Inf Treaty

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

 

 

 

 

Works for me. You could host that just as easily on a Typhoon. Wonder if one would fit in the internal bay of an F35B?

 

JSOW barely fits (except F-35B), ASMP-A is mor than one metre longer than JSOW.

http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/planes/q0163.shtml

 

You don't really need internal carriage for a 500+ km standoff munition anyway.

As mentioned, I think of ASMP-A as a deterrent against the use of nukes on 'tactical' land targets. ASMP-A can easily be brought to action against equivalent "tactical" 'red' land targets.

 

 

Thanks for that. I was just idly wondering what we could use if we ever decide we need a capability on the QE carriers.

 

 

How could basing a nuclear deterrent on aircraft carriers, of which we'll ever have, at most, two, and will be heavily tasked elsewhere, ever make sense?

 

 

Because its cool?

 

And besides, dropping a 10 kiloton weapon on the submarine pens at Murmansk is a MUCH better counterforce solution than sending one 3000 miles on the end of a Trident. And a reasonable response if the Kremlin throws around buckets of sunshine in a deescalatory strike.

 

 

For that to work:

 

1. The carrier would have to be in the right place at the right time and not itself have been sunk.

2. The launch aircraft and missile would have to make it to the target.

3. I'm not sure how many "pens" a single cruise missile could take out, but it would indeed be strange if they contained submarines that you might think would have better places to be at the outset of a conflict.

4. The payback would take out our only SSBN base, probably kill at least two SSBNs and eliminate the sustainability of our deterrent.

 

Other than that, I think it's a great idea.

 

 

1 F35B has a range of 900NM. So lets halve that for combat range, 450miles. Then say we have a weapon of over 300nm range, like stormshadow. Then throw in middair refueling, say via buddy pack. Thats a hell of a lot of sea room, particularly if you arent expecting them. Even a superhornet has only 390nm combat radius, and they hang B61's on that.

 

It takes off from a ship. The Russians are entitled to shadow our surface ships, quite openly, and often used to do so. It would be unlikely to survive to the point where such an attack took off, but, should it do so, whether or not it survived from that point on would be moot.

 

2 If its a stand off weapon, I cant see a problem, particularly if you launch from the land side where you can exploit terrain masking.

 

ASMP is quite a fast missile - I'm not sure how much it can use terrain masking. If you are now coming up with a nuclear Storm Shadow, that would be an entirely new weapon and could have way over 300nm range.

 

3 If they deploy, we would sink them. Far better for them to keep them in the barn or a boomer bastion.

 

They would have deployed prior to the outset of a conflict. If, and it's a big if (have you counted our SSNs recently?), we sank them, it would be a bit of phyrric victory having sunk an SSGN that had just launched 72 cruise missiles at the UK

 

4 But that would be a strategic weapon attack, requiring an appropriate response! And if that sounds ropy logic, that is precisely the logic the Russian General staff has been thinking of employing, in attacking US strategic targets with tactical weapoins, because they figure it wont cross the strategic threshold. If it works for them, maybe they will see it the same way?

 

The trouble is we are a lot more vulnerable than they are. Better to deter a conflict from getting to the point where we each start lobbing hypersonics at command centres etc. by at least making the areas they might seek to invade a lot less appetising (not that they are particularly tasty at the moment.)

 

Its not a particularly useful idea, I grant you, but neither is INF, except in purely political terms. But it increases the threat calculation, and makes it impossible for Russia to take carriers off its shore without anything but alarm. I find that a useful idea, in some circumstances at least.

 

And how would this be better than simply putting a few nuclear TLAMs on our SSNs?

[Roman Alymov]

"For a decade and a half after the United States lost its nuclear monopoly, it strove diligently to build far more deliverable nuclear weapons than any other country.It is true that the United States began to accept quantitative equality with its primary adversary, the Soviet Union, by the late 1960s and 1970s. Two points are in order. First, the United States accepted parity only reluctantly. As James Cameron astutely observed, “Nixon hated MAD, believed its logic was defeatist and naïve, yet he signed agreements that enshrined it at the heart of the United States’ relations with the Soviet Union.” Mired in a disastrous war in Southeast Asia and facing both economic and domestic political constraints on military spending, the United States pulled in its horns. Second, while American policymakers accepted quantitative parity, they still sought qualitative primacy over U.S. adversaries.

