Meanwhile In The Baltic Republics And Poland...

[Stuart Galbraith]

Incidentally, lecture featuring General Breedlove is here. Amusingly he has touched on elements like deep attack on air defence systems and decision cycles. I swear the man must be a Tanknetter.

[Damian]

Stuart, actually a lot of lessons learned were done by US Army and USAF, now they need time and funds to implement them.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Stuart, actually a lot of lessons learned were done by US Army and USAF, now they need time and funds to implement them.

Well Breedlove and a few others their clearly identify the problems, and there are solutions. The knotty problem is who is exactly going to fund them. I cant see Hillary or Trump opening the checkbook for the Pentagon, unfortunately.

[Chris Werb]

Re railways, I know you know quite a lot about those Stuart The thing about a road is, if you're somwhere rural, reasonably flat and well drained and someone blows a hole in a road, you can usually drive off it, around the hole and back onto it. It's quite easy to deploy trackway or other reinforcement. With a railway, if someone blows it up, you are stuck until it's repaired. All the more so if the network is limited, which it is in that part of the world.

[Chris Werb]

Stuart, actually a lot of lessons learned were done by US Army and USAF, now they need time and funds to implement them.

 

I suspect that, most often, the "lesson" was merely an exercise in highlighting and publicising known deficiencies. It always tickles me when a new campaign we engage in highlights some shortfall in our capabilities that anyone who pays attention to domestic and world military affairs would have known about years if not decades previously.

[Chris Werb]

Incidentally, lecture featuring General Breedlove is here. Amusingly he has touched on elements like deep attack on air defence systems and decision cycles. I swear the man must be a Tanknetter.

 

That link is actually to a following panel discussion that was quite interesting in its own right. It's late at night here and I may have taken this in wrongly, but the most important takeway I get from that is that the US has no intention of mounting an active defence of the Baltic States, but instead intends to deter an invasion/takeover thereof by convincing them that such action will result in upspecified Bad Things happening to them which would make the game not worth the candle. That's something I have been arguing for all along. If done convincingly, that would also deter the Russians from going top-end assymetric on us and mounting conventional attacks on vital civilian infrastructure. Of course, whilst there has been talk of doing something along these lines, and in some surprising quarters (Sweden for example), it will probably be seen as a) too provocative and too expensive to actually procure.

[Stuart Galbraith]

The problem with the nature of our deterrence, is that its calculated at trying to deter Russia. But it does nothing to deter Putin and one of his 'emotional' moments. I was reading an interesting article the other day that suggests that Crimea, when looked at the evidence, was not decided upon until maybe 2 days before it happened. Sure Russia had military plans to do it, but who doesn't plan for contingencies? Sure they planned to weaken Ukraines control over Crimea, and had for years, yet there was no evidence they planned to do anything than wait for a plumb to fall in its lap. Which implies Crimea was nothing more than blatent opportunism.

 

There was something pertinent I read about Putin, that he was one day (I forget when this was, but it presumably was before he joined KGB) he was training with a Judo instructor, and Putin offered him a lift somewhere. As he was driving to their destination he saw a lorry loaded with hay. Putin passed it (and judging by the drivers postion, must have done it on the inside) and ruffled his hand through the hay. He drove like that for some distance, before pulling ahead and continuing their journey. His instructor was apparently white faced when he reached his destination and said 'You take risks'.

'I dont know why I did that' Putin is later reputed to have said.'The hay felt so soft'.

 

Now possibly thats a bullshit story, or it does indicate a person whom is incredibly impulsive and makes his mind up frequently in (what I discover from a BBC documentary the other day) Tier 1 decision-making, rather than what is common for national leaders, Tier2. And how do you deter the impulsive from doing what they will do? As somebody whom has suffered from an addiction problem, im not sure its really as easy as we might think.

 

 

Im not saying Putin is insane, or even likely to kick off a war with NATO intentionally. I really rather think he likes the interest rate in London to actually WANT to mess that up, let alone his supporters. The problem is, you cant really calculate what a leader whom make things up on the fly, and takes decisions without really stopping to consider them, will be deterred by. Best example of that, Nikita Khrushchev. Their ability to decision make, and indeed some of their rhetoric, is similar. Doesn't mean Khrushchev wanted a war. But equally he came far closer than any other Soviet leader postwar to kicking one off.

