Arnhem - Best Book By Far!

[Stuart Galbraith]

'We have ways of making you talk'. I think it was during the Arnhem series they did back in September last year. So if thats any guide, 1st Airborne was not well thought of by the rest of the British Airborne community.

Edited July 25, 2020 by Stuart Galbraith

[RETAC21]

Nearly done with Arnhem, deifinitely a superb book and easy to read, as complete as it can get and the format of breaking each day in equal parts allows to get a complete view of the battle and the time it took for things to happen.

I have an quibble (well, a difference of opinion to be fair), BillB interprets that Horrocks had decided to give up the Rhine bridgehead occupied by the 1st Airborne, but finding the pill difficult to swallow, he told his commander that they were still going for it while setting up Polish brigade commander Sosabowski as a fall guy. However, a man that does that surely would have had a bunch of skeletons over his military career held in some closet, but Horrocks, a vocational actor, was ·the down-to-earth general with a natural ability to inspire, the general who rarely fussed over the details, the general untroubled by self-doubt."*

While I have no doubt that Browning would be capable of poisoning the waters, it seems to me the man wanted to keep his options open, so if the reinforcing effort worked then he would reinforce the bridgehead, but he already had doubts and preferred to hedge his bets by ordering an evacuation to be prepared. The other characters in the meeting, Browning (who comes across as an asshole) and Thomas (a man known for his difficult character) would be more than ready to humiliate Sosabowski, as SOP. His treatment post-war suggest he was in fact made a fall guy.

Thoughts?

* source: Delaney, Douglas E., 1964- Corps commanders : five British and Canadian generals at war, 1939-1945

 

Edited September 10, 2020 by RETAC21

[BillB]

On 9/10/2020 at 6:37 PM, RETAC21 said:

Nearly done with Arnhem, deifinitely a superb book and easy to read, as complete as it can get and the format of breaking each day in equal parts allows to get a complete view of the battle and the time it took for things to happen.

I have an quibble (well, a difference of opinion to be fair), BillB interprets that Horrocks had decided to give up the Rhine bridgehead occupied by the 1st Airborne, but finding the pill difficult to swallow, he told his commander that they were still going for it while setting up Polish brigade commander Sosabowski as a fall guy. However, a man that does that surely would have had a bunch of skeletons over his military career held in some closet, but Horrocks, a vocational actor, was ·the down-to-earth general with a natural ability to inspire, the general who rarely fussed over the details, the general untroubled by self-doubt."*

While I have no doubt that Browning would be capable of poisoning the waters, it seems to me the man wanted to keep his options open, so if the reinforcing effort worked then he would reinforce the bridgehead, but he already had doubts and preferred to hedge his bets by ordering an evacuation to be prepared. The other characters in the meeting, Browning (who comes across as an asshole) and Thomas (a man known for his difficult character) would be more than ready to humiliate Sosabowski, as SOP. His treatment post-war suggest he was in fact made a fall guy.

Thoughts?

* source: Delaney, Douglas E., 1964- Corps commanders : five British and Canadian generals at war, 1939-1945

 

Hello Retac,

glad you are enjoying the book and thank you for the kind words, they are much appreciated. 😊 Ref the above, the following is off the top of my head as I'm not on my work machine, so please excuse the lack of/any errors in locations and/or timings.

I don't think the bit about Horrocks reflects what I was driving at, mebbe I could/should have been clearer. By the time 30 Corps had finally closed up to the south bank of the Lower Rhine and they were holding the meeting that hung Sosabowski out to dry the die was cast regarding the 1st Airborne Division and Horrocks (and Dempsey I think) were looking to put the best face on a totally preventable failure. I suspect Horrocks was not so much aping the behaviour of Thomas and Browning but allowed himself to be led by the nose, probably in arguably misplaced loyalty toward his senior subordinates. What I see as the reason for his quiescence is laid out below. It should also be remembered that the scapegoating went further up the British chain-of-command as far as Montgomery, who also played a shameful role in the affair, presumably also in an effort to protect his subordinates; to be fair I don't think there is any evidence that Montgomery was looking to deflect personal blame at the time or later.

With ref to Horrocks being someone who did not fuss over details etc I would argue this was exactly the problem with MARKET. Horrocks made all the right noises with regard to the vital need for haste etc. and I think he was genuine about it. The problem was that his senior subordinates commanding the Guards Armoured Div and 43rd Div simply ignored Horrocks' intentions and pretty much did what they liked, when they liked totally without censure or sanction. Horrocks should have been dishing out severe arse kickings from the evening of 17 September but I did not come across evidence of any such things at any point during the nine days up to the evacuation of the 1st Airborne across the Lower Rhine.

