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Could The Germans Have Successfully Propagated Sealion Without Air Supremacy


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Not to mention Phosgene, Mustard, all the old favourites....

 

Its worth remembering that although the army was in bits, there was still one complete division in the UK, and that was the Canadian Division. If you think how hard D Day was to put 6 division sets on the beaches of Normandy, then it defies understanding how the Germans, with what they had, could have managed better than 2-1. With what they had to do, that just wasnt good enough. Sure, they could fly airborne divisions in. But they didnt have good enough equipment in that era to ward off the attack by the lights armoured task force.

 

Id love to wargame it, but I really dont see how it could have worked.

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I have always wondered why the Germans thought that they needed air superiority over Great Britain to successfully conduct Operation Seelowe and invade the UK.

 

If they had launched their planned invasion fleet from France, the RAF would have send bombers to attack the fleet, as well as escorts for these bombers. Rather then fly all over the UK attacking British airbases and targets at the limit of the 109's endurance, the British would be coming down to the English Channel. The Luftwaffe would have a shorter distance to travel to engage the RAF, and hence could fight for a longer time. As well, it would be the Germans who would be choosing the time and location of the engagement. Any German planes damaged would have a better chance to crash land in France and not have the pilots taken POW by the British if they had done the same over the UK. As well, any Germans shot down would have been over the Channel where they stand a 50-50 chance of being rescued.

 

The added bonus would be that it would also force the Royal Navy to enter the Channel to engage the German invasion fleet. In the Channel, the RN will be vulnerable to Luftwaffe dive bombing attacks from Stukas and possibly torpedo attacks from the Junker 88s and Heinkel 111. A serious blow could be delivered against the RN by experienced Luftwaffe ground attack units. At this time in the war, I believe the RN grossly underestimated the effectiveness of air attacks against ships, and hence they were vulnerable if they came within range of Luftwaffe units. Loss of several RN capital ships from a Channel battle would effects other battles down the road, especially in the Battle of Atlantic and the battles with other German capital ships like the Bismark, Graf Spee, Tirpitz, etc.

 

Would the Germans has suffered losses in their invasion fleet? No doubt they would. And these losses might have been higher if there was RAF still around in strength. But I have to question how effective RAF attacks would have been in the face of constant and prolonged harassment and engagement by Luftwaffe fighters. I think that even a feint invasion to draw out all the RAF aircraft to the Channel might have been a better way to defeat the RAF.

 

Welcome any views on this.

The 109 was even less suited for maintaining an impressive defensive CAP than for escorting. Well-coordinated attacks by the RAF would have succeeded easily.

The issue was rather that the air campaign caused attrition among German bombers which would be needed to support the invasion. Especially the 87 and 88 (anti-ship capable) bombers needed to be preserved and trained in ship killing rather than expended on land targets.

 

In worst case the RAF could have withdrawn from Southern England and preserved its strength in Mid and North England, so a decisive air superiority campaign was always dependent on an English strategic mistake.

 

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/12/critique-of-battle-fo-britain-strategy.html

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Re: bad planning. Almost no provision was made for resupply over the beach, for instance. One thing thst stuck in my mind was the plan for lifebelts for the troops going ashore. They didn't have enough for more than one wave at a time, so they were hoing to be reused. The way this was to happen?

 

1. First wave drops them on the beach after they get ashore.

 

2. ?

 

3. Profit! Second wave would put them on.

 

Not that this would matter. They wouldn't have got halfway across the Channel. If the sea state was anything other than dead calm, they'd have lost a lot of barges without the RN needing to sink them. A couple of destroyer flotillas in their mudst would be utter disaster.

Edited by R011
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Not to mention Phosgene, Mustard, all the old favourites....

 

 

 

The use of poison gas might defeat an invasion. Politically, it might play badly in the USA. Militarily, the question is whether Fighter Command does better or worse against the Luftwaffe with its airbases being attacked with poison gas.

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British ships suffered relatively light losses during the Duinkirk evacuation near land.

 

RAF Fighter Command had some success in protecting shipping on the wrong side of the Channel. But the Luftwaffe also often attacked unmolested and, according to the figures Rich posted, registered one ship was sunk or damaged for every 18 or 19 air attacks. At Dunkirk, the Luftwaffe was operating from bases not particularly nearby to the embattled port. That isn't the case here - Goering put his Stukas on the coast to be right over the sea lines to Dover. As the RN discovered off Crete, once an air sea battle is within about 30 miles of the LW airbase, the rate of sorties started to get very intense. If the rate of loss (sunk or damaged) at Dunkirk against stationary targets was 1 in 19 sorties, then against mobile targets, maybe more like 1 in 50 sorties.

