Clay Blair's "hitler's U-Boat War" Two Volume Set.

[Chris Werb]

Hi guys. I'm interested to hear your opinions on Clay Blair's "Hitler's U-boat War" two volume set. I'm reading at the moment and finding it excellent, but remember some controversy about the title on here some years (decades) ago.

[RETAC21]

Excellent, I got the first volume on the ebook and ended up buying both volumes and Silent victory (for US sub ops) in print as the standard reference. Some stuff would be dated but it won't reduce the value of the books

[Markus Becker]

I got the German version well over ten years ago and it's why I also got Silent Victory.

[Stuart Galbraith]

I keep getting stalled halfway through volume 1. Its brilliant but a little dry. Found Silent Victory much easier.

 

I do think his negativity to German late war submarines needs to be tempered. This also seems to be the origin of the 'Germans would never have won the war in the Atlantic anyway' argument, which ive always been suspicious of. Particularly when it was believed in some parts of the Admiralty that the country was down to 2 weeks worth of food at one point, and ignores just how chancy Enigma decripts were. I dont know, ive not read volume 2 so I cant comment, but from what ive seen is an excellent book thus far.

[RETAC21]

I keep getting stalled halfway through volume 1. Its brilliant but a little dry. Found Silent Victory much easier.

 

I do think his negativity to German late war submarines needs to be tempered. This also seems to be the origin of the 'Germans would never have won the war in the Atlantic anyway' argument, which ive always been suspicious of. Particularly when it was believed in some parts of the Admiralty that the country was down to 2 weeks worth of food at one point, and ignores just how chancy Enigma decripts were. I dont know, ive not read volume 2 so I cant comment, but from what ive seen is an excellent book thus far.

 

Volume 2 is depressing if you root for the U boats:

 

20 May 1943 U-485 sunk, U-578 sunk, U-699 sunk

21 May 1943 U-663 sunk, U-445 sunk, U-998 sunk

22 May 1943 U-997 sunk, U-876 sunk, U-112 sunk

 

etc.

[Ken Estes]

How would the Germans have won the Battle of the Atlantic, Stuart?

[Nobu]

By playing a role in the decision of a Britain fighting alone to reach a political accommodation with Hitler and his U-boat war before December 7, 1941.

[R011]

For all the legitimate concern at the time, Germany was not close to winning the Battle of the Atlantic. Even without US help, the RN was improving faster than the Germans and the Germans were years away from winning the tonnage war.

 

Once the US unofficially entered the war in mid 1941, German victory in the Atlantic would only have been possible with unbelievable incompetence on the Allied side.

[R011]

As for the Type XXI wonder subs, they weren't as quiet as claimed and they were limited to a 5 kt speed of advance, meaning slower to get to the convoy routes and slower than the convoys. They would be faster than older subs during the attack and harder, but not impossible, to detect.

[Argus]

Up front I have to say I have not read Blair, but I have read a good deal on the subject and been on the edges of debate around his conclusions many times.

The telling thing to me, is the SME's always end up arguing the degree and detail about how badly he got it wrong and why he got there. The question of his fundamental error in asserting Britain was under no real threat gets taken as read.

My wider reading finds little to support a case the UK was actually comfortably off for imports and just crying poor, and everything to suggest that their surpluses were more a result of careful husbandry than over supply, but thats only my 2 cents and worth as much.

Edited February 4, 2020 by Argus

[Argus]

As for the Type XXI wonder subs, they weren't as quiet as claimed and they were limited to a 5 kt speed of advance, meaning slower to get to the convoy routes and slower than the convoys. They would be faster than older subs during the attack and harder, but not impossible, to detect.

 

And high speed submarines were not as revolutionary as get claimed either, the RN kept a R-class as a clockwork mouse down at Portland into the mid 30's specifically to provide a high speed submarine target, the results of which were incorporated into base doctrine and on file in every fleet library.

[Stuart Galbraith]

How would the Germans have won the Battle of the Atlantic, Stuart?

You are better to ask, how could we have lost it?

