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Could The Germans Have Successfully Propagated Sealion Without Air Supremacy


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Not to mention Phosgene, Mustard, all the old favourites....

 

Its worth remembering that although the army was in bits, there was still one complete division in the UK, and that was the Canadian Division. If you think how hard D Day was to put 6 division sets on the beaches of Normandy, then it defies understanding how the Germans, with what they had, could have managed better than 2-1. With what they had to do, that just wasnt good enough. Sure, they could fly airborne divisions in. But they didnt have good enough equipment in that era to ward off the attack by the lights armoured task force.

 

Id love to wargame it, but I really dont see how it could have worked.

 

Already been done.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion_(wargame)

 

tl;dr the Germans get ashore and things aren't going too badly but then the Royal Navy turns up and it all goes horribly wrong.

 

Yeah, I got that out the local library many years ago. It was interesting, but probably not enough action in it for when I was 10 years of age. :D

 

Im sure they did a good job with it, but as we can see, they didnt model possible landings in East Anglia, and dont appear to have modelled the use of gas. That said, it doesnt change the basic conclusion, that it couldnt have worked.

 

Maybe if they had the ability to move 2 or 3 airborne divisions in a single lift, but that was never possible at this point in the war. And they would still have needed air superiority to do that.

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The RAF doesn't need to be trained in anti-shipping strikes to cause damage though. If it came to it, the German invasion barges would have been horribly vulnerable to strafing attacks by RAF fighters.

 

 

To be honest, probably not. The problem with the barges was not its vulnerability to strafing attacks or swamping by British destroyers sailing past (an old and inaccurate canard). It was this:

 

The initial German plan was to use a powered barge to tow an unpowered one...except tests demonstrated most of the powered barges weren't powerful enough to tow anything and many would have trouble even getting across on their own. So they decided to use a tug to tow the powered and unpowered barge across...except they didn't have enough tugs, so they decided to use coasters as substitute tugs...only to discover that most of the coasters weren't powerful enough either, but they had just enough to combine with the real tugs to maybe make it work...if everything went according to plan.

 

Except that in tests the towlines kept parting, especially when any radical maneuvers were undertaken...like when attacked. Oh, and then they found that the draft on most of the tugs and coasters meant they couldn't work inshore, so were back to square one with the barges...the powered barges or other shallow draft craft were intended as "pushers" to push the barges onto the beach.

 

Then we have the problem that the initial extemporaneous ramp design required the barge to ground on a falling tide, took 15 to 30 minutes to assemble under ideal conditions, i.e., nobody shooting at them, and the draft of the barges meant that it would take 15 to 45 minutes after grounding before it shallowed enough for vehicles to actually drive off.

 

Oh, and yeah, most of the "tugs" along with the R-Boot and VP-Boot embarked the Vorausabteilungen and their gear, including stormboats, so yeah, lets make sure every vessels has two or three roles to play...how about control boats? Fast motorboats fitted with radios so the tow commanders could swan about their huge formation passing orders to various vessels...oh, except wait a minute we need 25 of the fastest motorboats so the Brandenburg commando can make its attempt on Dover, AKA let's see how many motorboats the twin-sixes can turn into matchsticks.

 

I'm not really sure at this point which is more lunatic, the German plan or the perennial attempts by inveterate what iffers to "prove" it was just the niftiest, neatest way those cool guys in the black and silver Hugo Boss-designed uniforms could have made the world safe for the Aryan race... :angry:

 

 

 

All true, but should the German infantry have managed to make it most of the way across the channel without sinking, losing their tow, mechanical breakdown, being swamped by heavy seas, drowning (IIRC there were only enough life vests for the first wave) or being butchered by the Royal Navy, then I still maintain that strafing by the RAF could have been a real problem :).

 

 

:D

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At dawn on 24 September the follow-up echelons of German invasion barges were intercepted still 9 miles short of their beach objectives by a Royal Navy fleet of 17 cruisers and 57 destroyers plus Motor Torpedo Boats. (Tank net is not letting me put quotes around this)

I wonder why it would take them so long? Were they hard to find? Flotte B from Rotterdam, Zeebruge, Ostend, and Dunkirk was 16.5 KM long and 1 KM wide. C from Antwerp, Calais, and Gravelines was another 14 to 15 KM long by 1 KM wide. D from Boulogne was 20 KM long and 2.2 KM wide.