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Minelaying certainly is an option for both the Germans and the British, and would indeed be a big problem if the Germans planned on actually invading af UK. But if the real plan is not the invasion but to inflict heavy losses on the RN it doesn't matter if barges loaded with German soldiers and equipment goes boom-boom in the Channel - as long as the RN hit the minefields on the way to the Channels.

 

It is true that the RN had a good minesweeping capacity, but in 1940 not nearly as impressive as later - most of which BTW was utilised as escorts.

 

The initial battles will be the British trying to prevent the Germans in laying their minefields and will involve both air and sea forces. Most of the minelaying, especially close to the British shores, will be at night however and evolve after the "hawk over hawk" principle - ie. destroyers escorting the minelayers/sweeperes, which are then countered by light cruisers, which are then countered by heavy cruisers etc. Obviously the Germans will run out of "hawks" first but that really doesn't matter if the British "eagles" end up in the minefield and are picked off by the U-boats when they try to escape.

 

A big problem for the RN is that they really don't have the time to thoroughly clear the minefields, but OTOH the German plan is rather "Japanese" - i.e. a complicated plan needing a lot of things going as planned in order to work -. a big gamble. And in mid 1940 the Germans saw no need for gambling - they had just in a few weeks defeated the France that broke their neck in 1914-18 and why waste resources on the British now, they really couldn't threaten Germany - "Let's go East and kick in Stalin's door and see his house collapse over him - then we can always deal with perfidious Albion!"

 

Brilliant plan - plans just have a tendency not to survive the first contact with reality.

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Seelöwe was poorly planned, but no more poorly than Weserübung, which worked. Germans had high confidence on initiative of field commanders instead of making minute plans about every little detail.

 

Having said that, Weserübung was undertaken as a surprise operation against ill-prepared enemy. Invading England in 1940 would have been whole different ballgame.

 

In short, I believe Germans would have got signifant forces across, though landing in confusion, often in wrong places and with little to no heavy equipment. Then local commanders undoubtely could have gained some minor successes and advances on their own initiative. Panic and confusion in defenders' side would have been considerable early on.

But that would have been maximum extent of it. In couple of days, realities of supply and support arms (or lack thereof) would have dropped on Germans like a cartoon anvil.

 

Yes, Weserübung suceeded, but in some ways was a simpler plan that did not require the immense tow convoys and the improvised landing craft. It was also executed against a completely unprepared and surprised enemy.

 

Was there a chance to get some across and landed? Sure. It is possible most of Landungsflotte E might get across, since the RN forces at the western end of the Channel were weaker - and Revenge was probably not going to get committed - but they were light infantry forces only dependent on resupply through the Channel ports and Flotte D, C, and B.

 

Part of the problem was that the British forces were much more prepared than many believe, certainly stronger than the German intel estimates and stronger than what Fleming claimed. For example, Stuart is off a bit. Yes, the Canadian Division was the only fully equipped division immediately after Dunkirk in mid June, but shortly thereafter 3 Division was issued a complete set of replacement equipment - the only one around - and 104 days later on 24 September the situation was very different.

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RAF Fighter Command had some success in protecting shipping on the wrong side of the Channel. But the Luftwaffe also often attacked unmolested and, according to the figures Rich posted, registered one ship was sunk or damaged for every 18 or 19 air attacks. At Dunkirk, the Luftwaffe was operating from bases not particularly nearby to the embattled port. That isn't the case here - Goering put his Stukas on the coast to be right over the sea lines to Dover. As the RN discovered off Crete, once an air sea battle is within about 30 miles of the LW airbase, the rate of sorties started to get very intense. If the rate of loss (sunk or damaged) at Dunkirk against stationary targets was 1 in 19 sorties, then against mobile targets, maybe more like 1 in 50 sorties.

 

You know it doesn't work that way, we've been over this too.

 

T6+KL flew from Golzheim against Eben-Emael and vicinity, about 60 miles away and managed 7 sorties on 10 May and 4 on 11 May. Flying against Louvain the next day, 90 miles away, it managed 3. Against Sedan the next day, 130 miles away, it was 1. Then flying from Duisberg to the Zuiderzee on 14 May, 110 miles, it was 1.