How did the United States seek this superiority? Concurrent to American policymakers negotiating and accepting the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and SALT II) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaties, the U.S. government undertook a massive, extraordinary effort to develop and deploy more sophisticated nuclear weapons and systems to support them. This allowed the United States to exploit its natural advantages over the Soviet Union. As John Mauer has argued,

American leaders raced the Soviets in military technologies where the United States was perceived to enjoy significant advantages, while simultaneously entangling the Soviet Union in an arms control regime that would limit areas of Soviet strength. By combining arms racing and arms control, the United States pursued a holistic offset strategy.29

As historians Niccolo Petrelli and Giordana Pulcini reveal, between 1969 and 1976 the Nixon and Ford administrations “actively sought to transcend nuclear parity.”

In the years after quantitative parity was accepted, the United States developed and deployed a number of technologically sophisticated and expensive capabilities, including the Pershing II, MX, Trident D-5, as well as cruise missiles. It also invested enormous resources into missile defense; anti-submarine warfare (i.e., targeting and eluding Soviet nuclear submarines); and command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities.31 As Austin Long and Brendan Green demonstrate in their path-breaking work, the United States “invested massive resources into intelligence capabilities for a first strike, including successful innovation in tracking submarines and mobile missiles.”32 These expenditures were oriented toward systems whose characteristics and capabilities, such as speed, stealth, intelligence, and accuracy, were best suited to a nuclear posture that focused on counterforce, damage limitation, and even preemptive uses. In other words, the nuclear forces built in the decades after the SALT and ABM treaties made little sense if the United States had fully embraced the consequences of mutual vulnerability spelled out by the nuclear-revolution school. This is certainly how the Soviet Union perceived these efforts. Because of the “development of American counterforce capabilities,” Soviet leaders “were uncertain they could indefinitely maintain a secure second strike in spite of their strenuous efforts."

 

from https://tnsr.org/2019/01/rethinking-the-bomb-nuclear-weapons-and-american-grand-strategy/?fbclid=IwAR1B9xIP_4I2seHH0TZr53VALIQiSgLrsam1ktl5mpaKSc_HvK3TKr0yPnY

Rethinking the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy

Edited February 26, 2019 by Roman Alymov

[glenn239]

 

https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/after-putins-warning-russian-tv-lists-nuclear-targets-in-us/ar-BBU3zGr?ocid=spartandhp

 

This article indicates that nuclear tipped hypersonic missiles off the US coast would be based on submarines, not on surface ships.

Probably they are referring to this report - clearly whole story is nothing more than TV sketch, as to get within 400 km off US coast Russian submarines would have to cross all US anti-submarine defense lines, meaning they will be in inferior position even to Soviet submarines of 1970th

 

with English subtitles

 

 

Since submarines would cross ASW picket lines during peacetime, these are not a factor. If the deployment as pictured were to occur, and if the submarines themselves could evade detection, then Washington would have to reckon with the destruction of key targets in the continental USA within minutes of launching its own strikes into Russia from Europe. This would deter any thoughts of attacks into Russia, or, alternatively, the preparations on US soil to evade such counterstrikes, (ie, evacuate the Pentagon), would give away the game and put the defenses on high alert.

 

This poll here,

 

https://thehill.com/policy/international/431779-majority-of-americans-in-gallup-poll-now-sees-russian-military-power-as

 

Indicates that a slim majority of US citizens view Russia as the primary military threat. However, the breakout out between Democrats (46%) vs. Republicans (14%) is the telling detail - I would suspect from this remarkable divide that Russian counterforce targeting would reflect that divide. Given the range of Zircon, the submarines in the picture seem oriented towards coastal (ie, Democrat) territory. A historical analogy might be if the British had nuclear weapons in 1938 and had a targeting policy prioritizing Prussian target centers, or if in the Cold War the US had a targeting policy placing more importance on Russian territory and less importance on Belarus, Ukraine, Baltic States, etc.