 

The presence of US forces, even as a tripwire, is a sensible step. Will it prove enough? Well Task Force Smith didnt deter anyone. I think sometimes we put too much faith in political lines in the sand, particularly if someone else is reading from a different rulebook.

 

Thats not saying we shouldnt put our emphaisis on deterrence. But as Breedlove seems to suggest, we really need a solid plan B in case just a tripwire will not work.

Edited July 6, 2016 by Stuart Galbraith

[Stuart Galbraith]

Re railways, I know you know quite a lot about those Stuart The thing about a road is, if you're somwhere rural, reasonably flat and well drained and someone blows a hole in a road, you can usually drive off it, around the hole and back onto it. It's quite easy to deploy trackway or other reinforcement. With a railway, if someone blows it up, you are stuck until it's repaired. All the more so if the network is limited, which it is in that part of the world.

Yes but no.

 

Yes, railways are vulnerable. But there is a lot of evidence from the London Blitz, you could have a wide section of track devastated, and 24 hours would be in service again. Not in top condition, in fact if you search on-line you can find footage of LMS workers replacing the station neck trackwork at St Pancras station to replace bomb damage that had been patched up years later. But what the hell, it worked. And short of long range bombing inside Russia, and special forces attacks which is a political area that is not really for the faint of heart to undertake, then most of the Russian Rail network will be impossible to target at all, without encountering the threat of escalation.

And when you have a freight train as long as some of the Russian military ones were, you begin to see that in terms of bandwidth, of moving stuff quickly, its probably far better value than roads. What it lacks is flexibility. You can always bulldoze a road and a mud track would suffice for many off road trucks (at least when its not pissing down). Not quite so easy to lay track, certainly not in the post narrow gauge era.

With the baltic states, they do have several sections of useful track heading in the right direciton. But actually INSIDE the country (even allowing for railway troops that still seem to retain a track repair capacity) you are going to have to use trucks. Even allowing for track that still is in Russian gauge, ther ehas been quite a contraction of the Baltic Rails system in the past decade. There are several place that look like Dr Beeching had got his axe out again.

 

. Ive a feeling the rail network bit will work fine. Where it may fall down is the hub, where although they are investing in logistic infrastructure they are still making good on bad decisions made at the time of the reorganisation, not least, substantial corruption that got fed into the system by private contractors.. And secondly, Ive yet to see good evidence that they have the ability to distribute in good order to the units. Karber points to the Ukraine campaign about frequent tailing off of intense actions by the 'insurgents' till humanitarian aid trucks brought in more ammunition. Then it all kicked off again for a few days. Now possibly that is just down to the unusual nature of the war in Ukraine. Or maybe it points to a real logistical problem in getting stuff from railheads to front line units. Thats surely going to be even more acute in any really large military campaign if it is not resolved as an issue.

 

I should read more up on Syria and see how well they are doing there. As its an out of area operation substantially supported by the Syrians, in not quite sure how relevant it would be, particularly as they are not using Brigade style motor rifle units.

 

Just my 2P FWIW.

Edited July 6, 2016 by Stuart Galbraith

[Chris Werb]

I think Putin can be impulsive and opportunistic. The trick is to ensure opportunities don't arise - that's called deterrence

 

Stuart, there is a slight difference between driving off a road and around a crater to waiting 24 hours for a hole to be repaired There also doesn't just have to be one hole and new holes can keep appearing. A hole with a derailed train on it will be even harder to repair. Ditto a hole that happens to be where a bridge is or a hole at either end of a bridge that caused it to collapse onto a railway. Railways just are inherently more vulnerable.

[Stuart Galbraith]

I think Putin can be impulsive and opportunistic. The trick is to ensure opportunities don't arise - that's called deterrence

 

Stuart, there is a slight difference between driving off a road and around a crater to waiting 24 hours for a hole to be repaired There also doesn't just have to be one hole and new holes can keep appearing. A hole with a derailed train on it will be even harder to repair. Ditto a hole that happens to be where a bridge is or a hole at either end of a bridge that caused it to collapse onto a railway. Railways just are inherently more vulnerable.

