Fall Blau

[Inhapi]

As far as i know, fall blau started out as an attempt to grab the Russian Caucasian oil fields. This to deny them to the Russians, but most important because the German economy and army ground to a halt due to the lack of fuel (e.g. the "demechanisation").

 

All clear and well, but was there any preparation made in Germany to repair wells (they can hardly have been so optimistice that they expected to capture the oil fields intact), transport the oil to Germany and what about refinery capacity ?

 

many thanks,

 

Inhapi.

[RETAC21]

Yes, there was a unit tasked to do just that whose designation I can't remember right now. Export of the oil I suppose would be through Novorossysk to Romania, where there was refining capacity.

 

Google-fu comes through:

 

https://www.joelhayward.org/Hitlers-Quest-Finished.pdf

 

"It appears that during this period there was little discussion between Hitler and his military advisers over the important question of how Caucasus oil was to be transported to the Reich. A quarter of a century earlier, this problem had also vexed Ludendorff and the German High Command, who never arrived at an adequate solution.129 The overworked Fürher may not even have realized the importance of this matter, considering it best simply to cross that bridge when he came to it. He had almost certainly not read the March 1941 report by Generalleutnant Hermann von Hanneken of the War Economy and War Armaments Office, which was appended to a letter sent by Keitel to the OKH. This report warned that, even if the Caucasus oilfields could be captured intact, very little oil (only 10,000 tons per month) could be carried overland to Germany.130 Moreover, even if the Black Sea could be made safe for shipping, there would be no ships available for the transport of Caucasus oil up the Danube because its river tankers were already working to capacity transporting Rumanian oil.131 The only remaining route was across the Black Sea, through the Dardenelles, and on to Mediterranean ports. Accordingly, the report concluded, 'the opening of the sea routes and the security of the tankers in the Black Sea is the prerequisite for the use of Russian supply sources in sufficient quantity to support the further continuation of the war.' Clearly, to attain this prerequisite was virtually impossible by early 1942; the Germans would have had to wipe out the powerful Soviet Black Sea Fleet (which still had, according to Raeder, 'naval supremacy ... [allowing] great freedom of movement"32) and eliminate British air and sea power from the eastern Mediterranean"

Edited December 13, 2019 by RETAC21

[Stuart Galbraith]

Thats really interesting, Id never given thought to that before. Of course this was long before ultra long pipelines became a practical possibility. I doubt they would have had the resources to build something like that anyway.

[MiloMorai]

It is uncertain when the first crude oil pipeline was built.^[4] Credit for the development of pipeline transport is disputed,^{[citation needed]} with competing claims for Vladimir Shukhov and the Branobel company in the late 19th century, and the Oil Transport Association, which first constructed a 2-inch (51 mm) wrought iron pipeline over a 6-mile (9.7 km) track from an oil field in Pennsylvania to a railroad station in Oil Creek, in the 1860s.

[Stuart Galbraith]

That long ago? I would have thought it would have been something like Anglo Iranian oil in the 1950's?

 

I suppose if the Germans had thought ahead and had one prefabricated. You also wonder if they could have got the oil across the Black Sea via a pipeline like Pluto, but again, it requires foresight that they seemed to be lacking?

[Rick]

Thats really interesting, Id never given thought to that before. Of course this was long before ultra long pipelines became a practical possibility. I doubt they would have had the resources to build something like that anyway.

Agree.

[RETAC21]

That long ago? I would have thought it would have been something like Anglo Iranian oil in the 1950's?

 

I suppose if the Germans had thought ahead and had one prefabricated. You also wonder if they could have got the oil across the Black Sea via a pipeline like Pluto, but again, it requires foresight that they seemed to be lacking?

 

Helpfully, there was a pipeline that run to Kharkov, but then the oild would need to go overland to a refinery, and I guess logistics were already strained going to Kharkov, so going back with oild wouldn't help a bit. The best option would be a tanker to Constanta IMO

[Leo Niehorster]

There was the "Crude Oil Brigade Caucasus" ("Mineralöl-Brigade kaukasus", sometimes also referred to as Mineralöl-Brigade Kasnodar" — A large unit raised in 1942 by the paramilitary oprganization Technischen Truppen (Technical Troops, part of the German Army as of 1 June 1941). It was expanded in 1943 to "Kommandeur der Technischen Truppen Mineralöl".

