Thresholds Of Prc Military Power

[JasonJ]

I'm making a new thread about China's comprehensive capabilities. The other thread will continue to have updates and such, but for this thread, I'm curious about just estimations of the necessary power it would theoretical take to challenge and hold the equal or marginal advantage over the US. Experience, amount of training, quality of maintenance, etc., are certainly valid factors, but since these factors are difficult to determine, just a discussion on the quantity and quality of weapons and equipment would be sufficient. Those other factors like training can be factored in freely elsewhere.

 

The PLA Navy and PLA Air Force are the branches of most interest. But the PLA Army Rocket Force is a factor as well. One other factor will be bases.

 

Also for simplification, I think it might be helpful to just compare the US and the PRC and leave out any allies. In this comparison, if at any giving threshold the balance of power is near equal or leans in PRC's favor, then all the more important allies become. This factor can be just assumed to fit in after figuring how the PRC and the US stack up against each other.

 

Finally, I mentioned threshold. Threshold in both geographic range and threshold in number of certain items. The threshold would be the point where the PRC as at parity or conceivable edges above the US.

 

Regarding geography, naturally, the closer to the PRC coastline, the closer to the threshold of the PRC will be to having the advantage over the US. The next geographical stage would be various strategic theaters not too far from China's coastline, namely the South China Sea, the waters around Taiwan, the waters around the Senkaku islands and Okinawa, and the waters around the Korean peninsula. The third stage would be all the regions more or less combined, thus the whole water area within the 1st island chain. Then finally two more separate geographical stages; the Indian Ocean on one side, and the waters within the second island chain on the other end. In short:

 

1. Caostline

2. SCS, Taiwan, Senkaku and Okinawa, Korean Peninsula (perhaps a 2.5)

3. The whole interior of the 1st island chain.

4. Indian Ocean (Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea as well)

5. Second island chain in the western Pacific.

 

 

 

 

 

Next is the threshold in the quantity and quality of weapons and equipment. The puzzling thing about procuremnt regarding the PLAN and the PLAAF is that they seldom seem to indicate what their end goal is. The US on the other hand makes pretty clear about its 355 ships which has minimum of 12 carriers, and other outlined numerals for subs, destroyers, etc. On the PRC side, even Chinese friendly forums have little idea as to how many warships and military aircraft China actually plans on procuring. So there is a transparency issue.

 

So various stages of quantity can be drawn up, and then I am curious as which points can be considered to give the PRC the edge in a giving geographical stage.

 

So for example, a first stage for the PLAN could be 2 ski jump carriers, 13 Type 52D destroyers, 4 Type 55 destroyers, 25 Type 54A frigates, and any other subs, and other destroyers like their Type 52Cs, etc.

 

The next stage would be supposing that they make more Type 52D destroyers and more Type 55 destroyers, along with their catapult carriers. So say maybe 4 carriers (2 ski jump, 2 catapult), 19 Type 52D destroyers, 8 Type 55 destroyers.

 

And so on. Well the quantity and quality threshold doesn't have to be made up into stages like the geography one, but I'm just wondering what it will take for the PRC to achieve marginal advantage at each of the geographical stages.

Edited June 30, 2017 by JasonJ

[RETAC21]

The PRC cannot set a goal for it's end strength as it is dependent on what its likely rivals are doing. If you tally up the navies and air forces of Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, plus the Indian Air Force, you have the minimum they need to neutralise in order to gain control of the first island chain. On top of that, they cannot count on allies, in contrast to SK, Japan and Taiwan.

 

In order to achieve a guaranteed treshold, they would also need some security over the oil routes from the ME, either by building an overland pipeline or by creating the capability to deploy Task forces to the Indian Ocean, which also require some kind of basing agreement with countries in the area.

 

Once you take into account maintenance and training needs, the PRC is way short of the required strength.

[JasonJ]

What a disappointing post

[RETAC21]

My average, ask Dingo.

[JasonJ]

[RETAC21]

My guess is no less than 6 full fledged carriers, 1 for training (Liaoning), the last ones based on Ulyanovsk (which was an stretched Kuznetsov hull) with nuclear power, 12 SSNs, 36 high end escorts (Type 55s and 52C/Ds), 36 low end escorts, enough combat support ships to support a continuosly deployed carrier in the IO. Enough corvettes/frigate to dominate the first island chain.

