50 Years Ago Today The Tet Offensive Started

[JWB]

Had Johnson been serious and had the harbors mined in '65, Rolling Thunder might well have been decisive.

Mining was brought up then but Mac rejected it because it would have almost no effect on the VC, That decision was logical because the NVA at that time was only a very small part of the enemy force. It wasn't until early 1967 that intelligence found out how Hanoi was inflating the size of the VC organization. Many of the NVA would switch unis after crossing into SVN. As the war ground forward attrition of the VC accelerated to the point where Hanoi was forced to supplement its ranks. Even that wasn't enough as we all know and the Tet offensive was forced upon them. Logically speaking the mining op should have been set into motion in spring 1968 as punishment.

 

I finally found a book that describes the Laos portion of RANCH HAND but it doesn't really explain why defoliation was never used to interdict the NVA going into Cambodia.

 

https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/28/2001329797/-1/-1/0/AFD-100928-054.pdf

 

edited part

Edited March 7, 2018 by JWB

[Stuart Galbraith]

Wouldnt that have interfered with covert bombing efforts in Cambodia, by drawing attention to the US being in their airspace?

 

I was reading yesterday that North Vietnam's first Mig21's arrived by ship in December 1966, early 1967. So at least mining would have made that process a little harder. That said, towards the end they were bringing in aircraft via train via China (where the Chinese were nicking the state of the art radar and replacing it with an off the shelf one), so any mining effort is going to have only relatively limited returns if they can bring stuff in overland via China.

[Skywalkre]

I thought mining was avoided because of fear of hitting a Soviet ship and thus escalating the war. It's been years since I've read about Vietnam but I thought that ended up happening with nothing as much as a shrug from the Soviets.

 

Still, even if the effect would have been minimal or simply delayed an outcome... isn't that still the point? Doesn't this play into that Powell approach to warfare where you either a ) put in 100% and everything you can to achieve victory or b ) don't bother and go home?

[JWB]

I thought mining was avoided because of fear of hitting a Soviet ship and thus escalating the war. It's been years since I've read about Vietnam but I thought that ended up happening with nothing as much as a shrug from the Soviets.

 

Still, even if the effect would have been minimal or simply delayed an outcome... isn't that still the point? Doesn't this play into that Powell approach to warfare where you either a ) put in 100% and everything you can to achieve victory or b ) don't bother and go home?

LBJ had nightmares about doing anything that would lead to escalation. Remember these things were going on only a few years after the Cuban missile crisis. Moscow protested vigorously but realized that the blockade was a temporary political expedient for Nixon to save at least some face. Had Nixon decided to leave the mines in place the Soviet navy would have found a way to clear them eventually. How long is anybody's guess. Delaying the outcome long enough and Moscow would have just quit helping Hanoi before Hanoi is able to win. Remember Moscow cut Hanoi off in 1974/1975 time frame.

[JWB]

Wouldnt that have interfered with covert bombing efforts in Cambodia, by drawing attention to the US being in their airspace?

 

I was reading yesterday that North Vietnam's first Mig21's arrived by ship in December 1966, early 1967. So at least mining would have made that process a little harder. That said, towards the end they were bringing in aircraft via train via China (where the Chinese were nicking the state of the art radar and replacing it with an off the shelf one), so any mining effort is going to have only relatively limited returns if they can bring stuff in overland via China.

After more research it appears the blockade would have failed because China provided more aid to Hanoi than I had originally thought.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/vietnam/hist-2nd-indochina-cpr.htm

 

"Chinese trucks, tanks, Surface to air missiles, MIG jet aircraft, 130mm artillery pieces, 130mm mortars, and shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles, were all moved south. The PAVN had enough first class material to launch a 20 division mechanized Easter Offensive in 1972 into South Vietnam, more divisions than ever commanded by General Patton in Europe during World War II, as one American Officer would point out. [56] The North Vietnamese would pay a terrible price for this gamble, thanks to U.S. airpower and advisors on the ground, losing an estimated 450 tanks and over 100,000 troops killed in action during the 1972 offensive. [57] China would, again, make up for much of the PAVN equipment lost, after the Paris Peace Treaty was signed, in 1973 and 1974, enabling the North Vietnamese to reconstitute units for another offensive in 1975. U.S. forces would not be present this time to help its South Vietnamese allies as 18 well trained and equipped PAVN divisions rolled to Saigon in April of 1975, effectively ending the Second Vietnam War. [58] Both Vietnam Wars, from 1946-1975, ended in victory for North Vietnam against the west, but without the massive amounts of military aid provided by the PRC, most likely the outcome would have been different. As with all what-if’s of history we shall never know."