Oh, I was just quoting from the 1974 exercise (typing on phone makes me look dumber than I already am). The initial assumption of the exercise that the RN would be caught flat-footed did seem suspect to me, alhough I have no idea whether it was based on reality or just the terms they set for the war game.

 

From what I read in James Hollands book on the Battle of Britain (well worth a look if people havent already read it) there was an RN auxillary force made up of armed trawlers, to act as a tripwire force. Their specific orders were to keep an eye open for any invasion attempt. I dont know if they modelled that, but maybe they were giving the Germans a break just so they could wargame something on land.

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All true, but should the German infantry have managed to make it most of the way across the channel without sinking, losing their tow, mechanical breakdown, being swamped by heavy seas, drowning (IIRC there were only enough life vests for the first wave) or being butchered by the Royal Navy, then I still maintain that strafing by the RAF could have been a real problem

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Depends on how RAF fighters identified valid ground targets in those early, primitive years of air-ground 'support'

Edited by Ken Estes
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I think as far as the landing on the beach, there would have been significant bunching at first. That would be a good target for ground attack. The use of liquid fire would also have reduced ther freedom to spread out.

 

It would be interesting to learn what way the winds was blowing in this period, my guess is that it would have been mainly westerlies. Which means any use of chemical weapons would have been blowing out to sea, possibly causing mayhem for any follow on forces.

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German air supremacy or not, considering the stakes involved, I don't see the Royal Navy hiding from the Luftwaffe and limiting itself to night operations against Sealion anymore than it did 8 months later in the Eastern Mediterranean against Mercury.

 

Agreed, but it's not just RN tradition that's at stake. It's also the fact that relying solely on a night battle to achieve victory against an invasion is a pretty risky idea, in that night actions by nature were confused and prone to misjudgement.

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I think as far as the landing on the beach, there would have been significant bunching at first. That would be a good target for ground attack. The use of liquid fire would also have reduced ther freedom to spread out.

 

It would be interesting to learn what way the winds was blowing in this period, my guess is that it would have been mainly westerlies. Which means any use of chemical weapons would have been blowing out to sea, possibly causing mayhem for any follow on forces.

The real question is would the British defensive positions be sufficient to repel the remnants of the German invasion fleet, presuming they push on. Would 45 West Country Division be strong enough to repel the attentions of elements of seven German divisions? Would 1st London Division be enough to repel the remaining two?

 

On the whole, the 52-odd mile long position of 45 Division is potentially the weakest...except I also suspect the landing of Flotte E is likely to be the most screwed up and is actually the weakest German effort. Although it had all five of the Schwer-Artillerieträger as "artillery support" it only had a single Tauchpanzer Kompanies as support. Without sufficient heavy weapons, the light infantry force would likely fair poorly against the 48-odd Vickers MG of 7 Devons. Meanwhile, Flotte B and C and 7. Flieger-Division were potentially sticking their collective heads into a buzz-saw, especially the paratroopers.

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I think as far as the landing on the beach, there would have been significant bunching at first. That would be a good target for ground attack. The use of liquid fire would also have reduced ther freedom to spread out.

 

It would be interesting to learn what way the winds was blowing in this period, my guess is that it would have been mainly westerlies. Which means any use of chemical weapons would have been blowing out to sea, possibly causing mayhem for any follow on forces.

The real question is would the British defensive positions be sufficient to repel the remnants of the German invasion fleet, presuming they push on. Would 45 West Country Division be strong enough to repel the attentions of elements of seven German divisions? Would 1st London Division be enough to repel the remaining two?

 

On the whole, the 52-odd mile long position of 45 Division is potentially the weakest...except I also suspect the landing of Flotte E is likely to be the most screwed up and is actually the weakest German effort. Although it had all five of the Schwer-Artillerieträger as "artillery support" it only had a single Tauchpanzer Kompanies as support. Without sufficient heavy weapons, the light infantry force would likely fair poorly against the 48-odd Vickers MG of 7 Devons. Meanwhile, Flotte B and C and 7. Flieger-Division were potentially sticking their collective heads into a buzz-saw, especially the paratroopers.

 

 

All this sounds like Crete, with the exception that Crete could be given up.

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I think as far as the landing on the beach, there would have been significant bunching at first. That would be a good target for ground attack. The use of liquid fire would also have reduced ther freedom to spread out.

 

It would be interesting to learn what way the winds was blowing in this period, my guess is that it would have been mainly westerlies. Which means any use of chemical weapons would have been blowing out to sea, possibly causing mayhem for any follow on forces.

