Repulse/prince Of Wales Sinking

[shep854]

In '42, I believe the Bofors were still rather rare. I was a bit surprised that there were still 1.1s shipped!

Edited December 27, 2018 by shep854

[Ken Estes]

It depended most on when and how long a ship was in port.

 

Hornet still had her 1.1's [5 quads, one added after commissioning] when lost at Santa Cruz, after barely a year in service. At least the 40mm could be operated manually, but the 1.1 barrel watercooling went down with her power loss, leaving her particularly vulnerable.

[Ken Estes]

The USN received a twin 40mm from Bofors on 28 Aug 40. The license to manufacture them came during June41, although a few had already been made. The Swedish plans were all metric, requiring a huge effort to produce in English measure:

 

The first USN pilot twin was completed in January 1942 and the first quad in April 1942. The first shipboard quad installation was on the gunnery-training ship (ex-battleship) USS Wyoming (AG-17) on 22 June 1942, and the first twin installation was on the destroyer USS Coghlan (DD-606) on 1 July 1942. The USA started a massive production program for these weapons and a monthly production rate of 1,600 Army guns and 135 Navy twin-barrel guns was achieved by December 1942.

 

 

A USN quad was simply two twins in a single mount. More here: http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_4cm-56_mk12.php

[Ken Estes]

 

RE: Santa Cruz and later battles, with so many guns on different ships blazing away at the same target, ascribing the kill is rather problematic, like kills of attacking fighters through a bomber formation. Maybe BB gets the kills because it's the biggest ship?

Who else was having 40's, particularly quad mounts?

 

 

 

 

 

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_4cm-56_mk12.php

[Ken Estes]

In '42, I believe the Bofors were still rather rare. I was a bit surprised that there were still 1.1s shipped!

 

On the 1.1" I don't find production numbers but it was in series production from 1940.

 

In 1941 - 42, the normal allocation was four mountings for larger ships and one or two for destroyers. However, USS Lexington (CV-2) carried a total of 12 mounts when lost in 1942.

 

 

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_1-1-75_mk1.php

[Markus Becker]

Re: Duguay - Trouin class.

 

The reloading mechanism sucked. It managed 3rpm instead of 5-6, when it wasn't breaking down, which it routinely did. Oh, wait! It's French, so it didn't break down, it went on strike!

 

The follow up 152/55 Mle 1930 was derived from the 138/50 Mle 29 and both gun and reloading mechanism were redesigned to actually fire as quickly as a gun of this caliber should. Albeit it never managed 8rpm, just 4-5 after many(!!) modifications.

Edited December 27, 2018 by Markus Becker

[DKTanker]

 

Let's not forget the training level of the Japanese pilots at the start of the war, they were arguably the best in the world. How many other air forces could hit maneuvering warships from level bombers? Also, the state of damage control (the ships and the men) early in the war was pretty bad.

All air forces.

 

The issue is investment return, how many hits vs flights mode+bombs dropped.

 

And to think the B-17 was sold to congress as needed for its ability to sink warships. Worse, the US Army Air Corps believed its own propaganda.

[Markus Becker]

 

 

Let's not forget the training level of the Japanese pilots at the start of the war, they were arguably the best in the world. How many other air forces could hit maneuvering warships from level bombers? Also, the state of damage control (the ships and the men) early in the war was pretty bad.

 

All air forces.

 

The issue is investment return, how many hits vs flights mode+bombs dropped.

And to think the B-17 was sold to congress as needed for its ability to sink warships. Worse, the US Army Air Corps believed its own propaganda.

Carpet bombing whole parts of towns wasn't PC, coast defense was, thus that label was put on heavy bombers.

 

@Ken: I meant, which other US ship participating in that battle had quad 40's?

[shep854]

"IJN Mutsuki's skipper was a noteworthy victim of overconfidence vs USAAF B-17s, taking no evasive action"-- Ken Estes

As he was being fished out of the water, wasn't he heard to mutter something about 'even B-17s getting a hit occasionally'?

[Ken Estes]

 

 

 

Let's not forget the training level of the Japanese pilots at the start of the war, they were arguably the best in the world. How many other air forces could hit maneuvering warships from level bombers? Also, the state of damage control (the ships and the men) early in the war was pretty bad.

All air forces.

 

The issue is investment return, how many hits vs flights mode+bombs dropped.

