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RETAC21

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In retrospect, the seven blade skew back configuration was bound to be copied. I had no idea that the USN nailed that configuration back in the 60's. The LA class had sharper tips, but then the LA class is widely rumored to have sacrificed, or at least not improved on, quieting compared the the Sturgeons for the sake of speed. But I had no idea that the first seven bladed boats dated back to the 60's; that is incredible. Obviously that was classified at the time. But still amazing that the USN nailed that configuration down so early.

 

I think it came out as a result of how easy it was to track the early SSBNs using SOSUS, with George Washington being tracked all the way across the Atlantic in her first deployment, but I have seen papers from the Royal Navy pointing out that US boats were noisier than their own (speaking about Guppy boats). This would have woken Navy leadership to the danger, as the first SOSUS array were in the Caribbean and the Soviets could have gotten a clue and start using Cuba for this (they didn't)

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The Carribean is a lot more shallow than the Atlantic. I think SOSUS relied on deep water sound phenomenon that would not have worked in the Carrib. Most of it it pretty shallow outside of the Tongue of Sea, and that place was wired up for surround sound at a very early stage in USN submarine development so Soviet boats likely didn't want to tread there.

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Operation Atrina: The real Hunt for Red October

 

While Soviet shipyards churned out submarines at a terryfing rate, the quality of said submarines also improved gradually as time went by: Introduced in the late 1970’s, the Shchuka (Victor III) nuclear powered attack submarines were much quieter than previous Soviet subs… Moscow had high hopes for those and in March 1987, the Soviet Navy launched Operation Atrina: 5 Victor III belonging to the 33rd submarine division of Polyarnyy put to sea at once. They first triggered the SOSUS line near the UK then vanished! Both Washington and London were alarmed: Why would Moscow simultaneously deploy 5 of its best submarines?! A massive Western ASW response was triggered: 1 British aircraft carrier (HMS Hilustrious) and several other RN vessels alongside RAF Nimrods, 3 USN aircraft carriers and 6 USN attack submarines were all deployed in search of the red submarines.

The Brits and Americans first looked for the Soviet subs near the Mediterranean entrance before realising they were actually crossing the Atlantic! Never had the Soviets dared to deploy en-force near the US East Coast since the Cuban missile crisis! What were the Soviet doing? Well, they wanted to test two theories: One, they wanted to know if their best submarines could evade pursuit after having been detected. They also wanted to test the theory that American boomers were hiding in the Sargasso Sea. It took the British and the Americans 8 days to find 4 out of the 5 Victors. During that time, the British Nimrods used an entire year worth of sonobuoys supply!

 

What about the 5th Victor, then? Well, it depends on who you ask… The British say they eventually found it. They say it was better maintained and much better sailed than the other four. The Soviet captain was also bolder and sailed his ship more aggressively and more silently than his colleagues… A Trafalgar class sub finally tracked him down but had to stay perilously close to keep in contact. Close enough to be detected by his adversary. As for the Soviet version of the story, it says the 5th Victor remained undetected.

By 1989, the Soviet Navy fielded 349 submarines in total! The British feared that in case of a war, they could actually run out of torpedoes before managing to sink all the Soviet subs! However, out of those 349 Soviet submarines, only 35 were of the latest -modern and silent- models. Still, that handful of modern Soviet submarines were causing all kind of troubles for the West and closing the qualitative gap: The same year, in 1989, seven of them were known to be at sea but neither the US Navy nor the Royal Navy could find them…

This was the swansong of the red navy, though… The Soviets never closed the qualitative gap: They ran out of money and time. They were already running on fumes in 1989 and the Union itself would crumble under its own weight 2 years later, in 1991…

The story isn’t over, yet, however: While the Russian Navy (and Russian shipyards) never really recovered from the fall of the Soviet Union (as far as surface vessels goes), Russia somehow managed to retain the shipyards, skilled manpower, design bureaus and expertise necessary to design, produce and field modern submarines close to, or on par, (depending on who you ask) with the best the West has to offer. And Russian submarine activity is now at its highest since the end of the Cold War.

https://defensionem.com/operation-atrina-the-real-hunt-for-red-october/

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On Aug. 6, 1991 the Russian Northern Fleet launched operation “Behemoth 2” - demonstrating that its ballistic missile submarine was capable of firing all of its missiles at once (within five to seven seconds of each other)

The Delta-IV submarine K-407 Novomoskovsk - under the command of Captain Second Rank Sergey Yegorov - was chosen for this operation.

