"all-Out Quality" Vs "just Good Enough"

[Heirophant]

Through out the 20th century, in the context of warfare, it seems that there have been competing philosophies on how to lead, train, and equip armed forces to allow them to emerge victorious.

Broadly speaking, the (conscious or unconscious) philosophies can be categorized as either "All-Out Quality" or "Just Good Enough". These are the two extremes, and most armies would seem to fall somewhere in the middle.

The All-Out Quality camp seeks to have the most superbly-led, most-intensively trained, best-equipped forces available, even at often (much) greater expense, in order to dominate on the battlefield - and ultimately, of course, win wars.

This camp seeks to have the most favorable exchange ratios possible, and recognizes that quality is what counts in trying to achieve this. The lives of soldiers, and their equipment, are seen as valuable and non-expendable.

The All-Out Quality philosophy is what soldiers and their direct commanders would want practiced, in order to give them the best chance of survival and battlefield victory. It's what most civilians believe is the system implemented by their armed services, so that their loved ones can come home safe.

Examples of the All-out Quality mind-set include the all-volunteer British Army of the pre- and early World War One era, the all-volunteer U.S., British, and Australian armed services of today, most major NATO powers' armed services (ex. Germany, France), the Israeli full-time regular army, the German armed services pre-1944, and broadly the German land armies throughout World War 2.

Then there's the camp of "Just Good Enough". The main thing that characterizes this philosophy, whether it is conscious or not, is the concept that there is a point of diminishing returns, and to have quality and performance beyond that point is too expensive and too wasteful.

It recognizes and (maybe unconsciously, maybe indeed purposely) accepts that the leadership, training and equipment that such an army fields is, man-for-man and weapon-for-weapon, inferior to what it might otherwise field under the "All-Out Quality" mind-set.

It's not necessarily the case that the given army and the nation behind it cannot produce better quality, but more often that it chooses not to. It chooses to settle for "Just Good Enough" to get the job done, and thereby realizes large or even massive cost savings in doing so. In the "Just Good Enough" style of raising armies, the "80% solution" is chosen over the "100% solution" when it comes to training and equipment.

It treats its equipment and even its personnel as ultimately expendable, and believes that it's better to simply produce more equipment and raise yet more fresh troops, rather than suffer the expense of superb troops with superb equipment. If, for example, its soldiers and weapons-systems suffer disproportionate losses when it comes up against an enemy practicing "All-Out Quality", it accepts that as inevitable, and simply trains more men, and produces more weapons.

Most soldiers and their direct superiors would not want to feel that their army has stinted on their training and their equipment, and would not appreciate the thought that they were expendable and replaceable. They would want the very best their nation's industry and training system had to offer. "100% solutions" as it were.

But the "Just Good Enough" mind-set has won wars, most notably World War 2. Allied and Soviet armor was not up to German standards, but were (just barely) good enough. They were also produced in overwhelming quantities. Allied and Soviet AFV crews were similarly not as intensively trained as their German counterparts. Throughout the war, until near the very end, the Germans had an over-all quality edge in terms of the "human factors" - leadership, training and tactics. The Allies' human factors were "Just Good Enough".

Not that "Just Good Enough" was universal in the Allied services. I would characterize Anglo-American Air Forces and Naval Forces as practicing All-Out Quality, while their armies were in the camp of Just Good Enough.

The Soviets, on the other hand, were firmly in the camp of Just Good Enough through-out their armed services. It should be noted that the Soviet victory was the most resounding of all, achieved against the arch-practitioner of All-Out Quality, Germany.

Examples of the "Just Good Enough" style of fielding armies would include the American draftee army of the Vietnam era, (possibly) the Soviet Army during the Cold War, the Soviet armed services of World War 2, and the Anglo-American land armies, again of World War 2.

My question is this: Is there something to my characterization and summary of these competing philosophies, or am I simply seeing patterns of military behavior which in actuality don't exist?

