bd1 Posted July 7, 2016 Posted July 7, 2016 Most likely Medvedev do you think?May be as transitional President, but I do not expect him as lasting figure as he is not greatly respected in Russia (despite some pro-Russians consider him as more decisive then Putin following fast and decisive solution following Georgia attack, even if it was not in fact his decision – I do not know). I can’t point good replacement for Putin right now (and even Putin himself is far from perfect). May be switching back to more parliamentary political system is good solution for Russia. does sergey ivanov chave a chance?https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Ivanov
Chris Werb Posted July 7, 2016 Author Posted July 7, 2016 Glenn239, agreed on all points except Kaliningrad and possibly the ultimate outcome. Were things to seriously kickoff in the Baltics and we were to go Article 5, I could see Kaliningrad launching an opening salvo of SS-26s, at Polish airbases, IADS, command centres, vehicle and munitions storage etc. They would then use aircraft to follow up. Those aircraft, or the survivors thereof. I would expect to recover to Belarus or continental Russia as Kaliningrad, from that moment on is toast, S-400s or no S-400s. We can't allow Russian forces to remain there and interdict air and sea operations with SAMs an AShMs and the mobile nature of both systems means we are going to have to go in and winkle them out. Secondly, on outcome, there is no way the Russians will sit back and let us build up a major invasion force, even if we claim it is only intended to recover the Baltic Republics. Obviously, nuking us would be suicide, but they might well be determined enough to say to the West: "OK, so you want the so-called Baltic Republics as a platform to strike at Russia and are intending to invade our sacred soil - you must remember that we can destroy almost anything on your soil and anywhere on the world's oceans with impunity and without resorting to nuclear means should you carry on with your preparations. We will start small with demonstration attacks against relatively minor power grid modes and the sinking of some unimportant freighters and tankers to demonstrate out capabilities and willingness to use them. Your public will soon realise we can destroy your entire power grids and their control facilities, air traffic control, stock exchanges, radio, television, internet and mobile phone networks etc.. They will have to decide whether three small parcels of forest in the middle of nowhere are worth the Western Europe and US Eastern seaboard returning to the stone age." The whole idea that the Russians are going to settle in to the Baltics and need Spetsnaz brigades to hold down a long-term (more than three months, max) insurgency is plain silly. I don't know why we're even discussing it to be honest.
Josh Posted July 7, 2016 Posted July 7, 2016 Would not Russia's ability to engage most of the West in a non-nuclear fashion be limited to sub and bomber launched cruise missiles and theater ballistic missiles? If the US puts its weight behind NATO it seems like it would have a distinct advantage in terms of strategic strike with CVs, bombers, and SSGN/SSNs. Though the political will to do so might be lacking...
glenn239 Posted July 7, 2016 Posted July 7, 2016 (edited) Chris Werb The whole idea that the Russians are going to settle in to the Baltics and need Spetsnaz brigades to hold down a long-term (more than three months, max) insurgency is plain silly. I don't know why we're even discussing it to be honest. Agreed. Looks to me the proposed situation is impossible for the Russians – the NATO frontier with the Baltic States goes all the way to Portugal, they can’t seal it off like they could Crimea. It’s a festering wound. They will not do it. That's why I really wonder whether this is actually a discussion about regime change in Russia, 2003 style - pros and cons.Glenn239, agreed on all points except Kaliningrad and possibly the ultimate outcome. Were things to seriously kickoff in the Baltics and we were to go Article 5, I don't see Kaliningrad not launching an opening salvo of SS-26s, at Polish airbases, IADS, command centres, vehicle and munitions storage etc. They would then use aircraft to follow up. I assume NATO has contingency planning for this – it may or may not trigger until the Russians themselves started shooting. My inclination would be that if they don't fire, then leave it be. We can't allow Russian forces to remain there and interdict air and sea operations with SAMs an AShMs and the mobile nature of both systems means we are going to have to go in and winkle them out. Pretty sure we could. The British put Argentina in the “hands off” category back in 1982 despite the threat posed to their carriers and battle fleet and the lack of Arg threat to Britain itself. Maggie figured she could take the Falklands back without this type of complication, so that’s what she did. Kaliningrad’s coastal defenses would need a land link to be more than ‘one shot wonders’.Route sea traffic on the Swedish side, jam the hell out of them. Edited July 7, 2016 by glenn239
swerve Posted July 7, 2016 Posted July 7, 2016 I remember going to Beltring about 10-15 years ago and noticing a number of DROPS (Fodens I think) on display there. When you consider how long we used to keep landrovers stockpiled in the cold war, you have to wonder at the mentality of the MOD surplusing useful equipment and not replacing it. Utterly mental. I'm sure that bloody stupid capital charge insanity must have something to do with it.