It took three minutes and 44 seconds to launch all 16 R-29RM missiles, with the submarine shedding 650 tons of weight in the process.

The operation was seen as a possible scenario for nuclear war with the U.S.

Two years earlier, on the same day, operation “Behemoth 1” was launched. The Delta-IV class submarine K-84 Yekaterinburg attempted to launch all 16 of its missiles at the same time, yet the operation failed after a fuel leak caused a fire.

https://www.rbth.com/arts/history/2017/08/06/on-this-day-soviet-military-operation-behemoth-began_816798

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During the Falklands war in 1982 the Royal Navy were dropping torpedoes left, right and centre supposedly targeting Argentine submarines but only succeeded including blowing up some whales 😀 

I've never belived the hype that Western navies could easily targeted USSR subs. I'm positive that they would of been a very serious and dangerous threat.

Edited by TrustMe
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23 hours ago, TrustMe said:

During the Falklands war in 1982 the Royal Navy were dropping torpedoes left, right and centre supposedly targeting Argentine submarines but only succeeded including blowing up some whales 😀 

I've never belived the hype that Western navies could easily targeted USSR subs. I'm positive that they would of been a very serious and dangerous threat.

I agree with you

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How Soviet sailors defended the Pacific frontier in 1982

Today, much is written about the fact that during the Cuban Missile Crisis the world stood on the brink of nuclear war, but almost no mention is made of when it stood on this brink in 1981-1983. Returning to those distant times of the early 80s of the last century, I first of all want to interrupt the chain of publications about the Soviet Navy, in which accidents, incidents and unsuccessful campaigns of our ships and submarines have been actively exaggerated for the last 30 years and significant victories have not sounded at all, saved the world from nuclear war. Break nuclear parity In the early 1980s, there was a sharp deterioration in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and its NATO allies, and by 1982 it became clear that Washington was seeking to break nuclear parity between the US and the USSR in its favor. Under these conditions, the edge of the struggle was transferred to the underwater environment. The new strategy, called "Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare", was to be tested during the FleetEx-82 exercises. It should be noted that by that time the confrontation between the Pacific Fleet (Pacific Fleet) of the USSR Navy and the Pacific Fleet of the US Navy had reached its climax. The main reconnaissance targets of the Pacific Fleet are American aircraft carriers and the sea-based strategic nuclear forces of the Trident system, represented by nuclear submarine missile carriers (SSBNs) of the Ohio type with ballistic missiles on board. To assess the significance and results of the activities of the submarines of the 45th Division of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Rear Admiral Igor Gordeev, one should start with a trip of the nuclear submarine (NPS) K-492 (commander - Captain 2nd Rank V.Ya. Dudko) to the western coast of the United States in the fall of 1982, its operations in the base area of the main forces of the US Navy, including the search and tracking of the Ohio SSBN.

 

An analysis of the tactical and strategic situation and an assessment of the two fleets, two countries and the results of the quality of naval weapons is required. An examination of the results of the combat service of the K-492 is needed not as a single nuclear submarine that established tracking of an American boat in peacetime, but as a tool of a strategic triad, the use of which had a significant impact on the balance of forces and the course of events in the theater of operations, which led to fundamental changes in the geopolitical alignment of forces and influenced the content of the entire doctrine of the offensive strategy of the US Navy in the Pacific. The contradictions contained in various publications prompted me to once again turn to the events of those years. "Lone Wanderer" In 1981, with the advent of third-generation transitional submarines at the Pacific Fleet, as well as with the start of serial construction of project 671RTM boats and the completion of the transfer of the shipbuilding industry to fundamentally new design solutions, K-492 officers introduced fundamentally new methods for digital processing of hydroacoustic signals and assessing the hydroacoustic field of nuclear submarines , which allowed the commander to develop fundamentally new tactics for ensuring stealth and search for surface and underwater targets, as well as to implement fundamentally new combat methods that equalized the chances with American boats. Moreover, the command of the Soviet Navy immediately got the opportunity to develop and put into practice fundamentally new methods and methods of warfare at sea, to eliminate the overwhelming superiority of American nuclear submarines, caused primarily by their unprecedented superiority in stealth and low noise over our submarines and ships. It became possible to create effective and adequate command reserves to ensure the strategic balance in the Pacific Ocean.