Is there, in fact, some point of diminishing returns to quality, such as would justify purposely choosing not to avail oneself of its advantages? In expeditionary warfare, it's clear that "All-Out Quality" is king. Spare no expense, and make sure your troops are the best-led, best-trained and best-equipped they can possibly be. The War on Terror, the Wars for regime change, and so forth, fall under the heading of Expeditionary Warfare.

But what of the case of a very large, very long war? Is "All-Out Quality" still king, or is there a case for "Just Good Enough"?

[DB]

Isn't this just a long intro to Lanchester's equation?

[Heirophant]

Apologies for the long wording of the post. It's just something that's been rattling around my brain for some time, and I tried to fully explain what I meant.

[JasonJ]

I think the sudden advance of Germany into Soviet territory put them in the situation of just going with whatever and produce as much as possible with not choice in the matter. Just the very size of the SU enabled them to hold on. If the SU was had the territorial the size of say, France, they probably wouldn't have had the chance for mass producing of relatively lower quality on a quick notice. But if changing the size of the SU for thought experiment, then lots of factors would change. I'm under the impression that in the early and mid 1930s the SU may have had requirements for good quality in their tanks. Perhaps even the same level of quality would have been held for T-34 as well if it wasn't pushed into service so quickly.

[Colin]

In the modern context, the argument for the West is what is more valuable people or equipment. Western nations are very causality adverse to a fault and our enemies attempt to exploit that weakness. Also the suppliers play upon that fear as well, saying we can "reduce the risk" so that factors into the buys. The current problem is that many politicians and public believe that a 100% solution exist. The whole armour vs mobility is a huge discussion. In my view anything beyond the 85% solution is far to expensive with result that to few are supplied and risk of loss of that equipment take on a similar dimension as personal.

[a77]

But the "Just Good Enough" mind-set has won wars, most notably World War 2. Allied and Soviet armor was not up to German standards, but were (just barely) good enough. They were also produced in overwhelming quantities. Allied and Soviet AFV crews were similarly not as intensively trained as their German counterparts. Throughout the war, until near the very end, the Germans had an over-all quality edge in terms of the "human factors" - leadership, training and tactics. The Allies' human factors were "Just Good Enough".

But what of the case of a very large, very long war? Is "All-Out Quality" still king, or is there a case for "Just Good Enough"?

 

"Just Good Enough" is not good enough if you do not have a greatly superior industrial base, Look at the disastrous losses of Russia in WW2 almost all T-34 was destroyed. German almost destroyed them as fast as they could be built, sure Russia victory was obvious in the end, But that was thanks to lend and lease and other fronts, think how many tanks German can build if they do not feel a neead to build about 1000 submarines as they done historic. think what will hapen if tens of thousands of heavy anti-aircraft guns are used as anti tank guns insted to defend Germans citys and factorys etc

 

Conclusion be sure to have greatly superior industrial base and fight a total war to ensure victory. Like take Hanoi promptly, and make it clear for China that you are ready to extend the war to China, if China send send troops or matriel to suport North Vietnam.

Edited March 31, 2016 by a77

[richard g]

The op raises a lot more issues than all out quality vs just good enough, for one thing comparing WW2 with what happens now in 2016 may appear on tomorrows TV is really unrealistic. Can you imagine having images of brewed up Shermans and their deceased occupants on tonight's news? The simple if incomplete answer to the op's proposition is that today's democracies can not tolerate high casualty rates while other forms of government eg North Korea, will not care so much.

 

The worst aspect of WW2 for the West was, or should have been, the lack of realisation that the inferiority of their weapons compared with Germany's was costing them excessive casualties. But that inferiority was buried beneath an avalanche of Western propaganda which still persists today for some strange reason.

[Adam_S]

Outside of the indisputable ability of late war German armor to stomp all over Shermans in a 1 on 1 fight, did the Germans really enjoy any qualitative advantage over the allies though?

 

If you look at the fighting post D-Day, where else do the Germans come out on top?

