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I'm pretty sure recent research has proved that the overwhelming majority of females were simply not registered.

 

China's much bigger demographic problem is the aging population due to the one child policy. It's workforce is shrinking and will continue to do so in dramatic fashion in the next couple decades.

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Even if China's economic efficiency is weakened by things like aging population, the sheer scale of it all will still mean a big economy. Additionally, China doesn't have the same kind of worker entitlements so expectations on the government won't be so demanding. And Chinese people in general are quite adapt at toughen it out. Also, manh other countries have similiar age related demographic issues. So it won't be a disadvantage unique to China. I'd still expect their GDP to keep marching up for some time still. GDP numbers are often skewed and what not, but false GDP numbers get corrected after a number of years. In general, it should be expected that total nominal GDP (not PPP) can reach the same level as that of the US in 5-10 years. Of course it may not, but I think it is more likely than unlikely. In terms of PPP, they already are bigger than the US. I don't think they will reach the US on GDP per capita but with a population so big, even if with just half the GDP per capita as the US would result in their total national GDP exceeding the US.

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A very comprehensive and well written diplomat article about PLAN 2030 ship composition prediction. Article dated February 15th, 2019.

 

Predictions for the Chinese Navy’s (People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN) growth have often focused on the quantitative number of ships or submarines. Even recent commentary surrounding the PLAN describes it as the “world’s largest navy” in terms of the number of ships fielded, rather than using more sensible metrics such as tonnage. A 22 class fast missile boat and an 052D class destroyer are both counted as “one” ship, but the difference between a 220 ton craft and a 7,000 ton surface combatant is significant.

Some future predictions for the PLAN have been more acknowledging of the qualitative advancements in addition to quantity. However, only a few commentaries have considered the number of each warship type which may be produced. This piece will seek to paint a picture of what the PLAN may look like in 2030 among major warship categories.

Destroyers and Frigates

The growth of Chinese surface combatants in recent years has greatly enhanced the PLAN’s overall profile. The emergence of the 055 class destroyer and high production rates of 055 and 052D class destroyers at two major shipyards have greatly changed the projections of future PLAN surface combatant composition from as a recently as a couple of years ago.

To place this growth in perspective, in the eight years between 2010 and 2018, 24 destroyers were launched from Chinese shipyards, consisting of four 052Cs, 16 052Ds (the three most recent being extended length variants), and four 055 large destroyers. By contrast, in the 20 years between 1990 and 2010, only 10 destroyers were launched from Chinese shipyards (not including four Sovremenny-class destroyers purchased from Russia), of which only two were the Aegis-type, competitive 052C class.

Current rumors regarding PLAN destroyer production suggest about 12 baseline 055 class destroyers will be produced before moving onto a more advanced 055A class perhaps sometime in the early 2020s. Production of the 052D will likely continue to over 25 units before an improved 052E variant succeeds it. Both the notional 055A and 052E are thought to incorporate new propulsion technologies in the form of partial or full electric propulsion.

Assuming Jiangnan and Dalian shipyards continue building destroyers at a similar pace to recent years when both shipyards were active, it is not unreasonable to project a launch rate of three 052D/E destroyers and two 055/A destroyers a year. Sustaining such a production rate from 2019 to the beginning of 2030 would result in approximately an additional 33 052D/E pattern destroyers and 22 055/A destroyers launched in those 11 years. Considering the current number of modern Aegis type destroyers in the water (six 052Cs in service, 10 052Ds in service, six 052Ds in sea trials or launched, four 055s in sea trials or launched), the total number of 7,000 ton destroyers in the water would number about 55, whereas the 12,000 ton destroyers would number 26.

However, the number of destroyers in service would be somewhat less when considering that two to three years pass between a destroyer being launched and commissioned. Therefore, by 2030 it is more likely that around 40 7,000 ton destroyers (052C/D/E) will be in service, and up to 20 12,000 ton destroyers (055/A) as well. It is worth noting that additional destroyers will likely be commissioned and procured after 2030.

