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Yes. The West had no interests in Asia. No trade with China. No allies and colonies like Hong Kong, Malaya, Australia, India, the Philippines. Of course, they could always count on the good intentions of whatever military clique happened to be in charge at the time. Why, that's hardly more reason to be interested than now. Perhaps the West should ignore the PRC?.

 

And it wasn't as if Japan hadn't already fought one war of agression against China or tried to grab more territory and concessions from China at Versailles.

 

This post is so incoherent that I'm not responding anymore.

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Had the Washington Treaty not been signed, Japan would have had perhaps six more capital ships and the USN ten.

I don't think so. One, they planned to build battle ships and battle cruisers, two they could not afford their grand eight-eight plan anyway.

 

Had they tried, they would have bankrupted themselves in a futile effort to keep up with the USA and the British Empire and probably ended up in a worse situation when being forced to negotiate.

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I think the evident anti Yellow racism present in the US would have prevented any settlement with the Japanese Empire after PH.

 

Japan could not conceivably overcome the defenses of Oahu, hence occupying any of the HI island group remained untenable. The US West coast was equally unreachable by the IJN. The Two-Ocean Navy was on the ways and the new classes of BBs, CAs, CLs and DDs and naval aircraft were entering service.

 

Australia was too large for the JA to invade and occupy and the IJN had not the fuel reserves to go past Port Moresby and, perhaps, New Caledonia. This applied equally to operations in the Eastern Pacific and Indian Ocean, at least in 1942-43.

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The Navy faction, certainly. The atmosphere regarding the inevitability of war with the US at the command level of the Imperial Japanese Army was likely less favorable to such naval obsessions.

 

The impact of the intelligence superiority was punishing, as Yamamoto's plan made sense operationally.

No, it didn't, it needed the USN to act exactly as required by the plan.

 

Tactically, perhaps, although it should be considered that even though the USN did not do so, the Combined Fleet still had a chance that day.

 

Operationally, point No. 3 on your rather one-dimensional list of what could go wrong for Japan is the only one I'd consider applicable. I'd also agree with it, as not offering battle would have been frustrating for the IJN, to put it mildly.

 

Why, sorry, but other than dropping terms you evidently don't understand (operational, tactical) can you show how Midway's plan was operationally sensible?

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Threatening a Hawaiian island in order to bring the USN out for battle would have been counterproductive from the perspective of the IJN as well based on proximity to Hawaii's un-neutralizable land-based airpower infrastructure relative to Midway's. On this rare point, the Navy and Army would probably have agreed.

 

Midway would have been tough to crack, but how relatively untried and raw American troops would react in battle under conditions of total Japanese naval and air dominance was not a certainty at this point in the war, just 8 weeks removed from the surrender of Wainright's 15,000 American troops to the IJA 14th Army in the Philippines Campaign.

 

They could very well have fought to the last man. They also could very well have laid down their arms, heads bloody but unbowed or otherwise.

 

Why, sorry, but other than dropping terms you evidently don't understand (operational, tactical) can you show how Midway's plan was operationally sensible?

 

Threaten something of the enemy's close enough for it to rescue navally, but far away enough to deny a role for its un-neutralizable land-based airpower.

Wait for the USN to come charging to the rescue.

Attrit it on its way in.

Knock its block off in Tsushima-like fashion when it arrives.

 

The USN not offering battle would be operationally frustrating, as the question at the IJN high command level at that point would probably be something along the lines of how many cries for rescue from surrounded American forces it would take for the USN to respond to them.

Edited by Nobu
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Midway would have been tough to crack, but how relatively untried and raw American troops would react in battle under conditions of total Japanese naval and air dominance was not a certainty at this point in the war, just 8 weeks removed from the surrender of Wainright's 15,000 American troops to the IJA 14th Army in the Philippines Campaign.

 

That would have been a "Tarawa on steroids" debacle.

 

- the pre landing bombardment was short and due to be done by CA.