 

Fighters:

 

Me 109G or late model Fw-190 vs. Mustangs, Tempests, Griffon powered Spitfires.

 

Medium bombers:

 

He-111's and Ju-88's were still in service in large numbers while the allies had Mitchells, Maraurders and Mosquitos

 

Heavy Bombers:

 

The Luftwaffe didn't even have any to speak of vs. Lancasters, Halifaxes, Fortresses and Liberators

 

Artillery:

 

The allies generally had more of it and their fire control was excellent

 

Rifles:

Mausers vs. Lee Enfields and Garands

 

 

The list could go on for a while but I'm struggling to see where the Germans have much of an advantage anywhere outside of heavy armor and I'd put the allies ahead in a number of important areas. The allies also win hands down on all the boring stuff like R&D, logistics, unity of command, strategy and production.

[DB]

I've never really understood why people compare bombers with bombers - it's not as if one is a direct counter to the other. Effectively I'd say it was meaningless. One must compare the counter-bomber capability of fighters because that's the way the fighting worked.

 

The raw, unadorned Lanchester equation has a pair of parameters for each side in a notional attritional battle. The "quality" parameter is essentially a measure of the effectiveness of the firepower of one side's units. The second parameter is the number of units deployed.

 

The outcome is determined by multiplying the firepower parameter by the square of the number of units, thus "quality" is a linear scaling whereas "manpower" is the square. At some point, "quantity has a quality all its own" is the alleged quote.

 

The application of the basic equation is specifically attritional battle - something like the Napoleonic era face-offs. One needs to be careful applying it more generally (and the discussion about Dupuy's work in the other sub-forum shows that defining "quality" can be a fiddly process).

 

Anyway, once one compares the "score" of one side versus the other, one can assume that one the side with the highest score will win. Given the linear versus square relationship, quantity should always outdo quality. Except of course that it isn't quite a tidy as all that - the crew of a single B-29 would have won the Battle of Waterloo in an instant regardless of how many French troops were fielded.

 

(Errors and Omissions excepted - there are others on the forum with a far more accurate understanding of this stuff than me.)

[JasonJ]

The op raises a lot more issues than all out quality vs just good enough, for one thing comparing WW2 with what happens now in 2016 may appear on tomorrows TV is really unrealistic. Can you imagine having images of brewed up Shermans and their deceased occupants on tonight's news? The simple if incomplete answer to the op's proposition is that today's democracies can not tolerate high casualty rates while other forms of government eg North Korea, will not care so much.

 

The worst aspect of WW2 for the West was, or should have been, the lack of realisation that the inferiority of their weapons compared with Germany's was costing them excessive casualties. But that inferiority was buried beneath an avalanche of Western propaganda which still persists today for some strange reason.

 

M1 garand was a great rifle from what I gather. 50 caliber MG too. B-17s hard a tough job but seemed to have been good at it. Often hear good things about US artillery. M4 Sherman is probably the most thought about in that regard, But in 1942, M4 seemed to be quite a good tank. Probably would have not been possible to have large numbers M26s already in service for D-Day. German Panthers and Tigers were on the defensive and operated near home by 1944. US tanks had to be shipped across an ocean and keep up an advance pace. Well there are more details about this topic that I have read quite often but still not one to give them. Just my impression that US inferior quality is exaggerated

[a77]

If you look at the fighting post D-Day, where else do the Germans come out on top?

 

Auftragstaktik and Kampfgruppe give more tactical flexibility. MG 42 and Panzerfaust.... but not much more as you did point out.....

[a77]

 

Just my impression that US inferior quality is exaggerated

 

 

But then what is the exuse that US need almost a half year to reach Germany from Normandy, then you have approximate equivalent weapons, superior numbers in all categories, superior logestic and suport and the strategic initiative?