 

There is an underlying narrative in the American Historians position that the battle of the atlantic that the Germans were doomed to lose it. That doesnt to my mind take into account how we had the lucky break of accessing Enigma, and the lucky break we had America came into the war when it did, which was entirely the Germans own choice. They lost the best chance of winning the war right there.

 

Well we nearly lost the intelligence war right from the start. We had the Admiralty codes for convoy protection broken. We had no maritime air worth a damn. Most of the initial breaks were on the Germans side. I think personally action in the South Atlantic would probably have broken us, because it would have broken links with the rest of the Empire, and when the Japanese got in the war, that could have been fatal. In fact, the invasion of Madagascar was to stop any such cooperation between the Germans and the Japanese, because if it had been lost, it could have made operations in the Indian ocean as problematic as the mid atlantic.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Madagascar

 

Failing that, remaining undefeated would have suited the Germans fine, because whilst the Submarine Fleet was undefeated, launching a second front in Northern Europe would not have happened. For the Germans that would have perhaps been achieved, if they had used more secure codes on top of the 4 wheel rotor system. From what I read in Hugh Sebag Montefiore's book on Enigma, this was actually starting to happen in 1945, right as the Third Reich was collapsing. If they could have done that 2 or 3 years earlier, we would have had problems pinning down the German boats enough to achieve the attrition on them we did. More secure coms, such as not reporting sightings till they engaged, as Kretchmer did, would also have been a good idea. It would have made DF virtually useless till wolfpacks were on the convoys.

 

There was nothing inevitable about the victory in the Atlantic, and it minimises British and Commonwealth efforts that this narrative is continually trotted out.

[R011]

There's a difference between enemy victory being impossible no matter what and enemy victory being impossible so long as friendly forces try.

 

Things were certainly tight, but not as tight as they were after the war when shortages had nothing to do with enemy action. As for SIGINT, it certainly made things much easier, but it's a bit of a stretch to say unwinnable without it. Indeed, there were times the Germans changed codes and we were blind for a while.

 

As for fanciful plans of cross oceanic invasions by a country without the logistics to support what they already had - good luck.

[Stuart Galbraith]

There's a difference between enemy victory being impossible no matter what and enemy victory being impossible so long as friendly forces try.

 

Things were certainly tight, but not as tight as they were after the war when shortages had nothing to do with enemy action. As for SIGINT, it certainly made things much easier, but it's a bit of a stretch to say unwinnable without it. Indeed, there were times the Germans changed codes and we were blind for a while.

 

As for fanciful plans of cross oceanic invasions by a country without the logistics to support what they already had - good luck.

Look what happened with Vichy Forces in Indo China. The Japanese turn up, set an ultimatum, the French handed it over. From what im led to understand, there were japanese Submarines off the coast of Madagascar just after the allied landings. Chancy for them? Yes. But what a payoff if it works out for them, and what an even bigger payoff for the Germans. And no real cost to them to even try.

https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/japanese-submarines-attack-naval-base-madagascar

[Rick]

During the actual time of the end of 1939 to the middle of 1944, how did the Royal Navy officers making the actual decisions know how the "Battle of the Atlantic" was doing at this time? Same question for the Kriegsmarine.

[Stuart Galbraith]

The only clue they had was tonnage being lost. And that at times was still a major issue as late as 1943. Didnt matter that ships were being replaced, I have to wonder how easy it was to find crews.

 

We look at it now as if it was inevitable the end result was always going to happen. Whilst it was probably likely with the decisions Germany made prewar, it wasnt a given. You only have to look at PQ17 to see the spectacular result a few bad decisions could have.

[R011]

 

 

There's a difference between enemy victory being impossible no matter what and enemy victory being impossible so long as friendly forces try.

 

Things were certainly tight, but not as tight as they were after the war when shortages had nothing to do with enemy action. As for SIGINT, it certainly made things much easier, but it's a bit of a stretch to say unwinnable without it. Indeed, there were times the Germans changed codes and we were blind for a while.

 

As for fanciful plans of cross oceanic invasions by a country without the logistics to support what they already had - good luck.