I wouldnt disagree, I just illustrate that Soviet methods of rail repair were developed in a non permissive air environment (and partisan environment, for that matter) and the Russians seem to still have gone about as far as is reasonable keeping such lines open in wartime. They retain those skills, and fair credit, from what they did in Donbass, I think they are probably still good at it. So yes, such things would cause delays (I question whether today with mini exavators it would take 24 hours though) But you still have to bomb deep enough in Russia to be sure of having a decisive effect. Whats to stop the Russians fixing a flatcar with several sections of rail to the front of a few trains and attaching a sapper platoon to every troop train. Well nothing much really. There isnt nearly so many bridges between Moscow and Pskov as you might think. You could bomb trains, but thats getting into a legal grey area it found itself in with Yugoslavia, and im not sure we really want to go there again.

 

Thats not commending rail over road. Road will always be more flexible. I just not sure we have the resources to do deep attack like that often enough to make an appreciable difference on the Russian rail network. 30 years ago, clearly yeah. But whilst the Russian armed forces are not what they were, we clearly arent either. The 1980s called, they want their Deep Strike Capability back.

 

 

Re opportunities, i keep coming back to the fractured nature of Russian Government. it still strikes me as inherently plausible that one part of the Russian Government can do something, and another part of the Government interprets it as hostile intent on the part of the west. Say the FSB got hacked off with Estonian crackdowns on smuggling. There is an altercation (not that much of a stretch seeing as how that Estonian intelligence agent was snatched), the FSB blames the Estonians for it, Putin believes the FSB, though they are lying through their teeth, and before you know we are knee deep in hybrid war. Its hard to determine what deters when the Russian leadership is opportunistic, and institutions in support of it are out for their own policies that might conflict with what the Government wants and are also opportunistic.

 

Im sure people will tell me this is impossible. OTOH, its pretty clear that there WAS instigation of the situation in Ossetia. And that having found itself in a war (either of, or not of its choosing) the Russian Government went large to change the strategic balance. It doesnt mean that that both policies were instigated by exactly the same person.

 

Is deterence possible? Yes. But Im not sure that offering anything other than extensive reinforcement very quickly is going to do it. Tripwire forces and maybe a large scale force that can arrive in a month is going to do it. Logic dictates thats just going to make Russian forces move faster to avoid escalation.

 

Breedlove points to the best solution, much more resources on surveillance and detecing at a very early stage hybrid war. And yet when it comes down to it, you just know when this is discussed in NATO, there are going to be some determined to say a brick is absolutely not thrown by a Russian hand, even if all the evidence is clearly pointing to it. Look at MH17 and you will see what I mean. We dont have a handle on information warfare enough to make such determinations with the clarity needed.

Edited July 6, 2016 by Stuart Galbraith

[Chris Werb]

I strongly doubt the Russians have an AD system that could prevent JASSM etc. hitting rail nodes inside Russia proper. You don't need "deep attack" to mess up the rail network inside the republics, you just start blowing it up (especially in the most inconvenient possible spots) the moment the Russians kick off. Destroying any signal gear, points etc. would help too. You don't even need explosives. Earth moving equipment, flame cutting gear. welders etc. would be fine. Save the explosives for road bridges, culverts etc. Start by dropping this bridge onto the railway line (if it's not preconfigured for demolitions, something has gone badly wrong). Remember the rail line is of no use at all to our side (other than perhaps to use the rails to make obstacles).

[Stuart Galbraith]

Yes, that kind of thing works in the baltic states. I dont think it would be much good for tactical movement anyway (nobody really does that with Rail anymore). But I dont think flinging high speed ordnance into Russia is going to be done without significant concern over possible results. Launching an offensive air campaign into a nuclear armed neighbour is not something one can advocate lightly. We say well its not different from Yugoslavia, or Iraq. Yet one can point to the idea nobody launches air strikes on North Korea, for much the same reason. IE you dont piss off nuclear powers lightly. I dont see bombing Kaliningrad or Western Russia is something that NATO would consider without seriously considering before the event the results.

 

Or at least, I would hope they have sufficently made clear nuclear use would be met by nuclear use in the event one sees a conventional attack used as a pretext for nuclear 'deesclation' strikes. As it stands, NATO seems to have its knickers in a knot over nuclear use, and that makes deep strikes, and indeed many other areas of such a potential conflict, really rather difficult to unpick. The last time anyone seriously discussed nuclear use in NATO was the 1980s.

