Bestest Korea Icbm Test Launch

[Josh]

I get the distinct feeling Trump really will react to an ICBM or nuclear test, though I'm not sure what form that will take. The least aggressive move would be an ICBM shoot down. I'm not sure what happens in the case of a nuke test, and IMO odds are good there is a nuke test Saturday. Kim is unlikely to take a hit lying down.

[JasonJ]

You're not alone. He might let a poor performance of an ICBM slide. But if it is a nuke test, I think the possibility of the US responding with air and missile strikes is high.

[Roman Alymov]

You're not alone. He might let a poor performance of an ICBM slide. But if it is a nuke test, I think the possibility of the US responding with air and missile strikes is high.

Not so long ago we have seen relatively big (~60 cruise missile) strike in Syria, with effect very minimal. Targets in N Korea are far more hard to destroy. What scale of strile would USA need to respond to N Korea ?

[JasonJ]

 

You're not alone. He might let a poor performance of an ICBM slide. But if it is a nuke test, I think the possibility of the US responding with air and missile strikes is high.

Not so long ago we have seen relatively big (~60 cruise missile) strike in Syria, with effect very minimal. Targets in N Korea are far more hard to destroy. What scale of strile would USA need to respond to N Korea ?

 

 

Don't know. But since an aircraft carrier is heading that way, I think more than what was demonstrated in Syria is quite possible.

[Josh]

 

You're not alone. He might let a poor performance of an ICBM slide. But if it is a nuke test, I think the possibility of the US responding with air and missile strikes is high.

Not so long ago we have seen relatively big (~60 cruise missile) strike in Syria, with effect very minimal. Targets in N Korea are far more hard to destroy. What scale of strile would USA need to respond to N Korea ?

 

That depends on the desired result. If it is just sending messages, which seemed to be the goal of the Syria strike, then the target practically doesn't matter. If the goal is specifically targeting the ICBM program, then the above ground facilities at the launch complex shouldn't be hard to access. For the nuclear program, the U235 centrifuges are deeply buried but I think the plutonium processing plant is completely above ground.

 

For deeper targets, B-2s could carry much heavier ordnance than cruise missiles. But I suspect any strike would be intended primarily to inconvenience rather than absolutely destroy anything.

Edited April 12, 2017 by Josh

[GARGEAN]

But I suspect any strike would be intended primarily to inconvenience rather than absolutely destroy anything.

Any US strike at NK without completely destroying their attack potential will be death sentence for Seoul.

[urbanoid]

Doubt it, SoKor and USFK should deal with the Nork artillery fairly easily.

[GARGEAN]

Doubt it, SoKor and USFK should deal with the Nork artillery fairly easily.

No doubt, but not fast enough to prevent a few thousand shells to be midair.

[JWB]

NorKor artillery can only reach the northern outskirts of the city.

[urbanoid]

 

Doubt it, SoKor and USFK should deal with the Nork artillery fairly easily.

No doubt, but not fast enough to prevent a few thousand shells to be midair.

 

 

Hardly a 'death sentence'.

[GARGEAN]

Hardly a 'death sentence'.

Well, hard to say exactly, but how do you think, how much bang norks can fire in 8-10 minutes? And if 25-30 minutes?

In any words, any non-fatal strike at norks, especially their forward artillery deployment, will cost SK many-many civ lives

[Roman Alymov]

Rus cruiser in Pusan

[Josh]

 

Hardly a 'death sentence'.

Well, hard to say exactly, but how do you think, how much bang norks can fire in 8-10 minutes? And if 25-30 minutes?

In any words, any non-fatal strike at norks, especially their forward artillery deployment, will cost SK many-many civ lives

 

Fundamentally it comes down to whether the Norks are willing to have their country taken apart or not. If they bombard the ROK, the US will eliminate the leadership where it can and destroy what little productive capability the country has. There's no doubt that the DPRK can ruin the ROK if it so desires. Is it willing to forgo its existence as a consequence of that? Possibly, and that is why no one tries to fuck with them. But if they go all in, they will not be allowed to remain in power.