The situation is somewhat less clear for PLAN warships in the 4,000 ton category. While the last of the 30 capable and proven 054A frigates will soon enter service in 2019, the long rumored 054B successor has yet to emerge. There are some indicators that production may have been delayed for additional enhancement to its propulsion system, but some more radical rumors suggest the PLAN may do away with the 4,000 ton category and choose to build more ships of the 7,000 ton and 12,000 ton category in lieu of the 054B. This author considers such a possibility unlikely at this stage, and believes 054B production will occur in the early 2020s, at the same Huangpu and Hudong shipyards that 054As were built. Assuming a three ship per year launch rate similar to the 054A and assuming eight years of production beginning in 2022, up to 24 054Bs could be launched and up to 20 commissioned by 2030.

Meanwhile, 056/A corvette production – now approaching 60 ships in total – is thought to be winding down.

 

Overall, the growth of PLAN destroyer production has made various past numerical projections obsolete. In the book Chinese Naval Shipbuilding – an Ambitious and Uncertain Course, a “maximal scenario” 2030 forecast for the PLAN predicted 34 destroyers, 68 frigates, and 26 corvettes in service. Needless to say, the destroyer projections appear to have been somewhat underestimated, and corvette prediction completely off the mark, while frigates were exaggerated. Considering the book was published in late 2015 – at a time when 052D production at two shipyards had only begun, as well as a year and a half before the first 055 was launched, and when 056 production was difficult to track – such numbers were not unreasonable for the time.

Submarines

The situation for PLAN submarines, both nuclear (SSNs, SSBNs) and diesel electric (SSKs) are somewhat more uncertain. It is virtually confirmed that new types of each category are due to emerge in coming years, namely the 09V SSN, the 09VI SSBN, and the 039C SSK.

However the exact number of boats currently in service is unknown. It is thought that anywhere between six to nine 09III SSNs of different variants may exist, as well as two to three older 091 SSNs. Up to five 09IV SSBNs may also exist. The status of the original 092 SSBN is unknown. Over 12 of the newest 039A/B class SSKs are in service, as well as 13 039 class SSKs, 12 Kilo class SSKs, and anywhere up to 16 035 class SSKs which are very much obsolete and likely in the process of being retired.

The suspected new nuclear submarine production facility at Huludao presents a potential wildcard for the future of PLAN nuclear submarine procurement as well as the overall PLAN submarine fleet. It is unknown how rapidly the PLAN may want to build new SSNs and SSBNs and the technological maturity of new upcoming boats can only be speculated upon. However, the sheer scale of the new nuclear submarine production facility suggests the PLAN has planned for a long production run of many nuclear submarines, and it is unknown if the PLAN will alter or reduce the size of its SSK fleet if a growth of nuclear submarine fleet size occurs.

The very opaque nature of Chinese submarine production means it is difficult to make even a medium term projection; however a very cautious estimate of the new facility producing one SSN per year and one SSBN every two years introduces an additional eight SSNs in service and three to four SSBNs in service by 2030. But it should be cautioned that if the technological maturity and capability of upcoming nuclear submarines are deemed satisfactory, a ramp up of production may occur to take advantage of the new facility’s overall potential. In such a situation, by 2030 anywhere up to 30-40 new SSNs might be launched for three to four per year, though it is not currently judged to be imminent.

Carriers

Recent pictures of Jiangnan shipyard have effectively confirmed that construction of China’s third aircraft carrier – 003, a conventionally powered carrier displacing about 80,000 tons full and equipped with electromagnetic catapults – is now underway. Large modules are currently being fabricated in a staging area and are expected to be transported to a drydock for assembly later in 2019 or in early 2020. It is thought that 003 will be launched by 2021 at the earliest, with commissioning at least two years afterwards.

In addition to CV-16 Liaoning in service and the as yet unnamed 002 carrier due to enter service in 2019, the PLAN will likely operate three aircraft carriers by 2023 at the earliest. However it is not known how Chinese carrier production will proceed after 003 is launched. It has been rumored that Dalian (where 002 was constructed) may proceed to build another carrier similar to 003, after which a nuclear powered carrier is expected from either Dalian or Jiangnan. It is also possible that 003 will be followed directly by a nuclear carrier, in which case both Dalian and Jiangnan will likely see a pause in carrier work as facilities are upgraded and retooled.