 

I mean from what I understand of Russian logistics (and its not my field) they use the rail system for bulk, then at the raihead will use trucks to move that to the brigades. They do have a logistics brigade attached to every army, which seems sufficient for that task. Or at least in theory. We can look at the British experience in 2003 which worked 'In theory' and didnt work at all very well in practice. Just having the kit doesnt mean you necessarily know how to use it effectively. The Karber report gives a lot of food for thought in that regard.

Edited July 6, 2016 by Stuart Galbraith

[glenn239]

 

Chris Start by dropping this bridge onto the railway line (if it's not preconfigured for demolitions, something has gone badly wrong). Remember the rail line is of no use at all to our side (other than perhaps to use the rails to make obstacles).

 

 

A sound defensive plan.

 

Stuart Launching an offensive air campaign into a nuclear armed neighbour is not something one can advocate lightly.

 

 

Only if one happens to be emotionally attached to the concept of having an air campaign which doesn’t lead to the disintegration of the host alliance. If I’m understanding you correctly, you’re shitting bricks over the Brexit and the weighty horrors to the UK in a 10% duty for the sale of Welsh Tiddlybiscuits to Germany, but when it comes to risking a nuclear war, you do not “advocate lightly”?

 

Or at least, I would hope they have sufficently made clear nuclear use would be met by nuclear use in the event one sees a conventional attack used as a pretext for nuclear 'deesclation' strikes. As it stands, NATO seems to have its knickers in a knot over nuclear use…

 

 

That’s because NATO hires smart people.

 

The last time anyone seriously discussed nuclear use in NATO was the 1980s.

 

 

First use by NATO tactically in West Germany to stop Soviet armor that had broken through if I recall correctly. I’m looking at a map of Estonia, but I don’t see West Germany

[swerve]

Start by dropping this bridge onto the railway line (if it's not preconfigured for demolitions, something has gone badly wrong). Remember the rail line is of no use at all to our side (other than perhaps to use the rails to make obstacles).

No, start by dropping the railway bridge between Narva & Ivangorod into the river, & do the same for both the road bridges & the footbridge (if that's what it is - it looks like it).

 

Then the Russians can't move anything by road or rail into Estonia north of Lake Peipus, i.e. not along most of the border.

Edited July 6, 2016 by swerve

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

 

Chris Start by dropping this bridge onto the railway line (if it's not preconfigured for demolitions, something has gone badly wrong). Remember the rail line is of no use at all to our side (other than perhaps to use the rails to make obstacles).

 

 

A sound defensive plan.

 

Stuart Launching an offensive air campaign into a nuclear armed neighbour is not something one can advocate lightly.

 

 

Only if one happens to be emotionally attached to the concept of having an air campaign which doesn’t lead to the disintegration of the host alliance. If I’m understanding you correctly, you’re shitting bricks over the Brexit and the weighty horrors to the UK in a 10% duty for the sale of Welsh Tiddlybiscuits to Germany, but when it comes to risking a nuclear war, you do not “advocate lightly”?

 

Or at least, I would hope they have sufficently made clear nuclear use would be met by nuclear use in the event one sees a conventional attack used as a pretext for nuclear 'deesclation' strikes. As it stands, NATO seems to have its knickers in a knot over nuclear use…

 

 

That’s because NATO hires smart people.

 

The last time anyone seriously discussed nuclear use in NATO was the 1980s.

 

 

First use by NATO tactically in West Germany to stop Soviet armor that had broken through if I recall correctly. I’m looking at a map of Estonia, but I don’t see West Germany

 

Once again Glenn you successfully mangle points Im making into stuff I cant recognise. For one over Brexit, most of the points ive made have been made by the mainstream media. You might ridicule them, but as you are living several thousand miles away and wont have to suffer the consequences and I shall, feel free to do so. Secondly air campaigns v Russia. Im not saying in such circumstances DONT do it because there is a risk of nuclear war. Im taking the same view during the cold war, such a war will, unless a miracle intervenes, turn into a nuclear war at some point anyway, so why not go large early and start by attacking all tactical nuclear systems at the same time via conventional means. And possibly, in removing those options swiftly enough, might just cause calmer heads to prevail. But its not an easy choice. And Im wary of suggesting that, though Im willing to take that risk, the rest of NATO is mentally prepared for dropping back 30 years into that kind of mindset.

