Arnhem - Best Book By Far!

[Stuart Galbraith]

Getting back to Arnhem, ive just been listening to a recent episode of 'We have Ways' podcast, and they drew attention to Max Hastings recent review of Antony Beevors new book on Arnhem. Now ive not actually read the latter, but the review ought to make our own Arnhem expert strap on his Jump Gear, put the Fairburn Sykes combat knife between his teeth and prepare for mortal combat.

 

https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2020/05/28/battle-arnhem-botch-rhine/

 

This is the 'we have ways' podcast.

https://play.acast.com/s/wehaveways

 

Its worth relating something I once heard on one of the Discovery Channel documentaries, when they were still good. There was a good documentary on the Battle of Villers Bocage, and they were interviewing Pat Dyas, the man who pretty heroically chased Michael Wittman down Villers Bocage High street in his humble little Cromwell, and got a face full of shrapnel as a result. He said something that has stuck with me ever since and I think is relevant. 'We tend to forget how good the Germans really were. And consequently, forget how much better we had to be in order to beat them.' Spot on.

 

Max Hastings I think is going to get pilloried for this one. Maybe he felt writing it for a NY publication nobody would notice.

[RETAC21]

Paging BillB, paging BillB - I am on a reading binge of your books. Tobruk is down, currently with D-Day, the first 72 hours, then Arnhem.

 

I have a question re USian landing practices - if I read it right, most of the training was on getting on the boats and then on to the beach, where some bright mind decided to reorg the small units and this resulted in US units being slow getting off the beaches. Question is was this due to experience in Sicily/Anzio? did you check how they did in Dragoon? where there any lessons learned off Utah/Omaha?

[Rich]

Paging BillB, paging BillB - I am on a reading binge of your books. Tobruk is down, currently with D-Day, the first 72 hours, then Arnhem.

 

I have a question re USian landing practices - if I read it right, most of the training was on getting on the boats and then on to the beach, where some bright mind decided to reorg the small units and this resulted in US units being slow getting off the beaches. Question is was this due to experience in Sicily/Anzio? did you check how they did in Dragoon? where there any lessons learned off Utah/Omaha?

I'm not Bill, but I can address parts of that.

 

The issue was that the USN never really coordinated with either the U.S. Army or the Marine Corps on the capacity of the standard landing craft. The initial requirement was that they fit standard boat davits, which limited the size. The initial Eureka design was for a raiding boat, carrying just 12 troops. It was enlarged to the classic "Higgins boat", the Landing Craft Personnel (LCP) carrying 24 troops, and then again as the Land Craft Personnel (Large) (LCP(L)) to carry 36 troops. However, none of those capacities really matched the tactical organizations of the units. Marine Rifle Squads were 9-man and the Marine Rifle Platoon was 1 officer and 41 men (under the D-Series). U.S. Army infantry organization was slightly different, but also did not match the boat sizes. It got no better when the LCP® and the LCVP were developed, they theoretically carried 36 to 39 riflemen, but in practical terms carried only 31 to 33 fully-equipped assault troops (with Bangalore torpedoes, flamethrowers, Hardisson Packs, light mortars, light machine guns, and do forth).

 

So the capacity of the landing craft forced planners to create temporary "assault" organizations for embarkation and landing, which then had to reorganize as doctrinal tactical formations on the beach. It didn't work that well, but at least it wasn't as problematic as 1940 boat designs trying to carry 1944 and 1945 tank designs. LCM-3 routinely became unstable and even capsized when attempting to land the second generation Medium Tanks M4-series, which is understandable, given they were designed for 25-ton medium tanks rather than the 34-ton to 35-ton tank they had to deal with.

[RETAC21]

 

Paging BillB, paging BillB - I am on a reading binge of your books. Tobruk is down, currently with D-Day, the first 72 hours, then Arnhem.

 

I have a question re USian landing practices - if I read it right, most of the training was on getting on the boats and then on to the beach, where some bright mind decided to reorg the small units and this resulted in US units being slow getting off the beaches. Question is was this due to experience in Sicily/Anzio? did you check how they did in Dragoon? where there any lessons learned off Utah/Omaha?