And to think the B-17 was sold to congress as needed for its ability to sink warships. Worse, the US Army Air Corps believed its own propaganda.

Carpet bombing whole parts of towns wasn't PC, coast defense was, thus that label was put on heavy bombers.

 

@Ken: I meant, which other US ship participating in that battle had quad 40's?

 

 

The USN History entity has good coverage:

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/s/solomon-islands-campaign-iv-battle-of-cape-esperance.html#force

 

It's a contemporary document, hence flawed by lack of enemy records. However it shows what their impressions were. Aircraft kills could have been shared, as noted earlier:

 

Admiral Kinkaid estimated that 170 to 180 enemy planes took part in the attacks on the Hornet and the Enterprise, and that approximately 133 came within striking range of the 2 carriers. He concluded that the Hornet had been assaulted by 49 planes, antiaircraft knocking out 23, and the Enterprise by 84, of which 33 were destroyed by antiaircraft fire. TheEnterprise thus was attacked by almost twice as many planes as the Hornet and, together with her supporting ships, shot down 10 more. Her damage was much less severe, because, unlike the Hornet, she did not have the ill-fortune to receive torpedo hits in her vital engineering spaces at the very outset of the battle.

One of the most gratifying aspects of the engagement was the outstanding performance of the new battleship South Dakota's antiaircraft batteries, in action for the first time. Their tremendous firepower contributed in large measure to the successful defense of the Enterprise.

 

 

 

So you can see how the lone battleship would have attracted most of the attention. I'd bank on the CLAAs having a pair of quads [started with 4x1.1" quads] before the CAs but one cannot be sure without investigating each ships' log book. The BB might have had the only quad 40mm at the battle, a real possibility.

 

 

Enterprise Group

1 carrier:

Enterprise (F, Rear Admiral Kinkaid) - Capt. Osborne B. Hardison.

1 battleship:

South Dakota - Capt. Thomas L. Gatch.

1 heavy cruiser:

Portland (Capt. Mahlon S. Tisdale, Commander Cruisers) - Capt. Laurance T. DuBose.

1 antiaircraft light cruiser:

San Juan - Capt. James E. Maher.

8 destroyers:

Porter (Capt. Charles P. Cecil, Commander Destroyers) - Lt. Comdr. David G. Roberts.

Mahan - Lt. Comdr. Rodger W. Simpson.

Cushing - Lt. Comdr. Christopher Noble.

Preston - Lt. Comdr. Max C. Stormes.

Smith - Lt. Comdr. Hunter Wood, Jr.

___________

4a All times in this Narrative are Zone minus 12.

--30--

Maury - Lt. Comdr. Geizer L. Sims.

Conyngham - Lt. Comdr. Henry C. Daniel.

Shaw - Lt. Comdr. W. Glenn Jones.

Hornet Group

1 carrier:

Hornet (F, Rear Admiral Murray) - Capt. Charles P. Mason.

2 heavy cruisers:

Northampton (F, Rear Admiral Howard H. Good, Commander Cruisers) - Capt. Willard A. Kitts, III.

Pensacola - Capt. Frank L. Lowe.

2 antiaircraft light cruisers:

San Diego - Capt. Benjamin P. Perry

Juneau - Capt. Lyman K. Swenson.

6 destroyers:

Morris (Comdr. Arnold E. True, Commander Destroyers) - Lt. Comdr. Randolph B. Boyer.

Anderson - Lt. Comdr. Richard A. Guthrie.

Hughes - Lt. Comdr. Donald J. Ramsey.

Mustin - Lt. Comdr. Wallis P. Petersen.

Russell - Lt. Comdr. Glenn R. Hartwig.

Barton - Lt. Comdr. Douglas H. Fox

Edited December 28, 2018 by Ken Estes

[Ken Estes]

Re: Duguay - Trouin class.

 

The reloading mechanism sucked. It managed 3rpm instead of 5-6, when it wasn't breaking down, which it routinely did. Oh, wait! It's French, so it didn't break down, it went on strike!

 

The follow up 152/55 Mle 1930 was derived from the 138/50 Mle 29 and both gun and reloading mechanism were redesigned to actually fire as quickly as a gun of this caliber should. Albeit it never managed 8rpm, just 4-5 after many(!!) modifications.

That was a good find; thanks!