 

My view simply put is, take the risk. But be aware of the risk, prepare to deal with it, and have the political framework for decision making on the likely eventuality of escalation sorted. And we dont, not so far. We say 'lets do deep strike' and pretend its just like bombing a non nuclear nation. Its not. I seem to recall in 1991 and 2003 a lot of people cacking themselves at fighting in a chemical warfare enivronment, because that seemed likely. It didnt stop anyone not taking the risk. It just meant that they took the risk adequately prepared to deal with it.

 

Actually Glenn, if you read up on this, from the Russian perspective they are using the NATO Cold War tactic of blurring at what point they respond with a nuclear attack. And that is very tricky, very clever, and politically very difficult for us. Because it makes the possibility of taking any action at all a potential step on the escalation rung. So yes, take the risk. To defend a treaty nation we would have to, but lets make sure at warsaw this kind of thing is considered, squared away, and we are mentally prepared for what happens if deterrence fails.

 

In short, if you go into deep strike to stop Russian reinforcement systems, you may need to go a lot further. Command and Control also conceivably.

Edited July 6, 2016 by Stuart Galbraith

[swerve]

Glenn thinks that if Russia invades us we shouldn't fight back in case it annoys Russia, & that Russia would be justified in feeling annoyed, & any Russian reaction would be our fault for not surrendering straight away.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Well clearly we should fight back in such circumstances, with all conventional capabilities at least initially. The problem is, I dont think we have made the mental leap that in such circumstances, there is likely to be a nuclear release. Even if its just for demonstrative purposes, Im not sure NATO, anyone really, is mentally prepared for the effect that would have. It was whilst watching that BBC movie 'War Book' that it suddenly struck me the monumental consequences that would have worldwide. I mean yes, on one level I knew it. Its another thing to see the effects demonstrated, even in nations wholly unconnected with the initial action.

 

So yes, we need to have a response in such circumstances measure for measure. Hopefully post Warsaw we might have an inkling of that happening, but its fair to say that NATO's nuclear release procedures date from the Cold war, and simply are no longer fit for purpose. Im not sure how you would even order a 'demonstrative' use in retaliation. And not having such processes resolved just makes it more likely if it ever comes to it.

Edited July 6, 2016 by Stuart Galbraith

[glenn239]

 

Swerve Glenn thinks that if Russia invades us we shouldn't fight back in case it annoys Russia, & that Russia would be justified in feeling annoyed, & any Russian reaction would be our fault for not surrendering straight away.

 

 

No, my objection is that bombing targets inside Russia while defending the Baltic States would be a stupid plan. Chris’s proposal to defeat an invasion by sabotaging Russian LOC within the Baltic States seems to me the best strategy. NATO has enough firepower that Russian casualties would be too high to sustain and the invasion would peter out.

[glenn239]

Stuart For one over Brexit, most of the points ive made have been made by the mainstream media. You might ridicule them,

 

 

I don’t disagree with your stand on Brexit at all – that’s for you to decide. I haven’t posted a single word on the question of Brexit on that thread since it was clear that the EU would not play games with Scotland. (I read it every day). No, what I’m wondering about is that you seem brave to the point of reckless with respect to the Russian nuclear arsenal, but quite meek on the possibility of import duties to the EU in the future. It makes no sense to me because the one is potentially much worse for the UK than the other.

 

Secondly air campaigns v Russia. Im not saying in such circumstances DONT do it because there is a risk of nuclear war. Im taking the same view during the cold war, such a war will, unless a miracle intervenes, turn into a nuclear war at some point anyway, so why not go large early and start by attacking all tactical nuclear systems at the same time via conventional means.

 

 

The problem is that you don’t seem to have a good handle on geostrategic risk vs. reward. Let’s say Putin invades the Baltic States and NATO takes the same position towards Belarus and Russia now as was taken for the Chinese border during the Korean War in 1950. Do you really think Russia can go on to win that war? No. It might take six months. It might even take a year, but I’m not seeing how the Russians can conquer the Baltic States against the patient determination of the entire fucking free world.