The Americans then dominated under water, believing that secrecy is the main condition for the surprise of delivering the first preemptive strike. In response to the idea of the FleetEx-82 exercise, the command of the Soviet Navy developed a plan for a naval counter-offensive operation, including the participation of the K-492 nuclear submarine under the legend "The Lone Wanderer". The result of the operation was to be the suppression of US naval strategic nuclear forces in the Juan de Fuca Strait.

As a result, while the Americans were carried away by the FleetEx-82 exercise, the K-492 submarine on a September stormy night took up a position just five miles from the American coast, that is, from enemy airfields and bases, and was ready to use all types of weapons on US territory, including nuclear . K-492 began searching for US Navy SSBNs leaving the base. Despite the transfer of all US forces in accordance with the FleetEx-82 exercise plan to combat readiness, intensive anti-submarine aviation flights and the work of coastal and other search forces, the K-492 remained unnoticed by the Americans. The anti-submarine defense forces (ASD) raised on alarm, "irresistible" for Russian boats, turned out to be ineffective. The Soviet multi-purpose submarine continued to operate unnoticed throughout the passage and patrols in the search area. Our nuclear submarine took up position and established tracking of an American SSBN leaving the base, which was guarding a multi-purpose submarine, and the Americans did not even suspect that the enemy was somewhere within a radius of two miles from them. The commander of the Soviet boat was given another most delicate task. In addition to recording the noise of SSBNs, a demonstration of force was required, that is, the mutual detection of boats. As a result, the American boat unsuccessfully tried to break away from the Soviet nuclear submarine for 17 hours, but, without breaking away, went into the territorial waters of Canada. The events that arose as a result of the first meeting with the enemy at the gates of his base had been an exception before, but here it was no longer just an exception, but the first step of equal opponents towards each other. The meeting of SSBNs with a Soviet submarine stunned the Americans, they immediately issued misinformation to the press about a Soviet boat that had fallen into the nets of fishermen. The outfit of PLO forces in the area was sharply increased. But they never found the USSR boat again. The US Navy was deprived of its main advantage - secrecy. But in accordance with the adopted US strategy, secrecy was considered the main condition for the surprise of delivering the first nuclear preemptive strike on the territory of the USSR with distracting actions of the surface forces of the US Navy.

Gaff for Bangor September 11, 1982, Saturday. The Pacific Fleet of the US Navy reached the eastern coast of the USSR, in the Kamchatka region. At the same time, the third, most important, element of the US Navy exercise began - the search for Soviet missile submarines and their conditional destruction, as well as the fourth stage, which completes the victorious report of the American command, - the covert exit of the Ohio SSBN from the Bangor base - the home of the strategic nuclear forces of the US Navy - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe combat use of nuclear weapons and inflicting a conditional nuclear strike on the territory of the Soviet Union in order to strategically support the aircraft carrier multi-purpose formation (AUS) of the US Navy operating off the east coast of the USSR, and develop success in countering with the ultimate goal of forcing the Soviet government to surrender to American conditions. The Soviet Pacific Fleet was not ready to meet the AUS of the US Navy as a threat in the far zone. The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov, while in Vladivostok on exercises, described these events of September 1982 as "Soviet Pearl Harbor." Nevertheless, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, in advance of "delivering strikes" by the AUS on the bases of the fleet, sent the K-492 nuclear submarine to the SSBN base - the Bangor naval base (currently - the Kitsap naval base. - "NVO"). As a result, on September 11–12, 1982, the K-492 submarine of project 671RTM, moving in a submerged position, was able, thanks to the skillful actions of the crew, to penetrate the Ohio SSBN deployment route at the border of the territorial waters of the United States and Canada and at the exit from the Juan de Fuca Strait detect this strategic missile carrier. After that, the author of this article, who then commanded K-492, reported that the enemy submarine was conditionally destroyed, and then set up tracking for it. Thanks to this maneuver, on the day of the AUS approach to Kamchatka, Navy Commander-in-Chief Gorshkov was informed about the detection and tracking of the K-492 by the American Ohio SSBN, after which he said the following: “The strategic balance has been restored. The commander fulfilled the super-task assigned to him. And he added: "You have no idea what they did." Then he immediately flew to Moscow.