 

Sure, distance, right? However on 16 May it flew three sorties from Duisberg to Cortil-Normont, 110 miles.

 

On 17 May it moved to Libin and flew single sorties on the 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th flying 37, 105, 131, and 94 miles respectively.

 

On 21 May it moved to Beaulieu and flew sorties against the coast from Calais to Dunkirk, between 105 and 88 miles, 1 each on 21 and 22 May, 3 on 23 May, none on 24 May, 1 on 25 May, 2 on 26 May, 1 on 27 May, 1 on 28 May, 1 on 29 May, none on 30 May or 1 June, and 1 on 2 June. It then stood down until it began support of ROT, flying 4 80-mile sorties on 5 June, a single 100-mile sortie the next day, three 30 to 40-mile sorties on 7 June, then single sorties each 9-13 June of 40 to 140 miles,

 

Then, based out of Cherbourg and Conde-sur-Ifs, it flew against southern England, distances of 90-125 miles, in single sorties on 4, 11, 17, and 27 July, but two on 26 July.

 

There is no significant correlation between distance and number of sorties.

 

Nor, BTW, did Goering put his "Stukas on the coast right over the sea lanes to Dover". Rhetorical flourishes are not evidence. The various Stuka Gruppen were based inland from the Pas-de-Calais, around Caen and Cherbourg in Normandy, and in Brittany, from 60 to 200 miles from the British coast.

 

Meanwhile, yet again you ignore what you have been told. The Stuka were not tasked with attacks on the RN, rather, they were to again be the flying artillery for the Heer, suppressing the beach defenses, because except for infantry guns and a few mountain guns, they were without artillery support for at least two days.

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Seelöwe was poorly planned, but no more poorly than Weserübung, which worked. Germans had high confidence on initiative of field commanders instead of making minute plans about every little detail.

 

Having said that, Weserübung was undertaken as a surprise operation against ill-prepared enemy. Invading England in 1940 would have been whole different ballgame.

 

In short, I believe Germans would have got signifant forces across, though landing in confusion, often in wrong places and with little to no heavy equipment. Then local commanders undoubtely could have gained some minor successes and advances on their own initiative. Panic and confusion in defenders' side would have been considerable early on.

But that would have been maximum extent of it. In couple of days, realities of supply and support arms (or lack thereof) would have dropped on Germans like a cartoon anvil.

 

Yes, Weserübung suceeded, but in some ways was a simpler plan that did not require the immense tow convoys and the improvised landing craft. It was also executed against a completely unprepared and surprised enemy.

 

Was there a chance to get some across and landed? Sure. It is possible most of Landungsflotte E might get across, since the RN forces at the western end of the Channel were weaker - and Revenge was probably not going to get committed - but they were light infantry forces only dependent on resupply through the Channel ports and Flotte D, C, and B.

 

Part of the problem was that the British forces were much more prepared than many believe, certainly stronger than the German intel estimates and stronger than what Fleming claimed. For example, Stuart is off a bit. Yes, the Canadian Division was the only fully equipped division immediately after Dunkirk in mid June, but shortly thereafter 3 Division was issued a complete set of replacement equipment - the only one around - and 104 days later on 24 September the situation was very different.

Thanks for putting me right there Rich.

 

So to have a 2-1 advantage, they would need a 4 division landing. That would have been hilarious to watch.

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If, and this is a big if, the Germans were able to get ashore and fight for a "couple" of days with enough supply and cohesion to do so to their standards, the question is what would be the chances of a British collapse on the ground against them.

 

Removing German air supremacy would reduce those chances significantly. Introducing it, and maybe, just maybe...

 

Poison gas use would have unpleasant ramifications for both sides.

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There is no significant correlation between distance and number of sorties.

 

Nor, BTW, did Goering put his "Stukas on the coast right over the sea lanes to Dover". Rhetorical flourishes are not evidence. The various Stuka Gruppen were based inland from the Pas-de-Calais, around Caen and Cherbourg in Normandy, and in Brittany, from 60 to 200 miles from the British coast.

 

 

 

There is no correlation between distance and sortie rate provided that one is using a Star Trek transporter to beam there and back. Otherwise, the relationship is that every aircraft has to fly to and from the target, and the further the target is from the air field, the longer it will take on average, the fewer the sorties on average. Peak (absolute maximum one day only, best case scenario) Stuka sortie rates were 9 per day. Sealion first day? Certainly much less than that. Factors to consider are, in no particular order -

 

1. Logistic state of air field and training of crews, (runway conditions, rested well trained air crews surplus to the number of aircraft, plenty of ground crew support, well equipped, well stocked, the aircraft coming off period of down time, well maintained).

