Meanwhile In The Baltic Republics And Poland...

[carrierlost]

Second day in a row reservist have been called up for zero-warning exercises (you hear the announcement and you go).

 

Nearly 1,500 additional reservists summoned for snap exercise

NEWS ERR

For the second day in a row, the Estonian government decided in a telephone meeting to summon an additional 1,467 reservists from the Estonian Defence Forces' (EDF) 23rd Infantry Battalion for the snap exercise Okas 2019, which began on Tuesday and is to run through the end of week.

Together with the reservists of the 61st Logistics Battalion summoned on Tuesday, a total of more than 2,200 reservists have been summed for the current snap exercise.

This week marks the first time that different units of the EDF have been summoned on consecutive days.

The 61st Logistics Battalion is of critical importance to the functioning of Estonia's national defense system — they are the reservists tasked with ensuring that the 23rd Infantry Battalion summoned Wednesday as well as other units are quickly prepared to fight.

The snap exercise is training in nature, as Estonia is not currently facing any immediate security threats.

Reservists can check whether they are among those summoned at www.kaitsevaeteenistus.ee. Reservists of the 23rd Infantry Battalion can also contact +372 717 5010.

The snap exercise Okas 2019 is to serve as a readiness inspection, in the course of which the national defense chain of command is to be tested — from the decision made by the Government of the Republic to the rendezvous of rapid response reservists.

The EDF is tasked with ensuring that the state is prepared for all kinds of situations, including those whose risk of materializing are slow. The EDF must be prepared to defend Estonia as well as practice doing so at exercises.

The EDF summons reservists to bigger and smaller exercises such as Siil and Kevadtorm ("Spring Storm") with 120 days' notice on a regular basis.

 

[BansheeOne]

Sixth rotation of eFP BG Lithuania. The 550 German soldiers are from Panzergrenadierbataillon 391, Panzerbataillon 393, and support units of Panzergrenadierbrigade 37. 260 Belgians from Battalion Bevrijding – 5 Linie with Piranha III and Dingo II, 250 Dutch from 17th Motorized Infantry Battalion with Boxers and Fenneks. Also a Norwegian mechanized company team with CV9030 Mk III and Leopard 2 A4, and elements of Czech 53rd Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare Regiment. And a civilian journalist from Iceland supporting the communication staff element. Any contribution counts!

[bd1]

 

​​

Any contribution counts!

 

the EDF Okas / Siil 20xx exercises translate into Ex Thorn / Ex Hedgehog 20xx and it´s motto is ´´every thorn counts´´

[Chris Werb]

2S7Ms for Kaliningrad?

 

https://www.overtdefense.com/2019/10/02/modernized-artillery-for-russian-forces-in-kaliningrad/

[Stuart Galbraith]

244 Guards Artillery Brigade, currently they have 2A36 and Grad.

 

http://wikimapia.org/6870190/244th-Artillery-Brigade-Kaliningrad

 

Presumably they wont hand the 2A36 in before they draw the 2s7M's. If so this is going to be a very powerful unit indeed.

[BansheeOne]

the EDF Okas / Siil 20xx exercises translate into Ex Thorn / Ex Hedgehog 20xx and it´s motto is ´´every thorn counts´´

 

That's beautifully apropos.

 

Seriously, I find it interesting how Iceland, as a NATO partner with no armed forces of its own, finds ways to participate in joint operations.

 

The Iceland Crisis Response Unit (ICRU) or Íslenska Friðargæslan, is an Icelandic para-military unit with a capacity roster of up to 200 people, of whom about 30 are active at any given time. It is operated by the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^[1] It is primarily designated for peacekeeping operations and was established in the 1990s to participate in operations and peacekeeping projects, including in support of NATO peacekeeping operations. That role later evolved into providing an appropriate forum for deploying personnel within other organizations such as with OSCE field missions as well as with UN DPKO, and organizations such as UNIFEM, UNRWA and UNICEF.