glenn239 Posted July 7, 2016 Posted July 7, 2016 Chris Secondly, on outcome, there is no way the Russians will sit back and let us build up a major invasion force, even if we claim it is only intended to recover the Baltic Republics. Obviously, nuking us would be suicide, but they might well be determined enough to say to the West: "OK, so you want the so-called Baltic Republics as a platform to strike at Russia and are intending to invade our sacred soil - you must remember that we can destroy almost anything on your soil and anywhere on the world's oceans with impunity and without resorting to nuclear means should you carry on with your preparations. We will start small with demonstration attacks against relatively minor power grid modes and the sinking of some unimportant freighters and tankers to demonstrate out capabilities and willingness to use them. Your public will soon realise we can destroy your entire power grids and their control facilities, air traffic control, stock exchanges, radio, television, internet and mobile phone networks etc.. They will have to decide whether three small parcels of forest in the middle of nowhere are worth the Western Europe and US Eastern seaboard returning to the stone age." That threat is possible, but is also completely unavoidable– if Russia invaded the Baltic States, then regardless of what happened next, they would have to somehow get NATO to agree to let them go. So, no matter what military strategy NATO chose, the Russians could, eventually, trot this threat out to see what happens. Bush Sr.’s strategy of setting really clear limits to escalation prior to the 1991 war was intended to help Saddam limit his own risk by not going on the offensive in Saudi Arabia, and Bush rewarded that by holding to his word – there was no invasion of Iraq. Clear boundries make it less likely the Russians will want to take this step themselves. Why, exactly, are they undertaking this risk if the contest is, by their own admission, for “three small parcels of forest”? Conversely, why are we? The act of a buildup allows cooler heads to prevail and might lead to a Russian withdrawal on some face-saving pretext. You make an important assumption - “obviously nuking us would be suicide” because, “They will have to decide whether…. Western Europe and US Eastern seaboard (return) to the stone age." Stuart wants regime change (triggered by some pretext that can be sold as defensive). Here’s what I think the Russian logic chain is in response to that; (1) The purpose of large scale NATO air strikes into Russia is regime change. (2) Regime change will lead to civil war in Russia. (3) The last civil war in Russia led to the deaths of over ten million Russians. (4) Therefore Russia should dismember NATO to avoid (2) because the cost will be less than the cost of (3). Our strategy has to avoid pushing Russia into this rabbit hole, because it all comes down to whether the Russians think accepting (2) as a consequence of (1) will cause more deaths in Russia than (4). If the Russians believe (2) will be worse than (4), then they will do (4) if they view (2) as inevitable. BTW - your draft Russian threat doesn't drill down on the most dangerous assumption. It would not be to return the US eastern seaboard to the Stone Age, or wipe London off the map. If you think about it really precisely, the key to the entire situation is the US military presence in Europe – that’s a much more specific defined objective than you are assuming.
Roman Alymov Posted July 7, 2016 Posted July 7, 2016 does sergey ivanov chave a chance?https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Ivanov I am not electoral expert, but IMHO this man is almost forgotten- and newer was very popular. So I do not expect him to jump to highest positions. Natalia Poklonskaya got more chances than him
Chris Werb Posted July 7, 2016 Author Posted July 7, 2016 Glenn, what you are saying above is logical. However, to us the Baltic Republics are a potential source of softwood. To the Russians (and excuse the hyperbole) they are arguably a dagger aimed at St. Petersburg. This is why I think we should take a three-fold approach for which I have been derided here. 1. Don't do things we know the Russians will find provocative. US troops exercising on the border, B-52s making low level overflights of Estonia and guided missile destroyers with land attack cruise missiles cruising around the Eastern Baltic fit that description. 2. Make defence preparations that could not rationally be characterised as offensive, but which would make the Baltic republics prohibitively expensive to take and hold whilst beefing up NATO defences in depth. 3. Create a survivable, land-based long (tactical-theatre) range conventional precision attack force to counter the A2D2 threat and slow up a conventional invasion at one end of the spectrum and to deter the kind of conventional tactical first strikes and coercive/punitive strategic attacks the Russians might engage in at the other.
