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Midway—77 Years Ago, Today.


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Another knee jerk reaction post. I included in the post about caution about getting to prideful about that past. I do find it annoying that after WW2 Japanese victory with the big banzai up by company's worth of soldiers and I do prefer the cooler tone approach by current JSDF. But your characterization of the post is baseless.

 

 

Not at all, you are going about what a great colonial power Japan was in Formosa, Korea and Manchukuo, yet the locals don't have that recollection, and no Japanese culture took hold in those places. Even the worst western colonial power (Belgium when Congo was the private property of its king) eventually left a common language and an administrative framework, nothing that could be called Japanese culture was left in the former Japanese colonies. And that without going on the territories conquered in WW2, so yes, there's enough base to show that Japan didn't have this colonial thing down pat.

 

Of course, for a childish denialist like you everything not Banzai enough are knee jerk reactions, racism, etc.

 

 

On a more serious note, of course I still want to reserve myself some space to be humble in that I do not know everything to the detail.

 

But some counter points (hurray[/sarc])

 

Of course in North Korea, all the institutions were wiped clean and washed out of with communism. Although the infrastructure still remained. Since the northern half of the Korean peninsula had the bulk of the mineral resources, Japanese developed industry was located in the north. So they inherited those industries which gave them the advantage ahead of the South for the first decade or two after the Korean War.

 

Manchukou was much the same result as North Korea. CCP would install its ideal of proper systems. This world naturally apply to the other parts under administration of Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo. CCP had their own ideas. Bluntly put, they were inferior to anything the Japanese had.

 

For South Korea, Japanese left tremendous influence in how to operate a country. The Chaebols were pretty much fashioned after Zaibatsu, along with everything else about work ethics and such.

 

As for Taiwan, a simila wiping out of Japanese style institutions would occur under the strict control of CKS. That strict control was included the February 22nd massacre in 1947 and mandatory Mandarin learning. So he too had his own ideas. A degree of democracy was first introduced in Taiwan in the 1930s. CKS would not continue that trend of democracy. Taiwan's first presidential election would come in 1996, and a big pro-Japan condidate who once served in the IJA as part of an AA unit won the election. Taiwan's economy did not grow during the 1950s and 1960s under his dominion. But again much infrastructure remained including the current presidential office building which is still used. Among many other points that you are probably aware of but are posting to bash me instead so just bashing.

 

To that last part, I would imagine my conduct in this thread has directed some of it. So for that, I apologize. Particularly to Stuart. We all know he tries more and he gave very kind words for Japan even which didn't warrant my sharp rebuttal even if I still disagree.

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Quite true. That also made the big loser of the Russo-German War ... Japan! As far as what-ifs are concerned, imagine Japan attacking only the European colonial possessions they wanted in the Far East and did not attack the Philippines, nor Guam, Wake, PH. Thus no casus belli for the US existed. This risk to JA would have been no greater for them than attacking the US, and most likely, FDR would not get a declaration of war against anybody in 1941, perhaps not until 1943....

 

Look at it from the Japanese perspective. The PI sits right on the flank of the SLOC to the DEI and the US is turning the PI into a fortress. The same US that is rather aggressively making war on Germany in the Atlantic without bothering about the formalities (=declaration of war).

 

I would trust that bunch staying neutral as far as I can push a standard type BB.

In the P.I., only Manila Bay and Rota were fortified, both vulnerable to aerial bombardment from Formosa. The Allied Asiatic Fleets were ineffective and air power largely absent. They could have done little damage to the IJN left flank, given what actually happened.

 

The undeclared naval war of FDR was pretty tame in the midst of real WWII. USN ASW remained ineffective and most surface raiders had been stopped or sent home.

 

The bunch that needed convincing was the US Congress. FDR had no influence on that and an external threat was required. Germany avoided it successfully until 11 December. Japan could have too.

I agree that going after the Dutch East Indies etc and not declaring war on the US was Japans best option, barring not going to war at all.

 

Both Germany and Japan were guilty of completely misunderstanding the US, both in terms of their willingness to go to war (isolationist sentiment was still pretty heavy) and their ability and willingness to wage war once war had broken out. The latter has always been very confusing to me since the US had been fighting in major wars, usually fairly competently, since the Revolution, and anybody with access to a 1930s era set of encyclopedias would have known that.