 

The ICRU personnel has been deployed to the former territories of Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Afghanistan through NATO missions and UNIFEM and to the Middle East and North Africa with UNICEF, UNRWA and UNHCR. It had a civilian observer mission in Sri Lanka in co-operation with Norway (previously a Nordic mission) and has explosive ordnance disposal personnel from the Icelandic Coast Guard to Lebanon and Iraq.

 

Iceland deployed its first peacekeepers in 1950, when two Icelandic police officers were sent to Palestine as a part of an UN peacekeeping operation. Though many Icelandic specialists have taken part in various peacekeeping operations since, mostly within the UN and its organizations but also within NATO, it was not until the 1990s that organized participation in peacekeeping operations was initiated, formalized with the establishment of the ICRU in 2001.

 

In 2008, a portion of uniformed ICRU deployed personnel still armed for self-defense returned their weapons and changed to civilian clothing. The policy since 2008, is that, unless under special circumstances, ICRU personnel do not wear uniforms or carry weapons.

 

[...]

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iceland_Crisis_Response_Unit

[bd1]

 

the EDF Okas / Siil 20xx exercises translate into Ex Thorn / Ex Hedgehog 20xx and it´s motto is ´´every thorn counts´´

 

That's beautifully apropos.

 

the whole current military ideology is based on hedgehog idea - ´forest is full of animals that could eat a hedgehog. very few want to´ ​

 

[BansheeOne]

These Army units are going to Europe this spring for Defender 2020 — but they’re pretending it’s 2028

By: Kyle Rempfer   3 days ago

The upcoming Defender 2020 exercise will involve about 20,000 U.S. soldiers deploying from the continental United States to support activities across 10 European countries.

The force deploying from the U.S. mainland will be the equivalent of a heavy division, according to Brig. Gen. Sean Bernabe, G-3 for U.S. Army Europe.

The major participating units include soldiers from the 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Armored Division, 1st Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division and 82nd Airborne Division, according to a slide presented at the Association of the U.S. Army annual gathering Tuesday.

“The 1st Cavalry Division will serve as the primary training audience for both a command post exercise and a live wet-gap crossing taking place in Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area in northwestern Poland,” Bernabe said at the panel on Defender 2020. “The 82nd Airborne Division will provide the command and control for three joint forcible entries.”

The division-size element will depart from seaports in Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; and both Beaumont and Port Arthur, Texas.

U.S. soldiers and equipment will land at airports across Europe and seaports in Antwerp, Belgium; Vlissingen, Netherlands; Bremerhaven, Germany and Paldiski, Estonia. From there, heavy equipment, including about 480 tracked vehicles, will be moved by rail. Soldiers will convoy across the continent and move by bus.

Also, 14 sets of M1A2 Abrams tanks will ship in with new Trophy active defense systems, Bernabe said. Feedback from using those new systems will help the Army field it to more units.

The 116th Armored Brigade Combat Team, from the Idaho Army National Guard, will draw from pre-positioned stocks rather than bring equipment with them, testing the Army’s ability to equip units rapidly on the continent if needed.

“We will be doing this on the clock,” Bernabe said. “Our goal is 96 hours to issue all the equipment to the armored brigade combat team.”

[...]

About 9,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe will also be participating, as well as 8,000 European troops, bringing the total participants to 37,000.

For instance, from the 82nd Airborne Division’s command node near Ramstein Air Base, Germany, Americans will oversee a multinational parachute jump into Georgia, a drop involving the 6th Polish Airborne Brigade into Lithuania with 82nd paratroopers, and a 173rd Airborne Brigade jump into Latvia with Spanish and Italian paratroopers.

[...]

The river crossing in Poland will be done by the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, and elements of Poland’s 12th Mechanized Division.

The Mississippi National Guard’s 168th Engineer Brigade will provide the mobility capability for the river crossing of 11,000 U.S. and allied troops.

 

https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/10/15/these-army-units-are-going-to-europe-this-spring-for-defender-2020-but-theyre-pretending-its-2028/

 

In light of the Defender Europe scheme, I'm updating my estimates of what NATO ground forces would be available when. Note that I went with the deployment times for global missions mandated for various rapid reaction forces; in many instances they will arrive faster if they just have to move within Europe. Lacking various planned national mobilization times, I also made rather rough steps, so forces listed to be ready after seven days might in fact be available after one or two already; same as elements of formations which will only be fully assembled after the full time.