[nemo]

PRC's military buildup is not goal oriented, but rather budget limited -- PRC's military budget is stable at around 1.5% GDP for around 3 decades. What you have seen in media reports are crap -- it's either raw (uncorrected for inflation) or using exchange rate (appreciating currency), hence you were seeing military budget increase of over 10%. The reality is that PRC is not in arm race with anyone -- it is just replacing its capital stocks at its own pace.

 

However, baring significant economical reverse, China's economy will be around twice of US at exchange rate around 2030-2035. This means Chinese military budget will be roughly the same as US military budget. This is, however, exchange rate. The buying power of that will be significantly greater.

 

Military power, however, depend on capital stock -- accumulated investment over the years. A good rule of thumb is military equipment/capital stock got replaced over 30 years. Chinese per capita income is significantly lower than US. Even when Chinese economy reach twice the size of US, its per capita income will still be half of US. This means higher percentage of PRC's military budget goes to capital expenditure. By my calculation, PRC's military stock will be around 75%-100% of US by 2030-2035. Right now, Chinese military is around 2/3 to 3/4 modernized. By 2030, it will be completely modern.

 

PRC does not skip on training also. It's per soldier expenditure is already equal or higher than South Korea, and it's training and operation budget is higher in percentage than SK, per soldier.

 

All this is presuming that no one pissed of PRC enough it starts to mobilize. At 1.5% GDP, PRC can afford to double military expenditure indefinitely.

 

Why do you think Xi is calling Obama's bluff on Asia pivot? US primacy in western pacific is already unsustainable, definitely over long terms. As for US allies, Japan is less than half the size of PRC, in terms of economy. India, around 1/5. SK is about the same. The rest are trivial. You can probably get Japan to jump in on war with PRC. India probably prefer to sit on fence until the outcome is obvious. SK will probably sit this out, especially if Japan is involved. As for getting anyone else involved, forget it. PRC is the larger trading partners with more nations than US, and PRC's contribution to global growth is higher than US. And this advantage is increasing per time.

Edited July 12, 2017 by nemo

[Josh]

The above post by Nemo assumes current economic growth is projected for the next two-three decades without interruption. Without getting into specific economics, I doubt you'll find an economist who agrees with that projection even in China who isn't directly employed by the CCP.

 

As to the original question, its sufficiently vague for me to have ignored until now. However I'll note this generally: currently their naval reach is largely inside the first island chain in any kind of peer contested environment. That is, the overwhelming proportion of their force in terms of ships, subs, planes, and missiles is limited to this theater. The number of platforms they can project at longer ranges is a much shorter list, and is predominantly major surface combatants with minimal aviation and SSN support. This is partially because previous to maybe a decade ago they had no effective blue water capability, even if they had a few nominally blue water sized ships. I do agree with the post above that they need to have a long period of military investment in terms of training, doctrine, and technology to fill out the missing spaces in their capability. For CV and SSN operations in particular this is a long and painful learning curve. They also desperately need to extend their land based air capability in the short to medium terms while this happens to extend air coverage to more remote areas (look for a tanker version of the Y-20 to be tested soon IMO).

 

But even after they reach that zenith, they are dealing with fundamental geographic limits that no amount of power and money can completely undo: they are bottled up in the Pacific. Even assuming the local hostile powers ultimately give into their hegemony (and that seems rather unlikely in the case of Korea, Vietnam, or Japan in my lifetime) they still have a very small number of choke points that opponents can attack asymmetrically to limit their movements and blunt their effectiveness. In some cases those choke points are also shallow enough to be effectively mined. As a counter example, the US has effectively three coasts, only one of which has any geographical impediments or foreign nations to speak of, none of which historically were capable of challenging it in a naval fashion without British or French help.

 

There is another aspect to this that I like to call 'back yard advantage' vs 'home field advantage'. The PLAN has a back yard advantage inside the first island chain. Short ranged FACs, tactical aircraft, diesel electric boats, and land based missiles all are within easy range of the East and South China Seas, and these systems are relatively cheap to purchase and operate. But China *doesn't* have a home field advantage: those spaces are occupied by other navies in a position to observe anything the Chinese do and continually gather tactical and strategic intel, not the least of which is the US. If anything the US was operating in those waters long before the PLAN was and has thoroughly studied them, seeded them with sensors, and regularly patrols them above, below, and on the water. Anything the PLAN does gets observed. Again, compare to the USN which has two sonar instrumented ranges off CA and FLA where it can test anything it wants with sound lab level quality and no interlopers except the occasional Akula. This is the reason DF-21D has never been tested against a naval target even though its reached IOC: that test would tell the US as much about the missile as it would the Chinese. Instead they fired it into the Gobi at a painted target, something any GPS guidance system could have accomplished.