 

 

The Japanese understood full well of what power the US had. The IJN had advised against war with the US. And the Japanese government did seek a diplomatic path with Konoye from the summer to fall because they knew avoiding war with the US was by far the better choice. However US sanctions including the complete ban on oil, the demands to leave all of China with no interest on meeting to discuss that demand, and the US massive naval build up that was already underway, spells out an intention to not permit further Japanese expansion. The US had already committed itself to oil embargo, military build up, and hard stance on China. On that trend, even further Japanese expansion would not be tolerable. US submarines could easily operate from the Philippines and start interdiction. By 1943, the US would be ready. They aren't going to stay at home after making a navy of 15 fleet carriers and training so many naval pilots. A spark would occur either way. So when that would happen, then the Japanese wouldn't have the early stage opportunity to expand as far down as to Guadalcanal like it had in real life. Let's not kid ourselves. If the war didn't start in late 1941, and the Japanese just went into Indonesia and sinking the British fleet along the way, some spark would have happened in '42 or '43.

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A third device was going to be ready in theatre before the end of August.

They expected to have nine devices by the end of September and continue production at a starting rate of three per month.

 

The Japanese surrender allowed the US to halt production and build a safer and more efficient production line.

Not to be contrary (and taken with a grain of salt since I'm relying on experts rather than being one!) but I think there are some doubts as to being able to achieve that. I attended a talk with Captain Sweeney years ago and he made a an interesting comment about there being far more debate about returning with a bomb than published because if Hiroshima didn't cause a surrender their bomb would "expire" and it was uncertain when they would get a replacement to drop. That didn't make a lot of sense until reading Dr. Curatola's book years later and having a chance to hear him speak and the program was in a lot more uncertain state than I had ever read. Even before it fell to crap at the end of the war they were really not at a technical level to do what they were doing, they were persevering by brute force and effort and not an insignificant amount of risk. Apparently internally there was a lot of doubt that they would get anywhere close to those production levels and were encouraging backing off on nukes for Downfall as much as possible without bluntly stating "you might not have them".

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On a more serious note, of course I still want to reserve myself some space to be humble in that I do not know everything to the detail.

 

But some counter points (hurray[/sarc])

 

Of course in North Korea, all the institutions were wiped clean and washed out of with communism. Although the infrastructure still remained. Since the northern half of the Korean peninsula had the bulk of the mineral resources, Japanese developed industry was located in the north. So they inherited those industries which gave them the advantage ahead of the South for the first decade or two after the Korean War.

 

Manchukou was much the same result as North Korea. CCP would install its ideal of proper systems. This world naturally apply to the other parts under administration of Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo. CCP had their own ideas. Bluntly put, they were inferior to anything the Japanese had.

 

For South Korea, Japanese left tremendous influence in how to operate a country. The Chaebols were pretty much fashioned after Zaibatsu, along with everything else about work ethics and such.

 

As for Taiwan, a simila wiping out of Japanese style institutions would occur under the strict control of CKS. That strict control was included the February 22nd massacre in 1947 and mandatory Mandarin learning. So he too had his own ideas. A degree of democracy was first introduced in Taiwan in the 1930s. CKS would not continue that trend of democracy. Taiwan's first presidential election would come in 1996, and a big pro-Japan condidate who once served in the IJA as part of an AA unit won the election. Taiwan's economy did not grow during the 1950s and 1960s under his dominion. But again much infrastructure remained including the current presidential office building which is still used. Among many other points that you are probably aware of but are posting to bash me instead so just bashing.

 

To that last part, I would imagine my conduct in this thread has directed some of it. So for that, I apologize. Particularly to Stuart. We all know he tries more and he gave very kind words for Japan even which didn't warrant my sharp rebuttal even if I still disagree.

 

 

More Banzai nonsense. The Japanese left behind infrastructure required to exploit the colonies, period.

 

There was no trend to democracy, there was a trend to supress Chinese identity in Taiwan and Korean in Korea, which, if the trend extended at infinitum, may have led to the subjects to become Japanese like Italians under the Roman empire, but that was not in the cards in the 30s, 40s and the cards were thrown out in 45.