I'm not Bill, but I can address parts of that.

 

The issue was that the USN never really coordinated with either the U.S. Army or the Marine Corps on the capacity of the standard landing craft. The initial requirement was that they fit standard boat davits, which limited the size. The initial Eureka design was for a raiding boat, carrying just 12 troops. It was enlarged to the classic "Higgins boat", the Landing Craft Personnel (LCP) carrying 24 troops, and then again as the Land Craft Personnel (Large) (LCP(L)) to carry 36 troops. However, none of those capacities really matched the tactical organizations of the units. Marine Rifle Squads were 9-man and the Marine Rifle Platoon was 1 officer and 41 men (under the D-Series). U.S. Army infantry organization was slightly different, but also did not match the boat sizes. It got no better when the LCP® and the LCVP were developed, they theoretically carried 36 to 39 riflemen, but in practical terms carried only 31 to 33 fully-equipped assault troops (with Bangalore torpedoes, flamethrowers, Hardisson Packs, light mortars, light machine guns, and do forth).

 

So the capacity of the landing craft forced planners to create temporary "assault" organizations for embarkation and landing, which then had to reorganize as doctrinal tactical formations on the beach. It didn't work that well, but at least it wasn't as problematic as 1940 boat designs trying to carry 1944 and 1945 tank designs. LCM-3 routinely became unstable and even capsized when attempting to land the second generation Medium Tanks M4-series, which is understandable, given they were designed for 25-ton medium tanks rather than the 34-ton to 35-ton tank they had to deal with.

 

 

Oh nice of them...

 

I see in the wiki that the RN equivalent was built to carry he thirty-one men of a British Army platoon and five assault engineers or signallers

 

Thanks Rich!

[Ken Estes]

Still the case today. The landing force is organized for the landing, not fighting. One could also say the same for air assault and of course for paras.

 

The burden for planning an amphibious assault is this: once the naval gunfire lifts, the first man steps ashore and faces potentially 1000% fire superiority of the defender. add another man, same thing, add 50 more, same thing. When you reach 2000 ashore you are getting better, because those guys are mobile, agile and very hostile.....

[RETAC21]

Still the case today. The landing force is organized for the landing, not fighting. One could also say the same for air assault and of course for paras.

 

The burden for planning an amphibious assault is this: once the naval gunfire lifts, the first man steps ashore and faces potentially 1000% fire superiority of the defender. add another man, same thing, add 50 more, same thing. When you reach 2000 ashore you are getting better, because those guys are mobile, agile and very hostile.....

 

Weren't the Marines better off in the Pacific with LVTs? at least they weren't wooden...

[Rich]

 

 

Paging BillB, paging BillB - I am on a reading binge of your books. Tobruk is down, currently with D-Day, the first 72 hours, then Arnhem.

 

I have a question re USian landing practices - if I read it right, most of the training was on getting on the boats and then on to the beach, where some bright mind decided to reorg the small units and this resulted in US units being slow getting off the beaches. Question is was this due to experience in Sicily/Anzio? did you check how they did in Dragoon? where there any lessons learned off Utah/Omaha?

I'm not Bill, but I can address parts of that.

 

The issue was that the USN never really coordinated with either the U.S. Army or the Marine Corps on the capacity of the standard landing craft. The initial requirement was that they fit standard boat davits, which limited the size. The initial Eureka design was for a raiding boat, carrying just 12 troops. It was enlarged to the classic "Higgins boat", the Landing Craft Personnel (LCP) carrying 24 troops, and then again as the Land Craft Personnel (Large) (LCP(L)) to carry 36 troops. However, none of those capacities really matched the tactical organizations of the units. Marine Rifle Squads were 9-man and the Marine Rifle Platoon was 1 officer and 41 men (under the D-Series). U.S. Army infantry organization was slightly different, but also did not match the boat sizes. It got no better when the LCP® and the LCVP were developed, they theoretically carried 36 to 39 riflemen, but in practical terms carried only 31 to 33 fully-equipped assault troops (with Bangalore torpedoes, flamethrowers, Hardisson Packs, light mortars, light machine guns, and do forth).

