made attacking a submerged submarine essentially a two dimensional problem. That drastically increased the effectiveness of conventional depth charges vs u-boats.

Think about the seabed echo problem for a minute.

 

 

Most successful attacks in the early period seem to have been the initial ones where the ship had a visual sighting (or later radar contact or HF/DF bearing) to race toward and the surfaced sub rapidly dived. ASDIC did not turn out to be the universal panacea expected. At least that's what I'm getting from Blair.

 

A couple of issues. I went and reviewed the KM planning for the U-Boot again...seven Typ-IX were supposed to be deployed south of the Lizard. Then ten Typ-VII off of Plymouth. Nine Typ-II off of Southampton. Six more Typ-II off of Dover. Two Typ-II off of Berwick. And finally, three Typ-II and two Typ-VII off Scapa.

 

So a total of seven Typ-IX, twelve Typ-VII, and twenty Typ-II.

 

Hmmm, at the beginning of September there were only sixteen Typ-VII and Typ-IX operational, with three joining operations during the month. Of those, nine were already on patrol and returned during the month (1, 3, 4, two on 8, 14, 17, and two on 26 September). Three more had just returned from patrol at the end of August (27, 29, and 30 August). Typical turnaround at the end of a patrol was three weeks. There seems to be a disconnect. There were twenty-seven Typ-II, but like the Typ-IX they problematically were slow to dive in comparison to the Typ-VII.

 

The next problem, for the Germans, was just why the U-Boot became such a problem for Britain. They enjoyed an early surge upon the outbreak, but noticeably dropped off in March, April, and May as they were directed to support WESERUBUNG...losing eight Typ-VII and IX February-April, along with three Ducks. However, opening up basing in France gave them access to the Atlantic without having to pass through the North Sea and straits...except on its deployment to France. The consequence, for the British, was the standard escort destroyer designed interwar, the Hunt-class were too short-legged and didn't have the sea-keeping qualities required for Atlantic escort. Operating in the Channel and east coast of Britain suddenly made the nine Hunts very effective...along with the various short-legged sloops and what were later the short-range escorts of the V&W class. In effect, putting the U-Boot in close proximity to Britain also put them into close proximity with more British escorts, more Coastal Command aircraft, and in narrow and shallow waters. It didn't work well in Norway and probably would have ended up badly in the case of Sealion.

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So, getting down to the end result. Sealion would have been both a strategic and a tactical loss to Germany. It may have bled Britain a bit, but it seems it would have bled the third Reich even more.

 

When you compare Sealion to Overlord, it is fairly easy to accept that Germany did not have a hope in September 1940.

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