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A third device was going to be ready in theatre before the end of August.

They expected to have nine devices by the end of September and continue production at a starting rate of three per month.

 

The Japanese surrender allowed the US to halt production and build a safer and more efficient production line.

Not to be contrary (and taken with a grain of salt since I'm relying on experts rather than being one!) but I think there are some doubts as to being able to achieve that. I attended a talk with Captain Sweeney years ago and he made a an interesting comment about there being far more debate about returning with a bomb than published because if Hiroshima didn't cause a surrender their bomb would "expire" and it was uncertain when they would get a replacement to drop. That didn't make a lot of sense until reading Dr. Curatola's book years later and having a chance to hear him speak and the program was in a lot more uncertain state than I had ever read. Even before it fell to crap at the end of the war they were really not at a technical level to do what they were doing, they were persevering by brute force and effort and not an insignificant amount of risk. Apparently internally there was a lot of doubt that they would get anywhere close to those production levels and were encouraging backing off on nukes for Downfall as much as possible without bluntly stating "you might not have them".

 

Was this the book you refer to?

https://www.archives.gov/kansas-city/press/2016/16-10.html

I might get that, looks like my cup of tea.

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A third device was going to be ready in theatre before the end of August.

They expected to have nine devices by the end of September and continue production at a starting rate of three per month.

 

The Japanese surrender allowed the US to halt production and build a safer and more efficient production line.

Not to be contrary (and taken with a grain of salt since I'm relying on experts rather than being one!) but I think there are some doubts as to being able to achieve that. I attended a talk with Captain Sweeney years ago and he made a an interesting comment about there being far more debate about returning with a bomb than published because if Hiroshima didn't cause a surrender their bomb would "expire" and it was uncertain when they would get a replacement to drop. That didn't make a lot of sense until reading Dr. Curatola's book years later and having a chance to hear him speak and the program was in a lot more uncertain state than I had ever read. Even before it fell to crap at the end of the war they were really not at a technical level to do what they were doing, they were persevering by brute force and effort and not an insignificant amount of risk. Apparently internally there was a lot of doubt that they would get anywhere close to those production levels and were encouraging backing off on nukes for Downfall as much as possible without bluntly stating "you might not have them".

 

Hans Bethe claimed 2 Pu and 2 U235 bomb could be produced per month starting IIRC Nov. 1945.

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https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-7-1/CMH_Pub_70-7-1.pdf

 

The USCMH book, Command Decisions, a worthy edition for anybody's library.

 

See the essay by Louis Morton, "Japan's Decision for War," still viable to this day.

 

His conclusion:

 

This plan was not entirely unrealistic in 1941, but it completely
overlooked the American reaction to Pearl Harbor and the refusal of
the United States to fight a limited war-or Japan's ability to so
limit it. The risks were recognized, but the alternatives were not estimated
correctly. Yet, even had the Japanese appreciated fully the extent
of the risks, they would probably have made the same decision.
To them, correctly or incorrectly, the only choice was submission or
war, and they chose the latter in the hope that their initial advantages
and the rapid conquest of southern Asia would offset the enormous
industrial and military potential of the enemy.
In the final analysis, the Japanese decision for war was the result
of the conviction, supported by the economic measures imposed by
the United States and America's policy in China, that the United
States was determined to reduce Japan to a position of secondary importance.
The nation, Tojo and his supporters felt, was doomed if it
did not meet the challenge. In their view, Japan had no alternative
but to go to war while she still had the power to do so. She might
lose, but defeat was better than humiliation and submission. ''Japan
entered the war," wrote a prince of the Imperial family, "with a
tragic determination and in desperate self-abandonment." If it lost,
"there will be nothing to regret because she is doomed to collapse
even without war." 51
51 Statement of Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, 9 Jun 49, ATIS, G-2 FEe, copy in OCMH

 

 

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I'd have also added at least a mention of the consistent track record of turn of the century American legislation targeting Japanese in particular, and Asiatic races of various denominations in general, in paragraph 2.

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On a more serious note, of course I still want to reserve myself some space to be humble in that I do not know everything to the detail.