The real question is would the British defensive positions be sufficient to repel the remnants of the German invasion fleet, presuming they push on. Would 45 West Country Division be strong enough to repel the attentions of elements of seven German divisions? Would 1st London Division be enough to repel the remaining two?

 

On the whole, the 52-odd mile long position of 45 Division is potentially the weakest...except I also suspect the landing of Flotte E is likely to be the most screwed up and is actually the weakest German effort. Although it had all five of the Schwer-Artillerieträger as "artillery support" it only had a single Tauchpanzer Kompanies as support. Without sufficient heavy weapons, the light infantry force would likely fair poorly against the 48-odd Vickers MG of 7 Devons. Meanwhile, Flotte B and C and 7. Flieger-Division were potentially sticking their collective heads into a buzz-saw, especially the paratroopers.

 

 

All this sounds like Crete, with the exception that Crete could be given up.

 

Well, yeah, except...

 

With the exception of the 1th Infantry Brigade and some elements of the Mobile Base Defence Force, the troops on Crete had been evacuated from the Greek mainland just five weeks earlier and had lost much of their equipment. The British coast defenses had been developing four about four months and were continuously being reinforced.

 

The Royal Air Force contingents on Crete were equally new, had little base infrastructure, and while radar was in place there was no early warning system in place yet.

 

The RN was more than a day sailing from its secure bases and had no opportunity to re-ammunition once their AA ammo was used up, unless they returned to Alexandria.

 

I just looked again at Flotte E and the plans for 7. Flieger-Division, which look more and more like a massacre in the making. For 'E', 29th Infantry Brigade Group and 1st MMG Brigade were well placed to enfilade the landing zones from the west and had more than enough AT firepower to take care of the tanks of the Tauchpanzer Kompanie, assuming it landed. The Germans also had little or no means of dealing with the British field artillery in place. For the two battalions of gliders and two battalions of paratroopers, they were landing essentially on the southeast edge of the 7th New Zealand Brigade area and the eastern edge of 31st Brigade Group's area, which had moved to east of Ashford from its previous position north of the Thames on 24 September. Finally, 4 Devons, a MG battalion, had moved to Dover to reinforce the defenses there.

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Aside from that the "aux. warships" consisted of 27 leichte and 5 schwere Artillerieträger, mostly large trawlers, fitted with one 15cm SK/C and two 2cm Flak in the schwere, except for one with two 10.5cm SK/C as main armament, or one 7.5cm (a captured French or Belgian "French 75") and a 3.7cm in the leichte, none of which were intended for anything other than support of the landings. The numerous V-Boot were small trawlers usually fitted with a single 3.7cm or 2cm gun.

 

 

 

Interesint, on what hull was the 15cm armed ship based ? A coaster or a (very large) trawler of some sort, something else ?

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Even more interesting would be to find and clarify the German doctrine for naval shore fire support in support of army ground forces. What teams would deploy ashore [survival assumed], what suitable and interfaced comm equipment would be used, and what agency, ashore or afloat, would provide the needed fire support coordination, day and night.

 

It took the USN about three years to go from blind shooting in 1942 to integrated combined arms in 1944 shore fire support in the Pacific,mostly based upon harsh lessons.

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All true, but should the German infantry have managed to make it most of the way across the channel without sinking, losing their tow, mechanical breakdown, being swamped by heavy seas, drowning (IIRC there were only enough life vests for the first wave) or being butchered by the Royal Navy, then I still maintain that strafing by the RAF could have been a real problem

​

 

 

Depends on how RAF fighters identified valid ground targets in those early, primitive years of air-ground 'support'

 

 

They wouldn't be coordinating with ground forces and collateral damage limitation would not have been on their minds. I really don't think it would be hard to pick out concentrations of barges, men and vehicles on a beach.

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Germans would be trying to cross Channel with one of those...

This one is not loaded and on the calm river. Now imagine trying to cross a Channel with less than 1m of freeboard?

Edited by bojan
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I have always wondered why the Germans thought that they needed air superiority over Great Britain to successfully conduct Operation Seelowe and invade the UK.

 

The short answer is because the Kriegsmarine and Heer demanded it as a prerequisite. Also, because the KM had no heavy units it could not support the landing with naval gunfire, so all support would be by the Luftwaffe.