[GARGEAN]

Fundamentally it comes down to whether the Norks are willing to have their country taken apart or not. If they bombard the ROK, the US will eliminate the leadership where it can and destroy what little productive capability the country has. There's no doubt that the DPRK can ruin the ROK if it so desires. Is it willing to forgo its existence as a consequence of that? Possibly, and that is why no one tries to fuck with them. But if they go all in, they will not be allowed to remain in power.

Exactly what I am talking about. Barking dog behind the fence is better that dead dog and bitten arm. If you want dog to shut up forever - make sure that it will not have a chance to bite you in process.

[klahtinen]

As an artillery reserve officer I was quite impressed how well hidden and protected ROK artillery was near DMZ, as I visited the area a month ago. I'd would say they were impossile to see from above.

 

Well, all I saw were 105 mm howitzers, so the more modern artillery must have been even better hidden

[urbanoid]

 

Hardly a 'death sentence'.

Well, hard to say exactly, but how do you think, how much bang norks can fire in 8-10 minutes? And if 25-30 minutes?

In any words, any non-fatal strike at norks, especially their forward artillery deployment, will cost SK many-many civ lives

 

 

As JWB said, (most of) Nork artillery can only reach outskirts of Seoul, that is if you put it right on the DMZ, where it's going to be easily destroyed by SoKor forces and USFK. Nobody said that SoKor won't suffer any losses, it obviously will, but some artillery shells and BMs are not going to diminish their ability to respond. They've been preparing for this scenario for decades and have one of the most impressive militaries in the world.

[JasonJ]

Trump now saying China is not a currency manipulator.

 

 

 

President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that his administration will not label China a currency manipulator, backing away from a campaign promise, even as he said the U.S. dollar was “getting too strong” and would eventually hurt the economy. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, Trump also said he would like to see U.S. interest rates stay low, another comment at odds with what he had often said during the election campaign. A U.S. Treasury spokesman confirmed that the Treasury Department’s semi-annual report on currency practices of major trading partners, due out later this week, will not name China a currency manipulator.

The U.S. dollar fell broadly on Trump’s comments on both the strong dollar and interest rates, while U.S. Treasury yields fell on the interest rate comments, and Wall Street stocks slipped.

Trump’s comments broke with a long-standing practice of both U.S. Democratic and Republican administrations of refraining from commenting on policy set by the independent Federal Reserve. It is also highly unusual for a president to address the dollar’s value, which is a subject usually left to the U.S. Treasury secretary.

“They’re not currency manipulators,” Trump told the Journal about China. The statement is an about-face from Trump’s election campaign promises to slap that label on Beijing on the first day of his administration as part of his plan to reduce Chinese imports into the United States.

The Wall Street Journal paraphrased Trump as saying that the reason he changed his mind on the currency issue was because China has not been manipulating its yuan for months and because taking the step now could jeopardize his talks with Beijing on confronting the threat from North Korea.
Separately on Wednesday, at a joint news conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Trump said the United States was prepared to tackle the crisis surrounding North Korea without China if necessary.

The United States last branded China a currency manipulator in 1994. Under U.S. law, labeling a country as currency manipulator can trigger an investigation and negotiations on tariffs and trade.

Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer said in a statement that Trump’s decision to break his campaign promise on China was “symptomatic of a lack of real, tough action on trade” against Beijing.

“The best way to get China to cooperate with North Korea, is to be tough on them with trade, which is the number one thing China’s government cares about,” Schumer said.

TRUMP OPEN TO REAPPOINTING YELLEN AS FED CHAIR

Trump also told the Journal that he respected Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen and said she was “not toast” when her current term ends in 2018.
That was also a turnaround from his frequent criticism of Yellen during his campaign, when he said she was keeping interest rates too low.

At other times, however, Trump had said that low rates were good because higher rates would strengthen the dollar and hurt American exports and manufacturers.

“I think our dollar is getting too strong, and partially that’s my fault because people have confidence in me. But that’s hurting – that will hurt ultimately,” Trump said on Wednesday.