- a reef that blocks landing craft

- no Amtracks

- no radio communication to the CA

- lot's of automatic weapons ranging from a BAR to a 37mm AA gun and in front of that:

- mines of the beaches

- barbed wire

 

BTW, the relatively untried and raw American troops on Wilkes Island counterattacked and destroyed a numerically much superior Japanese force of app 90, loosing nine in the process.

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Threatening a Hawaiian island in order to bring the USN out for battle would have been counterproductive from the perspective of the IJN as well based on proximity to Hawaii's un-neutralizable land-based airpower infrastructure relative to Midway's. On this rare point, the Navy and Army would probably have agreed.

 

Midway would have been tough to crack, but how relatively untried and raw American troops would react in battle under conditions of total Japanese naval and air dominance was not a certainty at this point in the war, just 8 weeks removed from the surrender of Wainright's 15,000 American troops to the IJA 14th Army in the Philippines Campaign.

 

They could very well have fought to the last man. They also could very well have laid down their arms, heads bloody but unbowed or otherwise.

 

Why, sorry, but other than dropping terms you evidently don't understand (operational, tactical) can you show how Midway's plan was operationally sensible?

 

Threaten something of the enemy's close enough for it to rescue navally, but far away enough to deny a role for its un-neutralizable land-based airpower.

Wait for the USN to come charging to the rescue.

Attrit it on its way in.

Knock its block off in Tsushima-like fashion when it arrives.

 

The USN not offering battle would be operationally frustrating, as the question at the IJN high command level at that point would probably be something along the lines of how many cries for rescue from surrounded American forces it would take for the USN to respond to them.

 

That sure as hell didn't work as intended in Wake island, why would it work in Midway? The Philippines surrendered after a tough defence, the same Marines defeated the Japanese in Guadalcanal, without any additional experience, so the propects for Midway weren't good no matter what.

 

Yamamoto's plan involved an attack on the Aleutians, which were irrelevant, to draw USN forces away, but it was done at the same time, meaning its forces were not doing anything relevant and breaking the concentration of force principle.

 

On top of this, the IJN was dispersed all over the place in formations that weren't supporting each other, so once the carriers were sunk, there was nothing useful they could do but pull back.

 

Further, absent intelligence, Midway could be ignored even if it fell in Japanese hands, as it was in the middle of nowhere, it's impact on the war afterwards being just a refueling spot for subs.

 

Even if everything had gone the IJN way, the Americans can just withdraw before the battleships come into play, which is what Yamamoto expected to deliver the decisive blow, not unreasonably because the air groups were likely to be depleted after the initial battle and invasion.

 

In short, a complex plan that failed operationally and tactically.

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Actually Tarawa's defenses were fairly comparable to Midway's (more troops overall, fewer combat troops, probably rather better static defenses, same number of tanks). US amphibious doctrine was vastly more sophisticated than Japan's, attacking force had enormously more naval support, two divisions of Marines and it was still a bloodbath for us.

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I don't think so. One, they planned to build battle ships and battle cruisers, two they could not afford their grand eight-eight plan anyway.

 

Had they tried, they would have bankrupted themselves in a futile effort to keep up with the USA and the British Empire and probably ended up in a worse situation when being forced to negotiate.

I agree. They would be doing well to build six of those planned sixteen.

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I think the evident anti Yellow racism present in the US would have prevented any settlement with the Japanese Empire after PH.

 

...

 

FDR wanted war against Germany so he wanted war with Japan and refused to negotiate with Japan. Over confidence in his administation led them to think that PH was safe so a sure bet to push Japan over the edge diplomatically and economically regardless of Japanese efforts to negotiate. PH attack must have came to a big surprise. In deeper then we thought perhaps was the thought. How dare the japs go out of line of not keeping the attacks inside the western Pacific. Fully well aware of his administartions unwillingness to negotiate, FDR gave his day of infamy speech, bobbing his head and utilizing his tone in that way. A real actor. His unwillingness is just as much of a cause to the war in the Pacific. Or in American terms of victory, a war criminal.