 

For example, spearhead units in VJTF are supposed to be ready to deploy 48 hours after notice, the rest within five to seven days. Similarly, advance elements of the airborne ready brigades from the US may be on the ground after 24-48 hours. Time for political decisionmaking and units below battalion [+] TF strength not included (nor are considerations whether formations might be tied up in other missions, or some allies shirking participation). Of course the argument could be made that anything arriving after X + 15, likely even X + 7, doesn't count anymore; though "X" doesn't need to be the actual onset of hostilities rather than the decision to react to a rise in tensions.

 

X + 0

 

- 13 x POL brigade (2 mech div, 1 ea amd, mtn, abn, air cav brig)

- 2 x LIT brigade (1 ea mech and mot inf)

- 1 x LAT brigade (mech inf)

- 1 x EST brigade (mech inf)

- 1 x US brigade [-] (2 bn rotating through Poland at a time, rest in Germany)

- 1 x NATO brigade (1 ea US, GER, CAN, UK-led eFP BG)

 

X + 7

 

- 13 x POL brigade (territorial defense; 4 more planned)

- 4 x US brigade (2nd Cav from Germany, 173rd Abn from Italy, 82nd and 101st Abn Div rdy brig from US)

- 4 x LAT brigade (national guard)

- 2 x LIT brigade (1 ea reserve and territorial defense)

- 2 x EST brigade (1 ea reserve and territorial defense)

- 1 x NATO brigade (VJTF)

 

X + 15

 

- 7 x US brigade (rest of 82nd and 101 Abn Div, 10th Mtn Div rdy brig, 2nd MEB, 1 x mech falling in on prepositioned equipment)

- 2 x NATO brigade (UK/FR CJEF, UK-led JEF possibly including DAN, FIN, NL, NOR, SWE)

- 1 x CZ brigade (4th Rapid Deployment)

- EU BG

 

X + 30

 

- 4 x US brigade (rest of 10th Mtn and 2nd Mar)

- 3 x UK brigade (3rd UK Div)

- 3 x GER brigade (1st PzDiv under MNC NE)

- 2 x DAN brigade (Danish Division under MNC NE)

- 2 x SVK brigade (1st and 2nd Mech)

- 1 x NL brigade (43rd Mech under 1st PzDiv)

- 1 x CZ brigade (7th Mech)

- 1 x NATO brigade (previous year's VJTF)

 

X + 45

 

- 3 x UK Brig (1st UK Div, via ARRC)

- 3 x GER brigade (10th PzDiv, via Eurocorps)

- 3 x ESP brigade (San Marcial Div, via Eurocorps)

- 3 x ITA brigade (from Acqui Div, via ARRC)

- 2 x FR brigade (1 x amd, 1 x mech, via Eurocorps)

- 2 x US brigade (2 x mech)

- 2 x NATO brigade (next year's VJTF, Franco-German Brig)

- 1 x BEL brigade (medium)

- 1 x CRO brigade (mech)

- 1 x SLV brigade (inf)

[Stuart Galbraith]

Ive grave doubts whether the UK can commit 6 brigades. They only committed 5 Brigades 15 years ago, and they had a lot more money then.

[BansheeOne]

Frankly, the whole list is based upon technical commitments and lots of benevolent assumption - like that everybody treats this as a Great Patriotic War-level event rather than an elective overseas conflict, that all the forces are not tied down otherwise, fully trained and equipped, etc. If the call came tomorrow, I'd have severe doubts about two German divisions being committed at the 30- and 45-day mark, too, except for that they couldn't very well be seen staying home while comrades and partners get slaughtered next door in Poland; otherwise that's pretty much the 2031 level of ambition. I think officially we're still on "generate a division of two German and at least one partner brigade for alliance defense within six months", because at that time you'd first have had to recall sufficient troops from various sandboxes, then equip and train them for their actual mission again.