“It’s very, very hard to compete when you have a strong dollar and other countries are devaluing their currency,” Trump told the Journal.
The dollar fell broadly Trump’s comments on the strong dollar and on his preference for low interest rates. It fell more than 1.0 percent against the yen, sinking below 110 yen for the first time since mid-November.

“It’s hard to talk down your currency unless you’re going to talk down your interest rates and so obviously he’s trying to get Janet Yellen to play ball with him…”, said Robert Smith, president and chief investment officer at Sage Advisory Services in Texas.

Trump’s comments about the Fed were his most explicit about the U.S. central bank since he took office in January, and suggest a lower likelihood that he plans to try to push monetary policy in some unorthodox new direction.
Some key Republicans have advocated an overhaul of how the Fed works, using a ruled-based policy that would likely mean higher interest rates – not the lower ones Trump said he prefers.

The Fed in mid-March hiked interest rates for the second time in three months, increasing its target overnight rate by a quarter of a percentage point.
“Maybe he’s learning on the job,” said Carl Tannenbaum, chief economist at Chicago-based Northern Trust, noting that with Trump’s transition from candidate to president he is now being counseled by more orthodox voices sensitive to what is needed to keep global bond markets on an even keel.

The president is also “very close” to naming a vice chair for banking regulation and filling another open seat that governs community banking on the Federal Reserve Board, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said during the interview.

http://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/us-president-donald-trump-backs-away-from-labeling-china-a-currency-manipulator/626159/

 

China says that a treaty they have with North Korea does not require China to defend North Korea if nuclear development is involved.

 

 

 

China is not obliged to help defend North Korea from military attack if the reclusive state developed nuclear weapons, according to Chinese diplomatic and military observers.

The assessment comes as senior officials in Washington warn of a strike against the Pyongyang regime.

China and North Korea signed a mutual aid and cooperation treaty in 1961 as they sought to mount a united front against Western powers. It specifies that if one of the parties comes under armed attack, the other should render immediate assistance, including military support.

But the treaty also says both nations should safeguard peace and security.

For China, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons in violation of the United Nations treaty on non-proliferation could amount to a breach of their pact, leaving Beijing with no obligation to lend a hand, observers said.

China could also have a get-out clause if any US military intervention was not deemed an armed attack.

“It’s hard to say how China would assist North Korea militarily in case of war, since North Korea is developing nuclear weapons, an act that might have already breached the treaty between the two nations,” said Li Jie, a retired Chinese naval colonel.

Shanghai-based military analyst Ni Lexiong said China would need to provide military assistance to North Korea if US land forces invaded, but Pyongyang’s violation of the UN non-proliferation treaty was a “strong reason” for Beijing to choose not to help.

Threats of military action against North Korea have grown, with US President Donald Trump saying Washington was prepared to act alone against Pyongyang.

A strike group headed by the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson has also been deployed to waters off the Korean peninsula.

Nevertheless, Beijing, North Korea’s economic lifeline, does have some interest in backing up its old ally. China fears the collapse of the regime in Pyongyang could lead to an influx of refugees into China and eliminate the buffer zone keeping US troops from the Chinese border.

But Ni said the possibility of a full-scale war was slim because the US was unlikely to send land forces into North Korea, preferring air strikes or missiles launches instead.

“The situation would be much easier for China in this case. China would not have to mobilise its land forces to help North Korea,” he said. “China then only needs to send the North Sea Fleet or military aircraft to step up patrols of the Korean peninsula.”

Zhou Chenming, from the Knowfar Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies think tank, said war over North Korea was unlikely because all the parties involved were looking for ways to defuse tensions.

But if military conflict did erupt, China could help Pyongyang with supplies such as food and weaponry, such as old tanks.

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2087320/china-not-obliged-defend-n-korea-if-its-attacked-say

[JasonJ]

https://twitter.com/FLEACT_Yokosuka/status/851660712845824000

 

CFAY, US Navy Yokosuka Base

Hello♪ The US-Japan interchange event (street corner cleaning volunteer) planned for April 19th (Wednesday) has been canceled because of circumstances with the US Navy. To everyone that applied, thank you.