Edited April 1, 2016 by a77

[JasonJ]

 

 

Just my impression that US inferior quality is exaggerated

 

 

But then what is the exuse that US need almost a half year to reach Germany from Normandy, then you have approximate equivalent weapons, superior numbers in all categories, superior logestic and suport and the strategic initiative?

 

 

My initial thought is that the Battle of the Bulge was an unexpected strong resistance.

 

Similar advantages probably could be said for Imperial Japan when they invaded the Philippines. AFAIK, they planned on occupying the majority of the Philippines in 45 days but the Battle of Bataan gave a tough fight, resulting in the campaign taking 150 days instead.

 

Well, I'm in no position for such details in search of why the ally push across France and into Germany took as long as you question. I ought to jump out now

Edited April 1, 2016 by JasonJ

[BillB]

 

The op raises a lot more issues than all out quality vs just good enough, for one thing comparing WW2 with what happens now in 2016 may appear on tomorrows TV is really unrealistic. Can you imagine having images of brewed up Shermans and their deceased occupants on tonight's news? The simple if incomplete answer to the op's proposition is that today's democracies can not tolerate high casualty rates while other forms of government eg North Korea, will not care so much.

 

The worst aspect of WW2 for the West was, or should have been, the lack of realisation that the inferiority of their weapons compared with Germany's was costing them excessive casualties. But that inferiority was buried beneath an avalanche of Western propaganda which still persists today for some strange reason.

 

M1 garand was a great rifle from what I gather. 50 caliber MG too. B-17s hard a tough job but seemed to have been good at it. Often hear good things about US artillery. M4 Sherman is probably the most thought about in that regard, But in 1942, M4 seemed to be quite a good tank. Probably would have not been possible to have large numbers M26s already in service for D-Day. German Panthers and Tigers were on the defensive and operated near home by 1944. US tanks had to be shipped across an ocean and keep up an advance pace. Well there are more details about this topic that I have read quite often but still not one to give them. Just my impression that US inferior quality is exaggerated

 

You are quite correct in your impression; in all the excitable frothing it usually gets overlooked that a goodly portion of late German armour and possibly a majority was way overloaded Panzer IVs (pretty much equivalent to the much derided M4 Sherman) or StuGs & Panzerjager vehicles based on the Panzer III & IV hull and running gear rather than Panthers and Tigers. Along with the monotonous regularity with which the latter types broke down. Another factor that routinely gets lumped into the Allied inferiority myth is that much of the losses were down to the fact the Allies were advancing rather than defending and were thus going to suffer heavier casualties whatever weapon systems they deployed; consider the losses incurred by the allegedly superior Germans at Mortain, Falaise and the Ardennes for a clear example of the boot switching to the other foot when the attack/defence situation was reversed.

 

BillB

[BillB]

 

 

Just my impression that US inferior quality is exaggerated

 

 

But then what is the exuse that US need almost a half year to reach Germany from Normandy, then you have approximate equivalent weapons, superior numbers in all categories, superior logestic and suport and the strategic initiative?

 

You better drop Eisenhower a line, IIRC he thought it was going to take a lot longer than half a year. No excuse necessary, the German collapse at Falaise caught the Allies on the hop before they had everything up and running properly for the longer, step-by-step advance across France they had envisaged and planned for; real life war at that level is not like a computer game where you can reset everything with a couple of mouse clicks. Moreover, it would've taken longer than half a year *without* the superior US logistics because the Allies would not have been able to truck everything they needed all the way across France from an over-the-beach set up as they were obliged to do because the Germans held on to all the deep water ports. On that basis they deserve credit for pulling it off, not denigrating for lacking 20:20 hindsight or clairvoyance or something.

 

BillB

[Harold Jones]

People like to compare weapons, but really they should be comparing trucks. The US tanks might have been good to average (based on the time you are looking at) but US trucks were superior for the duration of the war.

[JWB]

 

 

Just my impression that US inferior quality is exaggerated

 

 

But then what is the exuse that US need almost a half year to reach Germany from Normandy, then you have approximate equivalent weapons, superior numbers in all categories, superior logestic and suport and the strategic initiative?