 

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/chinesesupport.aspx

 

"It was known at the time that both China and the Soviet Union were pouring material aid into North Vietnam. Mr. Yang said the Chinese supplied more than 2 million rifles,. more than 270 million rounds of ammunition, 37,000 artillery pieces, 18.8 million artillery shells, 179 planes and 145 naval vessels."

 

https://www.nytimes.com/1979/07/31/archives/peking-says-it-sent-300000-men-to-aid-hanoi-in-war-with-us-road.html

[RETAC21]

China was matching the Soviets, so if the Soviet flow was reduced the Chinese would be less motivated to keep up with it. After the Sino-Soviet split both Communist powers were trying to swing the Communist governments and the Viets played skillfully one against the other.

 

What would have helped was mining the ports and unrestricted bombing cutting the rail lines from China, but Johnson feared an intervention like Korea which the RVN couldn't resist.

[JWB]

China was matching the Soviets, so if the Soviet flow was reduced the Chinese would be less motivated to keep up with it. After the Sino-Soviet split both Communist powers were trying to swing the Communist governments and the Viets played skillfully one against the other.

 

What would have helped was mining the ports and unrestricted bombing cutting the rail lines from China, but Johnson feared an intervention like Korea which the RVN couldn't resist.

Why would China reduce aid if the Soviets reduce aid? China's goal was and still is to become the regional hegemon. First step was to drive foreign militaries out. Second step was to destroy western oriented regimes. Third step is turn regional governments into vassals. That is why China invaded Vietnam in 1979.

 

OTOH it would have been possible to turn the tiny Con Son island into a Vietnamese version of Taiwan.

[RETAC21]

Precisely because of this: "Third step is turn regional governments into vassals. That is why China invaded Vietnam in 1979."

[JWB]

Precisely because of this: "Third step is turn regional governments into vassals. That is why China invaded Vietnam in 1979."

How is it possible to stop China arming NVN? Bombing rail lines cannot be sustained because bombers will shot down and the damage is quickly repaired. Interdiction of that sort worked against Germany in WW2 because of the man power shortage. China has no manpower shortage.

[Stuart Galbraith]

It wasnt that easy to keep railway lines out of service even in WW2.

 

Delayed action bombs is one possiblity. But hardly a real deterrent to people determined to win.

[RETAC21]

 

Precisely because of this: "Third step is turn regional governments into vassals. That is why China invaded Vietnam in 1979."

How is it possible to stop China arming NVN? Bombing rail lines cannot be sustained because bombers will shot down and the damage is quickly repaired. Interdiction of that sort worked against Germany in WW2 because of the man power shortage. China has no manpower shortage.

 

 

NVN is not Germany, its capacities to repair and rebuild are quite limited, the number of railines quite manageable too. For it to work, the interdiction effort needs to target bridges, the lines and the yards. Given that NVN was bombed for 3 year straight and the Ho Chin Minh trail was bombed between 65 and 73, and that the NVA lacked resources to defend everywhere, it was eminently doable using just those resources. As 1972 proved, once the logistic lifeline is cut, the air defence system collapses quite rapidly. None of this was new to the USAF, as it had been done in Korea quite successfully.

 

[JWB]

China had more will to dominate than the US voters and taxpayers had will to stop them. Trying to explain that to Hanoi would probably have been impossible.

 

OTOH it would have been possible to save Cambodia. Hanoi had no desire to colonize any countries (save reestablishing the Nguyen Empire). The only country that really wanted to vassalise Cambodia was China. They were able to do that by making use of the HMT. But once Hanoi took Saigon that route became a lot more difficult for China to use. The boarder between Laos and Cambodia is about 300 km in total length but from the Thailand to Vietnam in a straight line the distance is only 220 km. That is actually defendable. Very few US troops would be needed. China would be unable to deploy very much (if any) airpower because of the logistical restrictions. Had the USA redirected aid from Saigon to Cambodia in 1970 the Khmer Rouge would have been crushed and the NVA in Cambodia would have been pushed out. I have already written about that.

