Arnhem - Best Book By Far!

[Harold Jones]

 

Bought the hardcover, hopefully I'll be able to get it signed in '21.

How so Harold, are you planning another jaunt over here?

 

BillB

 

Yup, Jami wants to see Monkey World, I want to do another Tankfest and we thought we'd start in Scotland this time and work our way south. Something like arrive Glasgow depart London.

[Corinthian]

When I get my finances in order, I will order ASAP as well as the D-Day book.

[Brian Kennedy]

BillB, how do you think the Cornelius Ryan book has held up over the years? Obviously its much more a work of journalism than an academic study.

[Stuart Galbraith]

From what they were saying on the 'We have ways' podcast, Ryan did very few of the interviews himself, he had a team do it for him. Course that in itself does not make it inaccurate, but it's an odd way for a historian to work. Even less a journalist, which I believe was his previous profession.

[Gavin-Phillips]

If you liked Beevor's book I believe that you'll be very pleased with this one.

 

Thanks. So that's yet another title to add onto the to read list.

[Brian Kennedy]

Thanks Stuart you have a link for that? Sounds interesting

[BillB]

 

 

Bought the hardcover, hopefully I'll be able to get it signed in '21.

How so Harold, are you planning another jaunt over here?

 

BillB

 

Yup, Jami wants to see Monkey World, I want to do another Tankfest and we thought we'd start in Scotland this time and work our way south. Something like arrive Glasgow depart London.

 

Monkey World is good, I expect Jami will not be disappointed. Has it been on the TV on your side of the Pond? I assume Jami will be at Monkey World while you nip up to Bovington next door?

 

Bung me your dates and I'll check that I'll be around with work, am sure we can arrange a hook up. I don't live in Glasgow any more, moved just outside but as I'm married now we can do the couples thing.

 

BillB

[BillB]

BillB, how do you think the Cornelius Ryan book has held up over the years? Obviously its much more a work of journalism than an academic study.

Personally I think Ryan's work has held up pretty well. There are a few errors but off the top of my head I can't think of anything major and some of that is because it was the first major non-official accounts. As Stuart says he was a journo rather than a historian but on the good side of that, and IIRC he did some archival stuff as well as the invaluable participant interviews. FWIW I consider it a legitimate & useful source, and it gets cited frequently in my book.

 

BillB

[BillB]

From what they were saying on the 'We have ways' podcast, Ryan did very few of the interviews himself, he had a team do it for him. Course that in itself does not make it inaccurate, but it's an odd way for a historian to work. Even less a journalist, which I believe was his previous profession.

Din't know that, although I'd say it less of a problem than how Beevor did his archival research for Stalingrad. IIRC he was totally reliant on a female Russian assistant to find stuff and tell him what it said as he did not have the language.

 

With ref to historians doing their own research, I've seen folk employ others to help with research, sometimes PhD students studying allied topics, especially if its extensive as it's difficult for one person to do everything. I also suspect it comes down to funding - if they could afford it I bet you'd see a lot more historians employing folk. Not me of course, I'm far to anally retentive for that...

 

BillB

[Brian Kennedy]

 

 

BillB, how do you think the Cornelius Ryan book has held up over the years? Obviously its much more a work of journalism than an academic study.

Personally I think Ryan's work has held up pretty well. There are a few errors but off the top of my head I can't think of anything major and some of that is because it was the first major non-official accounts. As Stuart says he was a journo rather than a historian but on the good side of that, and IIRC he did some archival stuff as well as the invaluable participant interviews. FWIW I consider it a legitimate & useful source, and it gets cited frequently in my book.

 

BillB

Well that makes two books I need to buy. Thanks much!

[Brian Kennedy]

Just bought it on Kindle, no problems with the font at all.

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

From what they were saying on the 'We have ways' podcast, Ryan did very few of the interviews himself, he had a team do it for him. Course that in itself does not make it inaccurate, but it's an odd way for a historian to work. Even less a journalist, which I believe was his previous profession.

Din't know that, although I'd say it less of a problem than how Beevor did his archival research for Stalingrad. IIRC he was totally reliant on a female Russian assistant to find stuff and tell him what it said as he did not have the language.

 

With ref to historians doing their own research, I've seen folk employ others to help with research, sometimes PhD students studying allied topics, especially if its extensive as it's difficult for one person to do everything. I also suspect it comes down to funding - if they could afford it I bet you'd see a lot more historians employing folk. Not me of course, I'm far to anally retentive for that...

 

BillB

 

Yeah, I remember listening to a podcast where even Beevor tacitly admitted it had aspects he was uncomfortable with. For example, he uncovered a document from the Red Army detailing about rapes in Berlin, and his female assistant retorted 'Well, after all, they were Nazi's!'. Which begs the question how much, unwittingly or otherwise, might have been missed by the translator. Nobody really wants to see their forebears in a bad light, and I think those coming from former Soviet Regimes can be particularly adept at such things.