Whichever option is taken, it is likely that the PLAN will have four carriers in service by 2030, made up of CV-16, 002, and 003, with the fourth being either a second 003 pattern carrier or perhaps a nuclear carrier. Depending on PLAN confidence in key technologies and their overall carrier experience, it is also possible for additional carriers to be ordered more quickly, with a most high end ceiling of five to six carriers in service by 2030.

Amphibious Assault

As of early 2019, six 25,000 ton 071 class landing platform docks (LPDs) are in service, with a seventh being fitted out and an eighth hull under construction. Modules for the long awaited 075 class landing helicopter dock (LHD) are expected to emerge by the end of 2019 at the earliest, with three ships rumored to have been ordered. The 075 class is thought to field a full displacement around 36,000 tons, placing it smaller than U.S. Navy Wasp and America class LHDs but larger than most other classes of similar ships in the world. Recent rumors have suggested that a larger 075 derivative may be built after the first three 075s, to displace in excess of 40,000 tons. All large Chinese amphibious assault ships are built at Hudong Zhonghua shipyard and that is not expected to change in the immediate future.

It is difficult to predict the size of the PLAN’s future combined LPD and LHD fleet because PLAN procurement of 071 class ships has been somewhat irregular, with multiyear gaps between batches. It is unknown if such procurement practice will continue into the 2020s; however Hudong’s production of the last three 071 hulls has shown that a one ship per year launch rate can be comfortably sustained. Assuming that the larger 075 class LPD takes correspondingly longer (let’s say overall 1.5 years) to launch one ship, and assuming that production capacity is not expanded, a reasonable LPD and LHD fleet by 2030 would consist of eight 071 class LPDs and three 075 LHDs in service. In other words, such a fleet would consist of the present number of 071s and 075s confirmed or rumored to have been ordered. This could be achieved by 2026, with the eight 071 LPDs commissioned by 2020-2021. However, if additional orders are placed – a very reasonable notion considering the overall trajectory of PLAN procurement – anywhere up to 12 LPDs and five to six LHDs may be achievable by 2030. If the PLAN “only” achieves the conservative estimate, the combined amphibious assault capability would rank second largest in the world after the U.S. Navy, even disregarding the PLAN’s 25-30 strong fleet of the 072 family of landing ships which displace approximately 5,000 tons each.

 

Future factors

In summary, an early 2019 prediction for PLAN ships in service by 2030 are broken down as such:

16-20 055/A destroyers (12,000 ton category)
36-40 052D/E destroyers (7,000 ton category)
40-50 054A/B frigates (4,000-5,000 ton category)
Approximately 60 SSKs
Anywhere from 16 or more SSNs (including six to eight existing SSNs)
Anywhere from eight or more SSBNs (including four to five existing SSBNs)
At least four aircraft carriers (two ski jump, two catapult)
At least eight 071 LPDs (25,000 ton category)
At least three 075 LHDs (36,000 ton category)

Of the above, frigates, SSNs, SSBNs, and carriers are currently the most difficult to predict, with the most margin for error.

Other ships of note include the approximately 60 056/A corvettes that will complete its production run within the next year or so, as well as the 11 older “non-Aegis” type destroyers and dozen or so older frigates that will likely remain in service as “second line” surface combatants. The 25-30 ship fleet of 072s will likely be retained. It is unknown if the 60 odd fleet of 22 class missile boats will be retained. The numbers of replenishment ships are not predicted here, due to lack of long-term regular production rates that can be extrapolated, though fast launch rates have been demonstrated.

Making predictions for the PLAN a decade in advance is difficult given the PLA’s overall opacity. Unforeseen confounding factors – such as project mismanagement, technological hurdles, economic adversity, military conflict, and natural disaster – are also difficult to consider.