 

We can add onto this geographic disadvantage the fact that the PRC largely missed out on the bad old days of militaristic expansion and global allies. The US has bases that circle the globe. Three of its fleets aren't even home ported in its territory. Excluding major fleet bases, there is also a chain of important island bases that provide not only logistical support but crucial satellite and space support. Accession, Diego, Guam, etc. - these bases help control and monitor things like SATCOM and GPS, and also host search systems for detecting and analyzing opponent satellites and their changes in movement. If a Chinese LEO satellite is on the other side of the world, how do they even talk to it? As far as I know right now they don't, or if they do they have satellites specifically dedicated to inter satellite communications (the US also deploys such a system). But if so I've not heard of it. Its possible that China will create a network of bases to support a global navy, but it will have to engage in a major effort to do so and likely will never have the global network of allies that the US inherited post WWII.

 

So I don't have an answer to your question, but if I did it would not be a number of CVs or SSNs, or even MPAs, tankers, and logistical ships. I can say that becoming a dominant global naval power, even inside the IO and Pacific, is an absolutely daunting task that will take decades, if ever.

[JasonJ]

The above post by Nemo assumes current economic growth is projected for the next two-three decades without interruption. Without getting into specific economics, I doubt you'll find an economist who agrees with that projection even in China who isn't directly employed by the CCP.

 

As to the original question, its sufficiently vague for me to have ignored until now. However I'll note this generally: currently their naval reach is largely inside the first island chain in any kind of peer contested environment. That is, the overwhelming proportion of their force in terms of ships, subs, planes, and missiles is limited to this theater. The number of platforms they can project at longer ranges is a much shorter list, and is predominantly major surface combatants with minimal aviation and SSN support. This is partially because previous to maybe a decade ago they had no effective blue water capability, even if they had a few nominally blue water sized ships. I do agree with the post above that they need to have a long period of military investment in terms of training, doctrine, and technology to fill out the missing spaces in their capability. For CV and SSN operations in particular this is a long and painful learning curve. They also desperately need to extend their land based air capability in the short to medium terms while this happens to extend air coverage to more remote areas (look for a tanker version of the Y-20 to be tested soon IMO).

 

But even after they reach that zenith, they are dealing with fundamental geographic limits that no amount of power and money can completely undo: they are bottled up in the Pacific. Even assuming the local hostile powers ultimately give into their hegemony (and that seems rather unlikely in the case of Korea, Vietnam, or Japan in my lifetime) they still have a very small number of choke points that opponents can attack asymmetrically to limit their movements and blunt their effectiveness. In some cases those choke points are also shallow enough to be effectively mined. As a counter example, the US has effectively three coasts, only one of which has any geographical impediments or foreign nations to speak of, none of which historically were capable of challenging it in a naval fashion without British or French help.

 

There is another aspect to this that I like to call 'back yard advantage' vs 'home field advantage'. The PLAN has a back yard advantage inside the first island chain. Short ranged FACs, tactical aircraft, diesel electric boats, and land based missiles all are within easy range of the East and South China Seas, and these systems are relatively cheap to purchase and operate. But China *doesn't* have a home field advantage: those spaces are occupied by other navies in a position to observe anything the Chinese do and continually gather tactical and strategic intel, not the least of which is the US. If anything the US was operating in those waters long before the PLAN was and has thoroughly studied them, seeded them with sensors, and regularly patrols them above, below, and on the water. Anything the PLAN does gets observed. Again, compare to the USN which has two sonar instrumented ranges off CA and FLA where it can test anything it wants with sound lab level quality and no interlopers except the occasional Akula. This is the reason DF-21D has never been tested against a naval target even though its reached IOC: that test would tell the US as much about the missile as it would the Chinese. Instead they fired it into the Gobi at a painted target, something any GPS guidance system could have accomplished.