 

Superior does not always mean the same as adequate.

[Ken Estes]

Above all, we ought to be able to remember that combat is not just a weapon-for-weapon exchange. Since the changeover of the British Army after 1914 to a mass army, nobody has been in a position to stress quality over quantity in the age of modern warfare. The world wars were won by all the components of total warfare, topped off by the deliberate application of science to military problems on a rapidly increasing scale through the century. Nor does a single category of advanced weapons guarantee victory. The thermonuclear arsenals of the great powers have not ensured victory for them since 1945.

 

Thus, there are no simple choices such as posed by the OP. A quantity commensurate with the conflict at hand must be matched with qualities that make success even feasible. There are simply no examples of either of these 'camps' in exclusive form in modern warfare. The range of compromises we can observe in national approaches to war remain complex and well apart.

 

As for the vaunted Panzerwaffen, we seem to forget that the German Army in 1939-45 consisted of a 90% WWI style army where most of the troops walked and the arty and transport was horse-drawn. The 10% of the army that was mobile was more motorized than mechanized except for the tanks and assault/antitank artillery. What success the Germans had on the ground was based not on quality of weapons but earlier rearmament than its opponents and the quality of the preceding Reichswehr that managed to maintain the General Staff and education of the 1914 army.

 

Air forces remain particularly vulnerable to obsolescence and the advantages of certain air forces in 1939-40 could not necessarily be maintained.

 

Too many parameters remain to be assessed beyond the OP, which have particular influence on the outcome of conflict, and I think industrial base, character and education of the population, type of civil and military leadership regime and so forth have had powerful effect through the course of events.

[a77]

 

 

 

Just my impression that US inferior quality is exaggerated

 

 

But then what is the exuse that US need almost a half year to reach Germany from Normandy, then you have approximate equivalent weapons, superior numbers in all categories, superior logestic and suport and the strategic initiative?

 

Superior does not always mean the same as adequate.

 

 

Fair enough, but then the allies would be more concerned about the logestic, if that was the main bottelneck, Pay the price and do a frontall assult to take a deep harbo (yes it will be bloody but it will save blood in the long run) repair/upgrade the railway in france and not only rely on trucks.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

CCKW by GMC, the STANDOUT truck of all time...

still wasn't a replacement for having intact railways and ports

I understand the choices the Allies made in this regard

that said, can you imagine Red Ball Express in Opel Blitzes?

[Marek Tucan]

Fair enough, but then the allies would be more concerned about the logestic, if that was the main bottelneck, Pay the price and do a frontall assult to take a deep harbo (yes it will be bloody but it will save blood in the long run) repair/upgrade the railway in france and not only rely on trucks.

Err... You get destroyed harbor that you will be fixing for a LONG time. All the fortress harbors were primed for destruction and Allies seen how that ends when they took Cherbourg quite early. Yet... Most of stuff went by beaches until the non-fortress harbors could be taken. Allies WERE highly concerned with logistics - heck, to the extent of building two prefabricated harbors and dragging them across the Channel.

 

Speaking of your initial point, despite all the tactical and technical advancement, Germans advanced slower in the French campaign of 1940 than in 1914. Does it mean they were worse, or just that the overall speed of advance did not really change much since Napoleon, as there is only so much terrain your forward elements can safely cover in a day (esp. in case of enemy resistance)?

[Ken Estes]

Napoleon was in Moscow when v.Bock was only at Smolensk.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

The Emperor was a better soldier...(seriously, the Germans of WW2 had nothing on La Grande Armee)

[Adam_S]

Napoleon also managed to have even worse logistics than the Whermacht, which took some doing.

 

While Napoleon was unquestionably a better general than Hitler he actually made most of the same strategic mistakes.

[Ken Estes]

Well, it did not help that the Tsar had two capitals. Which one to march on? The Prussians were bogged down at Riga.