[Colin]

The USN received a twin 40mm from Bofors on 28 Aug 40. The license to manufacture them came during June41, although a few had already been made. The Swedish plans were all metric, requiring a huge effort to produce in English measure:

 

The first USN pilot twin was completed in January 1942 and the first quad in April 1942. The first shipboard quad installation was on the gunnery-training ship (ex-battleship) USS Wyoming (AG-17) on 22 June 1942, and the first twin installation was on the destroyer USS Coghlan (DD-606) on 1 July 1942. The USA started a massive production program for these weapons and a monthly production rate of 1,600 Army guns and 135 Navy twin-barrel guns was achieved by December 1942.

 

 

A USN quad was simply two twins in a single mount. More here: http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_4cm-56_mk12.php

As I recall the Swedish Bofors were made in the old style, basically handfitted, so parts wern't easily interchangable. The US had to redraw the designs and incorprated changes that sped up production.

[Argus]

IJN Mutsuki's skipper was a noteworthy victim of overconfidence vs USAAF B-17s, taking no evasive action:

 

Mutsuki was sunk in an attack by USAAF B-17 Flying Fortress bombers while assisting the damaged transport Kinryu Maru, 40 miles (64 km) northeast of Santa Isabel island. 7°47′S 160°13′ECoordinates: 7°47′S 160°13′E. Mutsuki took a direct bomb hit in her engineering section, killing 41 crewmen and injuring 11 more. Yayoi took on the survivors, which included her captain, Lt. Cdr. Kenji Hatano

 

 

HMS Repulse was very maneuverable compared to HMS PoW, as well as to IJN Settsu, the former BB converted to a target ship for the Nell and Betty bombers to practice against prior to WWII. In the attack on Force Z, Repulse was well handled, receiving only on bomb hit [detonated on her deck armor, setting fire to the seaplane, later jettisoned], but PoW took an unfortunate torpedo hit on a propeller shaft, which was distorted and literally beat the hull up, alone sufficient to knock her out of action. Left alone and still maneuvering, Repulse fell victim to no fewer than 17 Betties in a scissors attack, and five torpedos hit, dooming the ship.

 

PoW was designed to resist torpedos of approx 450 lb, as I recall from the relevant David Brown volume,but the IJN aerial torpedos had larger warheads.

 

 

Just a clarification/expansion. The divers have down to PoW over the last few years, and some (with balls that clang) have penetrated the wreck quite deeply. The flailing end of the prop shaft ripped up a good bit of shell plating and didn't help matters. But the PoW's loss came mainly from the damage to and subsequent break up of the prop shaft inside the hull, that basically reamed the shaft tunnels out, opening adjacent compartments and producing a flooding path you could drive a clown car through right up to the gear room bulkhead.

 

I'd deen to dig the reports back up and check to be sure, but IIRC the PoW's TDS seemed to have worked fairly well when/where it was hit.

[Argus]

 

The USN received a twin 40mm from Bofors on 28 Aug 40. The license to manufacture them came during June41, although a few had already been made. The Swedish plans were all metric, requiring a huge effort to produce in English measure:

 

The first USN pilot twin was completed in January 1942 and the first quad in April 1942. The first shipboard quad installation was on the gunnery-training ship (ex-battleship) USS Wyoming (AG-17) on 22 June 1942, and the first twin installation was on the destroyer USS Coghlan (DD-606) on 1 July 1942. The USA started a massive production program for these weapons and a monthly production rate of 1,600 Army guns and 135 Navy twin-barrel guns was achieved by December 1942.

 

 

A USN quad was simply two twins in a single mount. More here: http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_4cm-56_mk12.php

As I recall the Swedish Bofors were made in the old style, basically handfitted, so parts wern't easily interchangable. The US had to redraw the designs and incorprated changes that sped up production.

 

 

There's a fair bit of information out there about how the US Bofors were redesigned and produced and it was a brilliant effort. But equally there's a certain degree of myth about how 'primitive' the 'old world European' manufacturing methods were in contrast, new world good - old world bad. Yeah... nah.

 

The key point is/was the expected production scale. Bofors designed their product with order volumes of tens and hundreds in mind, with totals of thousands over years if they were lucky. This was perfectly reasonable, armaments companies in this period were basically great big jobbing shops, and Bofors more than most. The same workshop would be turning out 105mm howitzers for Thailand one month, and 120mm naval guns for Brazil the next while a batch of new 10" tubes worked their way down the back of the shop, and some 8" turrets were being erected over the pits.