Edited by JasonJ
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That would have been a "Tarawa on steroids" debacle.

 

It would have been a tough fight, no question, with the outcome in doubt.

 

That sure as hell didn't work as intended in Wake island

 

No it did not, until the Wake Island garrison, with heads bloody but unbowed and all that, surrendered.

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That would have been a "Tarawa on steroids" debacle.

 

It would have been a tough fight, no question, with the outcome in doubt.

 

That sure as hell didn't work as intended in Wake island

 

No it did not, until the Wake Island garrison, with heads bloody but unbowed and all that, surrendered.

They surrendered because the CO who didn't know the whole situation ordered them to. They were hunting down Japanese survivors at the time.

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Face palm.

And whoever gave the OK to drop A bombs on cities is also the American term of victory, a war criminal.

 

 

double-facepalm-for-when-one-facepalm-do

 

triple-facepalm-picard-812.jpg

Edited by Rich
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Face palm.

 

And whoever gave the OK to drop A bombs on cities is also the American term of victory, a war criminal.

double-facepalm-for-when-one-facepalm-do

 

triple-facepalm-picard-812.jpg

There wasn't justification to push to total and complete destruction of Imperial Japan. That was a US desire. Just like how Germany city bombed London to get their desire for the UK to surrender on Germany desires or how Japanese city bombed Chongqing to get CKS to surrender on Japan term's the US bombed Japan with nukes for US terms but also to show off new weapons to the world. If there are Japanese being convicted as war criminals of mass murder of civilians, then the order to drop the A bombs was also a war crime. Auguments about how ending the war sooner take the US demand of complete end and disarmemnt of Imperial Japan as a non-issue. That non-issue stands only on the fake narrative of "Japanese aggression".

Edited by JasonJ
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But surely the war aims of those dropping the bombs, whether its on China, or on Japan, ought to be considered also? Im frequently annoyed at lefties (of which I remain quaintly one) who contend the Bombing of Britain and Germany was pretty much the same thing and all a war crime. Im of the opinion if you do a military act, even if its a good one, as part of evil aims, than that act is complicit with it. Also, if you do an evil act to achieve good aims, then that cannot and should not be viewed the same way. If we had destroyed Nazi Germany via strategic bombing and saved 6 million jews, would anyone really regard it the way they do now? Probably not, no. Its far, far too easy for people to paint all motivations as equal, when try as I might, I cannot view Nazi Germany and Britain as equal in motivations. We wanted to preserve liberal Democracy, and they wanted to destroy it. Anything to stop Germany (or Japan doing the same thing for that matter) was fair game.

 

One can argue about Roosevelts motivation as well. I dont believe he WANTED a war with Japan. I think he expected one, and was determined to be as prepared as possible if it came. But equally he was going all out to try and push Japan to leave China, and if they had done it peacefully, all well and good. That clearly spectacularly backfired, but as an aim, I dont think any Japanese today would think their presence in China was justified. So what the Japanese Government was doing was an evil aim, whereas Roosevelts, even if it was apparently aggressive, clearly was not, because it has a good agenda. One ultimately, 70 years later, has actually proven more to benefit Japan than an Empire would have been.

 

 

Its easy for critics to decouple the things done in the war for the reasons WHY they were done. But its also very dishonest. I can happily own up to British atrocities in WW2, with the thought that we as a generation living in the peace that generation gave us, we dont really have the right to say they could have done better.