Edited February 27, 2019 by glenn239

[Roman Alymov]

 

 

https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/after-putins-warning-russian-tv-lists-nuclear-targets-in-us/ar-BBU3zGr?ocid=spartandhp

 

This article indicates that nuclear tipped hypersonic missiles off the US coast would be based on submarines, not on surface ships.

Probably they are referring to this report - clearly whole story is nothing more than TV sketch, as to get within 400 km off US coast Russian submarines would have to cross all US anti-submarine defense lines, meaning they will be in inferior position even to Soviet submarines of 1970th

 

 

Since submarines would cross ASW picket lines during peacetime, these are not a factor. If the deployment as pictured were to occur, and if the submarines themselves could evade detection, then Washington would have to reckon with the destruction of key targets in the continental USA within minutes of launching its own strikes into Russia from Europe. This would deter any thoughts of attacks into Russia, or, alternatively, the preparations on US soil to evade such counterstrikes, (ie, evacuate the Pentagon), would give away the game and put the defenses on high alert.

 

This poll here,

 

https://thehill.com/policy/international/431779-majority-of-americans-in-gallup-poll-now-sees-russian-military-power-as

 

Indicates that a slim majority of US citizens view Russia as the primary military threat. However, the breakout out between Democrats (46%) vs. Republicans (14%) is the telling detail - I would suspect from this remarkable divide that Russian counterforce targeting would reflect that divide. Given the range of Zircon, the submarines in the picture seem oriented towards coastal (ie, Democrat) territory. A historical analogy might be if the British had nuclear weapons in 1938 and had a targeting policy prioritizing Prussian target centers, or if in the Cold War the US had a targeting policy placing more importance on Russian territory and less importance on Belarus, Ukraine, Baltic States, etc.

 

Defensive lines themselves are not destroying submarines both in peace time and in war time, so most likely submarine would be detected and shadowed (US Navy clearly got potential to do it). Of course there is slim probability of one or two submarines getting through - but it is not changing much in terms of mutual nuclear destruction as being destroyed half an hour earlier or later is not big deal. As for me it is clearly political message tool. Note it is not even developed now, only plans for it...

And i doubt burning Democrats to please Republicans is reasonable strategy for Russia (or anybody else). Let's hope both US parties would reach some kind of peace agreement without another Civil War or WWIII.

[glenn239]

Roman, if Russian submarines can be tracked at will by the US Navy, then what's the point of them? They're garbage.

[Roman Alymov]

Roman, if Russian submarines can be tracked at will by the US Navy, then what's the point of them? They're garbage.

Have i said "at will"? I do not think so. Russian submarines are quite useful when operating near Russian shores or open ocean - and they are now able to launch ICBMs even from own base to reach any point on the globe.. But crossing massive and sophisticated detection lines is the receipt for being detected, and opposing side submarine on duty to start pursuit assisted by aviation, surface ships and so on - with high chances of maintaining the contact (otherwise what is the need for this detection lines?)

[glenn239]

 

Roman, if Russian submarines can be tracked at will by the US Navy, then what's the point of them? They're garbage.

Have i said "at will"? I do not think so. Russian submarines are quite useful when operating near Russian shores or open ocean - and they are now able to launch ICBMs even from own base to reach any point on the globe.. But crossing massive and sophisticated detection lines is the receipt for being detected, and opposing side submarine on duty to start pursuit assisted by aviation, surface ships and so on - with high chances of maintaining the contact (otherwise what is the need for this detection lines?)

 

 

The proposed deployment map to me suggests that the Russian navy is of the opinion that they can evade detection, even if subject to a massive search. Otherwise submarine launch platforms are no better than surface ships.

[Roman Alymov]

 

 

The proposed deployment map to me suggests that the Russian navy is of the opinion that they can evade detection, even if subject to a massive search. Otherwise submarine launch platforms are no better than surface ships.