 

So the capacity of the landing craft forced planners to create temporary "assault" organizations for embarkation and landing, which then had to reorganize as doctrinal tactical formations on the beach. It didn't work that well, but at least it wasn't as problematic as 1940 boat designs trying to carry 1944 and 1945 tank designs. LCM-3 routinely became unstable and even capsized when attempting to land the second generation Medium Tanks M4-series, which is understandable, given they were designed for 25-ton medium tanks rather than the 34-ton to 35-ton tank they had to deal with.

 

 

Oh nice of them...

 

I see in the wiki that the RN equivalent was built to carry he thirty-one men of a British Army platoon and five assault engineers or signallers

 

Thanks Rich!

 

Yeah, I'm not quite sure what the rationale was on the part of the USN? The RN tailored the size of the LCA to a slightly reinforced British Army Rifle Platoon. The USN to...I don't know what? It seems possible the Navy tried to tailor the LCP originally to the Marine Raider Company. It consisted ofa HQ Section of 1 Officer and 10 EM, plus 1 Officer and 10 attached EM, with two Rifle Platoons, each of a HQ Section with 1 Officer and 4 EM, two Rifle Sections each of 21 EM, and a Weapons Platoon of 1 Officer and 22 EM, so pretty well tailored to an assault boat carrying 24 troops...the entire Company would fit neatly on six LCP or less...or the four LCP(L) embarked on the early APD.

[Ken Estes]

 

Still the case today. The landing force is organized for the landing, not fighting. One could also say the same for air assault and of course for paras.

 

The burden for planning an amphibious assault is this: once the naval gunfire lifts, the first man steps ashore and faces potentially 1000% fire superiority of the defender. add another man, same thing, add 50 more, same thing. When you reach 2000 ashore you are getting better, because those guys are mobile, agile and very hostile.....

 

Weren't the Marines better off in the Pacific with LVTs? at least they weren't wooden...

 

 

They certainly thought so, the riflemen at least. The problem was limited manpower for the amtrac battalions, followed by the shipping requirement of suitable vessels to carry, service and launch the LVTs, including the three battalions of armored amphibians intended for the first waves. That means LSTs and LSDs, always in short supply. At landings such as Bougainville and Peleliu, tanks were reduced in number, simply because of shipping.

LVT troop capacity was no improvement over the LCVP either.

[BillB]

 

The British came close on Crete. Ok they lost, but the Parachute forces never really recovered.

Norwegians defeated them with improvised defences in couple of occasions, and the Dutch wiped them out in Hague.

Airborne operations are, by default, high risk-high reward and total loss of force is always a possibility.

 

Fair one but a bit of damning with faint praise too I think. The Dutch did make a mess of the landings at the Hague but that was as much due to flawed operating procedures and simple bad luck as Dutch resistance. Ref the flawed operating procedures the idea of dropping on a functioning airfield was a popular staple but rather risky at best, and then there was the German practice of dropping the men separate from their weapons due to the small door on the Junkers 52. With ref to bad luck, IIRC the paratroopers were dropped and/or blown wide of their target airfields and then had trouble recovering their weapons containers for the same reason; by the time they got organised it was too late and the laden Junkers 52s were trying to land in the face of unsubdued Dutch defences with predictable results. The Germans didn't learn their lesson either as I think things went the same way on Crete. To be fair there wasn't a lot that could be done about the Junkers door, although some paratroopers jumped into Crete with MP38/40s stowed behind their parachute harness straps and with the triple mag ammo pouches strapped to their shins.

 

However, getting back to Holland and the faint praise, while the Hague was a screw up that was only a third of the German Airborne effort for Fall Gelb and the other two-thirds went well. The assault on the Eben Emael fortress and adjacent crossings was exemplary and they also pulled off what was essentially a MARKET GARDEN in reverse, seizing a series of bridges across the breadth of Holland to open the way for the armoured forces. On at least one occasion they landed Heinkel 115 seaplanes loaded with troops on the river/canal and taxied up to the target bridge to unload the assault force directly onto the objective. Not too shabby overall, even if Student managed to get himself shot by the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler in Rotterdam...