Edited by Stuart Galbraith
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Japanese conquest in China was not the same as Germany in Europe. The Chinese aggravated relations with Japanese just as much as vice versa. And CKS was captured by the Chinese commies in December 1936 and after 2 weeks of being held by the commies, they agreed on the second united front to fight the Japanese. The Second Sino-Japanese war did not start until 6-7 months after that. And before the outbreak CKS made preparations for expanding the war to Shanghai. This wasn't a sudden Japanese blitz on China. It was escalation on escalation and Japan reasoned that the Chinese weren't going to stop shooting so made a rash run for Nanjing. In the following year CKS rival Wang Jingwei urged CKS to make settlement with Japan to end the fighting. CKS refused. Wang Jingwei changed sides to Japan. Had Japan won, Wang's switch would have payed off. Japan conducting a holocaust in Wang's China? Where is it? I dare say China under Wang wouldn't be much worse if not perhaps better than CKS's certainly. As I pointed out before CKS's forces were a mess. His recruitment process for his forces involved many being forced into service and many millions dieing from CKS policies. However as we all know, in our reality, it was the commies that won China in the end, even worse at unimaginable scope. "Good intentions" all ruined already by 1949 with commie win. Then 1950, Tibet loses their independence as the commies march in. As part of CKS return to China and gifted Formosa by the US, massacre in 1947. And then as more people should know, the Korean War against the commies, almost losing nearly losing all of Korea. Millions more dead, including 10s of thousands of Americans and 1,000 of others including the British for a poor result of a whacko DPRK that continues to be q problem all the way up to today. I'd say keep those naive "good intentions" sucked big time. Like such intentions for 2003 Iraq. Save it for just Europe. But the US didn't know how to get itself into a war with Germany.

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That's the exact narrative of German apologists claiming that Poland brought it on itself by behaving needlessly provocative, backed by the British and French guarantees, maltreated the domestic German minority, wouldn't talk about reasonable German demands, mobiliized ahead of Germany, yadda yadda yadda. And the apparent mainstream of such sentiments in Japan, pandered to by official politics, remains the reason for its image as an unreconstructed blameshifter that cannot take responsibility for its actions in the past (which makes it doubtful whether it can for present or future ones), whatever it actually does for it.

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That's the exact narrative of German apologists claiming that Poland brought it on itself by behaving needlessly provocative, backed by the British and French guarantees, maltreated the domestic German minority, wouldn't talk about reasonable German demands, mobiliized ahead of Germany, yadda yadda yadda. And the apparent mainstream of such sentiments in Japan, pandered to by official politics, remains the reason for its image as an unreconstructed blameshifter that cannot take responsibility for its actions in the past (which makes it doubtful whether it can for present or future ones), whatever it actually does for it.

 

Germany blitzed Poland with Soviet ally.

 

Japan did not blitz China. CKS and his forces were coky in rousing up trouble. Shit hit the fan. Then suddenly CKS ordered the flooding of a river to slow the advance of the Japanese, flooding that killed 700,000 Chinese people. How many Poles did the Polish kill?

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That's the exact narrative of German apologists claiming that Poland brought it on itself by behaving needlessly provocative, backed by the British and French guarantees, maltreated the domestic German minority, wouldn't talk about reasonable German demands, mobiliized ahead of Germany, yadda yadda yadda. And the apparent mainstream of such sentiments in Japan, pandered to by official politics, remains the reason for its image as an unreconstructed blameshifter that cannot take responsibility for its actions in the past (which makes it doubtful whether it can for present or future ones), whatever it actually does for it.

 

Germany blitzed Poland with Soviet ally.

 

Japan did not blitz China. CKS and his forces were coky in rousing up trouble. Shit hit the fan. Then suddenly CKS ordered the flooding of a river to slow the advance of the Japanese, flooding that killed 700,000 Chinese people. How many Poles did the Polish kill?

 

 

Because they couldn't, not because they didn't want to.

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That's the exact narrative of German apologists claiming that Poland brought it on itself by behaving needlessly provocative, backed by the British and French guarantees, maltreated the domestic German minority, wouldn't talk about reasonable German demands, mobiliized ahead of Germany, yadda yadda yadda. And the apparent mainstream of such sentiments in Japan, pandered to by official politics, remains the reason for its image as an unreconstructed blameshifter that cannot take responsibility for its actions in the past (which makes it doubtful whether it can for present or future ones), whatever it actually does for it.

 

Germany blitzed Poland with Soviet ally.