The projection laid out here is not concrete and final, and is likely to evolve in coming years as 2030 approaches. However, use of critical extrapolation and consideration of Chinese naval requirements can provide a gauge for how the PLAN may evolve in the medium term future.

https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/predicting-the-chinese-navy-of-2030/

Edited by JasonJ
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I cant remember if we have a dedicated chinese carrier thread, but if we do, feel free to repost it there.

 

https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-case-of-the-chinese-aircraft-carrier-spy?source=articles&via=rss

The man who oversaw the construction of China's first two aircraft carriers is on trial in Shanghai for corruption and also, according to press reports, for passing along information to foreign agents.

The charges brought against Sun Bo are part of Chinese President Xi Jinping's sweeping anti-corruption campaign, and if Sun really did give up naval secrets, then the Chinese fleet's most recognizable warship, and the shipyard that built it, are compromised.

Clearly their reputations are compromised.

Sun, an engineer and naval architect by training, spent decades working for the government-owned China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, located in Dalian in northern China. Sun, who was born in 1961, steadily climbed the CSIC's corporate ladder while rising in rank in the Chinese Communist Party.

His downfall was swift. In June 2018, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Chinese Communist Party's anti-corruption agency, announced Sun's arrest. Sun "is suspected of serious violations of the law," declared the commission. "As a senior cadre and responsible leader of a state-owned enterprise, Sun Bo has abused his authority and was disloyal to the Communist Party.”

The commission didn't specify exactly which crimes Sun allegedly committed. State media claimed Sun "abused his power in the course of executing the company’s business activities and the state suffered huge losses as a result."

CSIC, one of China's 10 biggest shipyards, rocketed past its competitors in the early 2000s when Beijing tapped it to rebuild an old aircraft carrier that the Chinese government had bought from Ukraine under the pretense of modifying the vessel into a floating casino.

The Chinese navy commissioned the carrier, renamed Liaoning, in 2012. Meanwhile CSIC was hard at work on a second carrier, a copy of Liaoning that could be commissioned some time in 2019. A third, larger carrier is under construction at a separate shipyard in Shanghai.

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About 1 year since the post counting up the number of surface ships that can be counted. Type 55s still at 8 accounted for although at that time just one was fitting out and three under assembly. Now there are two at sea trials and two fitting out. For Type 52Ds, number of commissioned (现役) went up from 6 then to 11 as of now. Total accounted for went from 18 then to 26 as of now.

Type52Ds.png

https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/052D%E5%9E%8B%E5%AF%BC%E5%BC%B9%E9%A9%B1%E9%80%90%E8%88%B0

 

All 30 accounted for Type 54A frigates are in service.

 

The number of Type 56 corvettes have also increased, from a total accounted for of 46 (of which 39 were commissioned) to 58 (42 commissioned).

type56corvettes.jpg

https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/056%E5%9E%8B%E5%AF%BC%E5%BC%B9%E6%8A%A4%E5%8D%AB%E8%88%B0

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A very comprehensive and well written diplomat article about PLAN 2030 ship composition prediction. Article dated February 15th, 2019.

 

Other ships of note include the approximately 60 056/A corvettes that will complete its production run within the next year or so, as well as the 11 older “non-Aegis” type destroyers and dozen or so older frigates that will likely remain in service as “second line” surface combatants. The 25-30 ship fleet of 072s will likely be retained. It is unknown if the 60 odd fleet of 22 class missile boats will be retained. The numbers of replenishment ships are not predicted here, due to lack of long-term regular production rates that can be extrapolated, though fast launch rates have been demonstrated.

 

 

https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/predicting-the-chinese-navy-of-2030/

Why would they retire the quite new and capable Type 022 missile boats ?

Edited by KV7
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A very comprehensive and well written diplomat article about PLAN 2030 ship composition prediction. Article dated February 15th, 2019.

 

 

Other ships of note include the approximately 60 056/A corvettes that will complete its production run within the next year or so, as well as the 11 older “non-Aegis” type destroyers and dozen or so older frigates that will likely remain in service as “second line” surface combatants. The 25-30 ship fleet of 072s will likely be retained. It is unknown if the 60 odd fleet of 22 class missile boats will be retained. The numbers of replenishment ships are not predicted here, due to lack of long-term regular production rates that can be extrapolated, though fast launch rates have been demonstrated.