 

So now we look at your plan, which is to attack into Russia all out at the start of the war. What have we gained? Victory? No. We’d eventually win in the Baltic States anyways even if we don’t attack into Russia. A shorter war? No. This war is certainly going to be longer. The elimination of the Russian leadership and overthrow of their government using the Baltics conflict as a pretext? Now we’re talking. What you’re aiming for isn’t the defense of the Baltic States, it’s the escalation to total warfare in order to eliminate Russia as a Great Power. That fine, except for one thing – the Russians have a say too. Remember I said Russia can’t take the Baltic States? That’s true for a conventional conflict, but not for a nuclear one. In a nuclear conflict, it is possible Russia could take that and even more – Rumania, Poland. So, do you want to defend the Baltic States sucessfully, or throw them away as ante to the pot, because at some level you’ve always been either annoyed that Putin still holds power, or titillated by the risk of a nuclear showdown? (I can’t tell which but I think its something like 90% the first and 10% the second).

Edited July 6, 2016 by glenn239

[Chris Werb]

 

Start by dropping this bridge onto the railway line (if it's not preconfigured for demolitions, something has gone badly wrong). Remember the rail line is of no use at all to our side (other than perhaps to use the rails to make obstacles).

No, start by dropping the railway bridge between Narva & Ivangorod into the river, & do the same for both the road bridges & the footbridge (if that's what it is - it looks like it).

 

Then the Russians can't move anything by road or rail into Estonia north of Lake Peipus, i.e. not along most of the border.

 

 

I assumed that, unless they were totally inept, the Russians would already have captured those. I actually thought the one I specified might be too close to the front line and be captured too. Anyway, it was just an example, not the entire plan. i didn't want to bore everyone shitless.

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

 

Swerve Glenn thinks that if Russia invades us we shouldn't fight back in case it annoys Russia, & that Russia would be justified in feeling annoyed, & any Russian reaction would be our fault for not surrendering straight away.

 

 

No, my objection is that bombing targets inside Russia while defending the Baltic States would be a stupid plan. Chris’s proposal to defeat an invasion by sabotaging Russian LOC within the Baltic States seems to me the best strategy. NATO has enough firepower that Russian casualties would be too high to sustain and the invasion would peter out.

 

You dont defend by only destroying enemy systems on the territory you are defending. The Israelis never limited themselves to that. NATO defence plans in the 1980s never proposed that. Doing that today would be a recipe for defeat, because you are essentially allowing the enemy to come to you before fighting him. Far better to interdict his reinforcement schedule and defeat him in detail on something like even terms. For example, its in everyones interest to keep 1st Guards Tank Army as far away from the Baltic states as can be arranged.I doubt there is enough firepower to defeat it if it stands up in anything like the numbers they are proposing. For example, as it stands its to be a 3 division army, 1 tank and 2 Motor Rifle, reputedly with 5 Regiments as they had in East Germany in the cold war. How does NATO defeat that? And quite possibly, it wouldnt, not with the units it has on hand.

 

And yes deep attack dangerous. But ultimately any war between NATO and Russia would inherently be dangerous, one could scarcely make it less so by fighting it one hand behind the back and inviting defeat.

 

Entire world? Russia invaded Ukraine, defeated it in detail, and 2 years later there are those still arguing that Russia was not involved. No, if Russia invaded the Baltic states, NATO countries would shit a brick. I dont think anyone else would be very concerned till it started going nuclear.

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

 

Start by dropping this bridge onto the railway line (if it's not preconfigured for demolitions, something has gone badly wrong). Remember the rail line is of no use at all to our side (other than perhaps to use the rails to make obstacles).

No, start by dropping the railway bridge between Narva & Ivangorod into the river, & do the same for both the road bridges & the footbridge (if that's what it is - it looks like it).

 

Then the Russians can't move anything by road or rail into Estonia north of Lake Peipus, i.e. not along most of the border.

 

 

I assumed that, unless they were totally inept, the Russians would already have captured those. I actually thought the one I specified might be too close to the front line and be captured too. Anyway, it was just an example, not the entire plan. i didn't want to bore everyone shitless.