 

But some counter points (hurray[/sarc])

 

Of course in North Korea, all the institutions were wiped clean and washed out of with communism. Although the infrastructure still remained. Since the northern half of the Korean peninsula had the bulk of the mineral resources, Japanese developed industry was located in the north. So they inherited those industries which gave them the advantage ahead of the South for the first decade or two after the Korean War.

 

Manchukou was much the same result as North Korea. CCP would install its ideal of proper systems. This world naturally apply to the other parts under administration of Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo. CCP had their own ideas. Bluntly put, they were inferior to anything the Japanese had.

 

For South Korea, Japanese left tremendous influence in how to operate a country. The Chaebols were pretty much fashioned after Zaibatsu, along with everything else about work ethics and such.

 

As for Taiwan, a simila wiping out of Japanese style institutions would occur under the strict control of CKS. That strict control was included the February 22nd massacre in 1947 and mandatory Mandarin learning. So he too had his own ideas. A degree of democracy was first introduced in Taiwan in the 1930s. CKS would not continue that trend of democracy. Taiwan's first presidential election would come in 1996, and a big pro-Japan condidate who once served in the IJA as part of an AA unit won the election. Taiwan's economy did not grow during the 1950s and 1960s under his dominion. But again much infrastructure remained including the current presidential office building which is still used. Among many other points that you are probably aware of but are posting to bash me instead so just bashing.

 

To that last part, I would imagine my conduct in this thread has directed some of it. So for that, I apologize. Particularly to Stuart. We all know he tries more and he gave very kind words for Japan even which didn't warrant my sharp rebuttal even if I still disagree.

 

 

More Banzai nonsense. The Japanese left behind infrastructure required to exploit the colonies, period.

 

There was no trend to democracy, there was a trend to supress Chinese identity in Taiwan and Korean in Korea, which, if the trend extended at infinitum, may have led to the subjects to become Japanese like Italians under the Roman empire, but that was not in the cards in the 30s, 40s and the cards were thrown out in 45.

 

 

I think you are imagining a purpose different than what I have been stating. I wasn't saying that they were great examples and that they were going to leave behind a world of genuine democracy, prosperity, and so on. It is true that during the war years, they went tight on control. So even though a degree of democracy was introduced into Taiwan in the 30s, it would not continue into the 40s and at the end by 45. But I do find that to be a reaction to war conditions, it it being unfair to just assume the same conditions would still have been applied if there was no war.

 

But the original point that I have been trying to pass is the result that each of these places actually got. It's you call to believe that DPRK and CCP regimes were better than times when part of Japanese empire. Taiwan and ROK would prove a time better than when part of the empire by 1970s~1980s. If there was no Pacific War, and if colonies around the world had their independence movements in Africa, South East Asia, etc, I'd imagine Korea probably would take the same path, and off they would go. Although I reckon there being a good chance of Taiwan remaining as part of the empire.

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Indeed you are right, on August 10 Groves reported that a third bomb would be ready by August 17 or 18, although there were problems with the explosives, as the castings had cracked, and the detonator "chimneys" had to built in place, but after that one there were no more bombs until September. The problem is that there was no industrial process end to end to build the bombs, they were assembled by hand.

 

Post-war, there were different issues as the Manhattan project was strictly wartime, so scientist and resources went away when the war ended and Los Alamos had to be built up again post war, but that's another story.

 

 

I see what you're saying. It's fascinating and a little terrifying how jury-rigged those early atomic bombs were.

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That table's not necessarily indicative of how many bombs the US could have produced if it went all out in 1945 though. I think after the war there was a bit of a hiatus as scientists left the Manhattan project and the production emphasis shifted slightly more to thinking about research and making things safer and more sustainable after the belt and braces approach during the war.

 

Those 299 bombs in 1950 were produced using essentially the same reactors and reprocessing plants as were available in 1945 IIRC with the obvious caveats mentioned above to do with the facilities available or otherwise to manufacture the available material into bombs.

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More Banzai nonsense. The Japanese left behind infrastructure required to exploit the colonies, period.

 

That infrastructure was apparently extensive, as under the economic direction of Abe's grandfather, approximately 1 million Chinese were transported to work as slave laborers in the factories and mines of Manchuria every year from 1938 to 1945.

