50 Years Ago Today The Tet Offensive Started

[JWB]

Again, much easier, cheaper and doable to mine the ports and bomb the railroads.

None of that would ultimately succeed because the Vehicles would travel off road on what would become the Mao Tse-tung Trail. To interdict that would require defoliating the border lands between NVN and the PRC. Undoable and impossible.

[NickM]

 

 

So somehow it's better to have to find and destroy thousands of trucks, bycicles, water buffalos and porters rather than shut the flow where it originates?

 

Block the trail by building a wall of fortified positions from the South China Sea across Laos to Thailand & back it with all the firepower 'in country' that can be spared.

 

Something like that. I forgot to add it. They would spray 2 strips a few hundred meters wide and 100 meters apart. The northern strip would be cratered. The interval between the strips would remain jungle where allied armor would be deployed. The southern strip would not need cratering because the only enemy trying to attack from the southern direction would be lightly armed insurgents. The enemy coming down from the north could be equipped with T-54s which is why the craters would excavated. This plan would require violating Laos sovereignty. The USA and the other non asian forces couldn't get away with such actions but I bet the some ARVN/ROK force could after Seoul, Manila, Cambodia et al raise a big stink in the UN.

 

Yeah the fortified line will 'violate' Laos's 'neutrality' but the 200 plus thousand NVA soldiers annexing huge swatches of the country & using said annexed areas as a buildup & rest area does not.

[R011]

You won't infiltrate SA2 and MiG 21 on bicycles through jungle trails. You may find T54 or even PT76 a bit hard to sneak in too

[Stuart Galbraith]

Im sure Lance Armstrong would have had a damn good try.

[NickM]

Im sure Lance Armstrong would have had a damn good try.

 

Do you still believe the NVA used bicycles? If anything they used trucks-THOUSANDS of them; So...thousands of NVA truckers, Thousands of NVA AA gunners, Thousands of engineering troops and thousands of security troops; On top of that, hundreds of thousands of reinforcements 'passing thru' to NVA battalions/regiments/divisions to 'replace casualties'. Laos was pretty much full to bursting with North Vietnamese.

[RETAC21]

 

Again, much easier, cheaper and doable to mine the ports and bomb the railroads.

None of that would ultimately succeed because the Vehicles would travel off road on what would become the Mao Tse-tung Trail. To interdict that would require defoliating the border lands between NVN and the PRC. Undoable and impossible.

 

 

You remain fixated on the same point in the face of historical evidence. When the Northern ports were mined and the railroads bombed, the NVA was unable to continue offensive operations and eventually ended up unable to defend its own airspace within 11 days

 

"By the end of September 1972, the North

Vietnamese diplomats in Paris were much more

amenable to serious negotiation than they were at the

end of March. Allied air, naval, and ground forces had

repulsed the Communist offensive in South Vietnam

and even regained much lost ground. After drastically

reducing the enemy’s reinforcements and munitions

infiltrated into the South, the U.S. air and naval

campaign in the North gradually destroyed Hanoi’s

ability to prosecute the war. However, it would take

one more massive air operation, Linebacker II in

December 1972, to finally compel the Vietnamese to

sign an agreement ending the war.

During that campaign, American forces employed

the most advanced precision-guided weapons,

electronic countermeasures, target-finding radar,

and other equipment. They also concentrated on the

destruction of the enemy’s missile defense network,

including command and control facilities, missile

assembly and transportation points, and the missile

batteries themselves. To spread thin Communist

defenses, the American command broadened the

operational arena to include areas in Hanoi. By 29

December, North Vietnamese leaders had had enough

and agreed to end the war on terms acceptable to the

United States...

Air power was least effective when trying to interdict

the flow of supplies through Laos. Air power and, by

extension, naval gunfire support, were more effective

when employed against high value military targets

near the enemy’s centers of gravity—Hanoi and

Haiphong. "

https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/publications/Publication-PDF/NixonsTrident.pdf

[JWB]

 

 

Again, much easier, cheaper and doable to mine the ports and bomb the railroads.