 

I still like relocating the Saigon regime to Con Son.

[JWB]

 

 

Precisely because of this: "Third step is turn regional governments into vassals. That is why China invaded Vietnam in 1979."

How is it possible to stop China arming NVN? Bombing rail lines cannot be sustained because bombers will shot down and the damage is quickly repaired. Interdiction of that sort worked against Germany in WW2 because of the man power shortage. China has no manpower shortage.

 

 

NVN is not Germany, its capacities to repair and rebuild are quite limited, the number of railines quite manageable too. For it to work, the interdiction effort needs to target bridges, the lines and the yards. Given that NVN was bombed for 3 year straight and the Ho Chin Minh trail was bombed between 65 and 73, and that the NVA lacked resources to defend everywhere, it was eminently doable using just those resources. As 1972 proved, once the logistic lifeline is cut, the air defence system collapses quite rapidly. None of this was new to the USAF, as it had been done in Korea quite successfully.

 

 

China deployed 300,000 workers to NVN to rebuild damages caused by US bombing. If need be they could deploy even more. A LOT more.

[RETAC21]

And magically produce the locomotives, rails, etc. under continuous bombing? Ex-machina explanations also serve the other side, the US could have deployed a LOT more airpower, like B-52s.

 

Repair this:

 

[RETAC21]

An example, Dec 26 1972:

 

Day 8 began with the largest formation of B-52s ever assembled into a single wave. One Hundred Twenty B-52's, 78 from Andersen (45 B-52G's and 33 B-52D's) along with 42, B-52D's from U-Tapao. The better ECM equipped B-52D's were used to strike targets in Hanoi. Of the 72, B-52D's attacking Hanoi targets, the Duc Noi rail yards was struck by 9 B-52D's entering Hanoi from the North West. The Kinh No vehicle complex was struck by 9 B-52D's entering the target area from the North West. The Hanoi rail yards was struck by 9 B-52D's arriving on the target area from the North East. Hanoi petroleum product storage facility was struck by 9 B-52D's flying into Hanoi from the North East. 18, B-52D's arriving to the area from the South West struck the rail yards of Giap Nhi. A Vietnamese SAM site, VN 549, was struck by 3, B-52D's from the South East. Also arriving from the South East was 15 B-52D's that hit the Van Dien vehicle repair depot in Hanoi.

The B-52G's were used to strike the Thai Nguyen rail yards north of Hanoi. This target was struck by 15, B-52G's accompanied by 3, B-52D's arriving on the target area from the North West. The remaining B-52G's arriving from Andersen approached the coastal city of Haiphong in two attack formations. One, a 15 plane group of B-52G's from the North East targeting the Haiphong transformer station, and another identical group arriving from the South East bombing the Haiphong rail yards.

[JWB]

The rail equipment and materiel would be produced in China which could not be bombed.

 

How many B-52s were downed?

[RETAC21]

On that day, 2. Once the USAF adjusted its tactics, losses were quite bearable. And the worst day they lost 6.

 

North Vietnam is going to ran out of rolling stock and ammo before the USAF runs out of B-52s, more so in the 60s, when there were less SAMs (if any in 65) and AA guns.

[RETAC21]

Also, this was something that was clear at the time:

 

http://vietnamwar.lib.umb.edu/warHome/docs/1964GoldwaterOnVietnam.html

 

And no, we will not let our support today silence our basic criticism that the war in Vietnam -- and let's call it what it is, a war--that the war in Vietnam is being fought under policies that obscure our purposes, confuse our allies, particularly the Vietnamese and encourage the enemy to prolong the fighting.

We must, instead, prosecute the war in Vietnam with the object of ending it along with the threats to peace that it poses all over the world.

Taking strong action simply to return to the status quo is not worthy of our sacrifices, our ideals, or our vision of a world of peace, freedom and justice.

Now this doesn't mean the use of military power alone. We have vast resources of economic, political and psychological power which have not even been tapped in our Vietnamese strategy.

These, I suggest, can be peaceful means of waging war on war itself and all I say is, let's use them.

[NickM]

Thought this was pretty interesting. Id heard the name Lansdale before, I just hadnt realised he was as smart as this.