2. Weather conditions, (sunny versus rainy, amount of daylight so summer vs. winter).

3. Distance to target, (any further than about 30 miles from the air base and sortie rate starts to suffer)

4. Locating target (any time taken to search for the target drops sortie rate)

5. Anti-aircraft defenses of target (any aircraft holed has to be inspected, decreasing sortie time, aircraft damaged or destroyed).

6. Effectiveness of fighter defenses, (same as 5. above, but also, time taken to link up with fighter escort decreases sortie rate).

 

 

Meanwhile, yet again you ignore what you have been told. The Stuka were not tasked with attacks on the RN, rather, they were to again be the flying artillery for the Heer, suppressing the beach defenses, because except for infantry guns and a few mountain guns, they were without artillery support for at least two days.

 

 

Upthread you indicated that the RN would attack at night and be out of the Channel by daylight. In that instance, Stukas would not be in an air sea battle because the RN will have surrendered the field during daylight hours. So, in that sense, I agree with you that the Stukas will be tasked differently since dive bombing at night was not a thing.

 

However, what you have to keep in mind is that the RN will not surrender the Channel at dawn if the issue on the beaches is in doubt. Because, if they did relinquish the Channel, that's about 12 entire hours for Sealion to get its act together after a night time beating and land. Shit like that is how Britain lost the Battle of Crete. So, let's say the RN had come into the Channel at night as you say and has spanked Sealion. By "spank", I mean a few hundred (out of 3,500) sunk, hundreds more damaged but afloat, and at least a thousand dispersed and disorganised, but still in the Channel intending to land. On the British shore, maybe 40% of the invasion has landed and it is a shit show - wrong beaches, units mixed up. British counterattacks in some place have succeeded, but in others, the defenses are a debacle and the Germans are already advancing inland.

 

In that instance, the RN can not retreat from the Channel at dawn because Britain doesn't want to lose the war. The RN will remain in the Channel past daylight in order to break up Sealion before it can reorganize from the night battle mid-Channel and land in the next few hours, now in places where the Germans have succeeded. What follows will be the most intense air sea battle in history. The Luftwaffe support plan will be out the window and most everything will go after the RN in the Channel. The British will also throw in the RAF - everything. The Luftwaffe will not ignore this situation in favor of ground support of landing forces because preserving Sealion's invasion forces was more important than supporting forces already having landed - that would have to wait until the RN was defeated.

 

That's my take, at any rate.

Edited by glenn239
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If, and this is a big if, the Germans were able to get ashore and fight for a "couple" of days with enough supply and cohesion to do so to their standards, the question is what would be the chances of a British collapse on the ground against them.

 

Removing German air supremacy would reduce those chances significantly. Introducing it, and maybe, just maybe...

 

Poison gas use would have unpleasant ramifications for both sides.

No, only for the Germans. They didn't have any on hand in France, but if course we had it at hand. And whilst they could at length bomb London with it, we could use it on Berlin.

 

I think the use of gas by Britain would be an unwelcome surprise. I doubt they could respond before it was all over.

 

And that's if they got through the sea of fire...

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Aside from some Coastal Command and Fleet Air Arm units, the RAF was also not tasked or trained at the time for maritime strike.

 

 

The RAF doesn't need to be trained in anti-shipping strikes to cause damage though. If it came to it, the German invasion barges would have been horribly vulnerable to strafing attacks by RAF fighters.

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Not to mention Phosgene, Mustard, all the old favourites....

 

Its worth remembering that although the army was in bits, there was still one complete division in the UK, and that was the Canadian Division. If you think how hard D Day was to put 6 division sets on the beaches of Normandy, then it defies understanding how the Germans, with what they had, could have managed better than 2-1. With what they had to do, that just wasnt good enough. Sure, they could fly airborne divisions in. But they didnt have good enough equipment in that era to ward off the attack by the lights armoured task force.

 

Id love to wargame it, but I really dont see how it could have worked.

 

Already been done.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion_(wargame)

 

tl;dr the Germans get ashore and things aren't going too badly but then the Royal Navy turns up and it all goes horribly wrong.