 

Good thing about submarines is that even when submarine is shadowed by another submarine, this contact could be lost (temporary or forever) any moment due to natural reasons or evasive maneuver, so nobody could guarantee destruction of them (not mentioning difficulty of communicating the attack order to hunter submarine). Massive search itself is consuming and easy to detect task (especially taking into account ocean will be full of underwater drones of many countries in few years - they are cheaper then flying ones). But i do not think this plans (if they are really plans) were discussed with Navy - most likely they are only on political/media level now.

[Stuart Galbraith]

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/25/russian-state-tv-map-potential-us-nuclear-targets-hypersonic-missile

 

In the Sunday evening broadcast, Dmitry Kiselyov, the presenter of Russia’s main weekly TV news programme, Vesti Nedeli, showed a map of the US and identified several targets he said Moscow would want to hit in the event of a nuclear war.

 

The targets, which Kiselyov described as US presidential or military command centres, also included Fort Ritchie, a military training centre in Maryland closed in 1998, McClellan air force base in California, which closed in 2001, and Jim Creek, a naval communications base in Washington state.

Kiselyov, who is close to the Kremlin, said the Tsirkon hypersonic missile that Russia was developing could reach their targets in less than five minutes if launched from Russian submarines.

Hypersonic flight is generally taken to mean travelling through the atmosphere at more than five times the speed of sound.

“For now, we’re not threatening anyone, but if such a deployment takes place, our response will be instant,” he said.

Kiselyov is one of the main conduits of state television’s strongly anti-American tone, once saying Moscow could turn the US into radioactive ash.

Asked to comment on Kiselyov’s report, the Kremlin said on Monday it did not interfere in state TV’s editorial policy.

 

We're not threatening anyone, but we are are threatening someone. uhuh.

[Stuart Galbraith]

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/feb/27/russian-missile-threat-to-us-homeland/

The commander of the Pentagon’s Northern Command warned this week that Moscow is deploying conventionally armed missiles that for the first time are capable of striking targets deep inside the United States.

Air Force Gen. Terrence O’Shaughnessy, who is also commander of the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Command (NORAD), stated in prepared congressional testimony that while Russian nuclear missiles have threatened the country for more than 50 years, Moscow “only recently developed and deployed capabilities to threaten us below the nuclear threshold.”

The new threats include offensive cyberattacks and a new generation of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.

The missiles can be fired farther from U.S. borders with “significantly greater standoff ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing them to strike North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage,” he told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Russian bombers, including Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160s Blackjacks, also are flying frequent sorties close to U.S. coasts and borders military to show off their nuclear capabilities, he said. The long-range Russian missiles include “highly capable” anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles.

Those air-launched weapons are backed by new Severodvinsk-class submarines “armed with advanced land-attack cruise missiles,” the general said, adding that the new sub “is much quieter and more lethal than previous generations of Russian attack submarines.”

Additionally, Russia is planning to deploy surface warships in Arctic waters armed with the modular Kalibr-NK cruise missile.

The Kalibr “will offer highly precise land-attack capabilities and introduce a new cruise missile threat from our northern approaches,” the four-star commander said.

In addition to the Kalibr, the Russians are bolstering Arctic defenses by deploying K-300 Bastion coastal defense cruise missiles on the New Siberian Islands, missiles that will significantly increase Russia’s control over a large stretch of the northern sea route, he said.

“Russia’s growing non-nuclear capabilities provide Moscow a range of options to dissuade an adversary from escalating and to terminate a conflict on terms favorable to Moscow, increasing the potential for miscalculation or opportunistic actions,” he added.

Another new weapon that poses a threat to the homeland is the Avangard hypersonic missile that travels at a reported 20,000 miles per hour — fast enough to defeat current missile defenses and capable of striking the homeland within 15 minutes of launch atop a ballistic missile.

Asked what is the most significant threat he is facing as commander, Gen. O’Shaughnessy said in the near term it is Russia’s missiles, both conventional and nuclear, and cyberattacks.