 

https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/predicting-the-chinese-navy-of-2030/

Why would they retire the quite new and capable Type 022 missile boats ?

Good question, according to this 2017 article, the Type 22s purpose was to provide overwhelming satuaration attack ability against Taiwan's Navy which in turn was to deter any independence declaration by Taiwan. However as time went by, the PLAN has underwent fundamental change with new and modern frigates, destroyers and the developing aircraft carriers which have the new much grander purpose of being a deep blue sea navy and could easily accomplish the same task given to the Type 22s regarding the Taiwan Navy. And in practice, the newer Type 56 corvette has started taking over and performing better at the roles that the Type 22 used to be doing during training.

 

中国多艘022导弹艇为何上岸停放 不会退役或将出口

 

近日,网上出现了一张数艘22型导弹艇停放在岸上船台的照片,引起军迷的广泛关注,22艇过时封存一说占据了主流。虽然从照片中很难看出已经封存,但可以通过22艇的特点和作战任务,来尝试推断其未来走向。

 

22型是本世纪初期我国大量建造的一型导弹快艇,也可以说是21世纪第一款批量化的全隐身导弹艇,当时,民进党成为了台湾执政党,台独气焰嚣张,对台军事斗争准备迫在眉睫,看一下当时中国海军的家底,唯一具有威胁的,就是两艘刚刚引进的现代级导弹驱逐舰(还未完全形成战斗力),其余驱护舰数量虽然排在世界前列,但以051和053系列的战斗力,无法抗衡台湾的二代舰,更别说海空军的综合实力对抗!因此,针对台独势力和干预势力,短时间内设计建造出成熟可靠又极具针对性的武器装备,就显得迫在眉睫。在这种背景条件下,国内各船厂大量建造了22型导弹艇(约60艘)、072A型登陆舰(约9艘)、073A型登陆舰(约10艘)和074A型登陆艇(约10艘)等舰船。

 

22型导弹艇最大的特点是采用了高速穿浪双体船型。自上世纪80年代以来,国际上高速双体船得到了迅猛发展,其两侧是由两个瘦削的深V型船体、中间一个主船体构成,这种船型对高速时的阻力和耐波性的改进都非常有利,特别是深V船型对波浪中的失速和运动加速度都有很大的改善。我国从1992年开始对穿浪艇进行跟踪研究,通过数年的努力,把研究理论顺利的转化为了22型这一军品成果,较好的耐波性极其适合在台海作战。

 

在艇身外形上,整体具有明显的低雷达信号特征,艇尾导弹发射装置巧妙的藏于一体化的艇内,驾驶室的舷窗边缘都做了锯齿化处理来减低雷达波反射,海洋迷彩的涂装有别于所有同类型舰艇,成为我国舰艇中一道亮丽且另类的风景。22型导弹艇的武器装载量大,每艘可以搭载8枚YJ83反舰导弹,超过了当时大多051驱逐舰和053护卫舰的单艘搭载量;作战时,可以利用隐蔽、突袭的狼群战术,实施饱和攻击,在当年特定环境下,可以对台独及其干预势力达到有效的威慑。

 

时过境迁,如今的两岸军力对比,已经发生了翻天覆地的变化,中国通过数十年坚持不懈的追赶,海空军作战力量已经对台有了压倒性的优势。而对于美国航母编队的阻吓手段,从过去依托的潜艇和快艇等、转变为由火箭军主导的“反舰弹道导弹”成了新的杀手锏,特别是东风-26(DF-26)的出现,射程覆盖关岛甚至迭戈加西亚群岛,使中国拥有了可靠的打击第二岛链固定目标和大型舰艇等目标能力。反观22型导弹艇,受制于用途单一、航程短、依赖数据链、喷水系统维护繁杂、占据编制大等问题,已经明显不适合时下新的作战体系,在海军中的地位和重要性日渐下滑,在近几年的海上演习中,已经很难见到22艇编队的身影,甚至在近海的小规模演练中,也是056型护卫舰占据了主角地位。