 

BillB

[BillB]

BillB,

 

Have you ever thought about leading a “Staff Ride” for this battle? I drove from “Joe’s Bridge” to Arnhem several years ago, but it was difficult trying to drive and looking at the terrain. The traffic was really heavy, and I think ever person living in Holland was riding their bicycle that day. We then stayed in Arnhem for two days walking about, but I would of gladly paid for a “Battlefield Guide”.

 

I think you should give this some thought, if you haven’t already!

 

mike

I'd be more than happy to act as battlefield guide as there are some places I have only visited via Google street-view, but I'm not sure my legs are up to much walking around these days, mores the pity. However, if you are up to carrying a fat bloke piggy-back...

 

BillB

[BillB]

 

BillB,

 

Have you ever thought about leading a Staff Ride for this battle? I drove from Joes Bridge to Arnhem several years ago, but it was difficult trying to drive and looking at the terrain. The traffic was really heavy, and I think ever person living in Holland was riding their bicycle that day. We then stayed in Arnhem for two days walking about, but I would of gladly paid for a Battlefield Guide.

 

I think you should give this some thought, if you havent already!

 

mike

As anyone who has put together an I&I can tell you, shepherding a group of enthusiasts around a tour like that is surprisingly hard work.

 

Yes, I can imagine it is. We could always try Stuart's idea regarding the beer bribery I suppose.

 

BillB

[BillB]

I would wager Bill would do it for free, if it was done riding a Vespa...

Ah, now you're talking! That would cut out the walking for access as I did that on one of my latest jaunts to Arnhem, bimbled around with the camera tucked into the front of my riding jacket. I have a pic somewhere of the scooter parked where they manhandled the 6 Pounder AT gun up onto the bridge ramp to deal with the pill boxes on the bridge.

 

BillB

[BillB]

I would do it if Bill is willing to lead

You're on!

 

BillB

[BillB]

To All,

 

Let us assume that MG is successful and the British Army gets up to the Zuiderzee on 25 September. Then what? I always get the answer we would envelope the Ruhr from the north. My question is envelope the Ruhr from the north with what? Weather? Clear western Holland first then envelope the Ruhr? Timeline? Logistics? Could this in fact be done? Snip

 

 

Fair question. FWIW I agree with Rich it was about the logistics so I don't subscribe to the ending the war by Xmas stuff you see sometimes, and I don't really think anybody that mattered thought so at the time either. However, I think a successful MG in its entirety might well have set the scene better for the resumption of operations in early 1945, possibly by removing the need to fight through the Reichswald and Westwall defences and force the Rhine; at worst it would have offered an additional line of attack that would have stretched the Germans yet further.

 

BillB

[BillB]

Paging BillB, paging BillB - I am on a reading binge of your books. Tobruk is down, currently with D-Day, the first 72 hours, then Arnhem.

 

I have a question re USian landing practices - if I read it right, most of the training was on getting on the boats and then on to the beach, where some bright mind decided to reorg the small units and this resulted in US units being slow getting off the beaches. Question is was this due to experience in Sicily/Anzio? did you check how they did in Dragoon? where there any lessons learned off Utah/Omaha?

Blimey RETAC, you're a glutton for punishment, I don't know whether to be flattered or just afraid...

 

In response to your question, I think Rich has answered better than I could have done. TBH I didn't look at DRAGOON and I doubt there was much if any cross pollination apart from the mainland Italian landings emphasising the need to clear the beaches as rapidly as possible - hence the omnipotent Beach Masters. OMAHA actually went better than it is routinely given credit for, and there was a distinct lack of push at UTAH despite the windfall of accidentally landing in a better stretch of coast than planned. All this is from memory, so rich will likely pop up and tell me that I'm wrong.

 

BillB

[RETAC21]

 

Paging BillB, paging BillB - I am on a reading binge of your books. Tobruk is down, currently with D-Day, the first 72 hours, then Arnhem.