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At dawn on 24 September the follow-up echelons of German invasion barges were intercepted still 9 miles short of their beach objectives by a Royal Navy fleet of 17 cruisers and 57 destroyers plus Motor Torpedo Boats. (Tank net is not letting me put quotes around this)

Edited by Brian Kennedy
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There is no correlation between distance and sortie rate provided that one is using a Star Trek transporter to beam there and back. Otherwise, the relationship is that every aircraft has to fly to and from the target, and the further the target is from the air field, the longer it will take on average, the fewer the sorties on average. Peak (absolute maximum one day only, best case scenario) Stuka sortie rates were 9 per day. Sealion first day? Certainly much less than that. Factors to consider are, in no particular order -

Glenn, trying to be a wise-ass doesn't necessarily make you wise, sometimes it just makes you an ass.

 

Anecdotally, peak one-day, one-off, Stuka sortie rate for an unknown unit/aircraft on one single day, 10 May 1940, was 9...except for the aircraft we actually have a logbook for, which only managed 7 on targets 60 miles. Yet despite being at the same distance or even closer on five, it never, managed 7 again, Instead, it managed 4 and 3 on single days and 1 on the remaining 3. So in six days at ranges 60 miles and under, it averaged 2.83 sorties per day. At greater distance, 80 to around 130 miles, it averaged about half that, 1.35 sorties per day.

 

Nor is the 10 May 1940 average for the Stuka even close to the known 7 or anecdotal 9. In fact, on 10 May 1940, after months of practice and preparation, the 316 serviceable Stuka in the nine Stuka Gruppen managed nearly 1,500 sorties, c. 4.75 sorties-per-aircraft per day

 

After the pummeling the Stuka received in August, yep, the first day of Sealion will certainly be "much less" than an anecdotal 9....I suspect something between 1.35 and 2.83 per day. I doubt they would even achieve the 4.75 sorties-per-aircraft of the first day of GELB.

 

 

1. Logistic state of air field and training of crews, (runway conditions, rested well trained air crews surplus to the number of aircraft, plenty of ground crew support, well equipped, well stocked, the aircraft coming off period of down time, well maintained).

2. Weather conditions, (sunny versus rainy, amount of daylight so summer vs. winter).

3. Distance to target, (any further than about 30 miles from the air base and sortie rate starts to suffer)

4. Locating target (any time taken to search for the target drops sortie rate)

5. Anti-aircraft defenses of target (any aircraft holed has to be inspected, decreasing sortie time, aircraft damaged or destroyed).

6. Effectiveness of fighter defenses, (same as 5. above, but also, time taken to link up with fighter escort decreases sortie rate).

Upthread you indicated that the RN would attack at night and be out of the Channel by daylight. In that instance, Stukas would not be in an air sea battle because the RN will have surrendered the field during daylight hours. So, in that sense, I agree with you that the Stukas will be tasked differently since dive bombing at night was not a thing.

 

1. So now instead of poo-pooing the effect of unimproved bases on sortie rates, now you're agreeing it was a factor. Good to know.

2. Well, yeah, the Luftwaffe had zero all-weather capability...which truly made the Sealion timeline problematic.

3. So you have examples of them flying sorties against targets 30 miles from base? Or do you have a location of a Stuka base 30 miles from its Sealion targets?

4. Yeah, like StG 77. on 13 August 1940...

5. Yep...

6. Yep...

 

No, Stuka would not be in an air-sea battle because they were not tasked for that role in Sealion...that was the role of 9. Fliegerdivision.

 

 

 

However, what you have to keep in mind is that the RN will not surrender the Channel at dawn if the issue on the beaches is in doubt. Because, if they did relinquish the Channel, that's about 12 entire hours for Sealion to get its act together after a night time beating and land. Shit like that is how Britain lost the Battle of Crete. So, let's say the RN had come into the Channel at night as you say and has spanked Sealion. By "spank", I mean a few hundred (out of 3,500) sunk, hundreds more damaged but afloat, and at least a thousand dispersed and disorganised, but still in the Channel intending to land. On the British shore, maybe 40% of the invasion has landed and it is a shit show - wrong beaches, units mixed up. British counterattacks in some place have succeeded, but in others, the defenses are a debacle and the Germans are already advancing inland.

 

Um, Glenn, the issue on the beaches would not be "in doubt" at dawn 25 September 1940. "Dawn" - nautical twilight - was 0538, while the initial landings were scheduled for 0700.