 

以辽宁舰编队的战斗力初步形成,国产首艘航母的即将下水、火箭军的雄厚实力等为依托,中国海军的作战方式也发生了根本变革,特别是近海作战体系,被已经入列30余艘的056型完全占据,22艇被淘汰,成了发展必然。

 

出航次数减少,还长期泡在水中,对舰艇的寿命是有较大影响的,受海水盐度、湿度、海洋大气等影响,腐蚀会严重威胁22型的使用寿命;喷水推进系统更是有别于传统螺旋桨,需要精细的清除水下部分的附着物及铁锈、并对机电设备进行维护保养,因此,为了减少腐蚀,使舰艇保持原有的性能,才把部分22艇暂存于岸边船台上。对于下步,一部分艇肯定要进行封存,不会提前退役,毕竟服役才十余年,还有一定的使用价值,甚至是改装更换更新反舰导弹的潜力。另外一部分,可以考虑出售给对导弹艇有需求的第三世界国家,从今年的阿布扎比防务展中,中国船贸相关部门首次推出的放大版22艇可以初见端倪。(作者署名:浩汉防务-海边漫步)

https://mil.sina.cn/sd/2017-03-14/detail-ifychhus1331230.d.html?from=wap

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Sure, there is a case here, as the Type 56 has appreciable ASW capabilities the Type 022 entirely lacks. On the other hand the 022 is a quite expandable ship that still cannot be ignored in a surface engagement and therefore adds quite a bit of resilience to a fleet, and can be usefully allocated to low-level tasks like patrolling around the artificial islands.

Re officer shortage, it would seem to be a useful way to get officers and captains some experience before serving on much more valuable ships. And a Type 56 requires 6.5 times the crew.

Edited by KV7
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Sure, there is a case here, as the Type 56 has appreciable ASW capabilities the Type 022 entirely lacks. On the other hand the 022 is a quite expandable ship that still cannot be ignored in a surface engagement and therefore adds quite a bit of resilience to a fleet, and can be usefully allocated to low-level tasks like patrolling around the artificial islands.

 

Re officer shortage, it would seem to be a useful way to get officers and captains some experience before serving on much more valuable ships. And a Type 56 requires 6.5 times the crew.

 

Indeed, but missile ships are not what the PRC lacks right now, if you want to train lieutenants it's better to use patrol boats, minesweepers and the like that will get more sea time, plus there may be a shortage of trainers.

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Sure, there is a case here, as the Type 56 has appreciable ASW capabilities the Type 022 entirely lacks. On the other hand the 022 is a quite expandable ship that still cannot be ignored in a surface engagement and therefore adds quite a bit of resilience to a fleet, and can be usefully allocated to low-level tasks like patrolling around the artificial islands.

 

Re officer shortage, it would seem to be a useful way to get officers and captains some experience before serving on much more valuable ships. And a Type 56 requires 6.5 times the crew.

 

Indeed, but missile ships are not what the PRC lacks right now, if you want to train lieutenants it's better to use patrol boats, minesweepers and the like that will get more sea time, plus there may be a shortage of trainers.

 

 

My understanding is that 022 fills the role of patrol boat. A dedicated patrol boat class never existed in PLAN doctrine, perhaps with the exception of the Type 062 'gunboat' which is long gone. Type 037 is still in service but is just an obsolete corvette.

 

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The Type 22 seems like more of a FAC to me - am I confusing designations? I was thinking of the catamaran with eight AShM tubes and little else.

Yeah that is it - it also has an AK-640 clone and some manpads. The AK-630 is probably more than enough for plinking very light craft you would not want to use a missile on.

 

With the retirement of the Type 062 there is no small gun armed classical 'patrol boat' in the PLAN inventory. Some time ago they decided that all light combat craft would be missile armed, starting with the purchase of OSA from the USSR in 1965 - the clone of which is still in service and has been recently modernised to take C-101 in place of Silkworm.

 

There might be other patrol boat type craft used by the coast guard.

Edited by KV7
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