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I'm away from my books, but I think the production for 1945 was 4 and for 1946, 9.

 

Ah, yes, the FAS Atomic Notebook is online:

 

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1177/0096340213501363?src=recsys

 

Does that include the Trinity test, or separate from it?

 

 

These are inventories, ie, bombs available at the end of each year so they don't include those that went off. But, and this is a big but, the definition of a bomb is rather flexible, were they just the cores? the external casings? the explosive assemblies? were they combat ready?. In the later half of the 40s, once the AEC had replaced the MED and Los Alamos had found a mission, a Congressional mission was horrified to find that the stockpile numbers were theoretical as they were just components that needed to be assembled and there was no confidence the actual numbers could be reached given the degradation of the components.

 

The story of the Demon Core shows how this was a rather artisanal process: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demon_core

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On a more serious note, of course I still want to reserve myself some space to be humble in that I do not know everything to the detail.

 

But some counter points (hurray[/sarc])

 

Of course in North Korea, all the institutions were wiped clean and washed out of with communism. Although the infrastructure still remained. Since the northern half of the Korean peninsula had the bulk of the mineral resources, Japanese developed industry was located in the north. So they inherited those industries which gave them the advantage ahead of the South for the first decade or two after the Korean War.

 

Manchukou was much the same result as North Korea. CCP would install its ideal of proper systems. This world naturally apply to the other parts under administration of Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo. CCP had their own ideas. Bluntly put, they were inferior to anything the Japanese had.

 

For South Korea, Japanese left tremendous influence in how to operate a country. The Chaebols were pretty much fashioned after Zaibatsu, along with everything else about work ethics and such.

 

As for Taiwan, a simila wiping out of Japanese style institutions would occur under the strict control of CKS. That strict control was included the February 22nd massacre in 1947 and mandatory Mandarin learning. So he too had his own ideas. A degree of democracy was first introduced in Taiwan in the 1930s. CKS would not continue that trend of democracy. Taiwan's first presidential election would come in 1996, and a big pro-Japan condidate who once served in the IJA as part of an AA unit won the election. Taiwan's economy did not grow during the 1950s and 1960s under his dominion. But again much infrastructure remained including the current presidential office building which is still used. Among many other points that you are probably aware of but are posting to bash me instead so just bashing.

 

To that last part, I would imagine my conduct in this thread has directed some of it. So for that, I apologize. Particularly to Stuart. We all know he tries more and he gave very kind words for Japan even which didn't warrant my sharp rebuttal even if I still disagree.

 

 

More Banzai nonsense. The Japanese left behind infrastructure required to exploit the colonies, period.

 

There was no trend to democracy, there was a trend to supress Chinese identity in Taiwan and Korean in Korea, which, if the trend extended at infinitum, may have led to the subjects to become Japanese like Italians under the Roman empire, but that was not in the cards in the 30s, 40s and the cards were thrown out in 45.

 

 

I think you are imagining a purpose different than what I have been stating. I wasn't saying that they were great examples and that they were going to leave behind a world of genuine democracy, prosperity, and so on. It is true that during the war years, they went tight on control. So even though a degree of democracy was introduced into Taiwan in the 30s, it would not continue into the 40s and at the end by 45. But I do find that to be a reaction to war conditions, it it being unfair to just assume the same conditions would still have been applied if there was no war.

 

But the original point that I have been trying to pass is the result that each of these places actually got. It's you call to believe that DPRK and CCP regimes were better than times when part of Japanese empire. Taiwan and ROK would prove a time better than when part of the empire by 1970s~1980s. If there was no Pacific War, and if colonies around the world had their independence movements in Africa, South East Asia, etc, I'd imagine Korea probably would take the same path, and off they would go. Although I reckon there being a good chance of Taiwan remaining as part of the empire.

 

 

I am amazed at the non-sequiturs here. When you start a war, you can't blame the war for the change of conditions. The Commuinist regimes were caused by the fall of the Japanese empire, a fall that was caused by its overreaching and aggressiveness in attacking all other powers within reach but one.

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I am amazed at the non-sequiturs here. When you start a war, you can't blame the war for the change of conditions. The Commuinist regimes were caused by the fall of the Japanese empire, a fall that was caused by its overreaching and aggressiveness in attacking all other powers within reach but one.