 

Japan did not blitz China. CKS and his forces were coky in rousing up trouble. Shit hit the fan. Then suddenly CKS ordered the flooding of a river to slow the advance of the Japanese, flooding that killed 700,000 Chinese people. How many Poles did the Polish kill?

 

 

Because they couldn't, not because they didn't want to.

 

 

That is unfair to assume such an underlying intention. Japan's policy has been about making "collaborators". They did it in Korea, they did it with Manchuria, and they did it with China. "Collaborator" can vary between peoples commitment reaching from must collaborate because no choice to people they decided on their own to pick Japanese side. Consider that annexation of Korea was a result of not war. There was a pro-Japan group in Korea. The whole area of Manchuria was taken by relatively small force. But before that, as I already stated, the clique was backed by Japan. And Japanese occupied areas were operating with Chinese "collaborators", loads of them, Wang Jingwei being just one of them. Japan was willing to make to take none war means. CKS wanted Manchuria back. Although obviously he was in no capacity to take after the collapse of the clique in Manchuria (Fangtian Clique) given how he never moved into the area after the collapse of that clique. If CKS or any other Chinese warlords have a desire to keep Manchuria under Chinese control, thats fine for them to have that desire, but I don't think it should be some sort of sacred point that must not be abandoned. China boundaries changed all the time throughout its long history and most of Manchuria wasn't part of the deeply historically Chinese area.

 

But sure Japan was still grabbing land. Like most other countries. What gets me going is when people apply the justice and rightful and other romantic terms to the war. Japan lost. Japan did lots of really bad things too. Life goes on. But if one thinks the US was righteous in its path, its a whole load of BS.

 

I also find it rather rich that how people that know everything there is about Europe in WW2 in the back of their hand in all sorts of details making arguments about the Second Sino-Japan war when they know little more than a typical MSM news report about that war.

Edited by JasonJ
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Here's text from the entry about WW II in the 1960 and 1968 editions of the "Brockhaus", Germany's pre-eminent encyclopedia.

 

[...] On 3/21/1939 Hitler proposed an agreement to Poland, according to which the Free City of Danzig would be reattached to the Gn. Reich and Gny. was to gain extraterritorial links with East Prussia through the Pol. corridor, in exchange for final recognition of the Gn.-Pol. borders. The Pol. government rejected this suggestion on 3/26; it merely declared itself ready to discuss alleviating Gn. transit traffic through the corridor, proposed a joint Pol.-Gn. guarantee for Danzig and let its Berlin ambassador advise orally that further pursuit of the Gn. incorporation plan would mean war with Poland. Three days prior it had taken steps for a partial mobilization and concentration of troops on the Danzig border. Consequently, Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht at the end of March to prepare itself for military conflict with Poland, which seemed inevitable, until the end of August. He did not believe in an intervention of Great Britain and France into a Gn.-Pol. war, even though the Brit. and the Fr. government had assured Poland of their full support in case of a threat on 3/31, and Great Britain had guaranteed the Pol. borders (4/6). Due to Poland's and Great Britain's stance, on 4/28 he declared the Gn.-Pol. rapprochement agreement of 1/26/1934 and the Gn.-Engl. fleet agreement of 6/18/1935 as invalid. [...] In August, Gn.-Pol. relations aggravated through Pol. measures against ethnic Germans and Danzig which, propagandistically exaggerated, provided Hitler with grounds for war. On 8/23 he scheduled the attack for the 26th, but postponed it when on the afternoon of the 25th the signing of a Brit.-Pol.assistance pact was announced. To the Brit. government he had proposed an encompassing agreement at noon on the 25th; the latter declared itself ready for this after a peacef. resolution to the conflict on the 28th and suggested direct Gn.-Pol. negotiations. Hitler assented on the 29th to receive a Pol. negotiator. When the latter did not appear on the 30th as demanded by Hitler, and Poland ordered mobilization on the afternoon of the 30th, Hitler gave the order on the 31st for the attack on 9/1 at 4.45 hours. [...]