 

 

If they had launched their planned invasion fleet from France, the RAF would have send bombers to attack the fleet, as well as escorts for these bombers. Rather then fly all over the UK attacking British airbases and targets at the limit of the 109's endurance, the British would be coming down to the English Channel. The Luftwaffe would have a shorter distance to travel to engage the RAF, and hence could fight for a longer time. As well, it would be the Germans who would be choosing the time and location of the engagement. Any German planes damaged would have a better chance to crash land in France and not have the pilots taken POW by the British if they had done the same over the UK. As well, any Germans shot down would have been over the Channel where they stand a 50-50 chance of being rescued.

 

The extemporaneousness landing craft could only ground on a falling tide, would then dry out, and had to wait for the next high tide to refloat and retract. High tide along the coast was at around 645 AM. The invasion fleet also had a top speed of 6 knots and the limited port facilities meant it would take a while for them to exit the ports after loading, assemble and then cross, while good visibility was required to assemble and organize the complex convoys. All that meant that assembly was in daylight, in full view of British observers, and that the crossing would take place at night with a dawn landing. The Luftwaffe, as noted, had zero torpedo attack capability, it also had zero night attack capability. The KM depended on 20 S-Boot, hasty minefields, and a half-dozen submarines to block a Royal Navy attack from the eastern end of the Channel and about ten destroyers and torpedo boats and another half-dozen submarines to block attacks from the Western end of the Channel. All that means that on the order of 70 destroyers and light cruisers, along with dozens of light craft, would have about ten hours of darkness to attack the German convoys with impunity from the Luftwaffe.

 

 

The added bonus would be that it would also force the Royal Navy to enter the Channel to engage the German invasion fleet. In the Channel, the RN will be vulnerable to Luftwaffe dive bombing attacks from Stukas and possibly torpedo attacks from the Junker 88s and Heinkel 111. A serious blow could be delivered against the RN by experienced Luftwaffe ground attack units. At this time in the war, I believe the RN grossly underestimated the effectiveness of air attacks against ships, and hence they were vulnerable if they came within range of Luftwaffe units. Loss of several RN capital ships from a Channel battle would effects other battles down the road, especially in the Battle of Atlantic and the battles with other German capital ships like the Bismark, Graf Spee, Tirpitz, etc.

 

The problem with that was the Stuka had been essentially wrecked by continuous operations in France and the Low Countries in May and June and the following Kanalkampf and battle of the airfields in July and August. As of 7 September the Stukagruppen were (unit - location - strength OH/OP:

 

Luftflotte 2.

Stab/StG 1. - St Pol - 7/5

I./StG 1. - St Pol - 0/0

II./StG 1. - Pas-de-Calais - 43/29

III./StG 1. - St Pol - 0/0 (formed from I.(St)/Tr.Gr.186 on 9 July)

Stab/StG 2. - Tramecourt - 11/9

II./StG 2. - St Pol - 27/22

IV. (Stg)/LG 1. - Tramecourt - 42/28

 

Luftflotte 3.

Stab/StG 3. - Brittany - 7/6

I./StG 3. - Brittany - 37/34

I./StG 2. - St Malo - 0/0

Stab/StG 77. - Brugy - 0/0

I./StG 77. - Maltot - 0/0

II./StG 77. - Brugy - 0/0

III./StG 77. - Argentan - 0/0

 

Heimat

III./StG 2. - Kitzingen - ?/?

 

Note of the eleven Gruppen, only four were operational, with only 113 aircraft operational. The other were non-operational, reorganizing, training new crews, and awaiting replacement aircraft.

 

The Luftwaffe also had two units trained in ship attack using level bombers, KG 26. and KG 30. KG 26. and its He 111H were in Norway until late September when they moved to France and it is unclear if they would have been operational for the probable 24 September S-Tag. I./KG 30. was in Norway, so only two groups with Ju 88A were available for maritime strike, one at Schipol and one (minus a Staffel detached in Norway) was at Grieves. The last maritime strike capable level-bomber unit was I./KG 40 with Fw 200C, but it was at Bordeaux engaged in strike-reconnaissance missions in the Atlantic and was not tasked in the invasion. The last available were the He 155 and a few Ju 88A of the Küstenfliegergruppe. 2./KGr.106 with He 115, which had limited torpedo-attack capability, were at Schellingwoude in the Netherlands, while Kü.Fl.Gr. 806 was at Carpiquet with some Ju 88A, but were mainly maritime reconnaissance.