 

Conditions for the ethnic native population in Manchuria were worse under Nobusuke Kishi's administration, I will grant you, as his policies were based on the harnessing of its people to maximize the industrial potential of it, and on Japanese racial superiority over it.

 

For what it is worth, his views changed upon his rehabilitation post war, at least outwardly, to the point where he remade himself into a statesman for modern Japan and Japanese.

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On a more serious note, of course I still want to reserve myself some space to be humble in that I do not know everything to the detail.

 

But some counter points (hurray[/sarc])

 

Of course in North Korea, all the institutions were wiped clean and washed out of with communism. Although the infrastructure still remained. Since the northern half of the Korean peninsula had the bulk of the mineral resources, Japanese developed industry was located in the north. So they inherited those industries which gave them the advantage ahead of the South for the first decade or two after the Korean War.

 

Manchukou was much the same result as North Korea. CCP would install its ideal of proper systems. This world naturally apply to the other parts under administration of Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo. CCP had their own ideas. Bluntly put, they were inferior to anything the Japanese had.

 

For South Korea, Japanese left tremendous influence in how to operate a country. The Chaebols were pretty much fashioned after Zaibatsu, along with everything else about work ethics and such.

 

As for Taiwan, a simila wiping out of Japanese style institutions would occur under the strict control of CKS. That strict control was included the February 22nd massacre in 1947 and mandatory Mandarin learning. So he too had his own ideas. A degree of democracy was first introduced in Taiwan in the 1930s. CKS would not continue that trend of democracy. Taiwan's first presidential election would come in 1996, and a big pro-Japan condidate who once served in the IJA as part of an AA unit won the election. Taiwan's economy did not grow during the 1950s and 1960s under his dominion. But again much infrastructure remained including the current presidential office building which is still used. Among many other points that you are probably aware of but are posting to bash me instead so just bashing.

 

To that last part, I would imagine my conduct in this thread has directed some of it. So for that, I apologize. Particularly to Stuart. We all know he tries more and he gave very kind words for Japan even which didn't warrant my sharp rebuttal even if I still disagree.

 

More Banzai nonsense. The Japanese left behind infrastructure required to exploit the colonies, period.

 

There was no trend to democracy, there was a trend to supress Chinese identity in Taiwan and Korean in Korea, which, if the trend extended at infinitum, may have led to the subjects to become Japanese like Italians under the Roman empire, but that was not in the cards in the 30s, 40s and the cards were thrown out in 45.

I think you are imagining a purpose different than what I have been stating. I wasn't saying that they were great examples and that they were going to leave behind a world of genuine democracy, prosperity, and so on. It is true that during the war years, they went tight on control. So even though a degree of democracy was introduced into Taiwan in the 30s, it would not continue into the 40s and at the end by 45. But I do find that to be a reaction to war conditions, it it being unfair to just assume the same conditions would still have been applied if there was no war.

 

But the original point that I have been trying to pass is the result that each of these places actually got. It's you call to believe that DPRK and CCP regimes were better than times when part of Japanese empire. Taiwan and ROK would prove a time better than when part of the empire by 1970s~1980s. If there was no Pacific War, and if colonies around the world had their independence movements in Africa, South East Asia, etc, I'd imagine Korea probably would take the same path, and off they would go. Although I reckon there being a good chance of Taiwan remaining as part of the empire.

I am amazed at the non-sequiturs here. When you start a war, you can't blame the war for the change of conditions. The Commuinist regimes were caused by the fall of the Japanese empire, a fall that was caused by its overreaching and aggressiveness in attacking all other powers within reach but one.

What's more surprising is the mixing of ally justice feeling with hindsight view that speaks in bias automatically set to be contray. The same argument could be pointed the other way had history played differently.

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What's more surprising is the mixing of ally justice feeling with hindsight view that speaks in bias automatically set to be contray. The same argument could be pointed the other way had history played differently.

 

 

You sure about that? show me the US invading Manchuria in 1931 using a false flag operation, and then going for the rest of the country. Show me the US officers running wages to see who cuts more Japanese heads, or the routine execution and abuse of PoWs, because, according to you, the same arguments could be pointed the other way...

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