 

I have a question re USian landing practices - if I read it right, most of the training was on getting on the boats and then on to the beach, where some bright mind decided to reorg the small units and this resulted in US units being slow getting off the beaches. Question is was this due to experience in Sicily/Anzio? did you check how they did in Dragoon? where there any lessons learned off Utah/Omaha?

Blimey RETAC, you're a glutton for punishment, I don't know whether to be flattered or just afraid...

 

In response to your question, I think Rich has answered better than I could have done. TBH I didn't look at DRAGOON and I doubt there was much if any cross pollination apart from the mainland Italian landings emphasising the need to clear the beaches as rapidly as possible - hence the omnipotent Beach Masters. OMAHA actually went better than it is routinely given credit for, and there was a distinct lack of push at UTAH despite the windfall of accidentally landing in a better stretch of coast than planned. All this is from memory, so rich will likely pop up and tell me that I'm wrong.

 

BillB

 

 

Well, there's the triple turret of Gneisenau armed with 3 138mm guns... but I will leave that one to artistic license.

[Sardaukar]

How about Crete and how well it went for German paras...at least casualty-wise...

 

This went lot better for Germans when it comes to their paras.

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kos

[sunday]

 

I would do it if Bill is willing to lead

You're on!

 

BillB

 

 

Looks like the 2021 I&I planning stage is starting...

[Harold Jones]

 

 

BillB,

 

Have you ever thought about leading a Staff Ride for this battle? I drove from Joes Bridge to Arnhem several years ago, but it was difficult trying to drive and looking at the terrain. The traffic was really heavy, and I think ever person living in Holland was riding their bicycle that day. We then stayed in Arnhem for two days walking about, but I would of gladly paid for a Battlefield Guide.

 

I think you should give this some thought, if you havent already!

 

mike

As anyone who has put together an I&I can tell you, shepherding a group of enthusiasts around a tour like that is surprisingly hard work.

 

Yes, I can imagine it is. We could always try Stuart's idea regarding the beer bribery I suppose.

 

BillB

 

You would think, but surprisingly one more jerry can I can look at now seems to trump a beer I can have later. The real problem is that while no one in is interested in everything, someone finds something interesting at every stop. This ensures that every sign and plaque will be read, every display discussed in depth and between 5 and 10 impromptu graduate level seminars will be held at every stop. My best advice is plan on no more than two stops a day and learn to love museum cafe lunches.

[Dave Clark]

 

To All,

 

Let us assume that MG is successful and the British Army gets up to the Zuiderzee on 25 September. Then what? I always get the answer we would envelope the Ruhr from the north. My question is envelope the Ruhr from the north with what? Weather? Clear western Holland first then envelope the Ruhr? Timeline? Logistics? Could this in fact be done? Snip

 

 

Fair question. FWIW I agree with Rich it was about the logistics so I don't subscribe to the ending the war by Xmas stuff you see sometimes, and I don't really think anybody that mattered thought so at the time either. However, I think a successful MG in its entirety might well have set the scene better for the resumption of operations in early 1945, possibly by removing the need to fight through the Reichswald and Westwall defences and force the Rhine; at worst it would have offered an additional line of attack that would have stretched the Germans yet further.

 

BillB

 

In this context, Hew Strachan has written that

 

 

The fact that the war ended when it did represented a paradox: after the Normandy landings in June 1944, the Western Allies thought it would be over by the end of the year; as they launched the greatest advance of the war, Operation BAGRATION, in July, the Russians never expected to be on the doorstep of the Reich so soon.

 

SOURCE:

 

Mawdsley, Evan. Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945. Hodder Arnold, London, 2007. ISBN 978-0-340-61392-4

**General Editor's Preface, pages xviii - xix**

Edited June 7, 2020 by Dave Clark

[BillB]

In this context, Hew Strachan has written that

The fact that the war ended when it did represented a paradox: after the Normandy landings in June 1944, the Western Allies thought it would be over by the end of the year; as they launched the greatest advance of the war, Operation BAGRATION, in July, the Russians never expected to be on the doorstep of the Reich so soon.

 

SOURCE:

 

Mawdsley, Evan. Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945. Hodder Arnold, London, 2007. ISBN 978-0-340-61392-4

**General Editor's Preface, pages xviii - xix**

I'm surprised to see those two caught out like that, I thought they were better than that.