 

 

Would the Germans has suffered losses in their invasion fleet? No doubt they would. And these losses might have been higher if there was RAF still around in strength. But I have to question how effective RAF attacks would have been in the face of constant and prolonged harassment and engagement by Luftwaffe fighters. I think that even a feint invasion to draw out all the RAF aircraft to the Channel might have been a better way to defeat the RAF.

Welcome any views on this.

 

Aside from some Coastal Command and Fleet Air Arm units, the RAF was also not tasked or trained at the time for maritime strike. Most of the damage to the invasion fleet would have been done by the Royal Navy. Given the high degree of coordination required within the complex German tow convoys. quite possibly the worst damage an attack by the Royal Navy could cause is disorganization and loss of time. For example, the really cool submersible tanks were tasked to land over specific beaches the German expected would provide the clear routes and firm sea bottom they required to be successful. They were also supposed to deploy in the falling tide so any that did get stuck would be exposed by low tide...arriving late or at the wrong place could result in disaster.

 

However, the Jagdwaffe had an impossible task. It was supposed to provide cover simultaneously for the Stuka supporting the landings, four Fliegerkorps doing both deep and close interdiction of communications as well as strikes on airfields, and Fligerdivision 9., which was supposed to interdict the Royal Navy by dropping mines. The dispersal of effort virtually guaranteed Fighter Command local superiority wherever they wanted it as well as unhindered routes for whatever strikes Bomber and Army Cooperation Command could muster against the German beachheads.

 

The result for the Germans would almost certainly be a shambles and failure.

 

How about the role of German army field artillery in the protection of the potential German Invasion fleet as it makes its way to England? Could German 150mm guns like the FH 18 be able to interdict any RN incursion into the English Channel to interfere with the invasion? These guns have a 23K range. Strategically placed batteries on the French side could surely disrupt the RN.

 

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sFH 15 had nowhere near 23km range. That is range for 15cm K18m, which were pretty rare.

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The Channel is wider than that. Much wider at some of the crossing points, and field artillery have neither the trained naval gunners nor fire control to engage moving ships. I'm not sure those guns in those mounts have the rate of fire or traverse to be capable of it at all.

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I have always wondered why the Germans thought that they needed air superiority over Great Britain to successfully conduct Operation Seelowe and invade the UK.

 

 

 

Manstein in his memoires thought that Hitler was abdicating on responsibility as war leader for fear of a debacle that would diminish his prestige. The gist of Manstein's take on Sealion was that it should have been started earlier and without air superiority or supremacy. That waiting until September was too late in the season, (by October the Channel gets chancy for Sealion style transport), and that since air superiority could not be attained, and was not demanded for other strategic undertakings like the invasion of France or Russia, that this should not have been made a criteria.

 

 

If they had launched their planned invasion fleet from France, the RAF would have send bombers to attack the fleet, as well as escorts for these bombers. Rather then fly all over the UK attacking British airbases and targets at the limit of the 109's endurance, the British would be coming down to the English Channel. The Luftwaffe would have a shorter distance to travel to engage the RAF, and hence could fight for a longer time. As well, it would be the Germans who would be choosing the time and location of the engagement. Any German planes damaged would have a better chance to crash land in France and not have the pilots taken POW by the British if they had done the same over the UK. As well, any Germans shot down would have been over the Channel where they stand a 50-50 chance of being rescued.

 

Essentially your saying that rather than fight the Battle of Britain to win Sealion, fight Sealion to win the Battle of Britain. That is, that Germany had more infantry and river barges than it did aircraft, so the key was to draw the RAF into an unfavorable battle, which by definition had to be in the Channel or the coast of France. Also, keep in mind that if Sealion did get a foothold one consequence might be some level of permanent degradation to the Chain Home radar network on which the RAF relied to win the BoB. (Worst case scenario would be capturing stations intact).

The added bonus would be that it would also force the Royal Navy to enter the Channel to engage the German invasion fleet. In the Channel, the RN will be vulnerable to Luftwaffe dive bombing attacks from Stukas and possibly torpedo attacks from the Junker 88s and Heinkel 111. A serious blow could be delivered against the RN by experienced Luftwaffe ground attack units. At this time in the war, I believe the RN grossly underestimated the effectiveness of air attacks against ships, and hence they were vulnerable if they came within range of Luftwaffe units. Loss of several RN capital ships from a Channel battle would effects other battles down the road, especially in the Battle of Atlantic and the battles with other German capital ships like the Bismark, Graf Spee, Tirpitz, etc.