Look what happened with Vichy Forces in Indo China. The Japanese turn up, set an ultimatum, the French handed it over. From what im led to understand, there were japanese Submarines off the coast of Madagascar just after the allied landings. Chancy for them? Yes. But what a payoff if it works out for them, and what an even bigger payoff for the Germans. And no real cost to them to even try.

https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/japanese-submarines-attack-naval-base-madagascar

These were Japanese forces moving across the border from Japanese occupied China. They also weren't then trying to support forces in Malaya, Dutch East Indies, the Dolomons etc. An occassional sub patrol isn't the same as an invasion force and the IJN was not going to wholeheartedly switch over to hitting merchants instead of supporting the battlefleet. Nor did the Allies not have escorted convoys.

 

PQ17 was very muchan exeption. Unless German capital ships could operate at will in the Atlantic and the Luftwaffe somehow manage to deploy several hundred miles further west, disasters like that were not going to happen on a regular basis.

Edited February 4, 2020 by R011

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

 

There's a difference between enemy victory being impossible no matter what and enemy victory being impossible so long as friendly forces try.

 

Things were certainly tight, but not as tight as they were after the war when shortages had nothing to do with enemy action. As for SIGINT, it certainly made things much easier, but it's a bit of a stretch to say unwinnable without it. Indeed, there were times the Germans changed codes and we were blind for a while.

 

As for fanciful plans of cross oceanic invasions by a country without the logistics to support what they already had - good luck.

Look what happened with Vichy Forces in Indo China. The Japanese turn up, set an ultimatum, the French handed it over. From what im led to understand, there were japanese Submarines off the coast of Madagascar just after the allied landings. Chancy for them? Yes. But what a payoff if it works out for them, and what an even bigger payoff for the Germans. And no real cost to them to even try.

https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/japanese-submarines-attack-naval-base-madagascar

These were Japanese forces moving across the border from Japanese occupied China. They also weren't then trying to support forces in Malaya, Dutch East Indies, the Dolomons etc. An occassional sub patrol isn't the same as an invasion force and the IJN was not going to wholeheartedly switch over to hitting merchants instead of supporting the battlefleet. Nor did the Allies not have escorted convoys.

 

PQ17 was very muchan exeption. Unless German capital ships could operate at will in the Atlantic and the Luftwaffe somehow manage to deploy several hundred miles further west, disasters like that were not going to happen on a regular basis.

 

Well yes, thats all im suggesting. If they could either convince the Vichy to yield madagascar, or better yet, continue to defend it and give port access, that would be a shot in the arm for the Japanese, and in fact, the Germans as well.

 

I dont think they liked attacking merchants, but they certainly did it, even off the US West coast. And in 1943 and 44 the Germans were increasingly using the IXD in the Indian Ocean as well. I wouldnt claim they were achieving the same kills they did in the North Atlantic, but it was stretching our defences. If they could have done that a year or 2 earlier, I really dont see us having enough to cover all the bases.

 

Agreed on PQ17, it was an exception. But that is kind of the point, we know we won the Battle of the Atlantic with what were, mostly, good decisions. If we accept that good commanders made good decisions, we have to reflect there was certainly opportunity for there to be bad ones making poor ones. I think around 1941, we didnt have much room to make many bad decisions.

 

If the commanders at the time felt they were approaching a crunch point, and they did, I think we have to stop and reflect why. its too easy for us to say in hindsight they were always going to win. I think that is lazy and frankly complacent thinking. It ignores the ability for even intelligent men to screw up occasionally.

 

Edited February 4, 2020 by Stuart Galbraith

[R011]

The Japanese actually invaded Indochina. The French didn't give it to them willingly. They wouldn't give them Madagascar either. A transoceanic amphibious assault from bases in Vietnam and China would not be feasible.

 

As for consistently bad leaders making consistently bad decisions, unless the RN had fired every competent officer of Captain rank or higher, it is not realistic to think that situation would last more than a few months,

 

Look. The RN had some three hundred years to figure out how to fight a worldwide naval war and had comparatively recent experience of a modern one where they did make basic errors thinking the old lessons didn't apply. They did and they relearned them in 1917.

[RETAC21]

 

How would the Germans have won the Battle of the Atlantic, Stuart?