 

Everyone of course thinks its because of North Korea.

Edited April 13, 2017 by JasonJ

[Gavin-Phillips]

I've read in the free paper today that China now has 150,000 troops on the border with North Korea although the article was indeed extremely vague and lacking in any details what-so-ever. Now I haven't seen any mention of it elsewhere which leads me to a couple of possibilities.

 

1: The article is complete rubbish, taken from perhaps a "fake news report" or whatever.

2: There is a strong military presence there all the time anyway and this was just mentioned to make things seem worse than they really are.

3: The PLA has mobilised 150k troops and no one else has noticed. Hardly likely these days now is it?

 

So just what has the Chinese reaction been? Do they really have a huge military presence just over the North Korean border?

[JWB]

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/kim-jongun-reinforcing-nuclear-threat-to-stay-in-power/news-story/f8f5b9cfe91dc57a8d899e876043204e

[GARGEAN]

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/kim-jongun-reinforcing-nuclear-threat-to-stay-in-power/news-story/f8f5b9cfe91dc57a8d899e876043204e

Demands subscribe. In two words, what's up there?

[Gregory]

STRATFOR

 

Editor's Note:This is the fourth installment of a five-part series that originally ran in May 2016 examining the measures that could be taken to inhibit North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The purpose of this series is not to consider political rhetoric or noninvasive means of coercion, such as sanctions. Rather, we are exploring the military options, however remote, that are open to the United States and its allies, and the expected response from Pyongyang. Part five can be found here.

North Korea is powerless to prevent a U.S. strike on its nuclear program, but retaliation is well within its means. The significant military capability that North Korea has built up against South Korea is not advanced by Western standards, but there are practical ways Pyongyang could respond to aggression.

The North Korean military's most powerful tool is artillery. It cannot level Seoul as some reports have claimed, but it could do significant damage. Pyongyang risks deteriorating its forces by exposing them to return fire, however, which significantly restricts their use. Less conventional methods of retaliation, such as sabotage or cyber warfare, are less risky but also limit the shock that North Korea would desire.

Analysis

After a strike, North Korea's most immediate and expected method of retaliation would center around conventional artillery. Many of the North's indirect fire systems are already located on or near the border with South Korea. By virtue of proximity and simplicity, these systems have a lower preparatory and response times than air assets, larger ballistic missiles or naval assets. Nevertheless, there are several critical limitations to their effectiveness.

Tube and Rocket Artillery

The biggest anticipated cost of a North Korean artillery barrage in response to an attack would be the at least partial destruction of Seoul. But the volume of fire that the North can direct against the South Korean capital is limited by some important factors. Of the vast artillery force deployed by the North along the border, only a small portion — Koksan 170-mm self-propelled guns, as well as 240-mm and 300-mm multiple launch rocket systems — are capable of actually reaching Seoul. Broadly speaking, the bulk of Pyongyang's artillery can reach only into the northern border area of South Korea or the northern outskirts of Seoul.

All forms of North Korean artillery have problems with volume and effectiveness of fire, but those issues are often more pronounced for the longer-range systems. Problems include the high malfunction rate of indigenous ammunition, poorly trained artillery crews, and a reluctance to expend critical artillery assets by exposing their positions.

 

Based on the few artillery skirmishes that have occurred, roughly 25 percent of North Korean shells and rockets fail to detonate on target. Even allowing for improvements and assuming a massive counterstrike artillery volley would be more successful, a failure rate as high as 15 percent would take a significant bite out of the actual explosive power on target. The rate of fire and accuracy of North Korean artillery systems is also expected to be subpar. This belief is founded on the observably poor performance of North Korean artillery crews during past skirmishes and exercises. Though inaccuracy is less noticeable in a tactical sense — especially as part of a "countervalue attack," where civilian areas are targeted — at the higher level an artillery retaliation rapidly becomes a numbers game.

Ineffective crews also rapidly curtail the potential for severe damage. Rate of fire is crucial to the survivability of artillery systems — the name of the game is to get the most rounds on target in the shortest period of time, lest your position be identified and destroyed before the fire mission is complete. Poor training translates to a greatly reduced volume of fire and a painfully limited duration of effectiveness.