 

From
Joel Hayward,
"Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production",
The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 769-794.

Copy preserved at

https://archive.org/details/JoelHaywardtooLittleTooLateAnAnalysisOfHitlersFailureInAugust

 

... because recent "scorched earth" experiences in the Ukraine and the Donets Basin clearly indicated that the Caucasus oilfields would probably not be captured before at least some attempts were made to destroy existing wells and refineries. As a result, the OKW raised this unusual paramilitary force to a strength of 10,794 men, issued it 1142 vehicles and six aircraft, and ordered it to stand by, ready to move into the Caucasus oilfields immediately behind the combat troops.

 

Report by Lieutenant General Hermann von Hanneken of the War Economy and Armaments Office, March 1941.
This report warned that, even if the Caucasus oilfields could be captured intact, very little oil (only ten thousand tons per month) could be carried overland [i.e., by rail] to Germany. Moreover, even if the Black Sea could be made safe for shipping, there would be no ships available for the transport of Caucasus oil up the Danube because the Danube river tankers were already working to capacity transporting Rumanian oil.

 

[An OKM (High Command of the Navy) memorandum of 9 May 1941 makes the same point about there being no available transport ships because all oil tankers were fully occupied with the transport of Rumanian oil up the Danube. Cited in N. Rich, Hitler's War Aims: The Establishment of the New Order (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), 498. ]

 

In early 1942, British Air Ministry intelligence staff ... noted that Germany did not have a tanker fleet sufficient to transport the oil from the Caucasus to Rumania, they did warn that it could probably also use part of Vichy France's large fleet in the Mediterranean. "German Plans for Russian Oil," AMWIS, No. 134, Up to 1200—25 March 1942 (on microfilm 32769), 512.607, USAFHRA. ]

The only remaining route was across the Black Sea, through the Dardanelles, and on to Mediterranean ports. Accordingly, the report concluded, "the opening of the sea routes and the security of the tankers in the Black Sea is the prerequisite for the use of Russian supply sources in sufficient quantity to support the further continuation of the war."

 

Clearly, to attain this prerequisite was virtually impossible by early 1942; the Germans would have had to wipe out the powerful Soviet Black Sea Fleet (which still had, according to Grosstadmiral Raeder, "naval supremacy . . . [allowing] great freedom of movement" and to eliminate British air and sea power from the eastern Mediterranean. Despite not considering how best to solve this logistics nightmare — which never occurred, because, as shown below, the German Army captured only the already-wrecked Maikop oilfield — Hitler and his courtiers were not entirely lacking in forethought. When planning the forthcoming campaign during the first months of 1942, they stressed the crucial need to reach the Caucasus oilfields so rapidly that the Soviets would not have time to destroy permanently the oil wells and refineries. If the latter were destroyed, the bulk of the Caucasus oil would have to be refined elsewhere until new refineries could be constructed. Only Rumanian refineries, which still had a considerable surplus refinement capacity, could handle large quantities of additional crude, but (for the reasons mentioned above) it would be extremely difficult to ship significant amounts of oil from the Caucasus to Rumania. The High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) had established an "Oil Detachment Caucasus" [year earlier, in the spring of 1941, when the capture of the oilfields was still a principal objective of the forth- coming attack on the Soviet Union. Its purpose was quickly to repair damaged wells and refineries so that exploitation of the oilfields could commenced as soon as possible.

 

The Mineralöl Brigade did not have long to wait. Operation Blau commenced on 28 June 1942.

 

...

 

However, their delight soon turned to bitter disappointment when they learned that Soviet rearguards had already destroyed hundreds of wells, wrecked oil storage facilities, and crippled the refineries by removing vital components. 25 Although this was always a likely result, the damage was far more extensive than the Axis leaders had naively hoped. Twelve days after the city fell, the Inspector of Air Defenses reported that only two oil wells were "capable of being developed for use. One well is still burning, although it may soon be possible to extinguish the fire. The other wells have been rendered useless by having cement poured down the bores." The Soviets had also destroyed the large refinery in Krasnodar, he added. Bringing Maikop back into production would prove difficult and time-consuming, despite the Mineralöl Brigade going to work almost ...