 

Most of the tows had barely trained coxswains, probably none could navigate worth a damn if the formations were broken up. As of 25 September, one minor practice exercise had been done, none of the complex peregrinations had been practiced, but yeah, sure...

 

You really need to do some better research into the actual planning.

 

 

In that instance, the RN can not retreat from the Channel at dawn because Britain doesn't want to lose the war. The RN will remain in the Channel past daylight in order to break up Sealion before it can reorganize from the night battle mid-Channel and land in the next few hours, now in places where the Germans have succeeded. What follows will be the most intense air sea battle in history. The Luftwaffe support plan will be out the window and most everything will go after the RN in the Channel. The British will also throw in the RAF - everything. The Luftwaffe will not ignore this situation in favor of ground support of landing forces because preserving Sealion's invasion forces was more important than supporting forces already having landed - that would have to wait until the RN was defeated.

That's my take, at any rate.

 

 

Okay, so that's your "take" fine. It's not based upin anything other than your assumptions, but sure, whatever floats you peniche.

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The RAF doesn't need to be trained in anti-shipping strikes to cause damage though. If it came to it, the German invasion barges would have been horribly vulnerable to strafing attacks by RAF fighters.

 

 

To be honest, probably not. The problem with the barges was not its vulnerability to strafing attacks or swamping by British destroyers sailing past (an old and inaccurate canard). It was this:

 

The initial German plan was to use a powered barge to tow an unpowered one...except tests demonstrated most of the powered barges weren't powerful enough to tow anything and many would have trouble even getting across on their own. So they decided to use a tug to tow the powered and unpowered barge across...except they didn't have enough tugs, so they decided to use coasters as substitute tugs...only to discover that most of the coasters weren't powerful enough either, but they had just enough to combine with the real tugs to maybe make it work...if everything went according to plan.

 

Except that in tests the towlines kept parting, especially when any radical maneuvers were undertaken...like when attacked. Oh, and then they found that the draft on most of the tugs and coasters meant they couldn't work inshore, so were back to square one with the barges...the powered barges or other shallow draft craft were intended as "pushers" to push the barges onto the beach.

 

Then we have the problem that the initial extemporaneous ramp design required the barge to ground on a falling tide, took 15 to 30 minutes to assemble under ideal conditions, i.e., nobody shooting at them, and the draft of the barges meant that it would take 15 to 45 minutes after grounding before it shallowed enough for vehicles to actually drive off.

 

Oh, and yeah, most of the "tugs" along with the R-Boot and VP-Boot embarked the Vorausabteilungen and their gear, including stormboats, so yeah, lets make sure every vessels has two or three roles to play...how about control boats? Fast motorboats fitted with radios so the tow commanders could swan about their huge formation passing orders to various vessels...oh, except wait a minute we need 25 of the fastest motorboats so the Brandenburg commando can make its attempt on Dover, AKA let's see how many motorboats the twin-sixes can turn into matchsticks.

 

I'm not really sure at this point which is more lunatic, the German plan or the perennial attempts by inveterate what iffers to "prove" it was just the niftiest, neatest way those cool guys in the black and silver Hugo Boss-designed uniforms could have made the world safe for the Aryan race... :angry:

 

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At dawn on 24 September the follow-up echelons of German invasion barges were intercepted still 9 miles short of their beach objectives by a Royal Navy fleet of 17 cruisers and 57 destroyers plus Motor Torpedo Boats. (Tank net is not letting me put quotes around this)

I wonder why it would take them so long? Were they hard to find? Flotte B from Rotterdam, Zeebruge, Ostend, and Dunkirk was 16.5 KM long and 1 KM wide. C from Antwerp, Calais, and Gravelines was another 14 to 15 KM long by 1 KM wide. D from Boulogne was 20 KM long and 2.2 KM wide.

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German air supremacy or not, considering the stakes involved, I don't see the Royal Navy hiding from the Luftwaffe and limiting itself to night operations against Sealion anymore than it did 8 months later in the Eastern Mediterranean against Mercury.

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German air supremacy or not, considering the stakes involved, I don't see the Royal Navy hiding from the Luftwaffe and limiting itself to night operations against Sealion anymore than it did 8 months later in the Eastern Mediterranean against Mercury.

It probably would not, but it depends how much initial disorganization it would cause and what the initial results of the landings might be.