 

We can add onto this geographic disadvantage the fact that the PRC largely missed out on the bad old days of militaristic expansion and global allies. The US has bases that circle the globe. Three of its fleets aren't even home ported in its territory. Excluding major fleet bases, there is also a chain of important island bases that provide not only logistical support but crucial satellite and space support. Accession, Diego, Guam, etc. - these bases help control and monitor things like SATCOM and GPS, and also host search systems for detecting and analyzing opponent satellites and their changes in movement. If a Chinese LEO satellite is on the other side of the world, how do they even talk to it? As far as I know right now they don't, or if they do they have satellites specifically dedicated to inter satellite communications (the US also deploys such a system). But if so I've not heard of it. Its possible that China will create a network of bases to support a global navy, but it will have to engage in a major effort to do so and likely will never have the global network of allies that the US inherited post WWII.

 

So I don't have an answer to your question, but if I did it would not be a number of CVs or SSNs, or even MPAs, tankers, and logistical ships. I can say that becoming a dominant global naval power, even inside the IO and Pacific, is an absolutely daunting task that will take decades, if ever.

 

I have to disagree with the part in bold. The three countries that form the 1st island chain that bottle China in are Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. ROK is a different matter but the following argument can still apply to their situation but won't touch on that part. By saying "falling into China's hegemony" then what would come along with that is permitting China to put land forces into those territories, just as the US can put land forces in foreign countries. So if China is able to station forces in the Philippines, Taiwan, or at least in the lower Nansei Japanese islands, then that means that can fortify those choke points with land based SSMs, SAMs, and supporting radar, sonar installations, and stationing maritime aircraft nearby that can regularly patrol and do things like ASM near those choke points. So the vulnerability of choke points becomes less on the basis of those areas falling into Chinese control.

 

So of course, there are two ways to bring the land territories into the Chinese sphere. One is very much just diplomacy, economics soft power, etc. of both China and the said countries.Theoretically speaking, suppose the Pro Beijing President Ma of Taiwan (2008-2016) pushed for and succeeded at unification with mainland China, then the PLA forces would naturally be able to station in Taiwan. So consequently, the middle link in the island chain would be broken.

 

In a case of various diplomatic and economic activities towards the southern islands of Japan, throwing lots of money and human resource support into the anti-base and Japanese communists in Okinawa in order to reduce and remove the US bases in Okinawa would be the first step. Then would be attempts to get Japan to the negotiation table about the sovereign territory of the Senkaku islands, and then other southern Okinawan islands. And similar kinds of efforts against the US bases can also try to stir up Ryukyu kingdom independence. And then with such independence, have the Ryukyu kingdom be friendly to China, and then get PRC forces to station in there. Far less likely of course than the Taiwan example. According to a leftist commie Okinawa newspaper survey, was a question of something like "do you support independence" it only got 8%. So if that's the best the leftist can do, then it goes to show that integration is well intact.

 

So for the Philippines, something like in the examples of Taiwan and Japan.

 

That is just to show the meaning behind countries falling into China's hegemony. The first island chain would matter little.

 

So then there is another way, and that is with military force. And China is developing a lot of amphibious capability assets such as the Type 75 LDPs, they recently announced to jack up the number of PLA Marines to 100,000 from what was something around 20,000. And it was said that their first roughly 35,000 ton Amphibious Assault Ship is being built. Naturally, simple possession of such forces doesn't mean invasion is likely, but their possession does augment the diplomatic front in negotiations.

Edited July 13, 2017 by JasonJ

[Josh]

Taiwan might be a special case where they could willingly fall into direct Chinese occupation. But I don't see any of the other countries willingly allowing Chinese occupation. They might go neutral or China friendly and as such no longer serve as US bases and early warning trip wires, but they would still be physical barriers which warships would have to navigate around unless Chinese troops were actually based on their land. Outside Taiwan (and even there only maybe out of future necessity), I consider that about as likely as the Poles asking the Russians to move in.

 

I disagree that outright conquest is an option or even the threat of such sufficient motivation to accept a Chinese troop presence. It would take a Normandy level of commitment in an age of anti shipping missiles and satellites. Even assuming they built up the assets and were willing to take that level of casualties, the only place readily accessible that way again would be Taiwan, and then only if US didn't follow through on its obligations. In any coercion type scenario, the US has to willing let it happen and go home, in which case the rest of your question would be moot anyway.