This leads to what I would argue was the underlying reason for Horrocks' poor performance during MARKET GARDEN, which was his health. He may have been the figure quoted by Delaney (who I think is bit too rah rah like Dover with regard to the more senior British Airborne leadership FWIW) in North Africa and again in the push through the Reichswald and over the Rhine into northern Germany, but he wasn't that man during MARKET GARDEN because of his severe wounding in the strafing attack at Bizerte in June 1943.  That put him out of action for over year to recover, and I don't think he was fit for service when he played the old boy network card with Montgomery to get command of 30 Corps in August 1944. His lack of fitness was not immediately apparent during the Falaise break-out and the Great Swan across France & Belgium because he didn't really have that much to do as his formations were running on auto-pilot from their Normandy experience but once the pressure came on with MARKET there are several references to him being ill at his HQ and then Montgomery ordered him back to the UK for rest in December 1944, a euphemism for being temporarily relieved of his command; I suspect by that time they could no longer sweep his lack of fitness and consequent erratic behaviour under the carpet.

 

BillB     

[RETAC21]

10 hours ago, BillB said:

Hello Retac,

glad you are enjoying the book and thank you for the kind words, they are much appreciated. 😊 Ref the above, the following is off the top of my head as I'm not on my work machine, so please excuse the lack of/any errors in locations and/or timings.

I don't think the bit about Horrocks reflects what I was driving at, mebbe I could/should have been clearer. By the time 30 Corps had finally closed up to the south bank of the Lower Rhine and they were holding the meeting that hung Sosabowski out to dry the die was cast regarding the 1st Airborne Division and Horrocks (and Dempsey I think) were looking to put the best face on a totally preventable failure. I suspect Horrocks was not so much aping the behaviour of Thomas and Browning but allowed himself to be led by the nose, probably in arguably misplaced loyalty toward his senior subordinates. What I see as the reason for his quiescence is laid out below. It should also be remembered that the scapegoating went further up the British chain-of-command as far as Montgomery, who also played a shameful role in the affair, presumably also in an effort to protect his subordinates; to be fair I don't think there is any evidence that Montgomery was looking to deflect personal blame at the time or later.

With ref to Horrocks being someone who did not fuss over details etc I would argue this was exactly the problem with MARKET. Horrocks made all the right noises with regard to the vital need for haste etc. and I think he was genuine about it. The problem was that his senior subordinates commanding the Guards Armoured Div and 43rd Div simply ignored Horrocks' intentions and pretty much did what they liked, when they liked totally without censure or sanction. Horrocks should have been dishing out severe arse kickings from the evening of 17 September but I did not come across evidence of any such things at any point during the nine days up to the evacuation of the 1st Airborne across the Lower Rhine.

This leads to what I would argue was the underlying reason for Horrocks' poor performance during MARKET GARDEN, which was his health. He may have been the figure quoted by Delaney (who I think is bit too rah rah like Dover with regard to the more senior British Airborne leadership FWIW) in North Africa and again in the push through the Reichswald and over the Rhine into northern Germany, but he wasn't that man during MARKET GARDEN because of his severe wounding in the strafing attack at Bizerte in June 1943.  That put him out of action for over year to recover, and I don't think he was fit for service when he played the old boy network card with Montgomery to get command of 30 Corps in August 1944. His lack of fitness was not immediately apparent during the Falaise break-out and the Great Swan across France & Belgium because he didn't really have that much to do as his formations were running on auto-pilot from their Normandy experience but once the pressure came on with MARKET there are several references to him being ill at his HQ and then Montgomery ordered him back to the UK for rest in December 1944, a euphemism for being temporarily relieved of his command; I suspect by that time they could no longer sweep his lack of fitness and consequent erratic behaviour under the carpet.

 

BillB     

Thanks Bill, agreed, it would seem the Guards also thought their part was done - hence the remark to the Paras that they had been in combat for 5 months.

[Angrybk]

Been getting this book teased a lot on my Amazon preferences. Was apparently written by a 1st Airborne vet who died in 1995? https://www.amazon.com/Grey-Goose-Arnhem-Amazing-Escape-ebook/dp/B083VVPNCY

[Stuart Galbraith]

Thought this extraordinary film warranted a thread jack.

 

[RETAC21]

Not Arnhem related but the Olde people here will recognize the author:

"While apt to be controversial – other recent studies have argued that the British Army was better than many earlier accounts would have us believe – The Noise of Battle is one of the most important recent works on the British Army in the Second World War." StrategyPage

[Stuart Galbraith]

Yes, wasnt he a poster here, just after the Ark grounded? Im sure I heard the name.