 

I dont know what Ryans health was like, I think he died of Cancer in the end? So if he had a long illness it might explain it. I dont think there is anything necessarily wrong with it, I just wonder how often aspects were missed because he wasnt there grilling them. Imagine if he gave Urquhart a hard time about poncing around in an attic for example. As said though, I thought it stood up well when I read it about 20 years ago. He had a knack (particularly with Longest day) of seeing a breadth of a military operation from the eyes of the participants that is not always that easy to find.

 

And the Para's seemed to like it too. When I was knee high to a grasshopper, I remember looking around the Para museum at Aldershot and seeing the cover of his book fully illustrated with lights showing the battle for the bridge underway. That was something of an endorsement.

Edited January 31, 2020 by Stuart Galbraith

[Brian Kennedy]

From what they were saying on the 'We have ways' podcast, Ryan did very few of the interviews himself, he had a team do it for him. Course that in itself does not make it inaccurate, but it's an odd way for a historian to work. Even less a journalist, which I believe was his previous profession.

Ryan was a pretty well known writer at the time, it was a period when you could actually make money writing books like that, and seriously A Bridge Too Far has like six billion interviews, with people from every side of the battle. I would argue that it worked out ok, and honestly some grunt level researcher employed by Ryan probably had more to lose by making sh@t up than Ryan himself did.

 

[edit to add Im not trying to be some fanboy, just saying I think hes in the clear on this one{

Edited January 31, 2020 by Brian Kennedy

[R011]

Presumably, he gave his assistants many of the questions to ask.

[sunday]

Finally bought the Normandy one. Should have read it before the I&I in the area. Even reading it now, I find it easy to establish relationships between the facts on the book and all the places we visited.

 

I could not recommend that book more.

[Ariete!]

Happy to be corrected but the thing that always amazed me teh msot abotu th whole operation is how a batallion-sized, training-unit commander in teh sapce of an hour sets up stop-gap positions that, whatever the difficulteuis of ana rilanding, stop 1-2 brigade of elite light infantry dead intehir tracks, giving teh rest of teh Jerries time to bring in serious forces.

 

I cannot think of any other simialr situation with another army where they woudl have reacted as quickly and as effectively given what they had.

[Stuart Galbraith]

The British came close on Crete. Ok they lost, but the Parachute forces never really recovered.

[Rich]

Happy to be corrected but the thing that always amazed me teh msot abotu th whole operation is how a batallion-sized, training-unit commander in teh sapce of an hour sets up stop-gap positions that, whatever the difficulteuis of ana rilanding, stop 1-2 brigade of elite light infantry dead intehir tracks, giving teh rest of teh Jerries time to bring in serious forces.

 

I cannot think of any other simialr situation with another army where they woudl have reacted as quickly and as effectively given what they had.

One of the best parts of Bill's research is that he exposes Sepp Krafft's self-aggrandizing bullshit as self-aggrandizing bullshit. No such thing ever happened.

[Martin M]

 

Happy to be corrected but the thing that always amazed me teh msot abotu th whole operation is how a batallion-sized, training-unit commander in teh sapce of an hour sets up stop-gap positions that, whatever the difficulteuis of ana rilanding, stop 1-2 brigade of elite light infantry dead intehir tracks, giving teh rest of teh Jerries time to bring in serious forces.

 

I cannot think of any other simialr situation with another army where they woudl have reacted as quickly and as effectively given what they had.

One of the best parts of Bill's research is that he exposes Sepp Krafft's self-aggrandizing bullshit as self-aggrandizing bullshit. No such thing ever happened.

 

 

I don´t want to buy another book, and don´t know alot about Arnhem. but . . .

 

Despite the mixed up letters in the post of Ariete, I think I see what the fanboy version is.

 

What is the actual account ?

[Rich]

 

I don´t want to buy another book, and don´t know alot about Arnhem. but . . .

 

Despite the mixed up letters in the post of Ariete, I think I see what the fanboy version is.

 

What is the actual account ?

 

Bill can probably do a more exact precis, but mine would be that Krafft embellished virtually everything he and his unit did. They did not play a vital role in stalling the advance of the Reconnaissance Squadron or 1st Parachute Brigade on the first day. They had little to do with hindering the second lift. He recorded attacks made and prisoners captured by his unit that did not in fact occur. He was essentially an SS Munchausen.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

Martin M

buy this one.

even if you have to get rid of another one to make room

[Martin M]

Yes, probably will. Last book cost an arm & leg and was no good.

Awaiting resurecction of the wallet.

[Stuart Galbraith]

'We have ways of making you talk' is doing a reading of Zeno's Novel 'The Cauldron'. Well worth listening to.