On September 13–14, the US Navy’s anti-aircraft control system as part of the aircraft carriers Enterprise and Midway passed east of the Kuril Islands, and a violation of the USSR’s airspace in the area of the Lesser Kuril Ridge by carrier-based aircraft was recorded. After that, the connection through the Sangar Strait entered the Sea of Japan. Here, of course, the Americans were waiting for opposing forces capable of giving an adequate response. At the same time, the Ohio SSBN made a second attempt to secretly exit the base, but the K-492 submarine was again discovered - still in the strait zone, not reaching the entrance points, and she again had to return home. At this point, American attempts to break the Russian resistance were stopped, and the exercise was quickly curtailed. The AUS ships left the Sea of Japan on the same day. Thus, an attempt by the American command in September 1982, according to the legend of the exercise, to force the USSR to surrender by a joint strike by an aircraft carrier strike force and sea-based strategic nuclear forces was not successful. The disruption of the exit of the Ohio SSBN and the covert penetration of the K-492 into the position of a volley at the bases of the US naval strategic nuclear forces did not leave the enemy, at that time, of course, conditional, not a single chance to put his plan into practice. By mid-September, the operation to "eliminate" the American SSBNs in the base was completed. It is noteworthy that during the next attempt of the Ohio SSBN to go to sea at the end of September, the boat was once again discovered and its entry into combat service was thwarted by a Soviet submarine, which drove the American missile carrier into the net of its own fishermen, after which it was taken in tow to dock and put for two weeks in the repair. Only in October did the Americans manage to bring their newest SSBN to the first combat service. This is how the historic battle on the Pacific frontier in 1982 ended victoriously for the Soviet fleet.

The teaching did not achieve its goals In numerous publications, the Americans arrogantly write about the defeat of the Russian Pacific Fleet in this exercise and the absolute superiority of the US Navy ACS over the Soviet fleet in the Pacific Ocean. A number of publications by domestic experts also confirm the suddenness of the actions of the Americans and their superiority over the Soviet Pacific Fleet in Kamchatka and the Kuriles. Yes, outwardly it partially looked like this, but only from the point of view of individual participants in the exercises. In fact, in the report on the results of the FleetEx-82-1 exercise conducted in 1982, the command of the US Navy Pacific Fleet concluded: “The exercise did not achieve its goals. The forces of the fleet failed to create conditions for overwhelming superiority and causing such irreparable damage to the Soviet side, in which the Soviet government would be forced to capitulate with the transfer of part of the territories of Siberia and the Far East. At the same time, special attention was paid to the covert breakthrough of a “group of three” Soviet submarines (in fact, only one K-492 was operating!) On the deployment routes of SSBNs. “In the period from September 11 to September 16, two reports were recorded from the commander of an SSBN leaving the base about contact with Soviet boats, but only one of them could be attributed to reliable contacts with a certain degree of probability,” the US Navy report says. And so it was. We had to make our presence known. It should also be noted that, while evaluating the activities of Project 671RTM nuclear submarines during the exercise, the Americans came to the conclusion that “... this nuclear submarine is low-noise and represents a challenge to the SOSUS system. The secrecy of American submarines predicted during the exercise was not confirmed, and the anti-submarine defense system of the protected area was ineffective even with a high concentration of search forces in the area. The demonstration of force in the zone of destruction of US Navy strategic facilities, the conditional destruction and further escort of SSBNs to the area of use of nuclear missile weapons, as well as the ability of the Soviet submarine to deliver a preemptive strike against the US NSNF in Bangor, deprived the US Navy of a strategic advantage, and an aircraft carrier formation of support from sides of the NSNF during the conduct of an offensive operation off the coast of the USSR. The Bangor base immediately lost its impregnability and significance, which caused serious consequences for the American fleet. The submarine base was no longer considered safe and turned out to be unprotected from a tactical missile attack from the K-492. The situation that arose required an urgent redeployment or deployment of US boats from Bangor to the ocean or other bases, and the command considered the question of redeploying American boats to the Indian Ocean. But the correctly foreseen ways of redeploying US boats from the base to new bases made them even more vulnerable.