 

So I think geography will always be biting the PLAN in the ass. If nothing else, there's a second island chain to fall back on (Guam likely isn't switching sides) and the IO is still thoroughly inaccessible to them with a minimal effort.

[GARGEAN]

Also I'm highly sceptical about 2/3 to 3/4 modernization number. Can't say about fleet, but ground forces(afv included) and especially airforce can barely scratch such measures.

[JasonJ]

Are we there yet?

 

One ski-jump carrier commissioned.

One ski-jump carrier currently under going sea trials.

Has been said that parts for one non ski carrier are being made.

 

Type 55 Destroyer - 1 fitting out, 3 under assembly, 2 at making parts, word of two more to start.

https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/055%E5%9E%8B%E5%AF%BC%E5%BC%B9%E9%A9%B1%E9%80%90%E8%88%B0

 

Type 52D destroyer - 6 commissioned, 3 to enter service, 2 at sea trials, 2 fitting out, 5 at making parts

https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/052D%E5%9E%8B%E5%AF%BC%E5%BC%B9%E9%A9%B1%E9%80%90%E8%88%B0

 

Type 52C destroyer - 6 commissioned.

https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/052C%E5%9E%8B%E5%AF%BC%E5%BC%B9%E9%A9%B1%E9%80%90%E8%88%B0

 

Type 54A frigate - 26 commissioned, 1 to enter service, 2 outfitting, 1 being made

https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/054A%E5%9E%8B%E5%AF%BC%E5%BC%B9%E6%8A%A4%E5%8D%AB%E8%88%B0

 

Type 56 corvette - a lot

https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/056%E5%9E%8B%E5%AF%BC%E5%BC%B9%E6%8A%A4%E5%8D%AB%E8%88%B0

[RETAC21]

Still a long way to go, compare those numbers to 1/3 of the USN, plus the Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese fleets.

[JasonJ]

Still a long way is the whole point because they are playing the long term game. At this rate, what kind of Navy are they going to have by 2025? 2030? The important thing is recognition of it. The US does seem to do so given their strategic paper released in Dec 2017. If this long term trend of PLA Navy development is not recognized in combination to their announced goals and territorial claims, and complacency sets in, with critical tone to the US or Japan to also build up in order to maintain superiority, then they will probably win in playing the long term game. Are we there yet, "there" being consensus support in maintaining superiority over them well into the 20s, 30s, and beyond? During that whole time, if the US-Japan alliance breaks, they probably win. If the US goes isolationists, they probably win. Well who knows.. maybe in 2040, China might score better in freedom of speech than the US, so then I would argue for Japan shifting its alliance to China, and you would take the opposition role for the sake of being opposition

Edited April 1, 2018 by JasonJ

[RETAC21]

It's like living in the 1900s, if the Germans lay so many battleships but the UK doesn't do anything then the British empire is screwed by 1920, and they are saying they want a place under the sun, etc, etc.

 

Yes, the Chinese are putting into service an impressive number of escorts and a few carriers of less capability than a US one (say 50% less than a US CVN and 50% more than a jeep carrier) and, in contrast to the Soviets, they are developing logistics capabilities for blue water deployment, so run for the hills, except....

 

They are way short of SSNs and those they have are based on older technology (despite chinese fanboi claims)

They are way short of the required number of ocean escorts if they want to tackle the US (check the number of Burke DDGs, which are equivalent to their Type 55)

They are midway in terms of coastal/medium escorts

They have a very long, very vulnerable SLOC to their oil providers.

Most of the Chinese strategic targets are within TLAM range

Their Air Force is still learning to use their new toys

Their Naval Air Force still lacks the long range ASM required to tackle a US CVN

 

They really don't have a fight to pick with the US, they are content if they can cow US allies and pressure those that aren't allied to the US, so they won't be able to push Taiwan and Japan, may influence South Korea and will see the Philippines and Vietnam bow to them, so why fight?

 

Which overwhelming US interest is at risk here? China is not a global superpower like the USSR was, it's not bent on screwing the US on all 5 continents. If the locals are willing to bow to Chinese interests, what will the US win by confronting the PRC, when the US has been happy to screw this same allies (remember TPP?)