The Barrage Principle

Although North Korea could technically open fire on South Korea with all of its artillery systems at once, this would open Pyongyang up to significant counter-battery fire and airstrikes that could rapidly reduce the artillery force it has so painstakingly built up. Instead, as other studies have shown, only a portion of North Korean artillery would be used at a time. This is particularly true for the advanced systems that are most important to Pyongyang: long-range artillery that is able to strike at Seoul. The heavier, more advanced systems are not only difficult to replace, but they are also priority targets for counter-battery fire and airstrikes. Even when firing, artillery systems would be able to do so only temporarily before relocating or otherwise trying to hide the system's firing location to avoid destruction.

Aside from constraints on range and volume of fire, North Korea has to decide what targets to hit in South Korea. There are two realistic options: a counterforce attack or a countervalue attack. In a counterforce attack, North Korea would target South Korean and possibly even U.S. military facilities near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and north of Seoul. A countervalue attack, on the other hand, is intended to shock South Korea by causing significant civilian casualties and damage to economically critical infrastructure. If North Korea opted for a countervalue attack, the lack of focus on South Korean and U.S. military targets would reduce Pyongyang's ability to limit any response. (Typically, the easiest way to counteract enemy artillery is to destroy it in place.) Engaging civilian targets and infrastructure would not only limit the effectiveness and sustainability of the North Korean artillery volley itself, but it would also open up Pyongyang to more significant counteraction targeting. A mix of both counterforce and countervalue responses may mitigate this risk but would in turn lower the overall effectiveness of the mission compared to full commitment.

Regardless of these considerations and constraints on the North Korean side, if Pyongyang embraces the worst-case scenario for Seoul — the indiscriminate targeting of the capital and its suburbs — the damage would still be significant. Some research claims that overall damage and casualties in Seoul would be minimal, but those studies have relied on very conservative data, especially regarding the effective range of North Korean artillery systems. Many findings do not take into account newly deployed, modernized 122-mm multiple launch rocket systems with extended range, or the much more capable 300-mm multiple rocket launchers. If projectile flight distances reach proven ranges (or commonly accepted ones) and involve these new systems, then the northern portion of Seoul could be saturated with fire. Even areas south of the Han River could be within range of 170-mm self-propelled guns, 240-mm multiple rocket launchers or 300-mm multiple rocket launchers, depending on their position on the North Korean side of the DMZ. If every one of Pyongyang's 300-mm multiple rocket launcher systems were directed against Seoul, their range would be sufficient to rain fire across the city and beyond. A single volley could deliver more than 350 metric tons of explosives across the South Korean capital, roughly the same amount of ordnance dropped by 11 B-52 bombers.

This is an extreme scenario, however, and one in which North Korea chooses to expose all of its most advanced rocket artillery systems simultaneously, suffers no failures, and chooses to direct all of them against Seoul itself. Yet in northern parts of Seoul, well within range of Koksan 170-mm self-propelled guns and 240-mm multiple rocket launchers, a more intense volume of fire could be achieved even if North Korea is prudent enough not to expose all of its capable artillery pieces. Infrastructure damage in Seoul, particularly its northwestern areas, would be difficult to prevent in the event of an immediate saturation of artillery fire. That said, underground shelters and concerted evacuation efforts, which would be initiated immediately in the event of an attack, could greatly reduce civilian casualties. It is also unlikely that North Korean artillery fire would be sustained at great volume. Even an initial mass volley imposes great risk to the artillery systems themselves, making them vulnerable to counter-battery fire. This means casualty rates would drop significantly after the initial barrage, limiting potential civilian casualties to thousands of dead rather than tens of thousands, as has been speculated in some instances.

Ballistic Missiles

Scud

'Scud' is the NATO reporting name for a series of widely exported Russian tactical ballistic missiles. The missiles are highly mobile thanks to an accompanying transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicle.