Chris Werb Posted July 7, 2016 Author Posted July 7, 2016 Way off topic, but you'll enjoy this Stuart Why on earth are we already getting rid of MAN SX's? also here.
Stuart Galbraith Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 Way off topic, but you'll enjoy this Stuart Why on earth are we already getting rid of MAN SX's? also here.Only speculation, but as long as the MOD keeps spending 2 percent of GDP, preferably in procurement, nobody notices we arent holding onto any of it, which surely costs money in storage and maintenance too. But that is pure speculation on my part. As pointed out earlier, we do a lousy job of repairing and restoring to service equipment that has been damaged as best I can tell. Nice site, I shall have to point that one out to my father too, thanks for that.
Stuart Galbraith Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 (edited) I remember going to Beltring about 10-15 years ago and noticing a number of DROPS (Fodens I think) on display there. When you consider how long we used to keep landrovers stockpiled in the cold war, you have to wonder at the mentality of the MOD surplusing useful equipment and not replacing it. Utterly mental. I'm sure that bloody stupid capital charge insanity must have something to do with it. I dont know, I cant help but wonder if it was MOD selling off storage facilities and they were trying to clear the books to get the softskin inventory down to make it happen. I notice quite a few of the old storage facilities at Ludgershall have been knocked down. In fact even the railline to the storage facility is talked of being sold off to turn into a heritage line. Why arent the media covering this kind of thing? They are more interested in the failings in a war 14 years ago than they are British military capability today. Edited July 8, 2016 by Stuart Galbraith
Stuart Galbraith Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 Chris Secondly, on outcome, there is no way the Russians will sit back and let us build up a major invasion force, even if we claim it is only intended to recover the Baltic Republics. Obviously, nuking us would be suicide, but they might well be determined enough to say to the West: "OK, so you want the so-called Baltic Republics as a platform to strike at Russia and are intending to invade our sacred soil - you must remember that we can destroy almost anything on your soil and anywhere on the world's oceans with impunity and without resorting to nuclear means should you carry on with your preparations. We will start small with demonstration attacks against relatively minor power grid modes and the sinking of some unimportant freighters and tankers to demonstrate out capabilities and willingness to use them. Your public will soon realise we can destroy your entire power grids and their control facilities, air traffic control, stock exchanges, radio, television, internet and mobile phone networks etc.. They will have to decide whether three small parcels of forest in the middle of nowhere are worth the Western Europe and US Eastern seaboard returning to the stone age." That threat is possible, but is also completely unavoidable– if Russia invaded the Baltic States, then regardless of what happened next, they would have to somehow get NATO to agree to let them go. So, no matter what military strategy NATO chose, the Russians could, eventually, trot this threat out to see what happens. Bush Sr.’s strategy of setting really clear limits to escalation prior to the 1991 war was intended to help Saddam limit his own risk by not going on the offensive in Saudi Arabia, and Bush rewarded that by holding to his word – there was no invasion of Iraq. Clear boundries make it less likely the Russians will want to take this step themselves. Why, exactly, are they undertaking this risk if the contest is, by their own admission, for “three small parcels of forest”? Conversely, why are we? The act of a buildup allows cooler heads to prevail and might lead to a Russian withdrawal on some face-saving pretext. You make an important assumption - “obviously nuking us would be suicide” because, “They will have to decide whether…. Western Europe and US Eastern seaboard (return) to the stone age." Stuart wants regime change (triggered by some pretext that can be sold as defensive). Here’s what I think the Russian logic chain is in response to that; (1) The purpose of large scale NATO air strikes into Russia is regime change. (2) Regime change will lead to civil war in Russia. (3) The last civil war in Russia led to the deaths of over ten million Russians. (4) Therefore Russia should dismember NATO to avoid (2) because the cost will be less than the cost of (3). Our strategy has to avoid pushing Russia into this rabbit hole, because it all comes down to whether the Russians think accepting (2) as a consequence of (1) will cause more deaths in Russia than (4). If the Russians believe (2) will be worse than (4), then they will do (4) if they view (2) as inevitable. BTW - your draft Russian threat doesn't drill down on the most dangerous assumption. It would not be to return the US eastern seaboard to the Stone Age, or wipe London off the map. If you think about it really precisely, the key to the entire situation is the US military presence in Europe – that’s a much more specific defined objective than you are assuming. Glenn, I would invite you to never put words in my mouth. Ive never been shy of delivering them. I have never once advocated regime change V Russia. Check back through all ive written (Not what you clearly WANT to think ive written) and you wont find it. I know, I was the one writing it. Do I want Putin to leave office? Sure. But ive never advocated an act of violence towards him, and secondly that if such a change occurs its between him and the Russian people. Nothing to do with us.