 

 

If interested, suggest you read the entire article.

 

--

Leo

Edited December 14, 2019 by Leo Niehorster

[Inhapi]

Thanks

[Adam_S]

There's some good stuff about this in "The Caucasus" by Robert Forczyk.

 

To summarise a few key points:

 

1. German intelligence estimated,incorrectly as it turns out, that 70% of Soviet oil production came from the Caucasus. There is a certain logic in the idea that if this were the case, even if the oil fields could not be captured, denying them to the enemy would have a significant strategic effect.

 

2. The Mineralöl Brigade was formed as a Luftwaffe unit under the authority of Goering who had assumed control over the entire German oil industry. He had done a deal with Kontinentale Ol AG granting them exclusive rights to oil from captured territories. They in turn advised Goering that it would be possible to restore significant production within six months.

 

3. The vast majority of oil production in the area was around Baku, and the Germans never managed to get that far. They did seize some oil fields around Maikop but they were utterly destroyed by the Soviets and the Germans had to drill new shafts. Production started at a trickle in October 1942 but it was estimated that it would have taken another six months to restore full production. Maikop was abandoned by the Germans in January 1943.

 

4. The Soviets were able to increase production of oil in the Urals to compensate for lost production and Soviet oil production actually increased after the end of Blau.

 

5. While Baku was the real prize, the infrastructure to ship the oil was orientated North along the edge of the Caspian Sea, not North West towards Rostov. The rail infrastructure the Germans did have in place couldn't support a handful of Panzer divisions and little thought seems to have been given to how to ship the stuff back to the Reich.

[Leo Niehorster]

Sorry, I thought about the initial post, and started a little research. I then posted my answer -- I seem to have duplicated RETAC21's post, but I hadn't read the new posts at the time.

 

Anyway...

 

 

Re the Adam_S post: Point No. 2.

 

Where did you get the info that MBK was a Luftwaffe unit? Yes, Göring was in charge of production, but not wearing his Luftwaffe hat.

Tessin — normally considered reliable about these matters — lists the Mineralöl-Brigade as an Army (Heer) unit. See Section E. Pioniere, Para IV. Technische Truppen in Vol. 1, pages 242–243.

 

Thanks

 

--

Leo

 

[Adam_S]

Sorry, I thought about the initial post, and started a little research. I then posted my answer -- I seem to have duplicated RETAC21's post, but I hadn't read the new posts at the time.

 

Anyway...

 

 

Re the Adam_S post: Point No. 2.

 

Where did you get the info that MBK was a Luftwaffe unit? Yes, Göring was in charge of production, but not wearing his Luftwaffe hat.

Tessin — normally considered reliable about these matters — lists the Mineralöl-Brigade as an Army (Heer) unit. See Section E. Pioniere, Para IV. Technische Truppen in Vol. 1, pages 242–243.

 

Thanks

 

--

Leo

 

It's possible I might have misunderstood the quote I read. From the book I mentioned above:

 

 

 

In order to transform the vision into reality, Goring ordered the formation of a special unit - under Luftwaffe command - known as the Technical Brigade Mineralol (TBM) to restore oil production at captured fields. Generalmajor Erich Homburg was put in charge of the TBM, which consisted of 5,500 personnel, over 1,100 vehicles and 80,000 tons of oil-drilling equipment, mostly looted from the French oil industry. In goring's mind, once the German army captured Maikop and Grozny, the TBM would quickly restore them and then the oil would begin flowing (and in the process, making him and his Konti Ol partners even richer).

 

I guess that wouldn't preclude the TBM being staffed by Heer personnel but under the overall authority of the Luftwaffe or at least Goring.

[Leo Niehorster]

Yes, you are right.

 

And it was Special Armed Forces unit (Spezial-Einheit der Wehrmacht), as opposed to the Heer.