You are better to ask, how could we have lost it?

 

There is an underlying narrative in the American Historians position that the battle of the atlantic that the Germans were doomed to lose it. That doesnt to my mind take into account how we had the lucky break of accessing Enigma, and the lucky break we had America came into the war when it did, which was entirely the Germans own choice. They lost the best chance of winning the war right there.

 

Well we nearly lost the intelligence war right from the start. We had the Admiralty codes for convoy protection broken. We had no maritime air worth a damn. Most of the initial breaks were on the Germans side. I think personally action in the South Atlantic would probably have broken us, because it would have broken links with the rest of the Empire, and when the Japanese got in the war, that could have been fatal. In fact, the invasion of Madagascar was to stop any such cooperation between the Germans and the Japanese, because if it had been lost, it could have made operations in the Indian ocean as problematic as the mid atlantic.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Madagascar

 

Failing that, remaining undefeated would have suited the Germans fine, because whilst the Submarine Fleet was undefeated, launching a second front in Northern Europe would not have happened. For the Germans that would have perhaps been achieved, if they had used more secure codes on top of the 4 wheel rotor system. From what I read in Hugh Sebag Montefiore's book on Enigma, this was actually starting to happen in 1945, right as the Third Reich was collapsing. If they could have done that 2 or 3 years earlier, we would have had problems pinning down the German boats enough to achieve the attrition on them we did. More secure coms, such as not reporting sightings till they engaged, as Kretchmer did, would also have been a good idea. It would have made DF virtually useless till wolfpacks were on the convoys.

 

There was nothing inevitable about the victory in the Atlantic, and it minimises British and Commonwealth efforts that this narrative is continually trotted out.

 

 

Don't forget that in 1945 the allies were also deploying their high tech toys in the form of sonobuoys and air dropped acoustic torpedoes against which the legacy U boats had no viable defence and the elektroboots would be few in number initially. The U boat arm fought to the last day of the war, with the last U boat appearing at Buenos Aires on 10th July 1945, but after May 1943 it was an impossible struggle and just ran up the casualty count.

 

The window in which the Germans could have "won" only in the narrow window between the fall of France and the US entry into the war, and they didn't have enough boats to even approach a decisive result, but that didn't mean they didn't try or that it was an easy fight

[Stuart Galbraith]

The Japanese actually invaded Indochina. The French didn't give it to them willingly. They wouldn't give them Madagascar either. A transoceanic amphibious assault from bases in Vietnam and China would not be feasible.

 

As for consistently bad leaders making consistently bad decisions, unless the RN had fired every competent officer of Captain rank or higher, it is not realistic to think that situation would last more than a few months,

 

Look. The RN had some three hundred years to figure out how to fight a worldwide naval war and had comparatively recent experience of a modern one where they did make basic errors thinking the old lessons didn't apply. They did and they relearned them in 1917.

Im not knocking the RN by suggesting that, by anyones estimate, they had by 1941/42 quite a lot on their plate. Its no shame to admit that being stretched a little more and they would have struggled to cope. In fact we know they did, hence the reason why we committed so little to the defence of Singapore.

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

 

How would the Germans have won the Battle of the Atlantic, Stuart?

You are better to ask, how could we have lost it?

 

There is an underlying narrative in the American Historians position that the battle of the atlantic that the Germans were doomed to lose it. That doesnt to my mind take into account how we had the lucky break of accessing Enigma, and the lucky break we had America came into the war when it did, which was entirely the Germans own choice. They lost the best chance of winning the war right there.