 

We're moving away from that of course, but as I recently posted over in the general Cold War thread, we only just now put a full armor brigade through a near-peer exercise again for the first time since who knows how long. By way of comparison, the troops designated for the respective next year's VJTF are supposed to deploy prematurely within 45 days from a cold start if necessary. Of course that probably includes bureaucratic hoops like being certfied mission-ready by NATO after a formalized string of exercises. But obviously there needs to be a bare minimum of preparation, and that's also a matter of available ressources for training.

Edited October 19, 2019 by BansheeOne

[carrierlost]

 

In light of the Defender Europe scheme, I'm updating my estimates of what NATO ground forces would be available when. Note that I went with the deployment times for global missions mandated for various rapid reaction forces; in many instances they will arrive faster if they just have to move within Europe. Lacking various planned national mobilization times, I also made rather rough steps, so forces listed to be ready after seven days might in fact be available after one or two already; same as elements of formations which will only be fully assembled after the full time.

 

What does that the availability mean? Mobilized in the respective country, transfered to point of conflict (where?)

[BansheeOne]

I was going for arrival in theater (i. e., Poland and the Baltic States), though as noted there is a lot of spread and guesswork involved. For VJTF, the official requirements are that advance units should be ready to march 48 hours after notification, the rest within five to seven days; previous year's force within 30, next year's within 45 days. The EU Battlegroups are to be deployable within ten days, and be deployed within five more - but that's for global missions. The French-British CJEF is based upon existing designated rapid reaction forces of both nations; its air component is supposed to be generated within 10 days, so I put it in the same category, though the ground element might be a lot faster.

 

For US airborne divisions, the requirement used to be having the designated ready brigade wheels up in 18 hours, and the rest of the division 24 hours after that, requiring a total package of 500 flights; but I'm not sure that's still the case, and then you still need to get to the airhead, assemble, and likely move a good portion of troops and equipment to the deployment area overland. For mechanized divisions, the times for a ready company, battalion and brigade used to be 18, 48 and 72 hours, but for many that would mean subsequently moving to a port of embarkation, be shipped across an ocean, disembark, assemble, and again move to the deployment area overland. It works faster with pre-positioned equipment, however the article in my post states that the target for Defender 2020 is handing out a brigade set in 96 hours.

 

If anybody has better insight on today's alert times, and particularly for what happens between rolling out of the gate and arriving in theater, I'm all ears to modify the list.

[Chris Werb]

In reality, it will all be down to how big and how dirty the Russians would be willing to play. Fortunately, I don't think they want the Baltic Republics back enough to kick off. As Roman pointed out, they already have enough trees.

[Stuart Galbraith]

As a surefire way of killing NATO, its got a lot to commend it though. Hard to get to, hard to justify to orange Presidents, Americans cant find it on a map. For Putin, I think increasingly anthing that is going to distract his population from a failing Russia has a lot to commend it. Look at how 1982 turned out for the Thatcher Government, which was also failing at that moment in time.

 

In the end, Russia didnt need Crimea or East Ukraine either. They still took it because the politics commended it. At that point I say honour the threat, and dont worry about how likely or unlikely it is.

 

 

I cant decide whether to post this here or on the cold war thread, but there seems to be operation Cabrit underway, otherwise known as Tractable. An effort to replace all the vehicles in service in Estonia, and rotate new ones in, as well as a battlegroup to go with it. There are a few posts on the British Army Twitter group showing trains carrying armour moving out of Ludgershall. All very Normandy 44, and Id be even happier if they didnt appear to be all FV432's and Spartans.

https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/events/tractable/

[bojan]

...Hard to get to, hard to justify to orange Presidents, Americans cant find it on a map...

 

Even w/o USA, European NATO members combined have way better economic potential than Russia. Yet they fail to field any sort of the credible deterrence. 1-2 Bn sized battlegroups do not make any sort of credible deterrence, and almost none in Europe is willing to spend money to make something more of it.

Until that happens all crying about "Americans can't find it on the map" will be pointless drivel.

You are either serious, or you are not. No whining "we would be serious, but...".

[Stuart Galbraith]

Hey, I would be willing to park a British mechanized brigade on Estonias lawn. And the next word we hear off Rtis that we broke the agreement with Russia to not encroach, that we are p!banning to attack, regime change underway, yada yada yada. Damned if we do, Damned if we dont.