The collapse of the strategy Summarize. Firstly, the K-492 nuclear submarine succeeded in discrediting the vaunted US Navy anti-aircraft defense system, which for two months was unable to establish tracking of a Soviet submarine and for the first time could not prevent our nuclear submarine from secretly entering the area of a nuclear missile attack on a US strategic nuclear forces base and tracking SSBNs. This led to the loss by the Bangor base of the importance that would provide the required security of SSBNs, which necessitated the redeployment of submarine missile carriers to other bases. Secondly, the actions of the K-492 on enemy communications deprived the US Navy of support from the NSNF, which resulted in the disruption of the offensive operation of the US Pacific Fleet, and this, in turn, caused the collapse of the naval offensive strategic operation, which showed the inconsistency of the doctrine of the US Secretary of the Navy John Leman. A second attempt by the Americans to implement their naval strategy was made in 1983 during the FleetEx-83 exercise, but even then the submarine of project 671RTM stood in the way of the Americans. Thirdly, the identified advantages in the detection range of US SSBNs and the actions of the K-492 in tracking SSBNs ultimately led to a radical change in the course of the submarine war and in the balance of power in the Pacific Ocean. The combat log detailed all three episodes of finding the Ohio on this exit. Subsequently, the experience of the first crew formed the basis for the planning of subsequent operations of the 45th division of the Pacific Fleet and became widespread in the 2nd flotilla and in the Northern Fleet. These operations included stealth techniques pioneered by the K-492. Only the fact that the boat was not discovered by the US Navy PLO was already considered a success, and the actions of the crew as heroism. The detection and forcing of the enemy SSBNs to return to the base dispelled the myth of the invincible US triad. It was a victory! The veil of secrecy that the American authorities have been surrounding this episode for more than 35 years only reinforces our version. No wonder, because it was an unprecedented defeat of the American fleet, which had lost its prestige and superiority over the Soviet Navy. The secret passage of the Soviet nuclear submarine into the enemy's lair devalued its huge anti-submarine forces and powerful military equipment. The battle for Bangor showed the increased combat power of the Soviet submarine fleet in the most vulnerable direction for the Americans - noise. All this became possible as a result of the heroic, selfless work of Soviet submariners, workers and scientists, who managed to reorganize their work and provide the submarine fleet with everything necessary for victory.

The historical significance of this campaign lies in the fact that K-492 marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the submarine war and the entire war at sea. And after the commissioning of new submarines with cruise missiles and the use of new tactics based on the developed principles of digital signal processing and tactical group management, based on the experience of sailing the K-492 in a tactical group with a strategic missile submarine, the submarine forces of the USSR Navy received a noticeable advantage in the fight against aircraft carrier multi-purpose groups and formations, as well as detachments of US Navy warships. When creating a base in Bangor, the Americans did not expect that the Russians would so quickly deprive it of combat stability and dispel the myth of an impregnable outpost of the US NSNF on the west coast. The discovery of SSBNs had an immediate effect on the course of the FleetEx-82-1 exercise: it was curtailed, as it lost its further meaning. And the first such operations were planned and successfully carried out by the submarine commanders of the 45th submarine division. In the fall of 1982, she was the first to pave the way to Bangor K-492 in Operation Lone Wanderer; in the fall of 1983, a group of nuclear submarines were already operating in the area of the Juan de Fuca Strait as part of Operation Fresh Wind, a prelude to a more complex anti-submarine event held in 1985 under the code name Mustachioed Tit. Within the framework of the latter, in accordance with the plan approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy, submarines and the forces attached to them were deployed on a huge front that occupied the entire water area of the northern part of the Pacific Ocean. The most dramatic events unfolded on August 26-27, 1985, when our boats, which blocked all approaches to the American naval base, did not detect a missile submarine leaving it. After the events of 1982, the Americans attached great importance to ensuring that SSBNs went on combat patrols. But the marching headquarters of the operation regrouped its forces and, as a result, was the first to succeed, again, the nuclear submarine K-492, but already under the command of Captain 3rd Rank Oleg Lobanov, who replaced Captain 2nd Rank V.Ya. Dudko. Using the experience of the first campaign, she discovered SSBNs, as in 1982, in an underwater canyon near the Charlotte Islands. SSBN tracking was established. The crew of the K-360 submarine also achieved success, which also discovered a returning foreign submarine on the approaches to the American base. Circumstances do not allow highlighting the actions of other forces, including the process of pointing the K-305 nuclear submarine at SSBNs following the combat patrol route. However, I note that the advantage of this operation was the use of diverse forces and means of the Pacific Fleet, which made it possible to achieve a large total time for tracking such important objects. Unfortunately, these important actions of the Pacific Fleet ships were not properly reflected in the military literature, and the heroes of the events remained unknown to anyone - as if these events did not exist at all ...