“We need to invest in our ability to defend if we’re going to be able to maintain our ability to defend, and that is something that I think we need to have a sense of urgency on,” he said.

STRATCOM ON RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUKES

Air Force Gen. John E. Hyten, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, for the first time released the intelligence community’s estimate of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

Gen. Hyten told the Senate Armed Services Committee this week that Moscow has deployed 2,000 small nuclear weapons in its arsenal and noted that the large stockpile signals that Russia is preparing to use the weapons in a future conflict.

The commander made the disclosure while discussing what he termed “Russia’s material breach of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty” in deploying an illegal ground-launched cruise missile, the SSC-8.

As of 2018, “multiple battalions” of the banned cruise missile were deployed, and Gen. Hyten stated that the weapon “illustrates Russia’s broader pattern of malign behavior and willingness to disregard negotiated agreements when they believe it is in their interest.”

“Finally, Russia has an active stockpile [of] up to 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which are not accountable under the New START Treaty,” he said. “These include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs and depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines, and Moscow’s antiballistic missile system.”

For years, the number of Russia’s tactical nuclear warheads and bombs was kept secret. Estimates ranged from 1,000 to as many as 6,000.

The Pentagon has about 500 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with some 200 deployed in Europe for aircraft strikes and the rest stored in the United States.

The release of numbers for the Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons stockpile comes as the Pentagon is planning to deploy two missiles armed with nonstrategic nuclear warheads.

The Nuclear Posture Review called for outfitting a small number of submarine-launched nuclear missiles with lower-yield warheads. The Pentagon is also contemplating new ground-based missiles in response to the SSC-8 deployment.

A senior military official told Inside the Ring that the need for the smaller nuclear arms was driven by China’s large-scale deployment of medium- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles and Russia’s INF Treaty-violating SSC-8, a ground-launched medium-range nuclear cruise missile.

To deter Chinese regional nuclear missiles, the Navy will deploy a new sea-launched missile for launch from surface ships or submarines. A low-yield warhead will be fashioned from the W-88 warhead by removing one of two explosive packages from the current 475-kiloton weapon.

All sea-launched tactical nuclear arms were deactivated in the 1990s during the George H.W. Bush administration.

Gen. Hyten said the large stockpile of Russia’s nonstrategic weapons supports Moscow’s nuclear doctrine of coercion.

“Combined with its large nuclear weapons infrastructure and ready production base, this underscores Moscow’s commitment to having nuclear weapons underpin its security and commitment to maintaining its nuclear forces for the indefinite future,” he said.

“Their doctrine of coercive use further enhances their ability to challenge the United States and NATO across the full spectrum of political, diplomatic, military and information warfare.”

Gen. Hyten explained during the committee hearing that Russian military doctrine calls for “escalate to win.”

“They may consider if something is going bad on the battlefield somewhere to deploy a low-yield nuclear weapon,” he said. “If they see we have a low-yield nuclear weapon, they won’t go that direction.”

Gen. Hyten also said Russia is cheating on the 2010 New START arms treaty by building new strategic weapons, including a nuclear drone torpedo, a long-range nuclear cruise missile and a new hypersonic strike vehicle. Under START, Russia is required to report new strategic weapons to a consultative group and has not done so.

[Josh]

It interesting that they say the W-88 is going to be used as a tactical weapon. All my information was that it would be W-76. Which makes more sense; W-76 is the lower yield and accuracy of the two. W-88 would be best used in its current form.

 

What ground launched nuclear system is being contemplated? Presumably Tomahawk? I can't imagine the US embarking on a brand new from scratch delivery system at this time.

 

Also what is the status of the B-61 mod 12? Is it being re-manufactured from existing deployed weapons or from retired weapons in the enduring stockpile? If the latter, that would affect the final number of deliverable US tactical weapons.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Its a good question about B61. Ive read nothing that says numbers are going to rise, not even in the NATO tactical stockpile where it currently outnumbered 10 to 1.