 

edited for spellchecker. The one in kindle should be hung drawn and quartered.

Edited October 22, 2019 by Stuart Galbraith

[bojan]

...No whining "we would be serious, but...".

 

[RETAC21]

 

...Hard to get to, hard to justify to orange Presidents, Americans cant find it on a map...

 

Even w/o USA, European NATO members combined have way better economic potential than Russia. Yet they fail to field any sort of the credible deterrence. 1-2 Bn sized battlegroups do not make any sort of credible deterrence, and almost none in Europe is willing to spend money to make something more of it.

Until that happens all crying about "Americans can't find it on the map" will be pointless drivel.

You are either serious, or you are not. No whining "we would be serious, but...".

 

 

You are understanding that the wrong way around, because (without the US) European NATO members have way better economic potential than Russia, deterrence works with minimal forces. There's an implicit understanding there, though, on where NATO actually ends (Baltics, Romania, Poland) so anything beyond the treaty line is superpower game - the near abroad and the US playing with Ukraine, Georgia, etc.

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

...No whining "we would be serious, but...".

 

 

 

So what would you have us do? Im not even sure the Estonians want a Brigade. They just want deterrence, and they have that, barely.

[bojan]

I did not say that blame is solely on the UK.

Edited October 22, 2019 by bojan

[Stuart Galbraith]

No you didnt, and I didnt mean to imply you did. We are however part of the problem in not doing more, and I wouldn't deny it. We should do more. It was only 10 years ago we cut our military budget by a third, that is after guarding it for the previous 20 years after the cold war.

 

I dont want to face Russia down, but in truth, they have brought all this on themselves. You only have to read accounts of how Russia was treating Estonia and the other Baltic states in the 1990's, to see why they wanted to join NATO. They practically pushed them into our arms.

[Chris Werb]

Deterrence from attack would need to work on at least two levels.

 

1. Forces in situ that could repel, at least significantly delay and cause massive attrition to a Russian incursion. On that scale it would make sense to issue the populations of the countries with vast numbers of sniper and anti materiel rifles, hand held AT weapons, ATGW, mortars and mines and have an all encompassing obstacle plan in place.

 

2. Forces to defend the Russians leveraging their advantage in long range precision strike weapons to interdict or simply blackmail us. That requires a similar capability to be put in place. The Americans seem to be working on one, but European NATO should have its own and pay for it.

 

You can also add the political will to send a major mechanised force after the Russians right on their doorstep.

[Stuart Galbraith]

1The Estonians have all of that coming out of their ears. What they lack is any significant mechanized forces, either infantry, tank or infantry, that can push an incursion back if it happens.

 

2 Yes, I dont disagree. We are all a bit piss poor at this. The only ones taking it seriously are the Poles who have long range air launched weapons for their F16's.

 

Bear in mind about the Russians, they have the weapons. Where I personally think they fail is in identifying targets quickly enough to make such weapons viable. OK, so they can use them against fixed points. But armies in the field or HQ's, or even mobile columns, are not going to hang around for them to identify. They DO have an interesting RPV they can deploy from a long range rocket. But its not been demonstrated that it can fulfill that role, particularly in a highly jammed environment. We must show care in not believing they have all the capabilities they claim. We learned that from the cold war.

[bojan]

For a smaller country facing larger, mechanized forces serve to die gloriously to buy a time for a mass mobilization for a stay-behind units. Idea being that while overrunning country is "acceptable" occupation would not be. Ofc, almost nobody today plans for prolonged guerilla conflict vs superior occupier and I really doubt that anyone today even has a stomach for it, so mechanized forces of the smaller countries in the 2-3 Bns size mainly serve as a dog and pony show.

[bojan]

... But its not been demonstrated that it can fulfill that role, particularly in a highly jammed environment...

Jamming works both ways. I know that some "old school" Slovenians that were on NATO maneuvers few years ago were shocked how much reliance is placed on the radio network, w/o any attempt to use non-jammable backup. Plus a blatant use of the mobile phones, which is a security leak of it's own.