None of that would ultimately succeed because the Vehicles would travel off road on what would become the Mao Tse-tung Trail. To interdict that would require defoliating the border lands between NVN and the PRC. Undoable and impossible.

 

 

You remain fixated on the same point in the face of historical evidence. When the Northern ports were mined and the railroads bombed, the NVA was unable to continue offensive operations and eventually ended up unable to defend its own airspace within 11 days

 

"By the end of September 1972, the North

Vietnamese diplomats in Paris were much more

amenable to serious negotiation than they were at the

end of March. Allied air, naval, and ground forces had

repulsed the Communist offensive in South Vietnam

and even regained much lost ground. After drastically

reducing the enemy’s reinforcements and munitions

infiltrated into the South, the U.S. air and naval

campaign in the North gradually destroyed Hanoi’s

ability to prosecute the war. However, it would take

one more massive air operation, Linebacker II in

December 1972, to finally compel the Vietnamese to

sign an agreement ending the war.

During that campaign, American forces employed

the most advanced precision-guided weapons,

electronic countermeasures, target-finding radar,

and other equipment. They also concentrated on the

destruction of the enemy’s missile defense network,

including command and control facilities, missile

assembly and transportation points, and the missile

batteries themselves. To spread thin Communist

defenses, the American command broadened the

operational arena to include areas in Hanoi. By 29

December, North Vietnamese leaders had had enough

and agreed to end the war on terms acceptable to the

United States...

Air power was least effective when trying to interdict

the flow of supplies through Laos. Air power and, by

extension, naval gunfire support, were more effective

when employed against high value military targets

near the enemy’s centers of gravity—Hanoi and

Haiphong. "

https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/publications/Publication-PDF/NixonsTrident.pdf

 

That is all true but it is also irrelevant because it fails to take into account the political impossibility of SAC bombing NVN every two years for almost ever.

 

https://www.congress.gov/bill/93rd-congress/house-joint-resolution/636

[JWB]

 

Im sure Lance Armstrong would have had a damn good try.

 

Do you still believe the NVA used bicycles? If anything they used trucks-THOUSANDS of them; So...thousands of NVA truckers, Thousands of NVA AA gunners, Thousands of engineering troops and thousands of security troops; On top of that, hundreds of thousands of reinforcements 'passing thru' to NVA battalions/regiments/divisions to 'replace casualties'. Laos was pretty much full to bursting with North Vietnamese.

 

That was the biggest problem with defoliating Laos. Every spray sortie had to start with a saturation bombing in order to destroy the enemy force on the ground.

[RETAC21]

 

 

 

Again, much easier, cheaper and doable to mine the ports and bomb the railroads.

None of that would ultimately succeed because the Vehicles would travel off road on what would become the Mao Tse-tung Trail. To interdict that would require defoliating the border lands between NVN and the PRC. Undoable and impossible.

 

 

You remain fixated on the same point in the face of historical evidence. When the Northern ports were mined and the railroads bombed, the NVA was unable to continue offensive operations and eventually ended up unable to defend its own airspace within 11 days

 

"By the end of September 1972, the North

Vietnamese diplomats in Paris were much more

amenable to serious negotiation than they were at the

end of March. Allied air, naval, and ground forces had

repulsed the Communist offensive in South Vietnam

and even regained much lost ground. After drastically

reducing the enemy’s reinforcements and munitions

infiltrated into the South, the U.S. air and naval

campaign in the North gradually destroyed Hanoi’s

ability to prosecute the war. However, it would take

one more massive air operation, Linebacker II in

December 1972, to finally compel the Vietnamese to

sign an agreement ending the war.

During that campaign, American forces employed

the most advanced precision-guided weapons,

electronic countermeasures, target-finding radar,

and other equipment. They also concentrated on the

destruction of the enemy’s missile defense network,

including command and control facilities, missile

assembly and transportation points, and the missile

batteries themselves. To spread thin Communist

defenses, the American command broadened the

operational arena to include areas in Hanoi. By 29

December, North Vietnamese leaders had had enough

and agreed to end the war on terms acceptable to the

United States...