Trying to take revenge for the defeat in 1982, the Americans and their closest allies conducted the FleetEx-83 exercise in the spring of 1983, but at the same time received an even more crushing blow, since this time the Soviet submarine of project 671RTM was already secretly operating inside the enemy warrant. The Americans were no longer able to raise the sharply shaken prestige, and the operations Aport (1985) and Atrina (1987), carried out in the Northern Fleet, finally put the Americans in their place.

 

This text was translated by the help of google translate from the site

https://3mv.ru/126322-kak-sovetskie-moryaki-v-1982-godu-otstoyali-tihookeanskiy-rubezh.html

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https://en.topwar.ru/169164-protivolodochnaja-oborona-korabli-protiv-podlodok-chast-1-gidroakustika.html

 

May 21-22, 1964 ship anti-submarine strike group (KPUG) 117 dk PLO 114 bq OVR KVF Pacific Fleet as part of the MPK-435, MPK-440 (project 122 bis), MPK-61, MPK-12. MPK-11 (pr.201-M), under the command of the commander of the 117th PLO Division, has long pursued a foreign nuclear submarine. During this time, ships traveled 2186 miles at an average speed of 9,75 knots. and lost contact 175 miles off the coast.

To evade the ships, the boat 45 times changed its speed from 2 to 15 knots, turned 23 times by an angle of more than 60 °, described four complete circulations and three circuits of the G11 type. released 6 movable and 11 stationary simulators, 13 gas curtains, 11 times created sighting interference with ship sonars with light from records. During the persecution, the operation of the UZPS means and the operation of the GAS boat in active mode were noted three times. It was not possible to precisely note the changes in the depth of immersion, since the ships chasing it were equipped with the GAS Tamir-11 and MG-XNUMX without a vertical path, but judging by an indirect sign - the range of reliable contact - the travel depth also varied widely .

 

The pursuit of the submarine "Snook" KPUG 117 dk PLO 114 bk OVR. A hydrological section is in the bottom left, and the estimated GAS submarine detection zone for ships calculated on its basis is on the right.

1584557471_otvaga2004_subchaser31.jpg

 

Edited by Perun
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Admiral I.M. gives another example in his book. Captain:
 

... two American ships arrived: a destroyer of the Forrest Sherman type (which had a GAS AN / SQS-4 with a detection range of 30 cable) and a frigate of the type Knox (as in the text of I. M. Kapitanets, it’s really just “Knox” "- author)
... set the task: to ensure the immersion of two submarines; forces were determined for this - three surface ships and a floating base.
The first submarine, which was tracked by a Forrest Sherman type destroyer when it counteracted our floating base and patrol ship, managed to come off after 6 hours. The second pl, which was watched by the frigate Friend Knox, tried to tear itself away for 8 hours and, having discharged the battery, surfaced.
Hydrology was the first type favorable for podcast sonar stations. Nevertheless, we hoped with two ships against one US ship to push it back, make tracking difficult, and planned to interfere with the hydroacoustic stations by resetting the regeneration.
...
according to the actions of the patrol ship, we realized that it maintains contact with the submarine at a distance of more than 100 cable ... GAS AN / SQS-26 had ... a detection range of up to 300 cable.
... intense resistance within 8 hours did not produce results; the submarine, having consumed the energy of the battery, surfaced again.
We were no longer able to oppose the new sonar station, and we had to go to the Navy CP with a proposal to send a detachment of ships on a planned official visit to Morocco, in which a submarine will also take part.

....

These examples are formally contradictory: the instructions of the submarine Pacific Fleet brigade indicate the detection range of new low-frequency GAS US Navy about 60 cabs, and the Captain (up to 300 cabs). In reality, everything depends on the conditions, and primarily hydrology.

https://en.topwar.ru/169164-protivolodochnaja-oborona-korabli-protiv-podlodok-chast-1-gidroakustika.html

 

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Schematic diagram of the construction of CVBG air defense at the transition by sea

Left column:

1. Command ship

2. AA cruiser

3. Radar picket ship

4. Fighter aircraft

Right column:

1. Aircraft carrier

2. ASW ship

3. AWACS

Translation is mine so any error is on me, my russian is worse then my english

http://www.zvo.su/VMS/pvo-avianosnyh-udarnyh-soedineniy-vms-ssha.html

 

prev_3752ee.jpg.b78ec324bf4b5bcab28fff52d03af014.jpg

Edited by Perun
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