 

I saw the author, Max Boot discussing his book on CSpan 2 BookTV (yeah, that's the name of the channel); 'hearts & minds' is fine, but the one thing never mentioned is the necessity for security; like in a 'mobbed up' or gang infested neighborhood, nobody is going to talk to the the police as there are 'hit men' just itching to blow you away for being a 'rat'--or if you prefer 'a grass'.

[NickM]

The rail equipment and materiel would be produced in China which could not be bombed.

 

How many B-52s were downed?

 

I think 15 is the accepted number;

[JWB]

 

Thought this was pretty interesting. Id heard the name Lansdale before, I just hadnt realised he was as smart as this.

 

I saw the author, Max Boot discussing his book on CSpan 2 BookTV (yeah, that's the name of the channel); 'hearts & minds' is fine, but the one thing never mentioned is the necessity for security; like in a 'mobbed up' or gang infested neighborhood, nobody is going to talk to the the police as there are 'hit men' just itching to blow you away for being a 'rat'--or if you prefer 'a grass'.

 

Security and "hearts&minds" are part and parcel of pacification. That is where and when the strategy went off the rails. Pacification was about sending troops into hostile villiages to convert the population. That was not going to work using that Euroafrican force that was (and is) the US.mil. They should have used the ARVN to do that. The US and other allies should have been used to block the NVA from getting into SVN.

 

Posters here have been advocating strategic interdiction by bombing the North. That will work but only to a limited extent. What the allies in SVN needed to do was interdict the HMT at the operational level. To do that required a multi step plan. First was defoliating the jungle areas of the southern most parts of Laos. The second was defoliating the jungle just east of the central highlands. Third is to send in B-52 to blast 50,000 craters in the defoliated strips. The craters would act as obstacles to force those long supply columns to weave and snake their way between the craters. That would forcing them to linger in the open ares where they would be easily spotted and destroyed. The result would be to push the "big war" out of SVN and into Laos where where there would be war at a distance instead of up close. Obviously the allies would have the advantage because of air power. It would also neutralize and eventually end the NVA in Cambodia. When that is accomplished Lon Nol would be able to retake his country from the NVA and the Khmer Rouge. With a little bit of US aid he would have been able to deploy a true blocking force at the Laos border. The big question is how much all of this would cost. The US command didn't understand the enemy until early 1967 and therefor could not implement this strategy until then. Of course that was too late in the game to prevent the Tet offensive because of the time lag. Applying agent orange won't kill the trees instantly. It takes several weeks before the leaves fall off. To truly defoliate would require a second application. By that time the rain season would have started and the NVA would have already stockpiled the caches in Cambodia from which it launched the Tet operations. The war budget would therefore be the amount of money spent from early 1967 forward. In current US dollars that would be about $800 billion. That is a lot of money but it would need to last almost for ever. Operation desert storm cost about 1.2 billion per day. Current ops in Afghanistan run about 1 billion per week. This alternate war I described would have cost somewhere in between those two figures. The ultimate question is how many decades would Peking be willing to throw away thousands of trucks per month?

[RETAC21]

So somehow it's better to have to find and destroy thousands of trucks, bycicles, water buffalos and porters rather than shut the flow where it originates?

[NickM]

So somehow it's better to have to find and destroy thousands of trucks, bycicles, water buffalos and porters rather than shut the flow where it originates?

 

Block the trail by building a wall of fortified positions from the South China Sea across Laos to Thailand & back it with all the firepower 'in country' that can be spared.

[JWB]

 

So somehow it's better to have to find and destroy thousands of trucks, bycicles, water buffalos and porters rather than shut the flow where it originates?

 

Block the trail by building a wall of fortified positions from the South China Sea across Laos to Thailand & back it with all the firepower 'in country' that can be spared.

 

Something like that. I forgot to add it. They would spray 2 strips a few hundred meters wide and 100 meters apart. The northern strip would be cratered. The interval between the strips would remain jungle where allied armor would be deployed. The southern strip would not need cratering because the only enemy trying to attack from the southern direction would be lightly armed insurgents. The enemy coming down from the north could be equipped with T-54s which is why the craters would excavated. This plan would require violating Laos sovereignty. The USA and the other non asian forces couldn't get away with such actions but I bet the some ARVN/ROK force could after Seoul, Manila, Cambodia et al raise a big stink in the UN.

[RETAC21]

Again, much easier, cheaper and doable to mine the ports and bomb the railroads.