AIUI Eisenhower's SHAEF's original plan involved a step-by-step broad front advance after the Germans who it was assumed would conduct a repeat of 1918; as Carlo D'Este puts it for example:

 

'The original Allied plan had included a pause at the Seine while the armies regrouped, advanced their logistical base farther forward and made plans to resume offensive operations north and east of the Seine. It was predicated upon an orderly German retreat across Normandy and a solid defence of the Seine river line...Eisenhower stoutly maintained and the papers of his HQ - SHAEF - support this - that the strategy he intended to employ was a broad front advance against Germany, one which would see Montgomery's Army Group push through Belgium towards the Ruhr industrial complex, while Bradley's 12th Army Group advanced to the south covering the British right flank.' (Carlo D'Este, Decision Normandy: the Unwritten Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign (London: Collins, 1983), pp. 463-464

D'Este cites a SHAEF planning paper to back up his analysis, WO 219/2506 'Post-Neptune Courses of Action After Capture of Lodgement Area' and refers to a copy belonging to 21st Army Group lodged in WO 205/660.

Nothing in there about anybody thinking it would be over by Chrimble, quite the contrary. My understanding is that the 'all over by Xmas' thing was born from the German collapse at Falaise and subsequent retreat which created a surge of overconfidence after the British 'Great Swan' and Patton's push carried the Allied advance to the Belgian-Dutch border and Metz respectively in days rather than weeks or months. Even then I don't think anyone was talking about finishing up by Xmas. D'Este quotes Montgomery's memoir suggesting a '...full blooded thrust towards the Ruhr...to establish a powerful air force in Belgium, to secure bridgeheads over the Rhine before winter began, and to seize the Ruhr quickly'. (Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery Memoirs (London: Collins,1958), p. 266; cited in D'Este, p. 464). Given that Montgomery was talking post-Falaise and just three moths or so short of Xmas and that he was likely over egging the pudding with the benefit of hindsight, that was still a pretty tall order, especially given the logistics problems created by the loss of the OMAHA MULBERRY, the failure to secure a functioning major port and the sudden and unexpected lengthening of the Allied logistics chain by hundreds of miles. Which pretty much brings us back to securing ground for a resumption of the advance in early 1945...

BillB

[Stuart Galbraith]

Wasnt this the cause of Monty's beef with Ike, that he thought all the bulk of the resources ought to go to the British Advance, with the Americans doing little more than providing a supporting action? And Ike, not entirely unreasonably before it became evident there wasn't the fuel to support a broad drive, felt that was politically unacceptable by the American people?

 

There was a very good discussion on 'We have ways' podcast yesterday on DDAY, and Montgomery's apparently overconfident aim to take Caen by D plus 1. Apparently that aim was only put in there by Dempsey (not Montgomery) who claimed it far better to aim for what was just about possible in a blue moon, than achieve all aims and not know what to do next.

 

I just wonder if we should view the Christmas claim in the same light. That if it was ever real, it was just about possible assuming a complete German collapse and so should be aimed for, but that it never was a concrete aim. Which if so would perhaps mean Arnhem was prospective of the potential for a German collapse, but not necessarily counting on it.

 

Just a wholly idle thought from a fevered brain.

Edited June 9, 2020 by Stuart Galbraith

[RETAC21]

Halfway through Arnhem, I can't but wonder on the difference in performance between the 1st and 6th Airborne divisions, against enemies that appear similar. Was it all on the leadership?

 

Another thing that jumps out is that the Germans were pitting the bottom of the barrel against the best the allies had, but it doesn't seem to show.

 

Finally, seems one of the decisive factors that is overlooked is that dropping on top of the enemy Army Group commander speeded the response quite.

[Stuart Galbraith]

There was a discussion on one podcast I was listening to, and a historian asked a 6th Airborne veteran why his unitwas able to fulfill all its objectives on DDay and 1st Airborne at Arnhem did not. '1st Airborne wasnt it?' was his reply.

[Daan]

Which podcast was that?