[JasonJ]

I think it is a mistake to look back at history too much. Lessons and common patterns for sure, but there is a lot to the current situation that makes comparing to history simplistic. Current factors such as the ROK and Taiwan already have fairly high defense budgets. Furthermore, the ROK is largely tied to DPRK. They haven't done anything related to security for Taiwan or the SCS. So in terms of naval power, they won't be able to scale up as China scales up. Taiwan is even smaller and thus lesser capacity to scale up. Germany and Great Britain were more or less the same size. China is far larger. So its up to Japan to scale up as they are still at just １% and I guess the US thinks they can scale up a bit more.

 

There is an issue with transperancy. Both the US and Japan publish their ship type quotas. China does not. Everything they do is at a very large scale. Maybe people need to start imagining that they'll make 50 destroyers and 50 subs.

 

Are the Type 55s really the equivalent of a Burke? They are much larger. Bigger phase array radars, more VLS. And all the Burkes aren't equal to each other. They have two different upgrade plans because of costs. Type 52Cs and Ds may be a little smaller with a little less VLS but I don't think they are really that far behind.

 

And I think this conversation is drifting away from the geographical zones. Sure the US has a total of about 65 Burkes but are all these Burkes really ready to go? Furthermore, all of them won't be within the first island chain. So you mentioned 1/3 of the USN which is probably acknoledgement that the other 2/3 will have to be else where in the world. So then how many Burkes with 1/3? About 22. The PLA Navy is going to be nearly 100% in the Western Pacific. So 22 vs the 8, 18, and 6, assuming they stop at that.

 

Also related to the geographical factor is China's man made islands in the SCS. They have three large airbases down there. Those airfields will complement the sky jump carriers for establishing air superiority. Those islands also act as additional targets that would need to be taken out.

 

Yes, I remember TPP. It's a whole other topic but I do not think it is critical for the continuation of the US-Japan alliance. What interests does the US have? I think I'm just going to agree to disagree with you on this point because I find it no use right now to have to explain that. But just by sheer observation, the US seems committed, a commitment that seems to be backed by a grand strategy in play regardless of whoever POTUS is.

Edited April 1, 2018 by JasonJ

[RETAC21]

You keep on dancing around the numbers without tackling the strategic situation, and yes, we need to use history in order to avoid making the same mistakes.

 

Sure, the Germans could build as many dreadnoughts as the Royal Navy and it wouldn't have mattered because by then, France and Russia were allied to Britain and their fleets needed to be counted too, and on top of that, Germany occupied a geographical position that made all that moot because that combat power couldn't be applied.

 

So the PRC could build 10 Type 55, 30 Type 52D, etc and be the equal to the sum of the JSDMF and the USN in the WESTPAC and still it wouldn't matter if a LCS could sit in the Persian Gulf as stop the oil flow to the PRC. Or they could put 6 carrier groups out to be sunk by a US SSN force that outnumbers the PRC numerically and quantitatively. They man made islands in the SCS are only relevant if they can be supplied and defended but all are easily targetted by mines or cruise missiles, leaving them as relevant as Truk was to the IJN in 1944, or worse, creating a liability by forcing the PRC Navy to come out to defend them.

 

But you keep on dodging the key point here, which vital US interest is at play in the SCS? Japan is a big bite for the PRC as it is, Taiwan can be done right now without additional expenditure and the Korean peninsula is content with the status quo and the NKs are the ones vying for more favorable terms. Vietnam and the Philippines, Laos and Myamnar are places where the PRC has an interest but not enough to invade and occupy.

 

So really, all this sparring between the US and the PRC looks like Lybia's line of death of the 80s, an excuse to make noise without really altering anything.

[JasonJ]

I don't think I am avoiding the strategic situation. Are you trolling?

 

Sure I put emphasis on numbers. Numbers is a vital factor that determines strength and it is up to the powers in how well they use them. Regardless, in the earlier post you said out the high number of Burkes. So I countered that point with the numbers. And now you say the numbers don't count and that I'm dancing on numbers.