[BillB]

Hi all, sorry for the delay on this, my work multiplied mucho once the university closed down and everything went on-line but here is the précis of what Bataillon Krafft got up to in the opening stages of MARKET at Arnhem.

 

Hauptsturmführer Sepp Krafft’s SS Panzergrenadier Ausbildungs und Ersatz Bataillon 16, sometimes referred to as Bataillon Krafft, was a replacement training unit billeted near Oosterbeek, three and a half miles east of Wolfheze and thus midway between the 1^st Airborne Division’s landing area and Arnhem proper. With between 306 and 435 men organised into two infantry and one heavy weapons kompanien, Krafft’s command appears fairly formidable on paper but almost half its personnel were officially classified as not yet combat ready. On the morning of Sunday 17 September the preparatory pre-landing bombing around the landing area prompted Krafft to move his infantry units 2 Kompanie & 4 Kompanie out of their billets for impromptu training in the woods and heath land to the north-west of Oosterbeek while 9 Kompanie, the heavy weapons unit, remained at its billets. Krafft thus inadvertently placed two-thirds of his Bataillon between the 1^st Airborne Division and its objectives and on observing the landings he moved west and set up a tactical HQ at the Hotel Wolfheze in the woods just east of LZ Z. From there he despatched 2 Kompanie to reconnoitre toward the landing area, called 9 Kompanie forward to act as a mobile reserve and set 4 Kompanie to establishing a line of outposts running inside the woods bordering the landing area centred on the Hotel Wolfheze. After becoming disoriented in the woods and briefly emerging onto the edge of LZ Z, from where they claimed to have hit four gliders with machine-gun fire, 2 Kompanie returned to the Hotel Wolfheze and assisted in establishing the outpost line. The timings are unclear but the outpost line appears to have been at least partially in place by c.15:45.

 

According to Krafft’s After Action Report (AAR) his Bataillon then held the line for the remainder of the afternoon until darkness fell in the early evening, inflicting significant casualties on the British Airborne troops before withdrawing north the overall German blocking line to regroup; they were subsequently involved in the fighting on Tuesday 19 September against the British third lift on LZ L and the north face of the Oosterbeek Pocket. However, Krafft’s AAR was not intended to provide an objective record of events for posterity. Rather it was intended to ingratiate him with his SS superiors with an eye to personal advancement in standard National Socialist fashion, and is consequently somewhat as variance with the verifiable evidence, particularly with regard to supposedly blocking the 1^st Parachute Brigade’s advance into Arnhem in the first hours of MARKET. Robert Kershaw’s It Never Snows In September credits Krafft with the deed in detail, James Lucas & Matthew Cooper’s Panzer Grenadiers cites Krafft’s AAR as an exemplar of German operational skill and efficiency and Middlebrook’s Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, while pointing out the inconsistency between Krafft’s account and those of British participants, nonetheless gives the SS commander partial credit for the deed. Quite why Krafft’s account has been taken at face value is unclear, but I suspect it is because a translated copy of it resides in the UK National Archives at Kew (File AIR 20/2333 ‘16^th SS Panzer Grenadier & Reserve Battalion Report’) and folk assume its presence there automatically lends legitimacy.

 

Be that as it may, the British participant accounts, and specifically unit War Diaries are actually the key to debunking Krafft’s account, by cross-referencing them across time and location. According to this the first British unit to make contact with Bataillon Krafft appears to have been Major John Winchester’s glider-borne 9^th Field Company RE on the north-eastern edge of LZ Z which had an officer badly wounded by machine-gun fire on landing, likely from Krafft’s 2 Kompanie. The 9^th Field Company was tasked to secure the Hotel Wolfheze a mile or so east of the LZ and moved off at 15:10 but the HQ element and half the Company was blocked by machine gun-fire and set in at a track junction in the woods c.500 yards east of the post-landing RV. The remainder of the Company reached the Hotel Wolfheze, which was serving as Krafft’s Command Post, at c.18:00 but were unable to secure it and lost one dead and two badly wounded in the attempt. At c.19:00 the Company HQ perimeter shot up a party of six SS who may have been seeking to outflank the Hotel attackers, killing three and capturing an MG42; the Sappers at the Hotel withdrew to the main Company position at c.19:30, possibly under cover of a shoot from the 1^st Airlanding Light Regiment RA. In all, Bataillon Krafft’s initial move toward the landing area thus led to a three hour skirmish that cost both sides a handful of casualties and prevented the 9^th Field Company from occupying its planned HQ location on the eastern perimeter of the landing area. While Bataillon Krafft was clearly responsible for blocking the 9^th Field Company RE, the latter was not part of the 1^st Parachute Brigade and it was not intended to advance into Arnhem, being part of the landing force tasked to hold the landing area for the second lift the following day.