The Commander was Generalleutnant Erich Homburg (Luftwaffe),

and the Technical Director was the civilian engineer Günther Schlicht (a member of the board of Ost-öl GmbH),

Other German technicians and specialists were civilians drafted into the Army.

The Non-Germans were forced labor Soviet civilians.

 

In any event, Göring had his fingers in everything German and economic, indulged by Hitler.

 

For those interested in the German activities regarding natural resources and their exploitation, and can read German, there is fascinating many-paged thread at the Forum der Wehrmacht.

See:

https://www.forum-der-wehrmacht.de/index.php?thread/29239-aufbau-einer-kriegsindustrie-im-eroberten-teil-der-sowjetunion/&pageNo=1

The monthly reports 01.12. – 31.12.1942 of the MBK begin on bottom of page 2, followed by reports by various units of the brigade on page 17.

 

--

Leo

[Nobu]

Count me in as one of those who, like Hitler perhaps, had not fully thought of the ramifications of oil extraction and transport after the destruction of the Red Army in a giant battle of maneuver in the South.

[Stuart Galbraith]

https://www.bing.com/th?id=OIP.2cuX3dXbvlv8JNhnVA6ubgHaJb&pid=Api&dpr=1.33

[lastdingo]

Historical crappy ideas. Today: "Fall Blau"

Edited December 19, 2019 by lastdingo

[Adam_S]

Count me in as one of those who, like Hitler perhaps, had not fully thought of the ramifications of oil extraction and transport after the destruction of the Red Army in a giant battle of maneuver in the South.

The giant battle of maneuver didn't really get much past Rostov either due to some seriously crappy logistics on behalf of the Germans.

[Nobu]

The OKH and, most importantly, its head, comes to the realization that the oasis of oil in the Caucasus is a mirage after a report by a Col. Niehorster of the Luftwaffe makes its way to Berlin, and the point abundantly clear to them. Fall Blau is canceled.

 

Germany now has decisions to make.

Edited December 20, 2019 by Nobu

[seahawk]

 

Count me in as one of those who, like Hitler perhaps, had not fully thought of the ramifications of oil extraction and transport after the destruction of the Red Army in a giant battle of maneuver in the South.

The giant battle of maneuver didn't really get much past Rostov either due to some seriously crappy logistics on behalf of the Germans.

 

Dude, German troops reached Rostov - that is far from crappy logistics. It is time to no longer expect miracles from Nazi Germany or even expect them to be fully rational and have everything planed out, because if they did, they would not be fighting that war.

Edited December 20, 2019 by seahawk

[lastdingo]

 

The loss of horses in III/41 to II/42 was extreme and many replacement horses (many small 'panje horses') were more robust, but also much weaker draft horses.

The production of trucks did not cope with losses, much less with demand. There weren't enough field-worthy civilian trucks to requisition; suitable French trucks had already been requisitioned before Barbarossa.

The loss of motorcycles and the mass failure of light motorcycles (which led to medium ones being needed for messengers and heavy ones that cost more than a 4-seat car Typ 82 car being needed for sidecar use) largely ended the use of motorcycle troops as kinda dragoons and led to even more demand for 4x4 trucks and half track APCs.

 

Overall, the mobility situation was much worse than in 1941 and the longer railroad lines were more affected by partisans and there was no matching increase in locomotives and railroad cars available. The supply situation was very troublesome, it was a permanent managing of severe shortages.

 

A strategy aimed at bleeding the Russians white would have required an intentional withdrawal. People like Model were exceedingly good at selling land for blood to the Red Army.

A strategy aimed at a knockout blow in 1942 would have required conquering Moscow (though that might not have delivered the knockout blow, but it would have been a try).

The strategy aimed at improving the resources situation was pointless, not the least as the reckless idiot had needlessly added the Untied States to the list of enemies right at the moment when it was distracted, possibly even distracted from continuing Lend-Lease in full swing.

 

On top of that Wehrmacht and SS stupidly raised additional divisions, not just for coastal defence and occupation security, but also supposedly fast divisions. For example, 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th tank divisions were formed in autumn 1941 or in 1942. By that time the OKH already knew it wouldn't have the motor vehicles to equip its existing divisions, wouldn't have enough fully trained officers for the jobs and so on.