 

The PRC wants to extend the reach of the PLAN to the ME and Africa. It is part of their OBOR initiative. And they are trying to set up navy bases around the Indian Ocean such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Djibouti. Why do you think the Indians are getting drawn in? It is also a reason why the US adopted a new term called "the Indo-Pacific" just last year IIRC, because all players understand that the naval arms race is going to extend all the way to the ME and Africa. And it is why I added the Indian Ocean as a geographical zone for discussion in the opening post. So naturally, China will want to remove that weakness. Another way to reduce the weakness should it be exploited against them is with land routes as well, which they seem to be working on.

 

PRC doesn't have to occupy places like the Philippines or Vietnam unless those places fire a shot at the PRC. If they don't fire a shot, then they just succumb to PRC naval control zone from their shorelines. Superior PRC naval power means they can dictate the rules. That gives PRC all the control hat they would want. Vietnam was just pressured by China in given up its plan to drill oil in the SCS. The Philippines has to do joint exploration with China, otherwise China will pressure them to abandon. China controls whether or not Filipino fisherman can go fishing in certain areas like Scarborough Shoal. It is just flat out bullying that China is doing. If China has greater naval power, then they have greater control, and can apply greater influence on those countries. That's why those countries like Vietnam and the Philippines are developing new defense relations with other bigger powers like the US, Japan, Australia, and India so that they can get some leverage and push back on China.

 

As I said, I'm not going to try and explain why the US has interest. You're free to think that I have nothing on that but I have done so many times in the past. If you really care (which I think you don't) go look for it.

Edited April 1, 2018 by JasonJ

[RETAC21]

I don't think I am avoiding the strategic situation. Are you trolling?

 

...

 

As I said, I'm not going to try and explain why the US has interest. You're free to think that I have nothing on that but I have done so many times in the past. If you really care (which I think you don't) go look for it.

 

So you are not avoiding the question of what US vital strategic interest is at play that collides with the PRC, but you refuse to answer the question, yet you have the gall to accuse me of trolling...

 

wot???

 

Because the numbers game is all about where you need those forces. I have already mentioned the PRC oil lifeline to the Persian Gulf, which just happens to go past India with whom China has already had a conflict and, that - oh surprise - has naval forces that in 2025 will amount to a third of the PRC Navy major combatants. Guess what % is deployable in a modern navy at a given time?

 

Yet the PRC is building up to confront the US over empty sea...

 

Land routes?? over the Stans and Russia won't give a lot of security to the PRC.

 

Alliances with the US or Australia will do very little for Vietnam and the Philippines because at the end of the day, Australia has little in terms of forces and China is their number one client and the US won't go to war for fishing or oil drilling rights. And beyond posturing, won't do much for the Philippines or Vietnam if they are unwilling to invest more than they do now (and probably beyond what they can afford) in defence.

 

And now you can go on with counting hulls and missing the context.

[JasonJ]

One point of inconsistancy is that you say the PLAN is still no where near the size to dominate those water regions. But then you say that the US has no interest and suggest that the US will continue to withdraw like with TPP. If the US is out, then the PLAN stands a much better chance in achieving its goals.

 

I'm leaving it at that.

[Josh]

The PLAN continues to grow in leaps and bounds. But they still will always suffer from a geographical disadvantage and short term have to deal with largely hostile choke points.

 

Its also not clear to me how truly effective it is as a fighting force. The number of units and their individual capability seems impressive on paper. But how well does a formation share information, SAM coverage, etc? How well does their combat system manage automated engagements? I think their offensive potential is pretty clear, in terms of numbers and types of AShMs, aircraft, and submarines. Its not clear to me that they would be very effective on the defense, both in terms of AAW but especially ASW. It's hard to get an understanding of their level of training and tempo of operations as well as the extent to which they've tested any of their weapons systems in anything like a real world scenario. Its worth noting that any testing or training they do in salt water is observable by the USN and that this heavily limits what they can test or train for without tipping their hand. The DF-21 for instance has never been tested over water to the best of my knowledge. As opposed the US having three different coasts that are all but sanitized of unfriendly naval units. I can't imagine how they can even give a submarine a shake down cruise without exposing almost as much information to the USN as they themselves gain.

 

Right now they can exert a lot of firepower inside the first island chain but would have a difficult time focusing ISR or offensive assets outside of it. And even within that area, a war with the US would likely thin out their surface fleet fairly quickly with the ASW disadvantage and the US finally adopting a modern AShM for its bombers.