 

The second contact was with the 1^st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron, which was tasked to take the bulk of its complement of armed Jeeps and seize the Arnhem road bridge in a coup-de-main attack. The glider borne component was on the ground by 13:35 but the Squadron was not fully assembled until 15:30 and the twenty-eight Jeeps of the coup-de-main did not move off for Arnhem until 15:40, following a route into Wolfheze, across the railway level crossing there and then east along the Johannahoeveweg paralleling north side of the railway line. At c.15:45 the lead Section of two Jeeps triggered an ambush set just moments before by elements of Bataillon Krafft’s 4 Kompanie; The ambush knocked out both Jeeps, killed or wounded all those aboard and sparked a drawn out but inconclusive firefight during which another NCO from a party sent forward to investigate on foot was also seriously wounded. The Germans called down mortar fire on the stalled Reconnaissance Squadron from 16:00 and thirty minutes later the Squadron commander was summoned to Division HQ. Thereafter the Squadron remained in place for a further two hours and despite the supposedly vital status of the Reconnaissance Squadron’s mission there was no attempt to ascertain the strength and extent of the German blocking position or to find an alternate route around it to Arnhem before also withdrawing to the landing area at c.18:30. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the coup-de-main mission was shelved while awaiting the Squadron commander’s return, and then quietly dropped altogether when he failed to reappear. The precise reason for the Squadron’s lack of application is unclear, but its commander had previously expressed serious misgivings about the mission and this may have been shared by the unit as a whole. The key point is that a mission of potentially vital importance was stopped and then abandoned virtually on the edge of the landing area following a skirmish that cost two Jeeps from a total of twenty-eight and a dozen or so casualties; while Krafft may have passed off the incident as a full-scale attack by two full companies in his self-serving report, he can nevertheless be credited with blocking one part of the British advance on Arnhem, albeit for underlying reasons and not by part of the 1^st Parachute Brigade.

 

Bataillon Krafft did make contact with two of the 1^st Parachute Brigade’s units. The first was with the 2^nd Parachute Battalion as it was moving south-east across LZ L en route to its designated riverside LION route to Arnhem. Shortly after moving off at 15:45 A Company’s lead platoon was approached by three cars and two trucks from Bataillon Krafft moving along a track running south-west from the Hotel Wolfheze and across the landing area. All the vehicles were comprehensively shot, up killing fifteen of the passengers with a further fifteen being taken prisoner. The second unit was the 3^rd Parachute Battalion, which made contact with Bataillon Krafft twice as it moved along is designated centre TIGER route toward Arnhem via Oosterbeek. At c.17:15 the lead platoon from B Company ran into a half-track mounted 20mm gun supported by infantry as it approached a crossroads just west of Oosterbeek; the vehicle disengaged by reversing into a side road and then it or another engaged again farther down the 3^rd Battalion column before withdrawing again. In all the incident held up the 3^rd Battalion’s advance for ten to fifteen minutes and cost the British two dead and five wounded. The second contact occurred at c.18:30 when elements of Bataillon Krafft opened fire on A Company at the tail-end of the 3^rd Battalion column with machine-guns and mortars. As the head of the column was already on the move at this point A Company would likely have been content to return fire while advancing away from the attackers but the Brigade commander, who had been conferring with the Division commander nearby, had other ideas and ordered A Company to mount an attack. This sparked an arguably needless two-hour fight that in addition to precious time cost the paratroopers eighteen casualties including two dead and the SS forty dead and a dozen prisoners, the moreso as the Brigade commander ordered a halt for the night in Oosterbeek at 19:30. Thus while the 3^rd Parachute Battalion’s advance was halted during the fight with elements of Bataillon Krafft, this was again not due to the SS attack but additional factors separate to it.

 

All this clearly rebuts Krafft’s claims to have blocked the 1^st Parachute Brigade’s advance into Arnhem for several hours while inflicting considerable casualties. Krafft’s first contact was an extended skirmish with the 9^th Field Company RE which was not even seeking to leave the landing area, while the second involved ambushing lead elements of the 1^st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron followed by another extended skirmish where the ‘blocking’ was largely self-inflicted. With regard to interfering with the 1^st Parachute Brigade, Bataillon Krafft had no contact whatever with the 1^st Parachute Battalion and its sole contact with the 2^nd Parachute Battalion appears to have been the ambush that eliminated Krafft’s motorised reconnaissance element on LZ Z; of the two contacts with the 3^rd Parachute Battalion, the first held up the advance for less than an hour and the second occurred at the rear of the 3^rd Battalion column while the head was actually on the move away from the attack toward Arnhem. The SS broke contact on both occasions and as such both incidents amounted to merely harassing rather than blocking the 1^st Parachute Brigade’s advance.

 

BillB

[JWB]

Looks like the wiki article needs to be corrected.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Arnhem