 

Against this 'mass production' is mostly about specialisation, the greater the mass to be produced, the more serious the capitol investment required, and generally the less useful/adaptable the resulting production capacity will be for other things (<note very very broad generalisation).

 

So Bofors built a gun (to high tolerances and interchangeability) to be made in batches within their existing capabilities (depression after all), which is more or less how the US would have made them if it had adopted the weapon in peacetime, and all the other pre-war licencees did. But as the US came in to the game KNOWING they needed hundreds and thousands a month, and they had the spare industrial/intellectual capacity to redesign the weapon to meet this very different production regime, they did so. This was playing to an American strength, no doubt about that either, but no one is served by exaggerating the case.

 

shane

 

[DB]

One of the major activities the US may have undertaken was redrawing and recalculating tolerances for US units compared to metric. This seemingly simple task is not trivial, even now where drawing updates are far simpler.

[Ken Estes]

Not only was that done in the US, but manufacturers competed to redesign certain components of the gun for more efficient mass production and less cost. In the end, the payoffs were huge for US forces, as the production rates soared.

[Markus Becker]

True but that was more or less SOP. Once 'war were declared ' and much more of anything was needed existing designs were simplified. The Thompson SMG, the Bren, Mauser 98 to name but a few.

[Jeff]

 

 

Let's not forget the training level of the Japanese pilots at the start of the war, they were arguably the best in the world. How many other air forces could hit maneuvering warships from level bombers? Also, the state of damage control (the ships and the men) early in the war was pretty bad.

All air forces.

 

The issue is investment return, how many hits vs flights mode+bombs dropped.

 

And to think the B-17 was sold to congress as needed for its ability to sink warships. Worse, the US Army Air Corps believed its own propaganda.

 

 

Hence the Rex interception stunt.

 

[shep854]

They had to keep the Depression-era dollars flowing. The B-17 program was on a very frayed string, until war became imminent

[Rick]

 

 

 

Let's not forget the training level of the Japanese pilots at the start of the war, they were arguably the best in the world. How many other air forces could hit maneuvering warships from level bombers? Also, the state of damage control (the ships and the men) early in the war was pretty bad.

All air forces.

 

The issue is investment return, how many hits vs flights mode+bombs dropped.

 

And to think the B-17 was sold to congress as needed for its ability to sink warships. Worse, the US Army Air Corps believed its own propaganda.

 

 

Hence the Rex interception stunt.

 

 

Having read the article, it appears the old saying "country x is our adversary, the (army),(navy) is our enemy" was true. Probably still is.

[DougRichards]

Not only was that done in the US, but manufacturers competed to redesign certain components of the gun for more efficient mass production and less cost. In the end, the payoffs were huge for US forces, as the production rates soared.

 

Would anyone have the production figures for the 37MM AA Gun M1 ? I wonder how production numbers of that weapon, per year in the US, compares with production of the Bofors, in the period 1932 to 1942?

[Markus Becker]

The website anti aircraft dot org is sadly defunct but the gun was the main medium AA gun used by the army during the war. ... Wait, 1932? The gun I'm thinking if wasn't in production until the very end of the 30s.

[DougRichards]

That may be a point actually, I had not noticed that it did not go into production until 1939 (even though the gun was standardised in 1927 as a Limited Procurement type but the carriage was not finalised until 1935 and 7,278 were produced in a fairly short time.

 

The Bofors was in production, at least in Sweden, from 1932. Of interest was that it was the USN that considered the Bofors before the Army, trying to buy examples from Botors in 1937 but actually, having receiving a British built Bofors in October 1940. It seems that the USN had a fair idea of what was needed and was not going to consider an Army weapon. The Army got one from the British in December 1940.

[Markus Becker]

It seems that the USN had a fair idea of what was needed and was not going to consider an Army weapon.

Of course not! Germans, Japanese and Italians are the other side, while the army is the enemy.

[DougRichards]

 

It seems that the USN had a fair idea of what was needed and was not going to consider an Army weapon.

Of course not! Germans, Japanese and Italians are the other side, while the army is the enemy.

 

 

Actually there could have even been a case for the USN to replace its 1.1in with the M1 37mm AA, but of course that was never going to happen.