Air power was least effective when trying to interdict

the flow of supplies through Laos. Air power and, by

extension, naval gunfire support, were more effective

when employed against high value military targets

near the enemy’s centers of gravity—Hanoi and

Haiphong. "

https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/publications/Publication-PDF/NixonsTrident.pdf

 

That is all true but it is also irrelevant because it fails to take into account the political impossibility of SAC bombing NVN every two years for almost ever.

 

https://www.congress.gov/bill/93rd-congress/house-joint-resolution/636

 

 

As opposed to fighting forever of a ground war in Asia, which was what prompted that resolution? Again you are trying to handwave your way to logic.

[JWB]

No handwavium. Just using the funds authorized by Congress to set up conditions where bye Cambodia and SVN can fend off the Hanoi invasions for enough years to regain US political support.

[RETAC21]

At the price of destroying parts of Laos and Cambodia, which surely will go down great amid the locals. Not to speak about how it will go in the US, when 3 years after agreeing to the neutrality of Laos a substantial part of the country is bombed, defoliated and occupied.

 

The plus side would be Johnson losing the 64 election...

[shep854]

Still, interdicting choke points at the ports and RR lines from PRC would have been more efficient than trying to bomb hundreds, if not thousands miles of roads and trails that made up the HCM Trail. Not to mention keeping forces tied down in the North for ADA and repairs. The North ran out of ammo several times; that's why they requested 'truce talks'. The bombing pauses gave them time to repair, restock and reload. And that was with the ports and railroads open...

Edited March 11, 2018 by shep854

[JWB]

At the price of destroying parts of Laos and Cambodia, which surely will go down great amid the locals. Not to speak about how it will go in the US, when 3 years after agreeing to the neutrality of Laos a substantial part of the country is bombed, defoliated and occupied.

 

The plus side would be Johnson losing the 64 election...

Cambodia won't be destroyed at all. Unless you are referring to the NVA doing those things in both countries which certainly pleased the locals. How defoliating and interdicting in would go down in the US? It would not even be reported. Nobody would notice.

[JWB]

Still, interdicting choke points at the ports and RR lines from PRC would have been more efficient than trying to bomb hundreds, if not thousands miles of roads and trails that made up the HCM Trail. Not to mention keeping forces tied down in the North for ADA and repairs. The North ran out of ammo several times; that's why they requested 'truce talks'. The bombing pauses gave them time to repair, restock and reload. And that was with the ports and railroads open...

Bombing thousands of miles of roads would not be needed. Just bomb and strafe the defoliated strips. As I wrote above that sort of bombing was halted by the US voters. That kind of bombing after 1973 could only be done by the AFRVN. How would it be possible to create a SAC for them?

[Quang]

Fifty years already! Parts if it still so fresh in my memory.

 

I’m surprised that even to this day, people are still using shallow excuses like: the side we were backing was corrupt... somebody already pointed out that that part of the world was corrupt. However, just look around, then and now, most of Asia and Africa, the Americas from Mexico down were and are corrupt. Anybody you back was/is bound to corrupt. Just deal with it. A failure is a failure, just stop the finger pointing. Same excuse used in Iraq.

 

Somebody also pointed out that the other side was also corrupt. As one who stayed there until 1980, my observation is that the other side was and is even more corrupt. The difference was that they knew how to use propaganda much better and how to control the flow of info (ie. censorship) much better, but hey that’s where democracy loses.

 

I remember my uncle who was deputy commander of Bien Hoa AF base telling my parents that they were having to drop fuel drums with explosives attached, from the back of transport aircraft during the fights at Long Khanh because they had run out of napalm.