 

There doesnt seem to be any discussion of what missile it will be, but the consensus seems to be it will be a Tomahawk Variant. this is from last year.

http://seapowermagazine.org/stories/20180202-nuke.html

ARLINGTON, Va. — The new 2018 Nuclear Posture Review outlines plans to give the Navy’s submarines more flexible nuclear response capabilities to meet a changing defense environment, Defense and Energy Department officials said.

Briefing reporters Feb. 2 at the Pentagon, Patrick M Shanahan, deputy secretary of Defense, said the nuclear yield of some of the warheads of the Navy’s submarine-launched ballistic missiles would be lowered and that a sea-based nuclear-tipped cruise missile capability would return to the fleet.

“Neither recommendation requires developing new nuclear warheads,” Shanahan said. “Neither will increase the size of our nuclear stockpile. They break no treaty. They align with our nonproliferation commitments. They strengthen American deterrence.”

The Navy maintained a nuclear-tipped version of the Tomahawk cruise missile in its arsenal until 2013. The briefers did not specify the vehicle that would return that capability to the fleet.

Shanahan stressed that the United States “would only consider the use nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies and partners.”

However, a U.S. nuclear response would not be limited only to nuclear attack. It could be a response to “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks,” Shanahan said. “This clarification is stabilizing. It lowers the risk of nuclear use by anyone.”

John C. Rood, undersecretary of Defense for Policy, affirmed that the United States, in order to preserve flexibility and credibility in its deterrent force, would “pursue some supplementary capabilities, one of which is a submarine-launched ballistic missile armed with a low-yield nuclear weapon.”

The fiscal 2019 budget request, expected to be released later this month, will announce more details of the plans, Rood said, adding it would be a “modest amount” in that it does not involve new warheads, missiles or submarines.

“There’s no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to deterrence,” Rood said. “A more flexible set of capabilities that is survivable, that is credible, and can be tailored to the circumstances to maintain deterrence, is the rationale behind looking at that capability.”

Rood said the Defense Department “will begin a study of the appropriate way to pursue [the cruise missile] and specifics around a program in that.”

He cited the “survivability of submarine-launched cruise missiles [and] the flexibility that that type of platform provides.

“Some of the attributes of the submarine-launched ballistic missile and the submarine-launched cruise missile [are] survivability, difficulty of detection, the flexibility and the range of circumstances to employ such a capability, where you place it, how you fly it, when you fly it,” he said. “The fact that you can have some flexibility in terms of whether you signal [the submarine’s] presence or you don’t, flexibility in basing options, given that most of the world’s surface is water, all of these things help provide flexible options for tailored deterrence.”

 

There is also this, but as they list no sources, you must make your mind up how authoritative it is. It looks a plausible candidate.

http://www.deagel.com/Offensive-Weapons/Tomahawk-Block-V_a001146006.aspx

[Chris Werb]

 

The targets, which Kiselyov described as US presidential or military command centres, also included Fort Ritchie, a military training centre in Maryland closed in 1998, McClellan air force base in California, which closed in 2001, a

 

All the US has to do is keep closing bases faster than the Russians can hit them.

[Roman Alymov]

 

 

The targets, which Kiselyov described as US presidential or military command centres, also included Fort Ritchie, a military training centre in Maryland closed in 1998, McClellan air force base in California, which closed in 2001, a

 

All the US has to do is keep closing bases faster than the Russians can hit them.

 

I do not think anybody expect Kiselev having and publishing real targets list Meanwhile more qualified opinion on this missiles and targets

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

 

The targets, which Kiselyov described as US presidential or military command centres, also included Fort Ritchie, a military training centre in Maryland closed in 1998, McClellan air force base in California, which closed in 2001, a

 

All the US has to do is keep closing bases faster than the Russians can hit them.

 

 

Not much chance of that, with BRAC being the abortion that it is

[EchoFiveMike]

Frankly, we're at(significantly past actually) the point where US gov policy is wrecking US .mil capabilities that might be useful to the interests of the American people in favor of things that benefit the MIC and donor classes. S/F....Ken M