[Nobu]

What you propose is starting to sound like the makings of a plan to move the venue of the giant battle of maneuver in 1942 westward. This would depend on cooperation from both idiots in various ways.

[lastdingo]

What you propose is starting to sound like the makings of a plan to move the venue of the giant battle of maneuver in 1942 westward. This would depend on cooperation from both idiots in various ways.

Well, Stalin had showed an overestimation of the Red Army's offensive capabilities.

 

Moreover, I didn't mean so much operational manoeuvre.

 

There was a kind of routine

 

1. rearward positions were prepared and stocked
2. plan for orderly withdrawal of the slow (partially motorised) infantry divisions was devised
3. Red Army was enticed to attempt an offensive by signalling weakness or geographic exposure (such as salients)
4. Red army readied for offensive
5. German artillery fires on marshalling areas inflicted most damage (seriously - more casualties from this than from actual battle involving line of sight)
6. Red Army attacked nevertheless
7. German forward positions were largely unoccupied during barrage
8. Red Army suffered from delaying action (agile artillery strikes, anti-tank ambushes and machinegun+mortar ambushes incl. mortar fires from infantry company itself) during advance
9. Red Army advance stalled in main defensive line (HKL)
10. rinse, repeat

 

What armoured forces were available in the sector exploited opportunities for counterattack and were available to help in a local crisis within hours.

 

The Red Army would advance less than 10 km at a time with this routine, and suffer an appalling casualty ratio as long as it couldn't break through rapidly. They became proficient at that only by 1944, and then only with a tell-tale build-up of strength that was visible even to sporadic aerial reconnaissance, occasional POW interrogation and SigInt.

 

Worst case scenario for Red Army; the offensive doesn't only stall, but the divisions turn into a disorderly and demoralised mess, and a German counteroffensive pushes them back to approx. the original front line with yet again an appalling casualty ratio for the Red Army.

 

That's about what the German generals wanted to do in 1942-1943 (and still in 1944 when the strength ratio didn't really allow for it any more).

 

 

[Ken Estes]

Ah yes, if only the Fuehrer had let the German Army use its innate brilliance, WWII would have been won.

 

 

Cf:

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bLJol2jcOIE

 

The myths surrounding the German high command in World War II deviate significantly from the reality. Many people have an image of the German high command (or, loosely, the German General Staff) as an entity that was independent; organized and centralized; expert; and anti-Nazi. While not wholly false, this picture is also far from accurate. This talk will examine the high command's structure, ideas, and culture, in order to reveal weaknesses that severely inhibited its performance and contributed to the onset, nature and ultimate loss of the war. Length: 69 Minutes Lecture Date: January 18, 2012

 

[RETAC21]

 

Ah yes, if only the Fuehrer had let the German Army use its innate brilliance, WWII would have been won.

 

 

Cf:

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bLJol2jcOIE

 

The myths surrounding the German high command in World War II deviate significantly from the reality. Many people have an image of the German high command (or, loosely, the German General Staff) as an entity that was independent; organized and centralized; expert; and anti-Nazi. While not wholly false, this picture is also far from accurate. This talk will examine the high command's structure, ideas, and culture, in order to reveal weaknesses that severely inhibited its performance and contributed to the onset, nature and ultimate loss of the war. Length: 69 Minutes Lecture Date: January 18, 2012

 

 

 

Well, Hitler was uniquely situated among WW2 leaders in the sense that he was able to unilaterally decide strategy - the US/UK has a collegiate direction in fact if not de lege as the UK was dependent on US support. Stalin didn't have a choice after 1941, and Japan had enough with survival.

 

Problem was, Hitler wasn't mentally prepared for that role, as he had no training, increasingly relied on yes men and eventually was overwhelmed, so the wide objectives of 1941/42, became operational by 1943 and was reduced to reacting by 1944.

[seahawk]

It was not Hitler alone. There were plenty of incompetent people in the high command and even the competent ones made mistakes like any other person.