 

Warships proved surprisingly robust in operations against aircraft. That being said, warships could not stand long under hostile skies without taking attrition. The question is at what range the battle is fought from the German air bases, the number of sorties the LW is able to generate against warships, the types of sorties, (dive, level or low level bombing, or strafing), the ammunition state and formation of the warships being attack, (AA formation and lets go blow up barge formations being quite different), and quite importantly, the ability of the RAF to break up attacks on warships.

In order against warships, the LW aircraft were probably the Stuka, then the ME-110 (ground attack), ME-109 (fighter bomber), JU-88, (level or dive bomber), HE-111/DO-17 (level bomber). The number of Stukas available for Sealion would probably not have exceeded about 300 and they would be overtasked between sea and land support roles.

Would the Germans has suffered losses in their invasion fleet? No doubt they would. And these losses might have been higher if there was RAF still around in strength. But I have to question how effective RAF attacks would have been in the face of constant and prolonged harassment and engagement by Luftwaffe fighters. I think that even a feint invasion to draw out all the RAF aircraft to the Channel might have been a better way to defeat the RAF.

 

The RAF would not be too effective against small ships in the Channel. Probably a threat mostly to the larger steamers and the invasion beaches themselves, but I still doubt they'd hit much. The fighters would be too busy elsewhere and were under armed anyways. The Royal Navy though, was a different story. But Sealion did have a large number of aux. warships such as Siebel ferries and minesweepers that would have absorb a lot of attention.

 

"Essentially your saying that rather than fight the Battle of Britain to win Sealion, fight Sealion to win the Battle of Britain. "

 

Yes, that is what I am saying. Also, the U-boat arm was best part of the Kreigsmarine. The massed employment of U-boats instead of the pathetic 3 U-boats assigned to anti-Dunkirk operations would really make the RN think twice in SeeLowe. I don't see why a blockade of both ends of the English Channel by U-Boats could not inflict heavy losses on the RN entering the Channel to interdict the German invasion fleet. The losses would be RN capital ships too. The RN would not be sending light destroyers and corvettes to interfere with the invasion. The U-Boats do not necessarily have to operate in the Channel itself, but the approaches to the Channel. Given the state and lack of sophistication in the anti-submarine warfare at that time, I can see the German U-Boat fleet having a target rich environment and a happy hunting ground when RN inevitably come to the Channel.

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Even more interesting would be to find and clarify the German doctrine for naval shore fire support in support of army ground forces. What teams would deploy ashore [survival assumed], what suitable and interfaced comm equipment would be used, and what agency, ashore or afloat, would provide the needed fire support coordination, day and night.

 

It took the USN about three years to go from blind shooting in 1942 to integrated combined arms in 1944 shore fire support in the Pacific,mostly based upon harsh lessons.

The German doctrine fornaval shore fire support of army ground forces did not exist insofar as I can see. The fire support for Sealion consisted of the 5 heavy and 27 light gunboats, which, just like whatever infantry guns, former Belgian or French field pieces, and whatever ass and trash they could find to load on barges, was intended to fire on any targets they could see. There were no provisions for NFCP or anything even close to that...like much of German doctrine it was focused on direct-fire weapons. There is little or no indication that they actually identified any shore battery positions, but a lot of talk of sending commandos and using Stuka against assumed positions. Like most of the planning, it was a shambles.

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Germans would be trying to cross Channel with one of those...

This one is not loaded and on the calm river. Now imagine trying to cross a Channel with less than 1m of freeboard?

Except they had no Marinefahrepraehme and few Pionier-Landungs-Boote. None of the later were intended for Sealion.

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"Essentially your saying that rather than fight the Battle of Britain to win Sealion, fight Sealion to win the Battle of Britain. "

 

 

Yes, that is what I am saying. Also, the U-boat arm was best part of the Kreigsmarine. The massed employment of U-boats instead of the pathetic 3 U-boats assigned to anti-Dunkirk operations would really make the RN think twice in SeeLowe. I don't see why a blockade of both ends of the English Channel by U-Boats could not inflict heavy losses on the RN entering the Channel to interdict the German invasion fleet. The losses would be RN capital ships too. The RN would not be sending light destroyers and corvettes to interfere with the invasion. The U-Boats do not necessarily have to operate in the Channel itself, but the approaches to the Channel. Given the state and lack of sophistication in the anti-submarine warfare at that time, I can see the German U-Boat fleet having a target rich environment and a happy hunting ground when RN inevitably come to the Channel.