 

I remember watching a A-1 Skyraider (not sure why we called them AD-6 or AD-5 for the trainer version with 6 seats) shot down by SA-7 after a strafing run somewhere toward Tan Son Nhut airport. We were watching it from our rooftop. At night, we could hear the sounds of UH-1 and their door guns, then the sky would be lit up by 23 mm rounds exploding. All this in the last few days of April 75.

 

After the fall of Saigon, I saw the carcass of an AC-119 that tried to crash land right in the middle of Hong Thap Tu blvd, about 2 km from our house. There was also a Cessna observation AC somewhere else. Sometimes these have a couple of rockets on each wing, most of the times with smoke warhead.

[shep854]

Thank you, Quang, for that first-person report on the nightmare of the fall of SVN. As you're comfortable to share, we'd all like to read more.

----

As for the Skyraider designations, 'AD-5' and 'AD-6' were old US Navy designations from before a restructuring in the early '60s. 'AD', in the Navy scheme meant 'Attack, Douglas'. It was the first attack plane built by the Douglas company. The -5 and -6 indicated subsequent models of the Skyraider. Later Douglas attack aircraft designs were designated A2D, A3D, A4D.

Under the change, they became the A-1, the A2D Skyshark never went into production so A-2 went to the North American A2J Savage, the A3D Skywarrior became the A-3 and the A4D Skyhawk became the A-4. Clear as mud??

Edited March 24, 2018 by shep854

[Chris Werb]

 

 

You remain fixated on the same point in the face of historical evidence. When the Northern ports were mined and the railroads bombed, the NVA was unable to continue offensive operations and eventually ended up unable to defend its own airspace within 11 days

 

I can't see how anyone can rationally argue against that. As you state, it is a historical fact.

[Chris Werb]

Thank you, Quang, for that first-person report on the nightmare of the fall of SVN. As you're comfortable to share, we'd all like to read more.

----

As for the Skyraider designations, 'AD-5' and 'AD-6' were old US Navy designations from before a restructuring in the early '60s. 'AD', in the Navy scheme meant 'Attack, Douglas'. It was the first attack plane built by the Douglas company. The -5 and -6 indicated subsequent models of the Skyraider. Later Douglas attack aircraft designs were designated A2D, A3D, A4D.

Under the change, they became the A-1, the A2D Skyshark never went into production so A-2 went to the North American A2J Savage, the A3D Skywarrior became the A-3 and the A4D Skyhawk became the A-4. Clear as mud??

 

AD-5 = A1E

AD-6 = A-1H

AD-7 = A-1J

 

I don't think earlier skyraiders were around long enough to be renamed. However, I'm curious why the new designations started at "E".

[shep854]

I guess a nod to the earlier, out-of-service models...Had they been flying, they would have gotten the earlier model letter.

E is the fifth letter in the alphabet, so 'logically', the AD-6 should have been A-1F and -7 the G model. Hmmm...

----

There are actually two theories on the SPAD nickname. One (and I believe correct) is that it was a naval aviator's slang for Single Place AD, as distinct from the wide-bodied, side-by-side A-1E.

The other, of course, is a joke on the plane's apparent age, referring to the WWII SPAD fighter.

[Quang]

I guess a nod to the earlier, out-of-service models...Had they been flying, they would have gotten the earlier model letter.

E is the fifth letter in the alphabet, so 'logically', the AD-6 should have been A-1F and -7 the G model. Hmmm...

----

There are actually two theories on the SPAD nickname. One (and I believe correct) is that it was a naval aviator's slang for Single Place AD, as distinct from the wide-bodied, side-by-side A-1E.

The other, of course, is a joke on the plane's apparent age, referring to the WWII SPAD fighter.

My uncle flew his first combat missions on a T-28. Now, what the hell was that? Around 64, he was sent to the US to get trained on AD-6. Upon his return, he took part in bombing missions to the north. These went on for a while until the AD up there became too dangerous (at first there were only some 23mm, 37mm, etc. But the majority of AA fire was still by heavy MG). Later on, he went back to the US to be trained on A-37.