In addition to its conventional artillery capabilities, North Korea also has a large stockpile of ballistic missiles with much greater ranges. These missiles vary from older Scud variants to North Korean versions of the Russian-designed system. There are also a number of self-developed longer-range missiles in the North Korean arsenal. Even the lowest-range Scud ballistic missiles would be capable of striking anywhere in South Korea. The main factors constraining the use of these systems, therefore, are volume of fire, equipment failures and depletion of stockpiles.

Even subtracting the most dated portions of the North Korean stockpile — which may not be in operational condition — it still has more than 1,000 ballistic missiles that could strike across South Korea. These range from Scud-based Hwasong missiles to Nodong and Taepodong projectiles. The Hwasong and Nodong missiles are the most important for achieving volume of fire, especially considering North Korea's limited ability to launch Taepodong missiles. The Taepodong is restrained by Pyongyang's dependence on large surface infrastructure, found in only two locations in North Korea. The long preparation times before launch make the larger missiles extremely vulnerable to counterstrikes, and the Taepodong does not deliver significant advantages over the Nodong missiles.

When assessing the damage that could be done by North Korean ballistic missile strikes, much depends on how they would be used. In conjunction with conventional artillery strikes, ballistic missiles could provide significant extra firepower directed at Seoul and surrounding areas. North Korea could also use these weapons to expand the indirect fire threat to the entirety of South Korea. This means that there would be less concentration of firepower as a whole but that a diverse spread of locations throughout the country would be subject to infrastructure damage or casualties.

Moreover, ballistic missiles could strike U.S. military positions beyond the Korean Peninsula, specifically in Japan. Whatever the targets, Pyongyang's existing ballistic missile stockpile could easily deliver approximately 1 kiloton (1,000 metric tons) of high explosives, as well as other nonconventional munitions — chemical, biological or even nuclear. Because of the inaccuracy of different North Korean missile systems, these strikes would most appropriately be used against urban centers or other wide-area targets. If employed against specific military facilities at longer ranges, a significant amount of misses would occur.

As with conventional artillery, North Korea will also be forced to show restraint in the use of these systems. Survivability may be less of a challenge because of the predominance of mobile launcher systems, but unlike conventional artillery munitions, ballistic stockpiles are limited — as is the ability to replenish them, which would draw on significant resources. Every missile spent by North Korea in an immediate retaliation scenario will diminish the leverage it maintains immediately after the retaliation. Furthermore, the high potential for failed launches, as demonstrated by frequent unsuccessful missile tests across a variety of platforms, could further damage Pyongyang's ability to influence through its ballistic missile stockpile.

The most significant threat from North Korea's ballistic missile stockpile is the potential for a nuclear strike. Some estimates indicate North Korea may have between two and five nuclear warheads at its disposal already, at least some of which could be made to fit on a Nodong missile. Even a single nuclear strike against a South Korean population center would result in catastrophic shock and incur an immense cost. Though a nuclear strike would not automatically guarantee Seoul's capitulation, South Korea and the United States factor the possibility of such a strike heavily into their considerations of a strike on the North's nuclear program.

[Gavin-Phillips]

That article seems to be quite familiar, I'm certain I've read it on this site somewhere before, quite possibly when talking about either North Korea's artillery in general or perhaps more specifically about the often-discussed "Koksan" 170mm artillery piece.

[Colin]

Sounds like Seoul needs to buy the Iron Dome which would help limit some of the potentiel damages

[GARGEAN]

Sounds like Seoul needs to buy the Iron Dome which would help limit some of the potentiel damages

Khm... No, not really. Far from it, to be honest. Iron Dome was mostly intended to intercept unguided rockets, not artillery shells. It can engage them, but with much lesser efficiency. And even aside from that - with full battery you will be able to destroy 80 shells with 100% hitrate. A dozen will give you 960 possible shells intercepted. That's already a huge money for doubtful gain. If things will go hot - there will be thousands of shells fired, and even not every engaged will be destroyed because of radar limitations, huge number of targets, misses, non-destruction of hitted shells...

 

Too much money for too little gain. Only real variant would be to not let those shells to be fired at all.