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At dawn on 24 September the follow-up echelons of German invasion barges were intercepted still 9 miles short of their beach objectives by a Royal Navy fleet of 17 cruisers and 57 destroyers plus Motor Torpedo Boats. (Tank net is not letting me put quotes around this)

I wonder why it would take them so long? Were they hard to find? Flotte B from Rotterdam, Zeebruge, Ostend, and Dunkirk was 16.5 KM long and 1 KM wide. C from Antwerp, Calais, and Gravelines was another 14 to 15 KM long by 1 KM wide. D from Boulogne was 20 KM long and 2.2 KM wide.

Oh, I was just quoting from the 1974 exercise (typing on phone makes me look dumber than I already am). The initial assumption of the exercise that the RN would be caught flat-footed did seem suspect to me, alhough I have no idea whether it was based on reality or just the terms they set for the war game.

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Given the difficulties that the RN and USN had in taking out coastal defences both in the Pacific and on D-Day, would the British coastal defences be considered to really be of no importance?

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At dawn on 24 September the follow-up echelons of German invasion barges were intercepted still 9 miles short of their beach objectives by a Royal Navy fleet of 17 cruisers and 57 destroyers plus Motor Torpedo Boats. (Tank net is not letting me put quotes around this)

I wonder why it would take them so long? Were they hard to find? Flotte B from Rotterdam, Zeebruge, Ostend, and Dunkirk was 16.5 KM long and 1 KM wide. C from Antwerp, Calais, and Gravelines was another 14 to 15 KM long by 1 KM wide. D from Boulogne was 20 KM long and 2.2 KM wide.

Oh, I was just quoting from the 1974 exercise (typing on phone makes me look dumber than I already am). The initial assumption of the exercise that the RN would be caught flat-footed did seem suspect to me, alhough I have no idea whether it was based on reality or just the terms they set for the war game.

 

Yeah, I have to wonder about that. The exit from the harbors, movement to the assembly areas, and the start of the advance was all to take place in full view of the British observers. Plus, loading of the transports was to begin on S-9 or S-8 depending on the harbor, and was also in view of even desultory reconnaissance sorties by the RAF.

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The RAF doesn't need to be trained in anti-shipping strikes to cause damage though. If it came to it, the German invasion barges would have been horribly vulnerable to strafing attacks by RAF fighters.

 

 

To be honest, probably not. The problem with the barges was not its vulnerability to strafing attacks or swamping by British destroyers sailing past (an old and inaccurate canard). It was this:

 

The initial German plan was to use a powered barge to tow an unpowered one...except tests demonstrated most of the powered barges weren't powerful enough to tow anything and many would have trouble even getting across on their own. So they decided to use a tug to tow the powered and unpowered barge across...except they didn't have enough tugs, so they decided to use coasters as substitute tugs...only to discover that most of the coasters weren't powerful enough either, but they had just enough to combine with the real tugs to maybe make it work...if everything went according to plan.

 

Except that in tests the towlines kept parting, especially when any radical maneuvers were undertaken...like when attacked. Oh, and then they found that the draft on most of the tugs and coasters meant they couldn't work inshore, so were back to square one with the barges...the powered barges or other shallow draft craft were intended as "pushers" to push the barges onto the beach.

 

Then we have the problem that the initial extemporaneous ramp design required the barge to ground on a falling tide, took 15 to 30 minutes to assemble under ideal conditions, i.e., nobody shooting at them, and the draft of the barges meant that it would take 15 to 45 minutes after grounding before it shallowed enough for vehicles to actually drive off.

 

Oh, and yeah, most of the "tugs" along with the R-Boot and VP-Boot embarked the Vorausabteilungen and their gear, including stormboats, so yeah, lets make sure every vessels has two or three roles to play...how about control boats? Fast motorboats fitted with radios so the tow commanders could swan about their huge formation passing orders to various vessels...oh, except wait a minute we need 25 of the fastest motorboats so the Brandenburg commando can make its attempt on Dover, AKA let's see how many motorboats the twin-sixes can turn into matchsticks.

 

I'm not really sure at this point which is more lunatic, the German plan or the perennial attempts by inveterate what iffers to "prove" it was just the niftiest, neatest way those cool guys in the black and silver Hugo Boss-designed uniforms could have made the world safe for the Aryan race... :angry:

 

 

 

All true, but should the German infantry have managed to make it most of the way across the channel without sinking, losing their tow, mechanical breakdown, being swamped by heavy seas, drowning (IIRC there were only enough life vests for the first wave) or being butchered by the Royal Navy, then I still maintain that strafing by the RAF could have been a real problem :).

 

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