 

His most cherished gift to me was a dog eared Le Grand Cirque (The Big Circus) by Pierre Clostermann. I guess it was his inspiration for becoming a pilot. I still think it’s a great book.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Thanks for the insight Quang. I dont think we have ever had anyone from Vietnam here before, and its good to get a perspective of someone who was there.

 

Re Napalm, I remember reading in Christopher Robbins (really rather good) book on Air America that they used homemade napalm in Laos. Apparently you could make it from Avgas mixed in with a packet of Tide detergent and mixed with a broompole, to which you taped on a thermite grenade.

 

I think the same book mentioned an AC119 gunship shot down in the last days, at night with an SA7. Which if true was some pretty remarkable shooting.

[Stuart Galbraith]

I didnt know the VNAF used the T28, but I shoudlnt be surprised. I knew it was used in Laos, along with the AT6 apparently.

[Quang]

Thanks for the insight Quang. I dont think we have ever had anyone from Vietnam here before, and its good to get a perspective of someone who was there.

 

Re Napalm, I remember reading in Christopher Robbins (really rather good) book on Air America that they used homemade napalm in Laos. Apparently you could make it from Avgas mixed in with a packet of Tide detergent and mixed with a broompole, to which you taped on a thermite grenade.

 

I think the same book mentioned an AC119 gunship shot down in the last days, at night with an SA7. Which if true was some pretty remarkable shooting.

It must be the one that crash landed on Hong Thap Tu.

 

I’ve been around since the days of the first Tank Net site, but lurking most of the times.

 

The VNAF stopped using the T28 at least for combat around 64.

 

During the last days, fighting was furious all over. At the Armor school of Long Thanh, they had to use delapidated M24, M41 and M42 (? The one with the twin 40 mm Bofor) to try to counterattack. Months afterward you could still see their carcasses. These were training equipment, the rifling of their tubes must be long gone. At the military academy of Vung Tau, the fighting went on for a few days. There, the defenders were kids as young as 12 whose fathers had fallen, that’s why they were given a place at the school as compensation (free education, room and board). The NVA didn’t spare them. My family had a vacation house there and I went to Vung Tau (beach town, 120 km from Saigon) about 2 months after the fall, hoping to find a boat out. The mil academy was heavily damaged, bullet and shell holes everywhere. I couldn’t help remembering those proud kids we saw on the parade ground and wondering if any survived.

 

In Saigon, fighting was everywhere too, but not concentrated and not very furious because the army has mostly withdrawn to avoid a bloodbath there and to save strength to fight elsewhere.

[rmgill]

Possibly of interest:

http://www.t28trojanfoundation.com/vietnam.html

 

http://www.t28trojanfoundation.com/vnaf.html

Edited March 24, 2018 by rmgill

[Brian Kennedy]

 

I guess a nod to the earlier, out-of-service models...Had they been flying, they would have gotten the earlier model letter.

E is the fifth letter in the alphabet, so 'logically', the AD-6 should have been A-1F and -7 the G model. Hmmm...

----

There are actually two theories on the SPAD nickname. One (and I believe correct) is that it was a naval aviator's slang for Single Place AD, as distinct from the wide-bodied, side-by-side A-1E.

The other, of course, is a joke on the plane's apparent age, referring to the WWII SPAD fighter.

My uncle flew his first combat missions on a T-28. Now, what the hell was that? Around 64, he was sent to the US to get trained on AD-6. Upon his return, he took part in bombing missions to the north. These went on for a while until the AD up there became too dangerous (at first there were only some 23mm, 37mm, etc. But the majority of AA fire was still by heavy MG). Later on, he went back to the US to be trained on A-37.

 

His most cherished gift to me was a dog eared Le Grand Cirque (The Big Circus) by Pierre Clostermann. I guess it was his inspiration for becoming a pilot. I still think it’s a great book.

 

 

My father was an A-1 pilot as well (mostly Sandy missions). Great to see you posting here!