 

Oh go on, its never stopped me.

 

They actually have a Spetsnaz Brigade near Pskov, so I think you can take it for granted any likely obsticle plans anywhere near the border are likely to be taken in short order. I think a better defensive plan would be the Daugava river, though im not sure the Estonians would agree...

[Chris Werb]

Stuart, LOL!

 

You can blow a hole in a railway line or tear up track anywhere, it's just better to do so at locations that cause additional difficulties. I don't see Spetsnaz holding the entire advance routes and MSRs until reinforcements show up.

 

As for being able to deploy massive armoured forces, even if the get them into theatre, they have to go down linear advance routes (which make massing extremely difficult) and be resupplied via long MSRs through forested terrain. That Swedish Colonel only thought in terms of their being able to stand up a division per MD per month (plus airborne - a brigade in the first month followed by a division in the second). Having loads of tanks etc. doesn't help if you can't actually stand up well trained units to man them and get them to where you need them.

 

Glenn, it's going to be very hard to defend and ultimately win back the Baltic Republics without doing anything about Kaliningrad and doing some MSR interdiction inside continental Russia. It's a bit of a stretch of the imagination to believe they wouldn't conduct any kind of offensive ops from the enclave, even if it was only Iskander attacks. If we shoot back we are shooting back at Mother Russia with all that entails. I don't have an answer to that which is why I feel deterrence by making the whole deal potentially as costly as possible for the Russians as possible is the best way forward.

[carrierlost]

No, start by dropping the railway bridge between Narva & Ivangorod into the river, & do the same for both the road bridges & the footbridge (if that's what it is - it looks like it).

One additional issue is the semi-dry riverbed. There is a hydroelectric station station on the Russian side and the water on the river is diverted there most of the year. The actual river in parallel with the channel between the dam and power station is pretty dry most of the year. The border runs in that original river bed. Dam is also theoretically drivable although not sure on how much weight it can take.

 

When there is water the riverbed looks like this

 

When dry like this:

The water diversion channel is nor visible in these pics

[Stuart Galbraith]

Stuart, LOL!

 

You can blow a hole in a railway line or tear up track anywhere, it's just better to do so at locations that cause additional difficulties. I don't see Spetsnaz holding the entire advance routes and MSRs until reinforcements show up.

 

As for being able to deploy massive armoured forces, even if the get them into theatre, they have to go down linear advance routes (which make massing extremely difficult) and be resupplied via long MSRs through forested terrain. That Swedish Colonel only thought in terms of their being able to stand up a division per MD per month (plus airborne - a brigade in the first month followed by a division in the second). Having loads of tanks etc. doesn't help if you can't actually stand up well trained units to man them and get them to where you need them.

 

Glenn, it's going to be very hard to defend and ultimately win back the Baltic Republics without doing anything about Kaliningrad and doing some MSR interdiction inside continental Russia. It's a bit of a stretch of the imagination to believe they wouldn't conduct any kind of offensive ops from the enclave, even if it was only Iskander attacks. If we shoot back we are shooting back at Mother Russia with all that entails. I don't have an answer to that which is why I feel deterrence by making the whole deal potentially as costly as possible for the Russians as possible is the best way forward.

Thing about Spetsnaz though, its not your grandmothers cold war old sneaky pete light infantry spetsnaz. From what I can tell from the Galeotti book and other sources, not only do they have light armour (including some BTR82As) but they also may have an artillery allocation. Warfare.be for example lists D30, which as we know has a 122mm heat round among others.

 

I guess the best comparison is a USMC infantry Regiment, or maybe the US Rangers. Its true they wont be able to do much to fight armour, but equally there really isnt very much there. About the best armed is the Lithuanians, and about the best they will have is a brigade of Strykers (if they buy them) and a brigade of M113s, which if nothing else must please Sparky.

 

Fair point about standing up though. I THINK the 1st Guards will probably be at relatively high readiness simply because its Moscow based, but clearly that doesnt mean they will have the ability to stand up more than one Division at a time. It would be good to know more about what the operational readiness inspections of this Army indicate about readiness. They supposedly ARE standing up a 2500 manpower reserve. But when a division supposedly absorbs about 10000 men, it wont go far.

Edited July 6, 2016 by Stuart Galbraith