 

Well we nearly lost the intelligence war right from the start. We had the Admiralty codes for convoy protection broken. We had no maritime air worth a damn. Most of the initial breaks were on the Germans side. I think personally action in the South Atlantic would probably have broken us, because it would have broken links with the rest of the Empire, and when the Japanese got in the war, that could have been fatal. In fact, the invasion of Madagascar was to stop any such cooperation between the Germans and the Japanese, because if it had been lost, it could have made operations in the Indian ocean as problematic as the mid atlantic.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Madagascar

 

Failing that, remaining undefeated would have suited the Germans fine, because whilst the Submarine Fleet was undefeated, launching a second front in Northern Europe would not have happened. For the Germans that would have perhaps been achieved, if they had used more secure codes on top of the 4 wheel rotor system. From what I read in Hugh Sebag Montefiore's book on Enigma, this was actually starting to happen in 1945, right as the Third Reich was collapsing. If they could have done that 2 or 3 years earlier, we would have had problems pinning down the German boats enough to achieve the attrition on them we did. More secure coms, such as not reporting sightings till they engaged, as Kretchmer did, would also have been a good idea. It would have made DF virtually useless till wolfpacks were on the convoys.

 

There was nothing inevitable about the victory in the Atlantic, and it minimises British and Commonwealth efforts that this narrative is continually trotted out.

 

 

Don't forget that in 1945 the allies were also deploying their high tech toys in the form of sonobuoys and air dropped acoustic torpedoes against which the legacy U boats had no viable defence and the elektroboots would be few in number initially. The U boat arm fought to the last day of the war, with the last U boat appearing at Buenos Aires on 10th July 1945, but after May 1943 it was an impossible struggle and just ran up the casualty count.

 

The window in which the Germans could have "won" only in the narrow window between the fall of France and the US entry into the war, and they didn't have enough boats to even approach a decisive result, but that didn't mean they didn't try or that it was an easy fight

 

 

You are probably right, but look at that for a moment, what was inevitable about America entering the war at that point? We thought they were going to do it for all of 1941, and it took the Germans declaring war on them, in response to Pearl Harbor, to make that happen. You can watch on the World at War, JK Galbraith (No relation!) saying that they were talking out how to get America into the war against germany, and just couldnt think of a way to justify it. And then they got the telegram Hitler declared war on them, and solved it for them.

 

Assume the Japanese held off, or even Hitler showing some strategic mess. What exactly happens in 1942 when the US is committing increasingly to the war in the Pacific and cant sell a war against Germany to the American people ? We may be fighting with the Americans in the pacific, we might get some more lend lease. But what we dont have is substantial US forces coming into the war in the Atlantic. As we saw, even at war, Admiral King was reluctant to do anything anyway, hence the remarkable success of Drumbeat.

 

I dont buy Doenitz's idea he could win the war in the Atlantic by more U boats prewar, I think that silly reasoning. We would have seen their buildup and build more commerce protection vessels. But there is quite a lot of reason to think that, if the Battle of the Atlantic affected grand strategy, then changed effents in grand strategy, I dont know, spain entering the war, the fall of Madagascar, Americans going into the war later, all these are bound to have an effect on the Battle of the Atlantic. I dont think we can really think about it in isolation.

 

None of this was inevitable. it just looks that way in retrospect.

Edited February 4, 2020 by Stuart Galbraith

[Ken Estes]

Good stuff there.

 

• We are forgetting how unprepared the German Navy was for the war and how few boats they had in service. It took a long time before they could have 100 boats at sea.
• UK ASDIC and HF/DF were an initial advantage. That and the fighting spirit [pluck] of the RN/RCN were enough to hold the line until ULTRA could become effective.
• US production of escorts from CVE to DE to PC or SC was unimaginable.
• There was much good luck, such as the escape of the King of Norway from Oslo in 1940 and the rallying of the Norwegian Merchant Marine to the Allied side.
• Doenitz' tonnage strategy was full of flaws. It was not true that the losses to the Allies could be decisive even if not in the N Atlantic.
• One cud go on an on....

Edited February 4, 2020 by Ken Estes

[RETAC21]

 

Good stuff there.

 

• We are forgetting how unprepared the German Navy was for the war and how few boats they had in service. It took a long time before they could have 100 boats at sea.

 

This, and it wasn't just lack of boats, but also lack of crews, so building more boats meant more trainers were needed and more boats needed to be in the Baltic, reducing the frontline boats further

[Nobu]

Assuming that the Battle of the Atlantic did not and could never affect the grand strategy of the war has the benefit, whether intentional or not, of taking some of the johnny come lately out of the United States waiting until December 1941 to enter it.