Chris Werb Posted July 8, 2016 Author Posted July 8, 2016 Glenn, I only thought of this after I logged off last night, but your Falklands analogy works better the other way around. Kaliningrad is more like the Falklands - small, dubious sovereignty claim by large nearby country, justification for invasion (if the Russians kicked off first of course), limited capacity for resistance by garrison etc., than it is like Argentina.
swerve Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 What dubious sovereignty claim is there for Kaliningrad? Germany officially renounced all claim to it long ago, just as with Silesia & eastern Pomerania.
Stuart Galbraith Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 They did, but the problem is the Russians dont believe them. There is a big long list of territorial disputes that they have drawn up that might lead to conflict, and apparently (this is what ive read, I cant cite where) they Include Kaliningrad being reclaimed by 'revanchist' Germans among them. I guess they probably believe Poland is out for a chunk of Belarus and Ukraine as well. Hence the justification of large forces in the area to deter it. Wonder if they include Pechory on the Estonian border on the list?
Damian Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 Why would we need Belarus and Ukraine? From economic point of view it would be nightmare to get these regions... not to mention other problems.
Stuart Galbraith Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 (edited) Absolutely. But still, if they went all out to get Crimea and East Ukraine, they are inevitably going to view Western nations in the same light. Call it mirror imaging. Edited July 8, 2016 by Stuart Galbraith
Damian Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 Well, nobody found a cure for stupidity yet. But seriously, there is already a huge difference in economic growth between western and eastern Poland, which causes some headaches... but regions in Belarus and Ukraine are... are just terrible in case of their economies, I can't even imagine how much we would need to invest there to even make them remotely producing some income. Besides our goverment have a different policy, instead of regaining regions where there are Polish minorities, they try to convience this minorities to come to Poland, and it's not only about minorities in Belarus, Ukraine, Baltic states, but also Russia or other former soviet republics.
Chris Werb Posted July 8, 2016 Author Posted July 8, 2016 What dubious sovereignty claim is there for Kaliningrad? Germany officially renounced all claim to it long ago, just as with Silesia & eastern Pomerania. OK, not that dubious, but spoils of war. They can hardly claim it's a bit of Mother Russia that someone else nicked of them. At least not recently.
Damian Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 Oh don't worry Chris, if this serves their goals, Russians will say that Southern Africa is ancient land of their ancestors and they have eternal rights to that piece of land.
Stuart Galbraith Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 Just as long they dont have designs on Port Arthur.
Stuart Galbraith Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 Probably shouldnt double post, but its as relevant here as it is on the new cold war thread.
swerve Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 What dubious sovereignty claim is there for Kaliningrad? Germany officially renounced all claim to it long ago, just as with Silesia & eastern Pomerania. OK, not that dubious, but spoils of war. They can hardly claim it's a bit of Mother Russia that someone else nicked of them. At least not recently. Ah, you misunderstand the reasoning. Anywhere that Russians have lived is forever Mother Russia, inalienable in perpetuity. It only got a Russian majority in the 20th century, due to immigration & the eviction of the previous inhabitants? Ancient lands of Mother Russia! See Crimea.
Damian Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 I wonder when Putin will start to ask US to give back Alaska.
Josh Posted July 8, 2016 Posted July 8, 2016 Why would we need Belarus and Ukraine? From economic point of view it would be nightmare to get these regions... not to mention other problems.One could say the same of Crimea or the Eastern Ukraine, since Crimea is now in complete recession as a result and Russia at large is following due to sanctions, yet it happened.
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