 

RE: RECTAC12 - "Their Naval Air Force still lacks the long range ASM required to tackle a US CVN"

 

They most definitely do have long ranged supersonic anti shipping missiles in the form of YJ-12. These are roughly on par with Kh-22 in terms of range and speed, if rather much lighter in warhead. The latest H-6K that have new turbofans instead of turbo jets can lift a half dozen of these weapons and by one count there are a hundred of these in service; certainly they number in the dozens. So they have a credible strike force and weapon system, given solid target info. Which inside the first island chain they are likely to have, at least early in a conflict.

[RETAC21]

One point of inconsistancy is that you say the PLAN is still no where near the size to dominate those water regions. But then you say that the US has no interest and suggest that the US will continue to withdraw like with TPP. If the US is out, then the PLAN stands a much better chance in achieving its goals.

 

I'm leaving it at that.

.

Not incosistency, I think the US needs to define where its strategic interests lie and plan accordingly rather than be fixated on the Middle East.

 

This doesn't exclude building strong partnerships with Japan, Korea and Taiwan, but also with ASEAN countries, but not only from the military point of view, but as part of an overall package in which the total is more than the parts.

 

By leaving TPP but still looking at this area from an strictly military point of view, the risk of confrontration increases as the PRC still "insulted" by the freedom of navigation exercises, but potential partners only feel they will become sepoys to the US and the history of being US allied in the region is rather poor.

 

If, however, the US doesn't find a compelling interest in the region because these are not allies but rivals, then the smart move would be to move out and let them duke it out with the PRC individually or as a group, with the US benefitting from the competition.

[RETAC21]

The PLAN continues to grow in leaps and bounds. But they still will always suffer from a geographical disadvantage and short term have to deal with largely hostile choke points.

 

Its also not clear to me how truly effective it is as a fighting force. The number of units and their individual capability seems impressive on paper. But how well does a formation share information, SAM coverage, etc? How well does their combat system manage automated engagements? I think their offensive potential is pretty clear, in terms of numbers and types of AShMs, aircraft, and submarines. Its not clear to me that they would be very effective on the defense, both in terms of AAW but especially ASW. It's hard to get an understanding of their level of training and tempo of operations as well as the extent to which they've tested any of their weapons systems in anything like a real world scenario. Its worth noting that any testing or training they do in salt water is observable by the USN and that this heavily limits what they can test or train for without tipping their hand. The DF-21 for instance has never been tested over water to the best of my knowledge. As opposed the US having three different coasts that are all but sanitized of unfriendly naval units. I can't imagine how they can even give a submarine a shake down cruise without exposing almost as much information to the USN as they themselves gain.

 

Right now they can exert a lot of firepower inside the first island chain but would have a difficult time focusing ISR or offensive assets outside of it. And even within that area, a war with the US would likely thin out their surface fleet fairly quickly with the ASW disadvantage and the US finally adopting a modern AShM for its bombers.

 

RE: RECTAC12 - "Their Naval Air Force still lacks the long range ASM required to tackle a US CVN"

 

They most definitely do have long ranged supersonic anti shipping missiles in the form of YJ-12. These are roughly on par with Kh-22 in terms of range and speed, if rather much lighter in warhead. The latest H-6K that have new turbofans instead of turbo jets can lift a half dozen of these weapons and by one count there are a hundred of these in service; certainly they number in the dozens. So they have a credible strike force and weapon system, given solid target info. Which inside the first island chain they are likely to have, at least early in a conflict.

 

I beg to differ, YJ-12 is half the size and lethality of the Kh-22, so it doesn't guarantee that its launching platform can survive long enough to fire them with a reasonable chance of success unless heavily escorted, limiting its effect to the waters around Taiwan and the SCS (see the maps JasonJ has posted and it clearly shows the limits of PRC airpower). More than enough, though, to deal with the local navies.

[Josh]

Range is still in 300-400km range, which while short of Kh-22 is enough to make interception before launch very difficult. The CAP would have to be pretty far out.

 

They definitely have a much smaller warhead, but their speed is such that a few hits should ruin a CVs day.

[urbanoid]

If, however, the US doesn't find a compelling interest in the region because these are not allies but rivals, then the smart move would be to move out and let them duke it out with the PRC individually or as a group, with the US benefitting from the competition.

 

The US benefitting from the competition? Not if PRC gets the upper hand, then the US will have to deal with a lot stronger enemy later.