 

This was obviously a mainstream take in German society of the 60s: Poland was given every chance to avoid the whole thing by meeting some reasonable demands months earlier, but instead acted belligerently, undertook reprisals against its German minority, threatened Danzig, didn't get in on last-minute negotiation attempts, practically forcing Hitler's hand. At best, both sides were equally responsible for the war in this view, certainly not Germany alone.

 

It's the same relativist narrative as your take on Japan and China. I note that neither takes into account that the territorial situation was the result of prior wars declared by the same aggressors, either. Germany wouldn't have had any issues with an independent Poland if it hadn't happily co-started WW I. Japan wouldn't have been open to Chinese action if it hadn't invited itself into Manchuria. Either could certainly claim some injuries by the other side, but both brought themselves into the position to suffer them in the first place. And they used them gladly for their respective aggressive expansionist policies.

Edited by BansheeOne
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Here's text from the entry about WW II in the 1960 and 1968 editions of the "Brockhaus", Germany's pre-eminent encyclopedia.

 

[...] On 3/21/1939 Hitler proposed an agreement to Poland, according to which the Free City of Danzig would be reattached to the Gn. Reich and Gny. was to gain extraterritorial links mit East Prussia through the Pol. corridor, in exchange for final recognition of the Gn.-Pol. borders. The Pol. government rejected this suggestion on 3/26; it merely declared itself ready to discuss alleviatingGn. transit traffic through the corridor, proposed a joint Pol.-Gn. guarantee for Danzig and let its Berlin ambassador advise orally that further pursuit of the Gn. incorporation plan would mean war with Poland. Three days prior it had taken steps for a partial mobilization and concentration of troops on the Danzig border. Consequently, Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht at the end of March to prepare itself for military conflict with Poland, which seemed inevitable, until the end of August. He did not believe in an intervention of Great Britain and France into a Gn.-Pol. war, even though the Brit. and the Fr. government had assured Poland of their full support in case of a threat on 3/31, and Great Britain had guaranteed the Pol. borders (4/6). Due to Poland's and Great Britain's stance, on 4/28 he declared the Gn.-Pol. rapprochement agreement of 1/26/1934 and the Gn.-Engl. fleet agreement of 6/18/1935 as invalid. [...] In August, Gn.-Pol. relations aggravated through Pol. measures against ethnic Germans and Danzig which, propagandistically exaggerated, provided Hitler with grounds for war. On 8/23 he scheduled the attack for the 26th, but postponed it when on the afternoon of the 25th the signing of a Brit.-Pol.assistance pact was announced. To the Brit. government he had proposed an encompassing agreement at noon on the 25th; the latter declared itself ready for this after a peacef. resolution to the conflict on the 28th and suggested direct Gn.-Pol. negotiations. Hitler assented on the 29th to receive a Pol. negotiator. When the latter did not appear on the 30th as demanded by Hitler, and Poland ordered mobilization on the afternoon of the 30th, Hitler gave the order on the 31st for the attack on 9/1 at 4.45 hours. [...]

 

This was obviously a mainstream take in German society of the 60s: Poland was given every chance to avoid the whole thing by meeting some reasonable demands months earlier, but instead acted belligerently, undertook reprisals against its German minority, threatened Danzig, didn't get in on last-minute negotiation attempts, practically forcing Hitler's hand. At best, both sides were equally responsible for the war in this view, certainly not Germany alone.

 

It's the same relativist narrative as your take on Japan and China. I note that neither takes into account that the territorial situation was the result of prior wars declared by the same aggressors, either. Germany wouldn't have had any issues with an independent Poland if it hadn't happily co-started WW I. Japan wouldn't have been open to Chinese action if it hadn't invited itself into Manchuria. Either could certainly claim some injuries by the other side, but both brought themselves into the position to suffer them in the first place. And they used them gladly for their respective aggressive expansionist policies.

 

You're not reading my posts fully.

 

Sometimes the only way to win some of these arguments is to go back in time, make Japan a pussy, colonized by the Europeans for good measure, and let the Soviets have the rest. They still have outer Manchuria.

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