 

Because they didn't have the U-Boot to do it with? Most of the U-Boot tasked for Sealion were the Ducks, Typ-II U-Boote, which had proven so woefully vulnerable and inadequate in Norway. The Typ-IX were completely unsuited and there were few operational Typ-VII and most were either on patrol, returning from patrol, or preparing for a new patrol.

 

BTW, it wasn't the "state and lack of sophistication in the anti-submarine warfare" that caused the British trouble...it was the needle-in-a-haystack problem of tracking U-Boot in the Atlantic...concentrating the U-Boot in the narrow and shallow waters of the Channel approaches was like herding cattle into the slaughter pen.

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"Essentially your saying that rather than fight the Battle of Britain to win Sealion, fight Sealion to win the Battle of Britain. "

 

 

Yes, that is what I am saying. Also, the U-boat arm was best part of the Kreigsmarine. The massed employment of U-boats instead of the pathetic 3 U-boats assigned to anti-Dunkirk operations would really make the RN think twice in SeeLowe. I don't see why a blockade of both ends of the English Channel by U-Boats could not inflict heavy losses on the RN entering the Channel to interdict the German invasion fleet. The losses would be RN capital ships too. The RN would not be sending light destroyers and corvettes to interfere with the invasion. The U-Boats do not necessarily have to operate in the Channel itself, but the approaches to the Channel. Given the state and lack of sophistication in the anti-submarine warfare at that time, I can see the German U-Boat fleet having a target rich environment and a happy hunting ground when RN inevitably come to the Channel.

 

Because they didn't have the U-Boot to do it with? Most of the U-Boot tasked for Sealion were the Ducks, Typ-II U-Boote, which had proven so woefully vulnerable and inadequate in Norway. The Typ-IX were completely unsuited and there were few operational Typ-VII and most were either on patrol, returning from patrol, or preparing for a new patrol.

 

BTW, it wasn't the "state and lack of sophistication in the anti-submarine warfare" that caused the British trouble...it was the needle-in-a-haystack problem of tracking U-Boot in the Atlantic...concentrating the U-Boot in the narrow and shallow waters of the Channel approaches was like herding cattle into the slaughter pen.

 

 

And I am sure that the Brits were willing to take the losses, after all, what is a fleet with no free home nation for it to serve?

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Even more interesting would be to find and clarify the German doctrine for naval shore fire support in support of army ground forces. What teams would deploy ashore [survival assumed], what suitable and interfaced comm equipment would be used, and what agency, ashore or afloat, would provide the needed fire support coordination, day and night.

 

It took the USN about three years to go from blind shooting in 1942 to integrated combined arms in 1944 shore fire support in the Pacific,mostly based upon harsh lessons.

The RN learned lessons in WW1 about this.

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Ostend_Raid

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeebrugge_Raid

 

You would have thought that German planners in 1940 would have dusted off old action reports and realised just how difficult an assault would be, let alone a landing. The British (and also the US) learned from the Dardenelles campaign just how difficult an amphibious assault actually is, it seems that German planners did not learn the lessons from just 25 years before.

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Aside from that the "aux. warships" consisted of 27 leichte and 5 schwere Artillerieträger, mostly large trawlers, fitted with one 15cm SK/C and two 2cm Flak in the schwere, except for one with two 10.5cm SK/C as main armament, or one 7.5cm (a captured French or Belgian "French 75") and a 3.7cm in the leichte, none of which were intended for anything other than support of the landings. The numerous V-Boot were small trawlers usually fitted with a single 3.7cm or 2cm gun.

 

 

 

Interesint, on what hull was the 15cm armed ship based ? A coaster or a (very large) trawler of some sort, something else ?

 

What would be more important is proper fire control. A ship is hard to hit from a moving platform, especially one that has an inexperienced crew.

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Except they had no Marinefahrepraehme and few Pionier-Landungs-Boote. None of the later were intended for Sealion.

 

Weren't original barges proposed for landing tanks the base of MFPs?

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Although the effectiveness of allied ASW weapons and techniques did vastly improve through the war, the depth of the English Channel, or lack thereof, made attacking a submerged submarine essentially a two dimensional problem. That drastically increased the effectiveness of conventional depth charges vs u-boats.

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