The narrative that Montgomery was poor and outperformed by the Americans, really warrants a rethink. It was something of a shock to recently earn 21st Army group managed a rate of advance similar to Pattons Third Army, which is not the narrative one would expect about an Army being scared to advance.

It also explains Arnhem. If Montgomery and his subordinates were so risk adverse, why take a risk on an operation with long odds? I never thought that quite fit.

[RETAC21]

4 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Yes, wasnt he a poster here, just after the Ark grounded? Im sure I heard the name.

The narrative that Montgomery was poor and outperformed by the Americans, really warrants a rethink. It was something of a shock to recently earn 21st Army group managed a rate of advance similar to Pattons Third Army, which is not the narrative one would expect about an Army being scared to advance.

It also explains Arnhem. If Montgomery and his subordinates were so risk adverse, why take a risk on an operation with long odds? I never thought that quite fit.

Tony had the bizarre idea that the Churchill could have had the same armor as the Tiger 1 from the get go - a project named the "Colvin" by the grate olde ones among other things. "TC" was somewhat opinionated before that was fashionable, to say the least.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Oh, Ive got to read this then, it sounds entertaining.

 

[bojan]

20 minutes ago, RETAC21 said:

Tony had the bizarre idea that the Churchill could have had the same armor as the Tiger 1 from the get go...

Tiger 2, immune to 88/71, with 8" of frontal armor.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

I recall that being his only hobbyhorse though, most of the rest of his stuff was well reasoned.  It was just the one blind spot...

[Rick]

I have not read any of the above books, but is the German perspective covered?

[GJK]

On 9/12/2020 at 12:26 AM, BillB said:

Hello Retac,

glad you are enjoying the book and thank you for the kind words, they are much appreciated. 😊 Ref the above, the following is off the top of my head as I'm not on my work machine, so please excuse the lack of/any errors in locations and/or timings.

I don't think the bit about Horrocks reflects what I was driving at, mebbe I could/should have been clearer. By the time 30 Corps had finally closed up to the south bank of the Lower Rhine and they were holding the meeting that hung Sosabowski out to dry the die was cast regarding the 1st Airborne Division and Horrocks (and Dempsey I think) were looking to put the best face on a totally preventable failure. I suspect Horrocks was not so much aping the behaviour of Thomas and Browning but allowed himself to be led by the nose, probably in arguably misplaced loyalty toward his senior subordinates. What I see as the reason for his quiescence is laid out below. It should also be remembered that the scapegoating went further up the British chain-of-command as far as Montgomery, who also played a shameful role in the affair, presumably also in an effort to protect his subordinates; to be fair I don't think there is any evidence that Montgomery was looking to deflect personal blame at the time or later.

With ref to Horrocks being someone who did not fuss over details etc I would argue this was exactly the problem with MARKET. Horrocks made all the right noises with regard to the vital need for haste etc. and I think he was genuine about it. The problem was that his senior subordinates commanding the Guards Armoured Div and 43rd Div simply ignored Horrocks' intentions and pretty much did what they liked, when they liked totally without censure or sanction. Horrocks should have been dishing out severe arse kickings from the evening of 17 September but I did not come across evidence of any such things at any point during the nine days up to the evacuation of the 1st Airborne across the Lower Rhine.

This leads to what I would argue was the underlying reason for Horrocks' poor performance during MARKET GARDEN, which was his health. He may have been the figure quoted by Delaney (who I think is bit too rah rah like Dover with regard to the more senior British Airborne leadership FWIW) in North Africa and again in the push through the Reichswald and over the Rhine into northern Germany, but he wasn't that man during MARKET GARDEN because of his severe wounding in the strafing attack at Bizerte in June 1943.  That put him out of action for over year to recover, and I don't think he was fit for service when he played the old boy network card with Montgomery to get command of 30 Corps in August 1944. His lack of fitness was not immediately apparent during the Falaise break-out and the Great Swan across France & Belgium because he didn't really have that much to do as his formations were running on auto-pilot from their Normandy experience but once the pressure came on with MARKET there are several references to him being ill at his HQ and then Montgomery ordered him back to the UK for rest in December 1944, a euphemism for being temporarily relieved of his command; I suspect by that time they could no longer sweep his lack of fitness and consequent erratic behaviour under the carpet.

 

BillB     

Not sure I'd agree that Horrocks performed poorly during MARKET GARDEN.  I think he was not prepared to allow his vanguard to be cut off and potentially lost if the Germans cut his line of communication, which they did at least twice during the operation.  This highlights the weakness of Montgomery's overall concept of operations, rather than the conduct of tactical commanders.

General Gavin said that Horrocks was the finest corps commander of the war, which indicates that he was reasonably good.

Best,

Greg.